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NARRATORS, NARRATEES, AND NARRATIVES  
IN ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE

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IRENE DE JONG, RENÉ NÜNLIST, AND ANGUS BOWIE

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IN ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE



# NARRATORS, NARRATEES, AND NARRATIVES IN ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE

STUDIES IN ANCIENT GREEK NARRATIVE,  
VOLUME ONE

EDITED BY

IRENE DE JONG, RENÉ NÜNLIST AND ANGUS BOWIE



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## PREFACE

The germ of this book lies in a research project that I developed in 1988, after finishing my PhD. That project promised the narratological investigation of narratives which are embedded in non-narrative genres, notably the Euripidean messenger-speech, the myth of the Pindaric victory ode, and the *narratio* in forensic speeches. As it turned out, the Euripidean messenger-speeches offered such a wealth of material that I devoted an entire book to them. After that I returned to my 'first love' Homer. I revived my plan in 1995, when I applied to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research for a 'Pioneer grant', i.e., a grant for a group of scholars working on an innovative subject. By that time, the project had been re-christened *Narrationis Ratio. A History of Ancient Greek Narrative*, and, as this title suggests, expanded to include both narrative and non-narrative genres. In 1998 the opportunity came to fulfil my old dream, when I was awarded a professorship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, which included a modest budget. In September 1999 I organized a two-day workshop in Amsterdam, which brought together prospective contributors, and during which the principles and practical organization of the project were discussed. One of the conclusions was that it would be impossible to complete the task we had set ourselves in a single volume, and that a series of volumes would be needed. On that occasion I asked Angus Bowie to co-edit the first volume. But it was soon clear to me that editing a multi-author and conceptually and methodologically experimental work such as this was a huge task, and I asked René Nünlist to act as—a second—co-editor of the first volume and to become co-editor of the series as a whole.

I wish to thank Heleen Keizer and Linda Woodward for their assistance in copy editing the texts. But my greatest thanks go to Michiel Klein Swormink of Brill Publishers for the trust he has shown in this truly pioneering project.



## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Someone interested in the history of ancient Greek literature has at his disposal a large number of literary histories.<sup>1</sup> Someone interested more specifically in the development of Greek drama, historiography, rhetoric, or literary criticism can also consult a series of handbooks.<sup>2</sup> But someone interested in the forerunners of the most popular literary genre of our own times, the novel, is left empty handed.<sup>3</sup> The story of ancient Greek narrative is as yet untold.

And yet the lack of a history of ancient Greek narrative is hardly surprising, given the sheer quantity of material. A rough estimate tells us that more than half of Greek literature is narrative, if we include historiographical, biographical, and philosophical narrative and narratives which are embedded in other genres. However, it appears that the moment has come to undertake the task of writing such a history. The reason is two-fold.

First, the twentieth century witnessed the rise of narratology, which has provided literary scholars with a set of refined analytical and descriptive terms. In the recent past, narratology has also taken root in classical scholarship, which means that an important condition for the writing of a history of ancient narrative has now been fulfilled: we have the tools, as well as a growing number of people who know how to wield them.

In the second place, literary history itself, after a difficult period in the sixties and seventies of the previous century, when 'the fall

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. Dihle 1967, 1989; Lesky 1971; Easterling and Knox 1985; Canfora 1986; and Saïd, Trédé and Boulluec 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. (for drama) Jens 1971; (for historiography) Marincola 1997; (for rhetoric) Leeman 1963 and Kennedy 1994; and (for literary criticism) Kennedy 1989.

<sup>3</sup> Scholes and Kellogg 1966 offer interesting discussions on the ancient roots of various formal aspects of the modern novel (plot, characterization, point of view), but their corpus is limited and theoretical basis somewhat outdated. Doody 1996 also explores the classical pedigree of the modern novel, but confines herself to the ancient novel.

of literary history' was proclaimed,<sup>4</sup> is making a come-back.<sup>5</sup> One of the new directions suggested is a move away from the traditional biographical, 'man and his work' approach. That such a new direction may also be fruitful for classics, has been demonstrated by the recent literary history edited by Oliver Taplin, which focuses on the *receivers* of the texts: readers, spectators, and audiences.<sup>6</sup>

The present history of ancient Greek narrative adopts yet another approach, focusing on the *formal devices within a text* which authors employ to enchant or persuade their audiences. Who introduces us to the (fictional) world depicted, through whose eyes do we see it, how do the events follow upon each other and combine to form a logical whole, how are the people who live in this world presented to us, and how are their words, prime indicators of their personalities, represented? Traditional literary histories by and large present summaries of what is known or generally thought about a work and author, but this one must virtually start from scratch. For a number of texts some narratological groundwork has been done, but the majority are as yet completely unexplored. A series of *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* will investigate the forms and functions of the main devices which narratology has defined for us, such as the narrator and his narratees, time, focalization, characterization, description, speech, and plot.

The aim of this enterprise is to combine the synchronic and the diachronic, to offer not only analyses of the handling of a specific narrative device by individual authors, but also a larger historical perspective on the manner in which techniques change over time, are put to different uses and achieve different effects in the hands of different authors, writing in different genres, and handling different material. Each volume will contain an introductory chapter, which provides the theoretical background to the topic under consideration, and an epilogue, which offers general conclusions about the forms and functions of that topic through the ages and across the genres.

The first volume, which deals with such basic questions as what actually constitutes a narrative and what kind of narrators present those narratives, includes discussions of almost all genres and authors, ranging from Homer to the novel, provided enough text has survived to make possible a description of rules. In this way the corpus of the

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<sup>4</sup> Wellek 1973.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g. Ceserani 1990 and Perkins 1992.

<sup>6</sup> Taplin 2000.

history of ancient Greek narrative is defined and the foundation laid for subsequent discussion. Later volumes will be in a somewhat more flexible format, and will not necessarily include all authors and all texts.

The series *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* is aimed primarily at classical scholars, but may also be of interest to a wider audience. As Wallace Martin, one of the historiographers of narratology, writes:

... what appears to be new may simply be something that has been forgotten, and scholarship on the Greek romances, medieval literature, prose narratives of the seventeenth century, and non-western tales provides evidence useful for any general theory of narrative.<sup>7</sup>

In the same way, any general history of narrative should start at the beginning and the *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* will explore that beginning, from 'the Greek romances' all the way back to Homer.

IdJ.

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<sup>7</sup> Martin 1987: 28–29.



## GLOSSARY

**actorial motivation:** the ‘why’ of the development of the story analysed in terms of the aims and intentions of a character. An actorial motivation usually is explicit. Compare **narratorial motivation**.

**analepsis** (flashback, ‘Rückwendung’): the narration of an event which took place earlier than the point in the story where we are. A distinction can be made between *internal* analepses (narrating events which fall within the time limits of the **main story**) and *external* analepses (narrating events which fall outside those time limits), in the case of internal analepses, between *repeating* ones (narrating events also presented elsewhere) and *completing* ones (narrating events which are not presented elsewhere), and between *narratorial* and *actorial* analepses (those presented by the narrator and those presented by one of the characters).

**argument function:** the function or significance which an embedded narrative has for the characters. Compare **key function**.

**characterization:** characterization may be *explicit* or *implicit* (when personality traits have to be inferred by the narratees), *narratorial* or *actorial*, *synoptic* (when a detailed introduction is given, often at a character’s first appearance) or *gradual* (when pieces of information are released only at intervals and have to be collected and turned into a composite whole by the narratees themselves).

**description:** descriptions can be *static* (the story comes to a halt and the outward appearance or nature of a person or thing is described) or *dynamic* (when the history of an object, place, or person is told or when an object etc. is described while in the process of being made), *narratorial* or *actorial* (given by the narrator or by one of the characters).

**embedded narrative:** a narrative which is embedded in the **main story**; it is either told by the primary **narrator** or by a character



acting as secondary narrator. It usually takes the form of an **analepsis** or **prolepsis**. See also **argument** and **key function**.

**embedded or secondary focalization:** when the **narrator** represents in the **narrator-text** a character's focalization, i.e., his perceptions, thoughts, emotions, or words (indirect speech). Embedded focalization can be *explicit* (when there is a shifter in the form of a verb of seeing, thinking, or a subordinator followed by subjunctive or optative) or *implicit*.

**fabula:** all events which are recounted in the **story**, abstracted from their disposition in the **text** and reconstructed in their chronological order.

**focalizer:** the person (the narrator or a character) through whose 'eyes' the events and persons of a narrative are 'seen'.

**frequency:** events may be told *singulatively* (telling once what happened once), *repetitively* (telling more than once what happened once), or *iteratively* (telling once what happened more than once).

**interlace technique:** the technique of interweaving different story-lines through regular switches between them.

**key function:** the significance which an embedded narrative has for the **narratees**. Compare **argument function**.

**main story:** the events which are told by the primary **narrator** (minus external **analepses** and **prolepses**).

**narratees:** the addressees of the narrator. We may distinguish between *external* and *internal*, *primary* and *secondary* (*tertiary* etc.), and *overt* and *covert* narratees. Compare **narrator**.

**narration:** we may distinguish between *subsequent* narration (following after the events have taken place), *simultaneous* narration (at the same time when the events are taking place), and *prior* narration (when the events still have to take place).

**narrator:** the person who recounts the events of the **story** and thus

turns them into a **text**. We may distinguish between *external* narrators (who are not a character in the story they tell) and *internal* narrators (who are), *primary* narrators (who tell the **main story**) and *secondary* (tertiary etc.) narrators (who tell **embedded narratives**), *overt* narrators (who refer to themselves and their narrating activity, tell us about themselves, and openly comment upon their story) and *covert* narrators. A special type of overt narrators are self-conscious narrators, who are aware that they are narrating and reflecting on their role as narrator. All narrators are also **focalizers**.

**narrator-text**: those parts of the text which are presented by the primary **narrator**, i.e., the parts between the speeches. We may further distinguish between simple narrator-text (narrator presents his own focalization) and **embedded focalization** (narrator presents focalization of a character).

**narratorial motivation**: the ‘why’ of the development of the story analysed in terms of the aims and intentions of the narrator. The narratorial motivation often remains implicit. See also **actorial motivation**.

**order**: the chronological order of the **fabula** may be changed in the **story**, for instance to create **prolepses** and **analepses** or any other anachrony.

**paralepsis**: a speaker provides *more* information than, strictly speaking, he could, e.g., when the narrator intrudes with his superior knowledge into the embedded focalization of a character or when a character knows more than is logically possible. Contrast **paralipsis**.

**paralipsis**: a speaker provides *less* information than he could; details or events are left out, to be told at a later, more effective place. Contrast **paralepsis**.

**periphrastic denomination**: a reference to a character not by proper name but by a form of indirect description.

**prolepsis** (foreshadowing, ‘Vorauswendung’): the narration of an event which will take place later than the point of the story where we are. We may distinguish between *internal* prolepses (referring to events

which fall within the time limits of the **main story**) and *external* prolepses (which refer to events which fall outside those time limits), and between *narratorial* and *actorial* prolepses. See also **seed**.

**rhythm**: the relation between **story**-time and **fabula**-time. An event may be told as a *scene* (story-time = fabula-time), *summary* (story-time < fabula-time), *retardation* (story-time > fabula-time), or *ellipsis*, i.e. not told at all (no story-time matches fabula-time). Finally there may be a *pause*, when the action is suspended to make room for an extended description (no fabula-time matches story-time).

**seed** (hint, advance mention): the insertion of a piece of information, the relevance of which will become clear only later. The later event thus prepared for becomes more natural, logical, or plausible.

**story**: the events as dispositioned and ordered in the **text** (contrast: **fabula**). The story consists of the **main story**+**embedded narratives**. In comparison to the fabula, the events in the story may differ in **frequency** (they may be told more than once), **rhythm** (they may be told at great length or quickly), and **order** (the chronological order may be changed).

**text**: the verbal representation of the **story** (and hence **fabula**) by a **narrator**.

## INTRODUCTION

### NARRATOLOGICAL THEORY ON NARRATORS, NARRATEES, AND NARRATIVE<sup>1</sup>

*I.J.F. de Jong*

#### *The narrator*

Perhaps the most central concept in narratology is that of the narrator. For most narratologists, his presence is the main criterion for calling a text a narrative (as opposed to drama, where we are also dealing with the representation of characters and events): 'A narrative text is a text in which a narrative agent tells a story.'<sup>2</sup> It is an important principle of narratology that this narrator cannot automatically be equated with the author, even when he bears the same name; rather, he is a creation of that author.<sup>3</sup>

Given that every narrative text has a narrator, the next step is to describe and analyse that narrator. There are, in fact, many types of narrators.<sup>4</sup> The first thing to ask oneself is whether or not the narrator is a character in his own story: if he is, we speak of an internal narrator, if not, we speak of an external narrator.<sup>5</sup> Internal narrators used to be called first-person narrators, but this is a less fortunate term, since external narrators can also refer to themselves as 'I', as witness, e.g.

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<sup>1</sup> For a historical overview of narratology see Martin 1987; for a systematic overview of key terms see Prince 1987.

<sup>2</sup> Bal [1985] 1997: 16. Cf. e.g. Friedemann 1910: 26; Genette 1979, [1983] 1988: 14; Stanzel 1982: 15, and from the point of view of drama Pfister [1977] 1988: 2–4. For narratologists who adopt a broader definition of narrative, which does not require the presence of a narrator, see the section on narrative below.

<sup>3</sup> Friedemann 1910: 21–22; Kayser 1958: 91; Genette [1972] 1980: 213–214; Stanzel 1982: 25–28.

<sup>4</sup> The following analysis is based on Genette [1972] 1980: 212–260 and Bal [1985] 1997: 19–77.

<sup>5</sup> Genette actually uses the terms homodiegetic (internal) and heterodiegetic (external). Bal replaced these terms by character-bound and external, and in De Jong 1987: 33 I have systematized the terminology into internal and external.

the ‘tell *me*, Muse, of the man’ of the *Odyssey*’s external narrator. In fact, all narratives are in principle recounted by a narrating subject—even if this narrating ‘I’ nowhere refers to himself—so that this is not a watertight criterion for distinguishing narrators.

Next, we must determine the level of narration at which the narrator finds himself: the narrator who recounts the main story and whose voice is usually the first we hear when the story begins, is the primary narrator. This primary narrator may hand over the presentation of events to a character who recounts a story in direct speech, in which case we speak of a secondary narrator. When this character in turn embeds another narrative in his own narrative, we are dealing with a tertiary narrator, and so on.<sup>6</sup>

Together the criteria ‘internal’-‘external’ and ‘primary’-‘secondary’ suffice to describe most narrators in world literature. A good example of an external primary narrator is the anonymous narrator in Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice*, while we find an internal primary narrator in the person of Pip in Charles Dickens’ *Great Expectations*. We have an external secondary narrator in Scheherazade in *Tales from a Thousand and one Nights* (a primary narrator introduces the frame-narrative of Scheherazade, who must tell the sultan stories in order to save her life; she herself plays no role in the stories she recounts). An example of an internal secondary narrator is Odysseus in the *Odyssey* (an external primary narrator recounts the last phase of Odysseus’ return from Troy, in the course of which the hero himself tells the Phaeacians about his earlier experiences on the way home).

Having established the ‘identity’ of the narrator, we can go on to investigate his role and his attitude.<sup>7</sup> It is convenient to start with an overt narrator, i.e., a narrator who clearly manifests himself as narrator throughout the text. His presence can take various forms: he may be dramatized (given a life and personality of his own), or comment on the events he relates, or may be self-conscious (showing awareness that he is telling a story and reflecting on his activity as narrator). When the narrator displays none of these characteristics, we speak of a covert narrator.<sup>8</sup> Another aspect worth analysing is the narrator’s privileges:

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<sup>6</sup> Again, I follow Bal, who introduced these terms to replace Genette’s extradiegetic, intradiegetic, and metadiegetic.

<sup>7</sup> The following discussion is based on Booth [1961] 1983: 149–165; Genette [1972] 1980: 255–259; and Chatman 1978: 196–262.

<sup>8</sup> This distinction between a covert and an overt narrative style is often referred to

does he know and reveal the outcome of his story, does he have access to the inner thoughts of his characters, and can he move freely and rapidly to and from all the locations in his story? An external narrator will by definition have more privileges than an internal one, but the latter may use his hindsight to supplement his knowledge.

In the case of an internal narrator,<sup>9</sup> it is also relevant to examine the role he plays in his own story, which may range from protagonist (Odysseus or Pip) to mere witness (Zeitblom in Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus* or Carraway in Scott Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby*), as well as everything that lies in between.

A special—and fairly rare—phenomenon is second-person narration,<sup>10</sup> which means that a narrator recounts the acts of a character in the 'you' form. This form of narration may be confined to a brief section, often triggered by an apostrophe, but it may also determine the shape of an entire novel, as happens e.g. in Michel Butor's *La modification*, which has been called an extended apostrophe.

One aspect that is relevant to all narrators and all forms of narration is the temporal relationship between narrator and narrated events. Narration can be subsequent (when the narrative follows the action), as is most often the case; simultaneous (when the narrative runs parallel to the action, when someone reports to another what he is seeing); or prior (when the narrative precedes the action, as in prophecies or dreams).<sup>11</sup>

Some narratologists posit one more agent to account for the signifying process of a narrative text: the implied author, the 'ideal, literary, created version' of the author, who is responsible for the moral evalua-

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as 'showing' versus 'telling' (the distinction, though not the precise terminology, derives from Lubbock [1921] 1926: 62, 67).

<sup>9</sup> Romberg 1962; Stanzel 1982: 71–72, 109–148; Sturrock 1993.

<sup>10</sup> Fludernik 1994a and Kacandes 1994. Strictly speaking, this is just as unfortunate a term as first-person narration: we are still dealing with a subject of narration, who may be an internal, external, primary, or secondary narrator. For a detailed discussion of how second-person narration might be integrated into Stanzel's and Genette's typologies, see Fludernik 1994b. However, since it would be somewhat cumbersome to speak of 'the situation of a primary (etc.) narrator using second-person verb forms and pronouns to refer to the actions of a character', the shorthand term 'second-person narration' will be used. I note that Genette [1983] 1988: 133 speaks of 'second-person narrating' in inverted commas.

<sup>11</sup> Genette [1972] 1980: 215–223.

tion of the story.<sup>12</sup> Following Bal and Genette,<sup>13</sup> I do not think that—for a narratological analysis—such an extra agent is necessary:<sup>14</sup>

[A] narrative of fiction is produced fictively by its narrator and actually by its (real) author. No one is toiling away between them, and every type of textual performance can be attributed only to one or the other, depending on the level chosen. For example, the style of *Joseph and His Brothers* can be attributed only (fictively) to the celestial narrator who is supposed naturally to speak in that pseudo-biblical language or to Mr. Thomas Mann, a writer in the German language, winner of a Nobel prize for literature, etc., who makes him speak that way ... No place here for the activity of a third person, no reason to release the real author from his actual responsibilities (ideologic, stylistic, technical, and other) ...  
(Genette [1983] 1988: 139–140)

This quotation briefly reintroduces the author into the realm of narratology, if only to distinguish the responsibilities of author and narrator, and to show that the notion of an implied author can be dispensed with. But it also has another relevance. Intertextuality is a factor of importance in many ancient Greek narratives. As a narratologist, one is immediately confronted with the question of who is responsible for this intertextuality, the narrator or the author? In the former case, we must posit the *persona* of a learned narrator, while in the latter case the intertext does not enter the narrative universe and, strictly speaking, falls outside the scope of a narratological analysis. There is no ready-made solution to this problem, and each case must be decided on its own merits.

### *Narratees*

Storytelling is an act of communication and every narrator presupposes an addressee, or narratee.<sup>15</sup> More specifically, for every primary narrator there is a corresponding primary narratee, for every secondary narrator, a secondary narratee, and so on. When we turn to the ques-

<sup>12</sup> Booth [1961] 1983: 74–75.

<sup>13</sup> Bal [1985] 1997: 18 and Genette [1983] 1988: 136–150.

<sup>14</sup> As Genette observes, in literary theory in general it may make sense to use the concept of the inferred author, ‘everything the text lets us know about the author’ (1988: 148).

<sup>15</sup> See Prince [1973] 1980 and Genette [1972] 1980: 259–262, [1983] 1988: 130–135.

tion of the narratees' involvement in the story being told (whether they are external or internal), we see that many combinations are possible.<sup>16</sup>

Let us start with primary narratees. An external narrator usually addresses external narratees. This fairly common narrative situation is found, for example, in Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*, where neither narrator nor narratees play a role in the events recounted. As in the case of the narrator and the author, it is tempting simply to equate these external narratees with the listeners or readers, not least because they are often referred to as 'dear reader'. But we only have to think of the 'Madam' and 'Sir' in Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* to realize that here again we are dealing with a product of the author's imagination. Sometimes we find the combination of an external narrator and an internal narratee, for example in ancient hymns, when a narrator recounts the deeds of a god while addressing that god (the so-called *Du-Stil*, which is a form of second-person narration). An internal narrator may have a corresponding internal narratee, i.e. a person who was also involved in the events recounted, as in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, where 'Hesiod' recounts the story of their quarrel to his brother Perses. Again we may find second-person narration, which in a novel like Oriana Fallaci's *A Man* is even continued throughout the entire book. But more often an internal narrator tells his story to persons who have *not* witnessed the events themselves, i.e. to external narratees, as Pip does in Charles Dickens' *Great Expectations* (cf. his sudden address to 'those who read this' at the end of chapter 9).

Primary narratees are either overt or covert, like primary narrators. Overt narratees may be found in the narrator's 'reader' or 'you', or represented in the text by anonymous witnesses ('the pensive character which the curtained hood lent to their heads would have reminded the observer of some early Italian conception of the two Marys': Thomas Hardy *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*) or anonymous interlocutors ('there someone could object'). When narratees are covert, we may still sense their presence, for example, in explanations that the narrator inserts on their behalf, or negated passages, where their—implied—expectations are contradicted or their curiosity piqued.

I turn to secondary narratees. The most common situation is where character A informs character B about something A has experienced

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<sup>16</sup> The following analysis of narratees is my own; curiously enough, Genette discusses only primary (extradiegetic) and secondary (intradiegetic) narratees, not internal (homodiegetic) and external (heterodiegetic) ones.



(internal secondary narrator–external secondary narratee). An example is the couple Nelly Dean and Mr. Lockwood in Emily Brontë’s *Wuthering Heights*. Next, we have character A telling character B about events in which neither has participated (external secondary narrator–external secondary narratee); this, too, is a fairly common situation and may be illustrated by Scheherazade’s telling her thousand-and-one tales to the sultan. Then there is character A recalling in the presence of character B something they have both experienced (internal secondary narrator–internal secondary narratee; here we may find ‘we’ forms or ‘you’ forms); an example of this situation is Zeus reminding Hera how he once punished her (*Il.* 15.18–33). Finally, there is character A telling character B about something B participated in (external secondary narrator–internal secondary narratee; again we may find ‘you’ forms); this is not a common situation, but one example is Achilles reminding Thetis of her support of Zeus in the past (*Il.* 1.396–406).

It will be clear that narratees, both primary and secondary, are a powerful instrument for influencing the reception of a text, in that they provide the readers with figures to identify with or distance themselves from.

### *Narrative*

I have already referred to the fact that most narratologists see the presence of a narrator as one of the conditions for calling a text a narrative. The other main condition is a sequence of at least two real or fictional events (as in Forster’s celebrated example: ‘The king died and then the queen died’).<sup>17</sup>

Some scholars adopt a broader definition of narrative, which also includes drama. Ricoeur, for example, says ‘I am not characterizing narrative by its “mode”, that is, by the author’s attitude, but by its “object”, since I am calling narrative exactly what Aristotle calls *mythos*, the organization of the events.’<sup>18</sup> This broader definition is followed by the classical scholars Gould, Goward, and Markantonatos.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Forster [1927] 1979: 87.

<sup>18</sup> Ricoeur [1983] 1984: 36 and Chatman 1990: 109–118. Cf. also Barthes [1966] 1977: 79, who mentions drama as a form of narrative.

<sup>19</sup> Gould 2001; Goward 1999: 10–13; and Markantonatos 2002. Cf. also Lowe 2000: 163–164.

Their main arguments are as follows. (1) The dichotomy between narrative and drama is not clear-cut, since narrative may contain speeches and drama may contain narrative. While this is true, no one would dream of calling the Homeric epics a play and analysing them in terms of drama theory; so why call drama a narrative and analyse it in terms of narratology? (2) Drama displays the same devices found in narrative, such as analepses and prolepses, choice of setting, and differences in pace. These, they claim, can only be explained by assuming a central controlling and selecting mind, a 'narrator' and can only be analysed in narratological terms. Let me start with the latter point. Drama theory, e.g. the highly systematic one devised by Pfister, offers a panoply of critical terms by which to analyse prolepses and the like.<sup>20</sup> It is therefore simply not necessary to turn to narratology when discussing drama texts. Indeed, applying narratology to drama dilutes the specificity of narratology and stretches its concepts to such a degree that they become meaningless; every character on stage becomes a narrator and a focalizer. Given that prolepses and the like are equally at home in drama, there is no need to postulate a 'narrator' (even in inverted comas). We may safely ascribe them to the author, and this is in fact what Gould and Markantonatos ultimately do, when they equate the controlling and selecting mind or 'narrator' with the playwright-director!<sup>21</sup> In actual practice, both Gould and Goward concentrate largely on narratives that are *embedded within* drama, such as messenger-speeches or the recollections and prophecies of characters. This is perfectly acceptable, and it is also the line followed in the *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*.

But drama is not the only literary genre which, while not narrative itself, does include narratives. Since this is a recurrent phenomenon in ancient Greek literature, a brief extension of my earlier discussion of narrators and narratees is in order here.<sup>22</sup> In the case of the victory ode and oratory, it is most logical to say that the poet or orator, at the moment he turns to his myth or *narratio*, becomes a primary narrator, and to see his audience (primarily the victor and jury, but in the end all listeners) as the primary narratees. In the case of the dramatic dialogues of Plato and Lucian, that is to say, those dialogues which lack a narrative frame and consist solely of speeches, it seems most sensible—

<sup>20</sup> I note, e.g. sections on 'the perspective structure', 'characterisation', 'story and plot', 'structures of time and space'.

<sup>21</sup> Gould 2001: 333 and Markantonatos 2002: 6–7.

<sup>22</sup> There appears to exist no discussion of this question in narratological theory.

in view of their close similarity to dialogues *with* a narrative frame—to see them as narratives with a suppressed primary narrator and suppressed primary narratees.<sup>23</sup> The same reasoning can be applied to the so-called ‘mimetic’ poems of Callimachus and Theocritus. In the case of drama, the intra-dramatic narrators are best seen as *secondary* narrators, even though there is no narrative frame and hence no suggestion of a suppressed primary narrator. The chorus or characters they address are intra-dramatic secondary narratees, which means that the role of primary narratees is reserved for the spectators, who as such can, e.g. savour instances of dramatic irony which elude the secondary narratees on stage.

Just as non-narrative texts may contain narratives, narrative texts may contain non-narrative elements. The first category is the dramatic element of speech. We have already seen that speeches can be carriers of embedded narratives by characters. In general, from Plato onwards, narrative has been described as the *genus mixtum*, a combination of narrative and speech, and speeches have traditionally been included in narratological discussion. A second category is description, which usually involves the present tense and temporarily brings the story to a standstill. Again, narratologists such as Genette, Bal, and Hamon<sup>24</sup> have argued for the relevance of descriptions within a narrative, and for their inclusion in narratological theory. Both speech and description will be the subject of later volumes of the series of *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative*.

A final question to be considered here is the status of historiographical texts. Whereas Barthes, one of the founding fathers of narratology, without further discussion considered historiography a form of narrative and hence as belonging to the domain of narratology,<sup>25</sup> two other narratologists, Genette and Cohn, have recently opened the discussion on whether factual texts, specifically historiographical texts, have a special status and whether, in the words of Cohn, we do not need a ‘historiographical narratology’.<sup>26</sup> Their arguments include (1) analepses and prolepses are always functional in historiography, whereas in fiction they may be included purely for aesthetic reasons; (2) detailed scenes, including speeches, in historiography are a sign of fictionalization; (3)

<sup>23</sup> Genette [1972] 1980: 236–237 speaks of the ‘pseudo-diegetic’ form of narration.

<sup>24</sup> Genette [1972] 1980: 99–106; Bal [1985] 1997: 36–43; Hamon 1993.

<sup>25</sup> Barthes [1966] 1977: 79 and 1970.

<sup>26</sup> Genette 1991: 65–93 and Cohn 1999: 109–131.

in the case of historiographical texts, we should postulate not only the triad fabula–story–text, but also an extra, referential level: ‘the more or less reliably documented evidence of past events, out of which the historian fashions his story’ and which in the text may manifest itself in the form of a ‘testimonial stratum’; (4) embedded focalization in historiography, according to Genette, can only occur in a modified or qualified manner (‘X thought ... as we know from his diaries’ or ‘X feared, as I suppose’), while in Cohn’s view it is unacceptable; (5) in historiographical texts the narrator is to be equated with the author.

Without going into the question of whether these arguments are valid for modern historiographical texts, I think they are certainly not all pertinent in the case of ancient historiography, where—presumably under the strong influence of Homer—we do find speeches (2) and embedded focalization (4), without this being considered a sign of fictionality. Equating the figure which, say, Herodotus projects of himself in his *Histories* with the real Herodotus (5) seems a dangerously naïve thing to do, not to mention Thucydides and Xenophon, who expressly forestall any identification of author and narrator by employing an external rather than an internal narrator, even though they themselves play a role in the historical events. The strict functionality of analepses and prolepses (1) is a more relevant point, and one that requires further exploration. Finally, positing an extra, referential level (3) makes sense, but is not unproblematic. There may be very little material from which to reconstruct this level, as is often the case in ancient history, with its relative lack of documents and archives. Also, this level itself is no narrative (yet): it is the historiographer who turns historical events into a narrative, for one thing by deciding what is ‘the beginning, middle, and end’. In other cases, this level may consist of the narratives of oral sources or written predecessors.<sup>27</sup> All in all, I am inclined to follow Quintilian, who considers ancient historiography as ‘close to poetry’ and ‘in a sense a kind of prose poem, which is told to narrate, not to win a case’.<sup>28</sup> Historiographical and biographical texts will therefore take up an important place in the *Studies on Ancient Greek Narrative*.

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<sup>27</sup> Seeing that most ancient Greek literature is traditional in the sense that the same stories are recounted time and again, it may be relevant to posit an extra, referential level in those cases as well, which would then consist of the narratives of predecessors.

<sup>28</sup> Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 10.1.31: *est enim [historia] proxima poetis, et quodam modo carmen solutum est ...*

*Embedded narrative*

The primary narrator may decide to embed another narrative into his narrative, either doing the narrating himself (Marcel recalling the story of *Un amour de Swann* in Marcel Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu*), or turning one of the characters into a secondary narrator (Odysseus' *Apologue*).

These embedded narratives can fulfil various functions in relation to the main narrative:<sup>29</sup> they may be (1) explanatory (when they take the form of an analepsis which recounts how the present has come to be); (2) predictive (when they take the form of a prolepsis, which announces what will happen); (3) thematic (when there is a resemblance between embedded and primary narrative); (4) persuasive (when the embedded narrative is intended to influence the further course of events in the main narrative); or (5) distractive (when there is no relationship at all, but the embedded narrative is told to entertain, as is often the case in frame-narratives like the *Canterbury Tales* or *Decamerone*). Needless to say, an embedded narrative can fulfil more than one function at the same time. In the case of an embedded narrative told by a character, it may also be relevant to distinguish between the function it has for the secondary narratee(s), the character(s) who are listening (the 'argument' function), and for the primary narratees (the 'key' function).

Having introduced the theory of narrators and narratees, it is now time to turn to the practice of ancient Greek narratives and investigate the manifold guises that their narrators take.

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<sup>29</sup> The following discussion is based on Genette [1972] 1980: 231–234, [1983] 1988: 92–94; Bal [1985] 1997: 52–60; and Andersen 1987a.

PART ONE

EPIC AND ELEGIAC POETRY



## CHAPTER ONE

### HOMER

*I.J.F. de Jong*

#### *The primary narrator*

Our first acquaintance with the Homeric narrator<sup>1</sup> is deceptive: in the proems of both epics (*Il.* 1.1–7 and *Od.* 1.1–10) he steps forward openly. This suggests an overt narrator, who will make clear his presence as a narrating and focalizing subject throughout. However, after the proems the narrator largely withdraws into the background.

Even the proems themselves, upon closer inspection, yield little information about the *persona* of the narrator: neither name nor place nor date. The only thing which we can deduce, in view of the fact that he addresses the Muses, is that the narrator is a professional singer (comparable to the characters Phemius and Demodocus in the *Odyssey*): these alone invoke the Muses, the ‘patron’ goddesses of their art, whereas ‘amateurs’, such as Achilles in *Iliad* 9.186–191 or Odysseus in *Odyssey* 9–12, do not.

The remainder of the poems offers a few scattered pieces of information. The ‘such as men are now’ passages (e.g. *Il.* 5.302–304),<sup>2</sup> an instance of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ motif, make it clear that the narrator, and by implication his narratees, belong to a later period than the characters, in other words, that his narration is subsequent. This difference in time is also suggested by his occasional use of absolute *tote*, ‘then, at that time in the past’ (*Il.* 6.314; 14.287; *Od.* 8.74), the expression *ēmati keinōi*, ‘on that remote day’ (*Il.* 2.482 and 4.543), and his—single—reference to the heroes of his tale as *hēmītheōn genos andrōn*, ‘a race of semi-divine men’ (*Il.* 12.23).

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<sup>1</sup> De Jong 1987: 41–53 and Richardson 1990.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Il.* 12.378–385, 445–449; 20.285–287. This type of passage does not occur in the *Odyssey*.



The Homeric similes have traditionally been seen as windows on the narrator's own world. However, many of them describe events of all times, such as rain, storm, or snow, in short are omnitemporal (as is also suggested by the presence of gnomic aorists and epic *te*), and as such link the heroes of the past, the narrator and his narratees, and us, the later readers.

The fact that the narrator belongs to a much later time than the events he is recounting immediately implies that he is external, does not himself play a role in those events. He is also omniscient, in that he knows—and reveals—the outcome of events beforehand in numerous prolepses (e.g. 'this was the beginning of Patroclus' downfall': *Il.* 11.604),<sup>3</sup> and in that he has access to the inner thoughts and emotions of his characters, primarily in the numerous instances of embedded focalization (e.g. 'and Odysseus pondered within him, whether to go for Melanthius with his cudgel and kill him or pick him up like a jug and break his head on the ground. But in the end he endured and restrained himself': *Od.* 17.235–238).<sup>4</sup> In some places the narrator suppresses his omniscience, introducing instead anonymous spokesmen: e.g. 'Athena went to Olympus, where *they say* (*fasi*) is the abode of the gods, unmoving and eternal' (*Od.* 6.42).<sup>5</sup>

The Homeric narrator is also omnipresent: he recounts what happens among the gods on Mount Olympus and among the heroes on earth, in the Greek camp and in Troy, on Ithaca and such remote places as the island of Calypso, regularly switching back and forth between the different locations.

An external, omniscient, and omnipresent narrator is in fact the archetypal narrator of early storytelling. Interestingly enough, the Homeric narrator accounts for his omniscience: it is the result of his collaboration with the Muses, who are eyewitnesses of everything that happens in the world (*Il.* 2.485), and whom he calls on not only in his proems but in various other places throughout his narrative (see below).<sup>6</sup> This explicit motivation of his omniscience is related to the

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<sup>3</sup> Narratorial prolepses are found in equal measure in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; discussions and inventories in Duckworth 1933; Hellwig 1964: 54–58; de Jong 1987: 86–89; and Richardson 1990: 132–139.

<sup>4</sup> Embedded focalization takes up about 5 per cent of the texts of *Iliad* and *Odyssey*; de Jong 1987: 101–148, 1994; Richardson 1990: 126–132.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Il.* 2.783 and 17.674.

<sup>6</sup> For the Homeric Muses, see Svenbro 1976: 11–45; Murray 1981; de Jong 1987: 45–53; and Ford 1992: 57–89.

proto-historiographical function of the epics.<sup>7</sup> Although brought as entertainment (cf. e.g. *Od.* 8.62–99), they are much more than that. They tell of the deeds of heroes of the past, for whom their status, the respect paid them by their peers, is a central concern. Next to land and riches, one of the most important means of gaining status is *kleos*, one's glorious reputation as 'doer of deeds and speaker of words' (cf. *Il.* 9.443). In the oral society in which these heroes live, there are two things that preserve this *kleos* for generations to come: grave-mounds (cf., e.g. *Il.* 7.86–91) and tales. Most of these tales are no more than hearsay (cf. *Il.* 2.486), but professional singers like the narrator can claim to offer the historical truth, precisely because of their collaboration with the Muses.

The Homeric concept of historical truth is not the same as the modern one. What is aspired to is a vivid evocation of the past, rather than an accurate and painstaking reconstruction of that past.<sup>8</sup> The narrator brings the past alive (e.g. by frequently allowing the heroes themselves to speak) and transports his narratees back to that past (by narrating events so graphically that they almost become eyewitnesses). This means that he allows himself a great deal of amplification and invention, while leaving intact the core of the story (which was presumably quite small). Here the Homeric narrator sets the tone for all traditional<sup>9</sup> and historical literature to come: lyric poets, tragedians, and historians alike will take the liberty of amplifying and adapting the events they relate.

After the proems the Homeric narrator withdraws into the background and narratorial interventions are rare. On occasion we find:

- Muse-invocations: e.g. 'tell me now, Muses, who have your homes on the Olympus, whoever came first against Agamemnon, either of the Trojans or of the illustrious allies?' (*Il.* 11.218–220),<sup>10</sup> which not only explain and authorize the narrator's omniscience, but also serve to enhance the significance of a scene or hero. Closely related to these are utterances such as 'there whom first and whom

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Strasburger 1972 and Ford 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Andersen 1987b; Finkelberg 1990; Ford 1992: 49–56; Bowie 1993: 8–20; Pratt 1993: 1–53; and Bakker 1997: 156–183.

<sup>9</sup> I use 'traditional' here to refer to all literature that makes use of a body of given stories. Only comedy and Hellenistic literature will introduce non-traditional, i.e. purely invented stories.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Il.* 2.484–493, 761–762; 11.218–220; 14.508–510; 16.112–113; never in the *Odyssey*.

last did he kill?’ (*Il.* 5.703–704),<sup>11</sup> which though ostensibly questions (addressed to the Muses) are in fact expressive statements.

- apostrophes, when the narrator addresses one of his characters with a vocative and then switches (for one or two lines) to second-person narration: e.g. ‘Then who killed you first, who last, Patroclus, when the gods called you to your death?’ (*Il.* 16.692–693). Though not all scholars agree, this marked way of narration seems a sign of compassion or sympathy on the part of the narrator.<sup>12</sup>
- gnomic utterances: e.g. ‘Zeus’ will is always the stronger; he terrifies even a brave man, and takes away his victory, easily, after he has himself urged him to fight’ (*Il.* 16.688–670).<sup>13</sup>
- evaluative comments: e.g. ‘the dream went away and left Agamemnon believing things in his heart *that were not to be accomplished*. For he thought that on that very day he would take Priam’s city; *fool, who knew nothing of all the things Zeus planned to accomplish*, who was yet minded to visit tears and sufferings on Trojans and Greeks alike in strong battles.’ (*Il.* 2.35–40), or ‘this man spoke among the overbearing suitors’ (*Od.* 20.291).<sup>14</sup> While these—sparse—comments in the *Iliad* tend to stress either the glorious or the tragic nature of the heroes (who march towards their death without knowing it), in the *Odyssey* they are negative or critical (mainly concerning the suitors, who persist in their criminal behaviour despite numerous warnings). Sometimes we are dealing with metanarrative comments: ‘it is difficult for me to relate all these things like a god’ (*Il.* 12.176), which can be considered an early instance of the ‘*aporia*’ motif, or ‘But the mass I could not describe nor mention by name, not even if I had ten tongues, ten mouths, an unbreakable voice and a bronze heart ... The leaders of the ships, however, I will name and the total sum of their ships’ (*Il.* 2.488–493), an instance of the ‘*recusatio*’ motif.
- ‘if not’-situations: e.g. ‘Now wretched Odysseus would have perished, beyond his destiny, had not the gray-eyed goddess Athena

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Il.* 11.299–300 and 16.692–693.

<sup>12</sup> Yamagata 1989, which also discusses older literature.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Il.* 20.264–266. In fact, these are the only two instances, since gnomic utterances are almost exclusively voiced by characters; Lardinois 1997: 229–233.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Il.* 2.38, 873; 4.194; 6.234, 262; 12.113, 127; 13.569; 16.46; 16.685–691; 17.293; 18.4, 311–313; 20.411, 445; 22.5; 22.158–161, 402–404; *Od.* 1.8; 2.156, 324 = 4.769 = 17.482 = 20.375 = 21.361; 4.627 = 17.169, 772; 13.170; 17.233; 19.62; 22.31–33; 23.152; 24.469. De Jong 1987: 18–20; Griffin 1986; and Richardson 1990: 158–166.

given him forethought' (*Od.* 5.436–437).<sup>15</sup> They create tension (is the 'Odysseus' story coming to an end here, with the death of the hero?) or pathos (once again our hero is facing death).

In the eighteenth century the covert nature of the Homeric narrator led to the *communis opinio* that the narrative style of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was distanced and impassive, and that the events told themselves. It is only in the last decades that studies have shown this view to be questionable: though 'invisible', the Homeric narrator is very active, 'rigorously controlling our beliefs, our interests, and our sympathies'.<sup>16</sup> Some of the more important means of implicit evaluation or emotionalization by the narrator are:

- descriptions: e.g. Eumaeus' yard and home, which he built himself in order to take proper care of his master's pigs (*Od.* 14.5–28), immediately characterize him as a loyal servant; Andromache's headdress, 'which golden Aphrodite had given her on the day when Hector of the shining helmet led her from the house of Eetion, after he had given countless gifts' (*Il.* 22.468–472), evokes the pathos of her situation following Hector's death.<sup>17</sup>
- comparisons and similes: e.g. the comparison of two young warriors to tall pine trees at the moment of their death (*Il.* 5.539–540) evokes pathos.<sup>18</sup>
- motifs: e.g. the death of the Trojan Hippothous in *Il.* 17.300–303 ('he collapsed ... far away from generous Larisa, and he could not render again the care of his dear parents; he was short-lived, beaten down beneath the spear of high-hearted Ajax') combines the three pathetic motifs of 'far from home', 'short life', and 'bereaved parents'.
- juxtaposition; e.g. by narrating the suitors' gleeful anticipation of Telemachus' trip abroad and Euryclea's concern one after the

<sup>15</sup> Cf. further *Il.* 2.155–156; 3.373–375; 5.22–24, 311–313, 679–680; 6.73–76; 7.104–108, 273–276; 8.90–91, 130–132, 217–219; 11.310–312, 504–507; 12.290–293; 13.723–725; 15.121–127, 459–464; 16.698–701; 17.70–73, 319–325, 530–532, 613–614; 18.151–152 + 165–168; 20.288–291; 21.211–213, 544–546; 22.202–204; 23.154–155, 382–384, 490–491, 540–542; 733–734; 24.713–715; *Od.* 5.426–427; 14.32–34; 16.220–221; 21.125–128, 226–227; 23.241–242. De Jong 1987: 68–77; Richardson 1990: 187–191; Nesselrath 1992; and Loudon 1993.

<sup>16</sup> Booth [1961] 1983: 4–5 and de Jong 1987.

<sup>17</sup> Griffin 1980: 1–49.

<sup>18</sup> Griffin 1980: 103–143.

other (*Od.* 2.301–381), the narrator underlines the depravity of the former, the affection of the latter.<sup>19</sup>

### *The main story*

There is a remarkable difference between the emphatic and explicit openings of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (the proems) and their unobtrusive and unmarked endings. The proems, which as we have seen, take the form of Muse-invocations, serve to mark the transition from the real world to the narrated world by introducing the mediator between the two (the narrator), to give an idea of what the story which follows is about, and to indicate its starting point.

The lack of formalized endings has been linked to the oral background of the Homeric epics:<sup>20</sup> as is clear from *Od.* 8.536–543, where the singing of Demodocus is abruptly interrupted by Alcinous, singers always had to reckon with the possibility of suddenly having to end their song; this circumstance was not conducive to the development of elaborate endings. This does not mean, however, that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* have no closure. This is effected by ring-composition (books 1 and 24 of the *Iliad* both feature a divine assembly, a father coming to the enemy camp to release his child, and summarized periods of nine and eleven days; books 1–2 and 24 of the *Odyssey* both feature divine councils and Ithacan assemblies), by a curtain call of the major characters in *Iliad* 23–24 (notably the Games) and *Odyssey* 23–24, and by the presence of natural closural motifs such as burial (of Hector, the suitors, and Achilles) and reconciliation (between Priam and Achilles and—temporarily—the Greeks and the Trojans; and between Odysseus and the families of the dead suitors).<sup>21</sup>

### *Secondary narrators and embedded narratives*

In addition to the primary narrator, the Homeric epics feature a host of secondary narrators. In the first place there are heroes recounting events from their own past: e.g. Nestor (*Il.* 1.267–273; 7.132–156; 11.671–

<sup>19</sup> Goldhill 1988a.

<sup>20</sup> Van Groningen 1958: 70–77.

<sup>21</sup> Whitman 1958: 249–284; Macleod 1982: 28–34; Taplin 1992: 251–284; de Jong 2001: Introduction to Book 24.

761; 23.629–643), Phoenix (*Il.* 9.447–484), and Eumaeus (*Od.* 15.403–486). The *Odyssey* in particular contains many long embedded narratives, which made ‘Longinus’ remark that ‘most of the *Odyssey* is narrative’ (*On the Sublime* 9.13). An important group are the *nostoi*-stories of Nestor (*Od.* 3.130–185), Menelaus (*Od.* 3.276–302 + 311–312; 4.351–586), Agamemnon (3.193–198; 4.512–537; 11.405–504), and of course Odysseus himself (*Od.* 3.153–164; 4.555–560; 9–12), which are told in several instalments and foreshadowed in Phemius’ song in 1.326–327: ‘he sang of the Achaeans’ bitter homecoming from Troy which Athena had inflicted upon them’. A special case is that of Odysseus’ many lying tales (the first in 13.253–286),<sup>22</sup> which serve to back up his disguise as a beggar and which display a shrewd and ever-changing mix of true and invented elements (not seldom allomorphs of his real adventures). Except for Athena, all the listeners totally believe these tales, which led Aristotle to comment that ‘Homer most of all has taught the other poets how to tell lies properly’ (*Poetics* 1460a18–20).

These internal narrators are more restricted in their knowledge than the omniscient and omnipresent external narrator: they do not know the future, cannot read the minds of other characters, and cannot be present everywhere. Occasionally these restrictions are effectively exploited: the fact that on his way home from Troy Nestor becomes separated from Odysseus makes it impossible for him to tell Telemachus about the whereabouts of his father (*Od.* 3.160–185), and therefore necessitates the youth’s visit to Menelaus. But more often they are circumvented by allowing the internal narrators to use their *ex eventu* knowledge. Thus Nestor knows what lies ahead of him in *Od.* 3.160–161, Odysseus can read the minds of his companions in *Od.* 10.415–417, and knows what took place on Mt. Olympus in *Od.* 12.374–390. Only their references to divine interventions are, almost without exception, non-specific (*theos*, *theoi*, *daimōn*, *Zeus*).<sup>23</sup>

An important difference between the external primary narrator and the internal secondary narrators is their use of emotional and evaluative words. As we have seen above, the narrator seldom makes explicit comments; characters, however, quite regularly employ emotional lan-

<sup>22</sup> Cf. further 14.192–359; 17.415–444; 18.138–140 and 19.75–80; 19.165–202 + 221–248 + 268–299; and 24.244–279 + 303–314. For secondary literature, see de Jong 2001: *ad* 13.253–286, to which Grossardt 1998 should be added.

<sup>23</sup> Jørgensen 1904.

guage in their narratives (as in their speeches in general).<sup>24</sup> Thus Achilles refers to Apollo's arrow, which caused the plague, as a 'bad missile' (*Il.* 1.382); Odysseus calls the stormy sea on which his raft floats 'unspeakable' (*Od.* 7.273), Circe's potion which changed his men into pigs 'destructive' (10.394), the meal which the cannibalistic Laestrygonians made of his men 'unpleasant' (10.124), and himself and his men, under attack by the Ciconians, 'unfortunate' (9.53).

Occasionally we find the rare form of second-person narration: e.g. when Zeus reminds Hera how he once punished her (*Il.* 15.18–30) or when Menelaus recalls how Helen nearly betrayed the Greeks inside the Wooden Horse (*Od.* 4.266–288).<sup>25</sup> This form of narration, which flows from the fact that the narrator's addressee plays a role in the events recounted, also increases the urgency or impact of what is told: Zeus' story functions as a threat, Menelaus' story as an implicit accusation.

But characters also tell stories about events in which they themselves have *not* been involved, in which case they are *external* secondary narrators. An example is the 'Meleager' story, as told by Phoenix in *Il.* 9.527–599, which he introduces as 'an event of old times, not recent'.<sup>26</sup> Here we find the kind of naïve, or rather unmotivated omniscience and omnipresence familiar from fairytale and myth, of which I talked earlier. Another characteristic of this type of embedded narrative is that it is usually told allusively and elliptically: because the stories are well known, their narrators can suppress details, motives, prehistory, etc., relying on the narratees to fill them in, while at the same time stressing or even expanding those points which are most relevant to the situation at hand. An example is the story of the battle between the Centaurs and Lapiths, as recounted by Antinous in *Od.* 21.295–304: all we are told is that the Centaur Eurytion became drunk in the palace of Peirithous and that a fight ensued; the larger context (the Centaur's attempt to rape Peirithous' bride Hippodamea) is omitted. Antinous does dwell on the punishment which the Centaur suffered at the hands of the Lapiths (they cut off his ears and nose), obviously because this is the punishment he has in mind for 'the beggar'/Odysseus, to whom

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<sup>24</sup> Griffin 1986; de Jong 1988, 1992.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Il.* 10.285–290; 20.188–194; 21.441–457; *Od.* 24.37–92.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Il.* 5.385–404; 19.95–133; 24.602–617; *Od.* 21.295–304.

he is telling this story. This allusive style will become typical of choral narration (→ Pindar, → Aeschylus, → Sophocles) and Hellenistic poetry (→ Theocritus).

Embedded narratives are told either in answer to a question from the narrator's interlocutor (e.g. *Od.* 3.247–252, where Telemachus asks Nestor to tell him the 'Oresteia' story) or spontaneously. In the latter case they often have an 'argument' function and serve either as a hortatory paradigm (e.g. when Nestor recalls how the Lapiths, when fighting the Centaurs listened carefully to his advice, in order to persuade the Greeks to do the same now: *Il.* 1.259–274), or as a dissuasive paradigm (e.g. when Phoenix holds up to Achilles the negative example of Meleager). For the primary narratees these embedded narratives may have an additional 'key' function. Thus, the 'Meleager' story prepares the narratees for the development of the story: even more than Meleager, Achilles will come to regret his refusal to join the fighting in time.

Embedded narratives are clearly marked off as independent units through the use of ring-composition (e.g. 'Now you and I must remember our meal. For even Niobe remembered to eat ... But she remembered to eat when she was worn out with weeping. ... Come then, we also must remember to eat': *Il.* 24.601–602, 613, 618–619), an emotional preamble, which often takes the form of the '*recusatio*' motif (e.g. 'I could not tell you all the exploits of enduring Odysseus, so many as there are. But here is something he did and endured ...': *Od.* 4.240–243)<sup>27</sup> or the '*aporia*' motif ('what shall I tell you first, what last; for the gods have given me many sorrows': *Od.* 9.14–15), or some form of conclusion ('all this I told you in truth, sorrowful though I am': *Od.* 7.297).<sup>28</sup> In *Od.* 11.328–332 Odysseus uses the same '*recusatio*' motif to *conclude*—somewhat abruptly—his narrative; this anticipates the later *Abbruchsformel* (→ Pindar).

A special type of embedded narrative is formed by the songs of Demodocus (*Od.* 8.73–92, 266–366, 499–520). Strictly speaking, he is not a secondary narrator, since his songs are quoted in indirect rather than direct speech (Demodocus 'began singing the story about the love of Ares and Aphrodite, how they first lay together in the house of Hephaestus, secretly ...'), which after a few lines becomes an independent construction ('And Ares gave many presents and defiled the bed of Hephaestus'). In this way the voices of primary and secondary nar-

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Od.* 3.113–114; 7.241–243; 11.517–520.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Il.* 7.155; *Od.* 8.516–520; 11.328–330; 12.450–453; 14.359.



rator merge. The first and third song, dealing with episodes from the beginning and the end of the Trojan War respectively, also provide us with the rare situation of an external narrator—albeit unwittingly—addressing an internal narratee (Odysseus). The figures of the singers Demodocus and Phemius can be considered narratorial alter egos, in that they are a mirror of the primary narrator, who as we saw earlier himself is a professional singer.

*Primary and secondary narratees*

Like the primary narrator, the primary narratees are largely covert. Only the *Iliad* contains explicit traces of them, in the form of the ‘indefinite second person’ device (‘there you could have seen’, e.g. *Il.* 4.223–225)<sup>29</sup> and the ‘anonymous witness’ device (‘and there no more could a man have disparaged the fighting’, *Il.* 4.539–542).<sup>30</sup> But their implicit presence is unmistakable and essential: they are the active recipients of the narrative devices of the narrator, the ones who pick up the pathos or feel the suspense he creates. Their presence can also be sensed in:

- *gar*-clauses, which anticipate their questions (e.g. the explanation that gods do not eat bread or wine anticipates the question of why the gods have no blood but *ichor*: *Il.* 5.539–542).<sup>31</sup>
- ‘presentation through negation’ passages, which contradict existing expectations or create new ones (e.g. the fact that Patroclus did not take Achilles’ spear with him in *Il.* 16.140–144 both contradicts an expectation based on other arming scenes and creates tension: what will be the role of this spear, which he has so conspicuously left behind?).
- rhetorical questions (e.g., ‘of the others, who could mention their names, so many of the Greeks as aroused battle behind them?’: *Il.* 17.260–261).<sup>32</sup>
- a very special way in which the existence of the narratees is evoked, is when characters foresee that they themselves or people

<sup>29</sup> Cf. 4.429–431; 5.85–86; 15.697–698; 17.366–367. Discussion in de Jong 1987: 54–57 and Richardson 1990: 174–178.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *Il.* 13.343–344; 4.421; de Jong 1987: 58–60.

<sup>31</sup> De Jong 1987: 91–93 and Richardson 1990: 141–148.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. *Il.* 22.202–204 and *Od.* 22.12–14.

around them one day will become the subject of song ‘for people to come’ (*essomenoisi*): *Il.* 6.357–358.<sup>33</sup>

More tangible are the numerous secondary narratees, characters who listen to stories told by other characters. Their function is more than just that of passive listener; in many cases we see how secondary narrators adapt their story to the recipient. This is most apparent in the case of repeated stories, since here we are able to make comparisons. Thus when the ‘Oresteia’ story is recounted to Telemachus, the emphasis is on the role of Orestes, whose example he should follow (*Od.* 1.298–302 and 3.193–200); when recounted to Odysseus, the role of Agamemnon is stressed, whose fate at the hands of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra he must avoid (*Od.* 11.409–456).<sup>34</sup> But even a story which is told only once may be clearly tailored to its addressee: the song of Ares and Aphrodite (*Od.* 8.266–366), which recounts how after a *faux pas* one man makes amends to another, is intended to appease ‘the stranger’/Odysseus, who has been insulted by Euryalus, but will soon receive conciliatory words and gifts.

The embedded narratives, especially those of the *Odyssey*, trigger a wide range of reactions from the secondary narratees, from aesthetic admiration (e.g. Alcinous in 11.363–369) and emotional involvement (e.g. Eumaeus in 14.361–362), to enchantment (e.g. Phaeacians in 13.1–2 or Eumaeus in 17.515–521). These reactions may help us to determine the intended reaction of the primary narratees to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* themselves, which I see as a combination of these three.

One last aspect of the Homeric narrative style that deserves our attention here is the brilliant handling of the hierarchy of narrators and narratees, especially in the *Odyssey*. Firstly, the primary narrator carefully distributes the presentation of one and the same story over different secondary narrators (notably in the case of the ‘*nostos*’ stories of Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Odysseus, which are recounted in several instalments by different speakers).<sup>35</sup> Secondly, he arranges for the interests of primary and secondary narratees to coincide (e.g. in *Od.* 8.572–576, where Alcinous’ request to ‘the stranger’/Odysseus to at last tell him about his wanderings reflects the curiosity of the primary narratees, who since the proem have also been waiting to hear

<sup>33</sup> Cf. *Od.* 3.203–204; 8.579–580; 24.196–202.

<sup>34</sup> The same phenomenon can be observed in the case of the ‘Tydeus’ stories (*Il.* 4.372–399; 5.801–808; and 10.285–290) and Odysseus’ lying tales.

<sup>35</sup> De Jong 2001: Appendix C.

about those wanderings). Thirdly, he quells the curiosity of a tertiary narratee and a secondary narratee at the same time (e.g. in *Od.* 4.535–560, where Proteus’ information about Odysseus’ whereabouts is as relevant to Menelaus, Proteus’ addressee in the past, as to Telemachus, Menelaus’ addressee in the present). Fourthly, he superbly adapts the interests of a secondary narrator to those of himself (e.g. when in his *Apologue* Odysseus comes to the point of his stay with Calypso, and stops narrating; for Odysseus it would have been the second time he recounted this episode, for the primary narrator the third time ...).

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to what is perhaps the greatest masterstroke of that covert but almighty Homeric narrator. He repeatedly compares the hero of the *Odyssey* to a singer, notably in a simile at the climax of the story, when Odysseus, who is stringing the bow with which he will strike the first—decisive—blow against his enemies, is compared to a singer stringing his lyre (*Od.* 21.406–409).<sup>36</sup> The message implied by this comparison is relevant to the entire history of ancient Greek narrative: heroes may perform great deeds, but their eternal fame depends on the narrators who turn those deeds into stories.

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. 11.363–369 and 17.518–521. Moulton 1977: 145–153; Thalmann 1984: 170–173; and Murnaghan 1987: 148–154.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HESIOD

#### *R. Nünlist*

#### *Theogony*

Of all the surviving Greek texts, the *Theogony* is the first to give its narrator a name: Hesiod.<sup>1</sup>

And once they [sc. the Muses] taught Hesiod fine singing, as he tended his lambs below holy Helicon. This is what the goddesses said to me first, the Olympian Muses, daughters of Zeus the aegis-bearer.

(*Th.* 22–25, transl. West)

Despite the transition from third to first person ('Hesiod ... me') there can be little doubt that they designate the same person.<sup>2</sup> The transition can be paralleled from the opening sections of Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides.<sup>3</sup> Hesiod's case is admittedly somewhat different because he becomes a character in his own story (i.e. an internal narrator).

Hesiod's *Dichterweihe* (on which more below) forms part of the so-called 'Hymn to the Muses' (*Th.* 1–103), which is best separated from the rest of the *Theogony* for a narratological analysis. Whereas the main part of the *Theogony* (104–end) is much closer to the Homeric epics (see below), the 'Hymn to the Muses' shares many features with the 'Homeric hymns'.<sup>4</sup>

In the first line of the 'Hymn', a self-conscious narrator proclaims in the first-person plural ('let us begin our singing') that the Muses

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<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that Hesiod actually was the first Greek poet to mention his name (so e.g. Jaeger [1933] 1954: 111). This question is better left open because the texts of Homer's and Hesiod's predecessors have not been transmitted to posterity.

<sup>2</sup> Differently and, to my mind, unconvincingly Ballabriga 1996.

<sup>3</sup> Hecataeus 1 F 1a *FGH*, Herodotus proem vs. 1.5.3. etc., Thucydides 1.1.1. vs. 1.1.3. etc.

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed comparison see Friedländer 1914.

are to be his subject matter. The narrator then ‘disappears’, and the subject matter is immediately expanded after an introductory relative pronoun (*Th.* 2). The same structure (narrator’s ‘I’ as subject of the first sentence, subject matter + relative pronoun) is to be found in a number of ‘Homeric hymns’ (→).<sup>5</sup> The relative pronoun starts off the narrative, which in the present case is simultaneous and iterative.

The term ‘simultaneous iterative narration’ and the claim that *Th.* 2–21 is actually narrative need a brief explanation, because many scholars work on the basis of the following equations: ‘past tense = narrative’ vs. ‘present tense (and “timeless” aorists) = non-narrative’.<sup>6</sup> It is, however, preferable to apply Genette’s distinction between ‘singulative’ and ‘iterative’ narration. Singulative narration means ‘narrating once what happened once’, iterative narration means ‘narrating once what happened n times’.<sup>7</sup> This distinction, then, is to be combined with a second, namely between ‘simultaneous’ and ‘subsequent’ narration (→ Introduction). Admittedly, simultaneous iterative narration is rather uncommon, but in the present case Hesiod’s choice was dictated by the subject matter. Unlike singular events (birth, encounters, etc.), recurring activities require a simultaneous iterative narration because gods are immortal.<sup>8</sup> The equation ‘present tense = non-narrative = descriptive’ is also misleading, because it does not do justice to a dynamic activity like the dance and song of the Muses (*Th.* 2–21, 36–52) or Apollo’s journey to the assembly of the gods with subsequent dancing and singing (*h.Ap.* 182–206). Scenes like these should not *a priori* be equated with the gods’ more static ‘appearance, possessions, haunts and spheres of activity’.<sup>9</sup> For these I suggest expanding Genette’s model with the notion of durative (or omnitemporal) narration (‘narrating once what happens permanently’; e.g. *Th.* 60b–1, 63–64, etc.).

<sup>5</sup> Alternatively, the narrator may begin with a request to the Muses (→ Homeric Hymns).

<sup>6</sup> E.g. Janko 1981: 11; Miller 1986; West 1989. However, Janko and West disagree on the status of *Th.* 5–21 (see below n. 9).

<sup>7</sup> Genette 1980: 113–116 = 1972: 145–148; an example of iterative narrative is *Il.* 1.488–492.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. e.g. *Il.* 5.746–747 and 750–751.

<sup>9</sup> Janko 1981: 11. As for the status of *Th.* 2–21 specifically, West’s (1989) explanation of *steikhon* (10) as a present-stem injunctive (similarly the augmented aorists in 7–8) is more attractive than a slightly awkward transition from simultaneous iterative (2–4) to subsequent singulative narrative (5–21) which is ‘required by the fact that they (sc. the Muses) cannot always be singing this particular song’ (Janko 1981: 20). West 1989: 135 rightly points to the very similar song in 36–52.

After ‘disappearing’ in *Th.* 2, the narrator marks his presence again emphatically in the ‘autobiographical’ *Dichterweihe* (22–34).<sup>10</sup> There, the Muses instruct him to sing a *Theogony*, which is framed by hymns to themselves, ‘And they told me to sing of the family of blessed ones who are for ever, and first and last always to sing of themselves’ (*Th.* 33–34). The *Abbruchsformel* in 35 (‘But what is my business round tree or rock?’) then leads to a fresh start in 36 (‘from the Muses let us begin’), comparable to the one at the very beginning. After that the narrator ‘disappears’ again, and simultaneous iterative and subsequent singulative narration alternate until the end of the ‘Hymn’.<sup>11</sup> It is noteworthy that the ‘Hymn’ does not contain an apostrophe (except for the self-apostrophe in 36) and therefore does not show explicit signs of a narrative.<sup>12</sup>

The main body of the *Theogony* is preceded by the narrator’s invocation of the Muses (104–115) which in principle makes use of the same rhetorical devices and fulfils the same function as in the Homeric epics: the external narrator addresses the Muses, asks them to give (him) a song, and thereby gives an outline of the content and subject matter of this song. Hesiod’s proem is, therefore, in principle similar to Homer’s. There are, however, a few differences: most important are the more frequent addresses of the Muses (*Th.* 104, 105, 108, 114, 115) and the specific instruction to relate the story ‘from the beginning’ (*Th.* 115), whereas the Homeric epics (→) do not start from the beginning.

When the story begins in *Th.* 116, the obvious and prominent markers of the narrator’s presence, his own ‘I’ and the ‘you’ of the Muses, disappear from the text much as they do in Homer. The exceptions are also comparable: two further invocations of the Muses in Hesiod mark the transition to a new section with new subject matter.<sup>13</sup> Apart from

<sup>10</sup> *Th.* 27–28 seem to discuss the question of fiction, but scholars widely disagree on the exact meaning of the lines, see most recently Katz and Volk 2000 and the literature cited there.

<sup>11</sup> Simultaneous iterative (and durative): 37–52, 60b–7, 71–72, 79–103; subsequent singulative: 53–60a, 68–70, 73–79. (→ ‘Homeric hymns’ for further details about the narrative style of the ‘Hymn’.)

<sup>12</sup> A similar observation can be made with respect to a number of Homeric hymns (→), which do not address the deity until the epilogue (E), which again is comparable in function to *Th.* 104–115 (Friedländer 1914).

<sup>13</sup> *Th.* 963–968 (unions of goddesses with mortal men), 1019ff. (unions of gods with mortal women) which probably sets off the ‘Catalogue of Women’ (→ Homer for the invocations). A majority of scholars doubt the authenticity of *Th.* 901–1022, but cf. West (1966: 399): ‘The most likely explanation is ... that the later poet received a complete

the three invocations, the Hesiodic narrator—like most narrators in antiquity—presents himself as omniscient.<sup>14</sup> This includes coverage of aspects that strictly speaking he cannot know, e.g. an elaborate description of the underworld.<sup>15</sup>

In some respects, the narrator's presence is even less discernible than in the Homeric epics: the narrator of the *Theogony* never addresses his narratee(s), except for five occurrences of the particle *toi*.<sup>16</sup> Other traces of communication between narrator and narratee(s) do not occur frequently either:

- (1) Presentation through negation (by which the narrator contradicts the expectation of the narratee)<sup>17</sup> does occur (e.g. *Th.* 488, 529, 687), but is more frequent in Homer.
- (2) There is a single instance of 'if not'-situation (again alluding to a different direction the story could have taken).<sup>18</sup>

A thing past help would have come to pass that day, and he [sc. Typhon] would have become king of mortals and immortals, had the father of gods and men not taken sharp notice. (*Th.* 836–838)

- (3) Frequent analepses and prolepses are not to be expected because the *Theogony*'s structuring principle is primarily genealogical and not chronological.
- (4) Explanations for the benefit of the narratee (in particular explanations and 'etymologies' of names) are given, but not very often: e.g. *Th.* 195–200, 209–210, 234–236.<sup>19</sup>

If this seems to point towards a generally covert narrator, the impression is substantially contradicted by other characteristics of the *Theogony*—

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*Theogony* ... and that he remodelled the end in his own style, but following the outlines of the original', which, one could add, may well have contained the invocations to the Muses.

<sup>14</sup> A rare qualification of his omniscience is a reference to anonymous spokesmen ('they say': 306), which is, however, problematic because the authenticity of the entire passage is doubtful.

<sup>15</sup> *Th.* 720–819. Contrast the Homeric narrator, who subtly sidesteps the question of how he knows what the underworld looks like by making divine characters describe the underworld (*Il.* 8.13–16 [Zeus], *Od.* 10.508–515 [Circe]).

<sup>16</sup> *Th.* 126, 448, 873, 986, 1015. The particle *toi* is virtually absent from the Homeric narrator-text (of seven Iliadic occurrences in the narrator-text, six concern a character and only one the narratee: 10.316).

<sup>17</sup> De Jong 1987: 61–68.

<sup>18</sup> De Jong 1987: 68–81.

<sup>19</sup> Examples only refer to explicit explanations. Obviously, the entire *Theogony* is pervaded by a didactic intent.

my's narrator. These make clear that he actually 'hides' much less than his notoriously covert Homeric counterpart. These features are:

- (1) Considerable reduction of secondary focalization: virtually the entire *Theogony* is presented from the narrator's point of view. This goes together with the remarkable absence of secondary narratives from *Th.* 116–end.
- (2) Unrestricted use of evaluative terms in the narrator-text: the Homeric (→) distinction between 'character language' and 'narrator language' virtually confines evaluative terms to the speeches. The same cannot be said about Hesiod. The narrator-text of the *Theogony* contains many words which belong to the Homeric 'character language', e.g.

They [sc. the Titans and the Olympian gods] had been fighting each other continually now for ten full years, and the fight gave them pain at heart (*thumalgēs*); and to neither side came solution of the bitter (*khalepos*) strife ... (*Th.* 635–637, cf. also 590–593 quoted below, which is part of the notorious misogynistic judgment about women and marriage: 590–612)<sup>20</sup>

- (3) Direct comments by the narrator, notably their frequency, position and type. As with his regular use of evaluative terms, the narrator of the *Theogony* does not refrain from commenting on his own narrative. The possible functions of these comments are
  - (3a) to make clear the structure of the text, e.g. by summarizing the preceding section, e.g. 'That is the descendance of Ceto and Phorcys' (*Th.* 336, cf. 263–264, 362–363, 448–449, 613, at the end of the Prometheus episode).
  - (3b) to make statements of 'eternal truth' (gnomes, aetiological explanations), e.g. 'For from her [sc. Pandora] is descended the female sex, a great affliction to mortals as they dwell with their husbands—no fit partners for accursed Poverty, but only for Plenty' (*Th.* 590–593, cf. 556–557 quoted below).
  - (3c) to evaluate the act of narrating itself, e.g. 'It is hard for a mortal man to tell the names of them all, but each of those peoples knows them that live near them' (*Th.* 369–370).

<sup>20</sup> For lack of statistically reliable material (only 8 speeches with a total of 34 lines), it cannot be ruled out with certainty that Hesiod distinguished between 'character language' and 'narrator language', but in the case of evaluative terms this seems highly unlikely.



(3d) to refer to the continuity of, say, cult practice down to the narrator's own time, e.g. 'Even now, when an earthly man sacrificing fine offerings makes ritual propitiation, he invokes Hecate' (*Th.* 416–418).

Not that comments like these are totally absent from the Homeric texts,<sup>21</sup> but Hesiod uses them in a rather un-Homeric way, e.g. in the following passage from Prometheus' deception of Zeus.

And he [sc. Zeus] grew angry about the lungs, and wrath reached him to the spirit, when he saw the white oxbones set for a cunning trick. *Ever since that, the peoples on earth have burned white bones for the immortals on aromatic altars.* In great ire Zeus the cloud-gatherer said to him, 'Son of Iapetus, ...' (*Th.* 554–559)

The aetiological explanation of the Greek sacrifice in 556–557 may not be inconceivable in Homer, but the narratorial interruption at such a dramatic point in the scene is unparalleled in Homer.

In terms of narrative style, the *Theogony* is an extended catalogue of characters (mostly gods), who may or may not become 'heroes' of a narrative section. In the latter case, the narrator simply states the 'facts' (mostly the birth or genealogy of the particular divinity, regularly expanded by his or her domain or particular achievement). In the former case, one in a group of divine characters (often the last mentioned) triggers off a narrative section: Cronus and the castration of Uranus which leads to new births (*Th.* 137–206), Zeus overthrows Cronus (457–505), Prometheus tricks Zeus (521–589), the Hundred-Handers support Zeus in the Titanomachy (624–720), Typhon fights against Zeus (836–868).<sup>22</sup>

Unlike the narrator, the narratee is completely covert. It is, therefore, impossible to deduce a directly applicable model of how the *Theogony*'s narrator envisages an ideal reception of his poem. But it is a fair assumption that the general description of the singer (*aoidos*) in the 'Hymn to the Muses' is an implicit self-portrait which includes the desired effect of his poetry:

Though a man's heart be withered with the grief of recent bereavement,  
if then a singer, the servant of the Muses, sings of the famous deeds of

<sup>21</sup> Compare e.g. *Th.* 369–370 with *Il.* 12.176.

<sup>22</sup> The material does not lend itself to a defensible description of how the narrator introduces and ends these narrative sections. A major stumbling block is the often disputed authenticity of (groups of) lines in the transmitted text.

men of old, and of the blessed gods who dwell in Olympus, he soon forgets his sorrows and thinks no more of his family troubles, quickly diverted by the goddesses' gifts. (*Th.* 98–103)<sup>23</sup>

### *Works and Days*

As with the *Theogony*, it is best to separate the introductory hymn to Hesiod's second poem for the purposes of a narratological analysis, although the hymn covers ten lines only. Its narrative form and function are comparable to that of the *Theogony* (see above). Important differences (apart from the length) are that in *Works and Days* the narrator starts with an invocation of the Muses<sup>24</sup> and that this hymn has two addressees, first the Muses (1–2) and then Zeus (9–10).

In many respects the *Works and Days* is rather different from the *Theogony*. From a narratological point of view, the most remarkable difference concerns the status of the narrator, who in the *Works and Days* is an internal narrator. That is to say, the narrator relates 'in his own name' events in which he himself takes part. The numerous signs of the narrator's 'I' and the narratee's 'you', which are spread over the entire poem, sometimes refer to the characters, in particular the notorious dealings of the two brothers (35–37, 396–397). More often, however, these signs refer to the 'I' as narrator and to the 'you' as narratee.<sup>25</sup> This led to the impression that the poem resembles a speech and therefore 'ist eine einzige verselbständigte und zum Epos erweiterte "Rede" ermahnenen Charakters'.<sup>26</sup> Although Jaeger does not say so explicitly, this impression is due not only to the ubiquitous signs of the 'I' and the 'you', but also to the preponderance of the

<sup>23</sup> Similarly, the birth of the Muses is described as 'oblivion of ills and respite from cares' (*Th.* 55).

<sup>24</sup> 'Muses from Pieria, who glorify by songs, come to me, tell of Zeus your father ...' (*W&D* 1–2) instead of 'From the Muses of Helicon let us begin our singing' (*Th.* 1), cf. 'Homeric hymns' (→).

<sup>25</sup> Signs of the narrator are pronouns and verb forms in the first person (*W&D* 10, 35, 37, 106, 174, etc.), signs of the narratee apostrophes (27, 213, 274, 286, 299, 397, 611, 633, 641; 248, 263), pronouns and verb forms in the second person (33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, etc.). Perhaps the most important signs are the numerous imperatives (and infinitives used as imperatives). Through them the presence is felt both of the narrator and of the narratee because they can be paraphrased as: 'I tell you to do x and not to do y.'

<sup>26</sup> Jaeger [1933] 1954: 101 with n. 1.

present tense (= simultaneous narration),<sup>27</sup> whereas the narrator-text of most narrative texts is dominated by the past tense (= subsequent narration). In short, the primary story of the *Works and Days* is one of the relatively few examples in Western literature of a simultaneous narration with a dominant internal narrator and a well-represented internal narratee.

The resemblance to speech is not so surprising if one takes into account parallel texts from the Near East,<sup>28</sup> which to a large extent consist of speech (sometimes in dialogue). An important difference from Hesiod is, however, that most of these parallel texts contain a framing narrative, in which a (usually external) narrator introduces the speaker and his addressee.<sup>29</sup> However, in *Works and Days* this framing narrative is lacking,<sup>30</sup> but the last line of the proem ('I should like to tell Perses words of truth': *W&D* 10) seems to indirectly fulfill this introductory function, as if the text read 'I (will) tell Perses the (following) words of truth: "I see there is not only one strife ..."'<sup>31</sup> In other words, *Works and Days* comes close to what Gérard Genette calls 'reduced metadiegetic' or 'pseudo-diegetic', i.e. the elimination of the framing narrative level.<sup>32</sup>

In view of this narrative trick, one should speak of the 'primary' and 'secondary' stories of the *Works and Days* in inverted commas only. In terms of the narrative situation, it is legitimate to compare the *Works and Days* to elegies by Tyrtaeus or Solon, which also 'suppress' the framing

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<sup>27</sup> E.g. 'for Hunger goes always with a work-shy man. Gods and men disapprove of that man who lives without working. [...] It is from work that men are rich in flocks and wealthy, and a working man is much dearer to the immortals. Work is no reproach, but not working is a reproach' (*W&D* 302–311).

<sup>28</sup> West 1978: 3ff.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. e.g. the Sumerian *Instructions of Suruppak*, part of which is quoted in translation by West (1978: 4): 'The intelligent one, who knew the (proper) words, and was living in Sumer, [...] Suruppak gave instructions to his son: "My son, let me give you instructions, may you pay attention to them!"' Here and in many other cases, the addressee is the speaker's son.

<sup>30</sup> Schmidt 1986: 18.

<sup>31</sup> The speech-like quality of *W&D* 11ff. is underlined by the particle *ara* in 11, which is operational at the level of interaction between speaker and addressee (Duhoux 1997; Wakker 1997: 212–213). On *W&D* 11 see also Most 1993: 77–80 and Scodel 1996: 72–79.

<sup>32</sup> 'These forms of narrating where the metadiegetic way station, mentioned or not, is immediately ousted in favor of the first narrator, which to some extent economizes on one (or sometimes several) narrative level(s)—these forms we will call *reduced metadiegetic* (implying: reduced to the diegetic), or *pseudo-diegetic*' (Genette 1980: 236–237 = 1972: 247). The archetype of this form is found in Plato's (→) *Theaetetus*: Euclides represents Socrates speaking directly to Theodorus and Theaetetus, thereby omitting the intercalated speech formulae like 'I said' or 'he said'.

narrative and immediately start with the ‘speech’. However, subject matter and the frequent apostrophes of the narratee Perses point more in the direction of Theognis and his narratee Cyrnus.<sup>33</sup>

As for the narratee of the *Works and Days*, it should be emphasized that Perses is the dominant but not the only explicit narratee. *W&D* 248 and 262–263 (and implicitly also 202) are addressed to the ‘kings’ (*basilēs*). And although the explicit narratee mostly is his brother Perses, the narrator presupposes a wider audience, especially in the passages that contain instructions of a general type.<sup>34</sup>

The subject matter and rhetoric of the *Works and Days* are didactic and instructive in nature. The narrator, therefore, is almost literally omniscient. In order to back his argumentation, he incorporates a number of ‘secondary’ narratives (the myth of Pandora, the five generations, the fable of the hawk and the nightingale), which are set off explicitly from the ‘primary’ narrative. E.g. ‘If you will, I will summarize another tale for you, well and skilfully—mind you take it in’ (*W&D* 106–107).

The passage caps the preceding myth of Pandora and at the same time introduces that of the five generations. Both ‘secondary’ narratives are called a *logos*. Similarly, the fable of the hawk and the nightingale is introduced as an *ainos* (202). Given the simultaneous nature of the ‘primary’ narrative, these ‘secondary’ narratives by necessity are instances of external analepsis. The only exception is the fifth and last generation to which the narrator himself belongs. Its dreadful fate is described in a long pessimistic prolepsis (‘they will not do x, they will not do y’: 176–201). The generally analeptic character of the ‘secondary’ narratives has as a consequence that—unlike the examples given above—they can also be introduced by a verb in the past tense only, that is, by means of a temporal shift, e.g. the myth of Pandora, ‘But Zeus concealed it [sc. men’s food], angry because Prometheus’ crooked cunning had tricked him’ (*W&D* 47–48). The ubiquitous ‘I’ of the narrator (see

<sup>33</sup> Tyrtaeus and Solon are compared e.g. by Jaeger ([1933] 1954: 100–101), Theognis e.g. by West (1978: 23). Phocylides is a different case because the recurring half-line ‘And the following is by Phocylides too’ (fr. 1.1 etc. Gentili-Prato) in function resembles the introductory narrator-text. Conversely, the *Precepts of Chiron* appear to start immediately with Chiron’s ‘speech’ (‘Hes.’ fr. 283 M-W). Further parallels to *W&D* may be found in Parmenides and Empedocles and their narratees (anonymous and Pausanias, respectively). In both cases, the fragmentary status precludes a decision about the presence or absence of a framing narrative.

<sup>34</sup> Schmidt 1986.

above) inevitably eclipses the other indications of his presence (evaluative language etc.), which are treated in a similar way as in the *Theogony* (see there).

To summarize: after a short introductory hymn, the *Works and Days* consists of a pseudo-diegetic and simultaneous narrative, in which a highly discernible internal narrator is almost constantly at the elbow of his narratee Perses and, through him, of his narratees in general.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE HOMERIC HYMNS

*R. Nünlist*

The so-called Homeric hymns were written by different poets and their dates of composition seem to vary greatly.<sup>1</sup> It is, nevertheless, justifiable to treat them as a group here because of their structural similarities, especially in terms of narrative technique. For virtually all the Homeric hymns have the following narrative structure: (A) The narrator introduces (B) his subject matter (usually the god to whom the hymn is dedicated), (C) followed by a relative pronoun, which (D) sets off the primary story. At the very end, (E) the narrator addresses the god in question in an epilogue. In fact, the invocation (E) of the god provides formal closure to the preceding primary narrative and in function mirrors the relative pronoun (C) at the beginning.<sup>2</sup>

The introduction (A) by the external narrator (which in form and function resembles the proems of Homer or Hesiod) can take two forms:<sup>3</sup>

(A') The narrator self-consciously announces (B) his subject matter in the first person, e.g.

‘Of Demeter the lovely-haired, the august goddess first I sing ...’  
(*h.Dem.* 1, transl. West)<sup>4</sup>

(A'') The narrator invokes the Muse(s) to sing a song about (B) the subject matter, e.g.

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<sup>1</sup> About the authors of the Homeric hymns one knows next to nothing (cf. however West 1975 for an attempt to identify the author of *h.Ap.*). Their dates of composition are vague and/or controversial. The most promising approach seems to be a combination of linguistic and historical arguments (Janko 1982, with a table on p. 200).

<sup>2</sup> An address to the narratee is a typical means with which to end a narrative.

<sup>3</sup> Unlike the narrator of Hesiod’s ‘Hymn to the Muses’, who once turns into an internal narrator (*Th.* 22–34; → Hesiod), the narrators of the Homeric hymns without exception are external: they are not themselves a character in their stories.

<sup>4</sup> This type is found in *h.Dem.*, *h.Ap.*, *h.* 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30; cf. Hes. *Th.* 1, *Ap.Rh.* 1.1–2.

‘Sing of Hermes, Muse, the son of Zeus and Maia ...’ (*h.Herm.* 1)<sup>5</sup>

The ‘I’ of the narrator and the ‘you’ of the narratee are absent from parts (B) through (D) of the hymns, which for that reason contain little more information about the narrator than that his story is located in a distant past which precedes him by an unspecified number of years. In other words, the bulk of the hymns consists of subsequent narration.<sup>6</sup> Only the short introduction (A) and the similarly short epilogue (E) show traces of ‘I’ and ‘you’, the most obvious signs of the presence of the narrator and the narratee. This observation holds for the majority of the hymns, the most important exception being the *Hymn to Apollo* with its remarkable mixture of ‘second person’ and ‘third person’ narrations.<sup>7</sup> Two explanations of the general rule are conceivable, which are not mutually exclusive: (i) The Homeric hymns’ general similarity to the Homeric epics, which includes diction etc., also extends to their primary narrators, who are similarly covert and equally reluctant to address the narratee directly.<sup>8</sup> (ii) As the epilogue (E) in each case shows, the narratee of the hymn is the god to whom the hymn is dedicated, but who is also the ‘hero’ of (D) the primary story. (Needless to say, the ultimate narratees of the hymns are, of course, the human audience, who, however, cannot be addressed, lest the *phthonos theōn* [envy of the gods] be roused.) More frequent references to the god-narratee would, therefore, make the narrator switch back and forth between ‘he/she’ and ‘you’. This, in fact, is what happens in the exceptional *Hymn to Apollo* (and probably also in the fragmentary *Hymn to Dionysus* 1). But its effect is rather odd, which may be the reason why the other poets avoid it altogether.

<sup>5</sup> The second type is found in *h.Herm.*, *h.Aphr.*, *h.* 9, 14, 17, 19, 20, 31, 32, 33; cf. Hom. *Il.* 1.1, *Od.* 1.1, Hes. *W&D.* 1. A third type begins with an invocation of the god to whom the hymn is dedicated: *h.* 8 (which is exceptional in several other respects and probably does not belong to the collection: e.g. Richardson 1974: 3), 21, 24 and 29.

<sup>6</sup> For temporal markers (in addition to the ubiquitous past tense) see *h.Dem.* 10, 97, 451, *h.Ap.* 101, *h.Herm.* 73, 233, 513, *h.Aphr.* 54 (in all eight cases the adverb *tote* ‘then’). Conversely, markers which point to the narrator’s own time are rare: *h.Herm.* 125–126, 508. Cf. the notorious *hoioi nun brotoi* passages in Homer (→).

<sup>7</sup> On the *Hymn to Apollo*, which is exceptional in several respects, see below; the other exceptions are *h.* 8, 21, 22, 24, 29 and 30 (cf. the exceptions in n. 5).

<sup>8</sup> This reluctance to address the narratee extends to an avoidance of the particle *toi* in the narrator-text (for Homer and Hesiod see chapter on Hesiod). Apart from the exceptional *Hymn to Apollo*, there are only three instances of *toi* in the narrator-text, all from the *Hymn to Hermes* (25, 111, 138); cf. Denniston 1954: 537, although his list is incomplete.

As it is, little can be gathered from the texts about the narrators themselves. Both introduction (A) and epilogue (E) are short and rather standardized. The epilogue, which does not, of course, occur in either *Iliad* or *Odyssey*, often contains a wish to the deity to grant a special favour, none of which is particularly informative, except perhaps for ‘food in exchange for the song’<sup>9</sup> and for ‘victory in the present contest’ (*h.* 6.19–20). The important exception here is again the *Hymn to Apollo* (see below).

The Homeric narrator (→) avoids using evaluative terms in the narrator-text to such an extent that one can differentiate between a ‘character language’ and a ‘narrator language’. The Homeric hymns are too short to provide statistically reliable results in such a comparison. It can, however, be said that explicit comments or evaluations by the narrator are not much more frequent than in Homer and hardly ever obtrusive. The most extensive (and for that reason not representative) example is the instruction not to divulge the secrets of the Eleusinian rites.<sup>10</sup>

... the solemn mysteries which one cannot depart from or enquire about or broadcast, for great awe restrains us from speaking. Blessed is he of men on earth who has beheld them, whereas he that is uninitiated in the rites, or he that has had no part in them, never enjoys a similar lot down in the musty dark when he is dead. (*h.Dem.* 478–482)

Except for direct comments, the narrator’s controlling function can also be gathered from (1) presentation through negation, (2) ‘if not’-situations, (3) ana- and prolepses, all of which do not occur frequently either. As for (1) presentation through negation, the most remarkable instance comes from the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, where the narrator first mentions three goddesses (Athena, Artemis, Hestia) whom Aphrodite could not seduce (7–32). This priamel, which is summarized in 33–35, functions as a foil for Zeus, who was and is a victim of her machinations (36–40). However, the thoroughly developed expectation of the narratee is eventually disappointed because the narrator does not expand on Zeus’ love affairs as expected, but instead on his revenge on Aphrodite by making her fall in love with a mortal (45–291). As for (2)

<sup>9</sup> *h.Dem.* 494; the wish is, of course, particularly apt after the famine described in the hymn.

<sup>10</sup> For other narratorial comments cf. *h.Dem.* 111, 243, 246, 291, 451, 486–489, *h.Ap.* 227–228, 237, *h.Herm.* 76, 125–126, 316, 396, 576–578, *h.Aphr.* 26, 167.



‘if not’-situations, there are only two in the entire corpus, both in the *Hymn to Demeter* and both marking an important crisis in the plot:

Indeed she [sc. Demeter in the guise of an old woman] would have made him [sc. Demophon] ageless and deathless, if in her folly fair-girt Metaneira [sc. Demophon’s mother] had not waited for the nighttime and spied from her fragrant chamber. (*h.Dem.* 242–245)

Indeed, she [sc. Demeter] would have destroyed humankind altogether by grievous famine, and deprived the Olympians of their honorific privileges and their sacrifices, had Zeus not taken notice, and counselled with his heart. (*h.Dem.* 310–313)

Even the longest among the Homeric hymns are short (max. 580 lines) compared to other narrative texts, and their primary narratives are straightforward in structure and narrated in roughly chronological order. Frequent ana- and prolepses (3) would therefore be more difficult to explain than their rarity. The straightforwardness of the plots is also indicated by the fact that they do not contain more than two principal elements. The *Hymn to Demeter* contains two: the main element (Persephone abducted, Demeter in search of her, famine, Demeter reconciled) frames a second element (Demeter in Eleusis, foundation of the Eleusinian rites). The *Hymn to Hermes* also contains two elements (cf. the programmatic summary in 17–18): the main element (Hermes steals Apollo’s cattle) is framed by the story of the lyre (its invention, means of consoling Apollo). The *Hymn to Aphrodite* contains one element only (Zeus makes Aphrodite fall in love with a mortal). The *Hymn to Apollo* is again exceptional. Although two principal elements can be discerned (birth; foundation of Delphic oracle), the narrator manages to fit in *en passant* a number of other things, notably the Tephrousa episode (244–276) and the long analepsis about Typhon (305–355).

Like their Homeric predecessor, the narrators of the Homeric hymns regularly leave the stage to their characters by quoting their speeches. It is noteworthy, however, that indirect speech is more frequent than in Homer.<sup>11</sup> A greater prominence of reported speech instead of direct speech inevitably leads to greater salience of the narrator’s controlling function.<sup>12</sup> The most remarkable passage is probably Demeter’s threatening declaration:

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *h.Dem.* 171–173, 207–209, 297–298, 331–333, 443–447, *h.Herm.* 57–61, 391–394, 427–433, 521–523, 525–526, *h.Aphr.* 28.

<sup>12</sup> Genette 1980: 171–172.

She said she would never set foot on fragrant Olympus, or allow the earth's fruit to come up, until she set eyes on her fair-faced daughter [sc. Persephone].  
(*h.Dem.* 331–333)

Given its importance, the Homeric narrator would, no doubt, have quoted her speech *verbatim*.

Despite the frequency of direct speech, secondary narrators do not feature prominently in the Homeric hymns. When characters do tell 'stories', they usually cover an aspect of the primary narrative itself, e.g. repeating internal analepsis (*h.Dem.* 407–432, *h.Herm.* 340–364, 370–374). The most remarkable counter-example is the story which Aphrodite tells Anchises about two other human lovers of a divinity. Ganymedes was abducted by Zeus, who compensated the mourning father with swift horses (*h.Aphr.* 202–217). And Eos, who fell in love with Tithonus, asked Zeus for eternal life but forgot to ask for eternal youth too (218–238). Both *exempla* have an obvious persuasive function and are meant to soothe Anchises' anxiety.<sup>13</sup>

The narrators of the hymns have confidence in the cooperation of their narratees. For they show a tendency to leave rather substantial 'gaps' (*Leerstellen*) in the narrative, which the narratee is to fill in for himself or herself. An instructive, because 'un-Homeric', example is a passage from the *Hymn to Hermes*: Apollo's actual discovery that his cattle have been abducted from Pieria, a corner-stone of the story, is left out of the narrative (between 183 and 184), but can be 'reconstructed' from Apollo's speech to the old man in Onchestus (190–200).

All in all, one can conclude that, despite a number of minor variations, most of the Homeric hymns do not depart from Homer's narrative technique in a substantial way. Their narratives form a steady flow, one event 'automatically' motivates the next, and the narrator's discretion leads to that well-known impression that 'the story appears to tell itself'.<sup>14</sup> The title 'Homeric hymns', though misleading in terms of authorship, is not inappropriate in terms of narrative technique—with one important exception.

<sup>13</sup> One could, however, argue that the argumentation of the second *exemplum* is to some extent undercut, because Tithonus' fate is after all not very appealing. This may, nevertheless, be deliberate on the part of Aphrodite ('argument function'). For she later ends her speech with an unmistakable warning not to disclose their lover's hour (286–288).

<sup>14</sup> The notorious phrase by Lubbock ([1921] 1926: 113), which describes a narrator who 'shows' (unlike the narrator who 'tells').

*Hymn to Apollo*

It has been stated more than once in the previous part of this chapter that the *Hymn to Apollo* differs remarkably from the other hymns.<sup>15</sup> Its most striking difference is the departure from the structural scheme as explained above. References to the narrator's 'I' and above all to the addressee's 'you', which are restricted to sections (A) and (E) in the other hymns, frequently recur in the *Hymn to Apollo*.<sup>16</sup> Both narrator and narratee(s) figure prominently, and this description could give the impression of an ongoing dialogue between the narrator and his narratee, similar to Hesiod's (→) *Works and Days*. This, however, is not exactly the case because the narrator does not use 'second-person narration' throughout the hymn (as the narrator does in *hh.* 24 and 29, and similarly in *hh.* 22 and 30). Apollo is both the main narratee and the main 'hero' of the hymn, in which guise he is regularly referred to in the third person. As a consequence, the hymn contains a curious mixture of 'you's' and 'he's' which have the same referent—sometimes with rather awkward transitions from 'you' to 'he' (e.g. 129/130: 'The fastenings no longer held you back, but all this came undone. At once Phoebus Apollo spoke among the goddesses') and *vice versa*.<sup>17</sup> The references to the addressee's 'you' stop after 282 (until the epilogue in 545–546). That is to say, from a narratological point of view the bipartition is less between a Delian and a Pythian part of the hymn than between ll. 1–285a and 285b–546. This same bipartition is also suggested by the relative distribution of simultaneous iterative narration and subsequent singulative narration.<sup>18</sup> Whereas the first part is dominated by simultaneous iterative/durative narration (2–13, 20–24, 30–44, 140–164, 182–

<sup>15</sup> The unity of the text transmitted as *Hymn to Apollo* in the manuscripts is a notorious *zetema*. A majority of scholars argue that two hymns, one to Delian Apollo (1–178), another to Pythian Apollo (179–546), have been connected in a rather clumsy way (e.g. West 1975, Janko 1982), but there are defenders of the unity (e.g. Miller 1986, Clay 1989).

<sup>16</sup> References to the narrator's 'I': ll. 1, 19, 166, 171, 177, 207, 208, 546. References to the addressee's 'you': ll. 14 (the addressee being Leto), 19–22, 25, 29, 120, 127–129, 140–149, 166 (addressees are the Delian girls who perform a song), 167 (*idem*), 171 (*idem*), 179–181, 207–209, 215–225, 229–230, 239–246, 277–282, 545–546.

<sup>17</sup> It is noteworthy that this mixed style is used both in the Delian and in the Pythian part of the hymn. In other words, if the hymn originally consists of two separate hymns, the 'imitator' also took over this unusual style.

<sup>18</sup> For the distinction between simultaneous iterative (and durative) narration and subsequent singulative narration see chapter on Hesiod.

206, 231–236), this type of narrative is virtually absent from the second part of the hymn, where the more standard subsequent singulative narration dominates as in the other long hymns.<sup>19</sup>

In addition to the bare references to the ‘I’ of the narrator, his function as the one ‘who is in control’ is further emphasized by the two questions, each followed by a list of possible topics, which stress the wealth of material from which the narrator must and does choose.

How shall I hymn you, fit subject as you are in every respect? Shall I sing of you as a wooer and lover, of how you went to court the Azantid maid (sc. Coronis)? or ...? or ...? or ...? (*h.Ap.* 207–215, cf. 19–29)<sup>20</sup>

The narrator expressly mentions a number of different directions where his story could go. As for the controlling function of the narrator, this resembles ‘presentation through negation’ and ‘if not-situations’ (see above), but it is much more discernible in the present case. At the same time, these questions recall the opening question of the *Iliad* (1.8) and at other transitional points (e.g. *Il.* 5.703–704).

Probably the most important difference of the *Hymn to Apollo* concerns the person of the narrator himself. Whereas the narrators of the other hymns are covert and say virtually nothing about themselves, the *Hymn to Apollo* contains a remarkable self-advertisement that made Thucydides (3.104) quote the passage.

But now, may Apollo be favourable, together with Artemis, and hail, all you Maidens! Think of me in future, if ever some long-suffering stranger comes here and asks, ‘O maidens, which is your favourite singer who visits here, and who do you enjoy most?’ Then you must all answer with one voice(?). ‘It is a blind man, and he lives in rocky Chios; all of his songs remain supreme afterwards.’ And we will carry your reputation wherever we go as we roam the well-ordered cities of men, and they will believe it, because it is true. And myself, I shall not cease from hymning the far-shooter Apollo of the silver bow, whom lovely-haired Leto bore.

(*h.Ap.* 165–176)

<sup>19</sup> Short passages like *h.Ap.* 393–396 are only apparent exceptions and in accordance with Homer’s narrative technique. The *Hymn to Aphrodite* begins with simultaneous iterative narration (ll. 2ff., cf. above on ‘presentation through negation’) before it leads into the (more common) subsequent singulative narration of the main narrative (ll. 45–291).

<sup>20</sup> Miller 1986: 21 explains the two passages as aporetic questions, elaborated by a summary priamel. Both passages combine the rhetorical functions of *Hindernis-* and *Leichtigkeitsmotiv* (Nünlist 1998: 33, 136). In accordance with standard priamel technique and with the ‘continuity of thought’ principle, it is the last item on the list that is eventually chosen.

This indirect form of self-praise is remarkably concrete and without parallel in any of the other Homeric hymns.<sup>21</sup>

To conclude: one of the leading experts in the field has recently formulated the following hypothesis regarding the relation of the Homeric hymns to the Homeric epics: ‘the familiarity of the material (i.e. the myths: RN) and its smaller scale may have invited experimentation and innovation in both diction and narrative technique’.<sup>22</sup> In terms of narrative technique, the present chapter seems to indicate that ‘experimentation and innovation’ do not completely alter the Homeric model but are of a comparatively small scale. The sole remarkable exception is the *Hymn to Apollo*, but it appears to be the exception that proves the rule.

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<sup>21</sup> The closest parallels in early Greek poetry are Hesiod (→) and Theognis’ *sphragis* (19–30), but unlike them the present poet does not actually name himself. However, the ‘blind man of Chios’ is of course a thinly veiled periphrasis for ‘Homer’. In this connection it is perhaps worth mentioning that Thucydides, in contrast to modern scholars, does not seem to doubt the authenticity of this self-identification.

<sup>22</sup> Clay 1997: 492.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### APOLLONIUS OF RHODES

*M.P. Cuypers*

By virtue of being an epic, Apollonius' *Argonautica* invites direct comparison with Homer. The poem's narrator relates a story about the remote past at length in hexameter verse; he is external, omniscient, omnipresent, and anonymous, and he uses virtually every Homeric narrative technique. However, whereas Homer operates largely in the background, Apollonius directs his narrative in an altogether overt and self-conscious manner. In his constant interaction with his narratees he not only uses Homeric 'interactive' devices with un-Homeric frequency and in novel ways, but he also covers topics and adopts narrative strategies which are at home in other genres. This results in a Protean narrative *persona*, an amalgam of (at least) the Homeric singer of epic, the hymnic and Pindaric singers of praise, the Herodotean historian, and the Callimachean scholar—these last two already complex personalities themselves, who, just as the narrator of the *Argonautica*, are tugged between the roles of epic storyteller and historian.

#### *Narrative goals, main narrative, and digressions*

Whereas the Homeric epics start with Muse-invocations, the opening of the *Argonautica*<sup>1</sup> rather recalls the Homeric hymns (→)—in particular the *Hymn to Apollo*, which stands out among the hymns for its overt narrator. In his first clause, 'starting from you, Phoebus, I shall recall the famous deeds of men of long ago',<sup>2</sup> Apollonius draws attention to his role as a narrator by opening with the word 'starting' (*arkhomenos*), by addressing the god after whom he is named (Phoebus Apollo), and by using a first-person verb form (*mnēsomai*). At the same time

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. Albis 1996: 17–26; Clare 2002: 20–32; Clauss 1993: 14–25; DeForest 1994: 37–46; Goldhill 1991: 286–294; González 2000; Hunter 1993a: 119–129; Wheeler 2002.

<sup>2</sup> My translations of the *Argonautica* are based on Hunter 1993b, with adaptations.

he evokes the suggestion that the *Argonautica* should at least on one level be read as a hymn to Apollo, the god who is the cause of the poem's action (by giving the oracles which instigated the Argonauts' quest for the golden fleece), the cause of its narration (as the god of poetry and eponymous god of this poet), and the divine model of its main hero (Jason is associated with Apollo throughout the poem). Since the Homeric hymns were traditionally sung as proems to epic recitation, Apollonius' hymnic opening also conjures the fiction of an epic singer performing before a live audience.<sup>3</sup> Finally, by assuming the role of a hymnic narrator, Apollonius underscores that the *Argonautica*'s narrative goal is praising—praising both the gods and the 'famous deeds of men of long ago' (*palaigeneōn klea phōtōn*). This double goal—simultaneous celebration of human exploits and the gods—is shared with the victory odes of Pindar (→), whom we may regard as another model for the *Argonautica*'s narrator. This is suggested in the proem by lines 5–17, which provide the background to the Argonautic quest. Besides owing their content to Pindar's fourth *Pythian ode*, these lines also reflect Pindar's allusive narrative style of 'reminding' his narratees of a story which they already know (i.e. which is already famous) instead of telling it in full.

The narrator engages in open dialogue with his predecessors in the last section of the proem (18–22), which explicitly demarcates the main story and also contains a late address to the Muses:

As for the ship, this is still celebrated in the songs of earlier singers, who tell that it was built by Argos on the instructions of Athena. Now *I* shall narrate the lineage and names of the heroes, their voyages over the vast sea and all the deeds they accomplished on their wanderings. May the Muses be *hypophētores* [discussed below] of my song.

In the c. 6,000 lines that follow, the narrator faithfully follows this programme. He first provides a catalogue of the Argonauts as they gather in Iolcus. Then, after a series of departure scenes, the heroes sail out on their 'voyage over the vast sea' and we hear 'all the deeds they accomplished on their wanderings', as the narrator transports them in a linear and episodic fashion from Iolcus to Colchis and back again, in a narrative that covers a full sailing season (from spring till fall), singling out some parts of the story for scenic development<sup>4</sup> and summarizing

<sup>3</sup> This fiction is supported by a verbal allusion to a performance of the epic singer Demodocus in Homer (*klea phōtōn* ≅ *Odyssey* 8.73 *klea andrōn*).

<sup>4</sup> Notably the Argonauts' adventures in Colchis (3.1–4.240). Though clearly devel-

others. This setup implies a departure from the organization of the Homeric epics (centred on Achilles' wrath and Odysseus' homecoming respectively) in favour of the 'historical' organization of the so-called Cyclic epics (criticized in Aristotle's *Poetics*) and, indeed, historiography.<sup>5</sup> In 4.1773–1781 the narrative closes with an apostrophe of the heroes:

Be propitious, heroes, blessed race, and may these songs be from year to year sweeter to sing for humans. For now I have reached the famous conclusion of your struggles, since no other labour confronted you as you sailed up from Aegina (...); and on the shores of Pagasae you gladly debarked.

This epilogue takes the narrative programme to an explicit and abrupt end.<sup>6</sup> The narrator had set out to recall the Argonauts' deeds during their journey. Although this journey did not end at Aegina, there are no more deeds to be celebrated after this point, and therefore the narrative ends. Another narrative goal has also been reached. In the address 'be propitious' (*hilate*) and the expressed hope that 'these songs be from year to year sweeter to sing for men', the epilogue resumes the genre of the proem: hymn. However, what started out as a hymn to Apollo now ends as a hymn to the Argonauts. For the expression translated as 'blessed race' (*makarōn genos*) can mean 'descendants of gods' (almost all Argonauts had a divine ancestor), but it may also be taken as 'race of gods'.<sup>7</sup> The Argonauts, it is suggested, have become immortal; not because, as their one-time companion and all-time *exemplum*, Heracles, they have gained a seat on Olympus, but because Apollonius has immortalized them with his epic, which he prays will be 'sung' forever. Finally, just as the first word of the *Argonautica* ('starting') drew attention to the act of narrating, so does the very last. For although *eisapebēte* must in this context be translated as '(you) debarked', it also evokes the frequent use of the verb *apobainō* as 'to end'. Thus the end of the Argonauts' journey coincides with the end of the path of song.<sup>8</sup>

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oped with a view to their thematic potential, the longer episodes stand out as semi-independent stories (→ Herodotus).

<sup>5</sup> Hunter 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Contrast the unmarked endings of Homer (→), which, however, show implicit signs of closure. For similar signs in *Arg.* 4 see Theodorakopoulos 1998; on the epilogue further Albis 1996: 39–42, 118–120; Clare 2002: 159–162, 283–285; Goldhill 1991: 294–300; Hunter 1993a: 119–129; Wray 2000: 240–247.

<sup>7</sup> As suggested by 'for *humans*', added in enjambement.

<sup>8</sup> On the Argonauts' journey as a metaphor for the path of song see Albis 1996; Clare 2002; Wray 2000.



The story of the Argonauts' exploits constitutes only part of the *Argonautica*'s narrative. A large percentage of the poem is taken up with descriptions and digressions whose argument function, if it is not the narrator's and narratees' love of information for its own sake, is to visualize and/or authenticate the events of the main story, but which also help to create the complex web of thematic connections which unifies the poem. These descriptions and digressions stand out by their weight in comparison to the main story, notably in books 1, 2, and 4, where they take up as much as half of the narrator-text and exacerbate the fragmentation of the narrative which naturally arises from the episodic plot. Some have Homeric ancestry, such as the Catalogue of Argonauts (1.23–233), the *ekphrasis* of Jason's cloak (1.721–767), the many extended ('epic') similes, and external prolepses. However, the *Argonautica* also contains numerous geographical and ethnographical excursions, such as that on the customs of the Mossynoeci in 2.1015–1029 (as the Argonauts sail past them without landing). Passages of this type are relatively rare in Homer but very frequent in Herodotus (→). Entirely un-Homeric are the poem's numerous aetiological asides, which explain the 'origins' (*aitia*) of phenomena still extant at the time of narration, such as the Etesian winds which delay the Argonauts in the Bosphorus (2.498–528). These to some extent resemble the historical digressions of Herodotus, but they first and foremost recall Callimachus' *Aetia* (→), which is entirely organized around this theme.

### *The narrator*

Following Pseudo-Longinus' qualification of Herodotus as 'most Homeric' of all historians (*Subl.* 13.3; → Herodotus), we may perhaps qualify Apollonius as 'most Herodotean of all epicists'. It is tempting to describe the *Argonautica*'s narrator as 'Homer gone Herodotean' or 'Herodotus trying his hand at epic'. Nearly all his narrative modes and devices have their roots in either Homer or Herodotus. However, their implementation and combinations are unique to the *Argonautica*. This applies first and foremost to Apollonius' negotiation of the seemingly incompatible rhetorical strategies of the epic storyteller, who knows and states, inspired by the Muses, and the historian, who argues from evidence. The narrator of the *Argonautica* is both and does both (sometimes invoking Muses and *historiē* in one breath). In the following survey I will focus on his 'Homeric' interaction with the Muses, other divinities, and

his characters (1), and on his ‘Herodotean’ manifestations as organizer (2), ‘researcher’ (3), and commentator (4) of the narrative.

(1) The narrator’s interaction with the Muses is more elaborate and complex than in Homer. We have seen how at the end of his proem he asks the Muses to ‘be *hypophētores* of his song’. In this debated phrase<sup>9</sup> ‘*hypophēt(or)*’ seems to be the opposite of ‘prophet’. This disquietingly suggests that the divine Muses provide insight in the past in the way that divinely inspired prophets provide insight in the future: uncertainty remains. Prophecies usually require intellectual activity from mortals, which results in an interpretation that may or may not be correct. This analogy invites taking the narrator’s discourse with the Muses as a trope for Apollonius’ critical dialogue with his sources. But other passages resist such a reading. In his story of the origin of the name Drepane (‘Sickle’), the narrator piously apologizes to the Muses for telling a discrediting story about the gods (4.982–986):

At the head of the Ionian strait, set in the Ceraunian sea, there is a large and fertile island, under which, as you know [*dē*], they say [*phatis*] lies the sickle—your gracious pardon, Muses! it is against my will that I relate a story told by men of earlier generations—the sickle with which Cronus pitilessly cut off his father’s genitals.

Here the Muses are imagined as divine overseers, who are listening in, and might step in, on the narrator’s communication with his narratees. The argument that the story must be mentioned ‘because it is out there’ recalls Herodotus, as does the fact that it is followed by an alternative explanation.<sup>10</sup> The rhetoric of this passage is especially remarkable because the narrator elsewhere seems to use the Muses largely to *excuse* parts of the narrative which might seem improper or incredible. In 2.844–845 the words ‘and if, under the Muses’ influence, I must also tell *this* without constraints’ introduce a discrepancy between the story and present-day cult which might lead to disbelief. In 4.1381 a reference to the Muses opens a tale in which the Argonauts display a strength and perseverance which sits ill with their overall characterization (4.1381–1390):<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Albis 1996: 20–21; Clauss 1993: 17–18; Fusillo 1985: 365–366; González 2000; Hunter 1993a: 125, all with further discussion of Apollonius’ Muses.

<sup>10</sup> Ironically, this alternative is a very pious one, which could easily have been presented as the authoritative *aition*. For further discussion see e.g. Clare 2002: 266–267.

<sup>11</sup> The structuring Muse-invocations that open books 3 and 4 fit the pattern (3.1–4:

This tale is the Muses', and I sing obedient (*hupakouos*) to the maidens of Pieria. This report too I heard loud and clear that you—indeed [*dē*] much the greatest sons of kings!—by your own strength, by your own excellence placed your ship and all that your ship contained aloft upon your shoulders, and carried it for twelve days and an equal number of nights through the sandy deserts of Libya. Who would be able to tell of the suffering and wretchedness which was the fate of those men as they laboured? For sure they were of the blood of the immortals, such was the task which the violent constraint of necessity forced them to undertake.

Again it is attractive to read 'Muses' as 'sources'. This passage also contains the only apostrophe of the *Argonautica*'s heroes beside the epilogue, with which it shares its emphasis on the Argonauts' divine status ('of the blood of the immortals'). Apostrophe of individual characters is equally rare.<sup>12</sup>

Problematic events are also framed by addresses to other divine agents. Thus, the narrator 'mitigates' the guilt of Jason and Medea in murdering Medea's brother Apsyrtus by scolding the god of love, Eros, as the first cause of their atrocious deed (4.445–451):<sup>13</sup>

Wretched [*skhēli'*] Eros, great curse, greatly loathed by men! From you come deadly strives and grieving and troubles, and countless other pains on top of these swirl up. May you rear up, divine spirit, against my enemies' children as you were when you threw hateful folly in the heart of Medea. For how then [*dē*] did she slay Apsyrtus with bitter death as he came to see her? This was in fact [*gar*] the next part of my song.

(2) The last sentence of this passage shows the narrator as organizer of the text—with a phrase that suggests a realization that with this sudden emotional evaluation of an act yet untold, he may have moved too fast for his narratees. We have seen him direct his narrative in the first-person singular in the prologue ('I shall recall', 'now I shall narrate', 'my song') and in his Muse-'invocations' ('if ... I must also tell this

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the decidedly un-epic subject of Medea's love requires a 'specialist Muse', Erato; 4.1–5: an embarrassing conclusion as to why Medea accompanied Jason—voiced by the narrator himself despite 'now *you yourself*, goddess, relate ...'). Cf. furthermore 4.552–556 (introducing a geographically impossible journey).

<sup>12</sup> The apostrophe of Canthus in 4.1485 accomplishes the transition from the Argonauts' search for Heracles to the story of Canthus' death; that of Theras in 4.1763 allows a wordplay hinging on the formal identity of the vocative of his name and the name of the island called after him (*Thera*).

<sup>13</sup> Compare also 4.1673–1675, where the narrator invokes Zeus to witness his bewilderment over the method by which Medea kills Talos ('Father Zeus! My mind is all aflutter with astonishment!'). The apostrophe of Hera in 4.1199 mirrors the characters' invocation of Hera in a wedding.

without constraints', 'it is against my will that I relate', etc.). After digressions he sometimes redirects with a capping phrase: 'well, this is the story that is told among these people' (4.618; cf. 2.528); 'these things, however, happened in a long course of time' (4.1216; cf. 1.1309, 4.1764; → Herodotus). Elsewhere he breaks off in the middle of a story (→ Pindar), apparently deciding that, on second thoughts, it is too long and/or irrelevant to be finished: 'but why should I tell these stories about Aethalides all the way through?' (1.648–649); 'but these things would make me stray far from the path of my song' (1.1220).<sup>14</sup>

Reminiscent of Herodotus, but also in line with the narrator's overall piety (which in turn reflects his narrative goals), are explicit silences motivated by religious propriety (*themis*), for example when the Argonauts are initiated in the cult of the Cabiri of Samothrace, learning 'ordinances about which one may not speak' (*arrhētous themistas*, 1.917):

About these I shall tell nothing more—but hail to the island itself and to its indigenous gods, the guardians of those mysteries—about which it is not proper [*themis*] for us to sing. (1.919–921; cf. 4.247–250)

In the same spirit the narrator apologizes for statements that might offend a god. Whoever is bitten by the snake that killed the Argonaut Mopsus in Libya cannot escape death, 'not even if Paean, if it is proper (*themis*) for me to speak openly, should administer drugs' (4.1511–1512; cf. 2.708–710).

Finally, it should be noted that, for all his 'Herodotisms', Apollonius stays true to Homer in avoiding cross-references of the type 'as I have said earlier'/'as I will tell later'—with one exception. In 2.1090–1091 he uses a phatic question to remind his narratees of an earlier (riddling) part of the story: 'what was Phineus' intention in making the divine expedition of heroic men put in here?'

(3) Calling upon the Muses does not prevent the Apollonian narrator from embracing 'historiographical' authentication strategies as well. This leads to an ironic paradox: in his attempts to *persuade* his narratees of the veracity of his story, the narrator constantly undermines his authority as an inspired epic bard. What are we to think, for example,

<sup>14</sup> Readers are surely invited to wonder why among so many 'irrelevant' digressions, these specific stories are suppressed. In the case of the second story, how young Hylas became the protégé of Heracles, the reasons must be that it was told in full in Callimachus' *Aetia* (from which the reader may supply the details) and that it is potentially discrediting to Heracles.

when we hear that ‘Lynceus had the sharpest eyes of any mortal, that is to say, if the lore is true (*ei eteon ge pelei kleos*) that with ease he could see even down beneath the earth’ (1.153–155). The narrator, if instructed by the Muses, should *know* if this is true. Even more striking is Apollonius’ introduction, directly after the Muse-invocation of the proem, of the Argonauts’ own bard as ‘Orpheus to whom Calliope herself *is said* to have given birth near the Pimpleian height, after she had shared the bed of Thracian Oeagrus’ (1.23–25). One thinks that Calliope, being the muse of epic, should remember whether and where she gave birth to Orpheus, and whether she shared Oeagrus’ bed or that of someone else. She might have enlightened our bard.

References to sources abound in the *Argonautica*. In some cases these are quite elaborate. In Herodotean style, the narrator presents different versions of a story in 4.597–617 (two explanations for the presence of amber in the river Danube, one uncredited, the other told by ‘the Celts’) and 4.982–992; but unlike Herodotus, he does not weigh the relative merits of the competing stories or declare a preference. In general, the narrator does not discuss sources, but merely acknowledges their existence, usually with phrases of the type ‘*x* is (so) told/called’.<sup>15</sup> His spokesmen remain anonymous or are identified as a group of people, typically ‘locals’; information is never credited to specific individuals. With the anonymous ‘is said’ in the Catalogue entry on Orpheus compare for example ‘one mouth (of the Istrus) *they call* Narex, the other on the south the Lovely Mouth’ (4.312–313) and ‘this route ... *is now called* Jason’s Path’ (1.988; cf. e.g. 2.929, 4.309). Local spokesmen are invoked in ‘the spring which those who live nearby call Pēgai’ (i.e. ‘Springs’, 1.1221–1222; cf. e.g. 1.941; 2.506–507); ‘herdsmen’ are the source of a name in 3.277, ‘hunters’ in 4.175.<sup>16</sup>

Although the narrator often evokes the *possibility* of autopsy, he never claims to have actually seen evidence himself or to have interviewed witnesses in person, unlike Herodotus. Very much like Herodotus, however, he never gives references that imply written sources (contrast → Callimachus). Just as he consistently presents himself as a speaker, he strictly maintains the illusion that all information he relates derives

<sup>15</sup> Verb forms used are *kaleousi/ontes/ontai*, *kiklēskousi/ontai/etai*, (*meta*)*kleiousi/ontai*, *klēizetai*, *phasi kaleesthai/kleiesthai*, *pephatai*, *phatizetai*, *pephatistai*, *enepousi*, *hudeontai*.

<sup>16</sup> Interesting are also 3.1323, where ‘Pelasgian *akainē*’ stands for ‘the instrument which the Pelasgians call *akainē*’, and passages with a verb of speaking in the past tense which dates a source to the time of the story (such as ‘the people of the area *called* all these heroes Minyans’, 1.229–230; cf. 4.1149, 1514).

from, and belongs to, the oral tradition or ‘collective memory’ of the Hellenic world. Noteworthy are two references to ‘singers’, in the proem (‘as for the ship, this is still celebrated in the songs of earlier singers’, 1.18) and in the Catalogue (‘for singers tell that ... Caeneus was still alive’, 1.59–60). Although Apollonius here certainly refers to poets whose work was available in writing, it would be misleading to translate the Greek text’s *oidoi* as ‘poets’. In the fictional discourse of the poem, poets are still ‘singers’ and their poetry exists in performance. The *Argonautica* itself, according to the rhetoric of the epilogue (‘may these songs be from year to year sweeter to sing for humans’, 4.1773–1775), will become part of the same oral tradition.

The narrator does not engage in the elaborate arguments that we find in Herodotus. Yet many small signs show that his tale is the result of critical thinking. In 1.196 *oiō* ‘I think’ (not found in narrator-text in Homer) conveys the narrator’s estimation of the potential of young Meleager as a personal opinion: ‘he would have surpassed all the others, I think, but for Heracles, if he had remained for only one more year to come of age among the Aetolians’. He also regularly uses the particle *pou* ‘I suppose’ (also absent from the Homeric narrator-text) to mark statements as assumptions, temporarily ‘forgetting’ his omniscience—either regarding the words, thoughts, and feelings of his characters (‘after their release from chilling fear I suppose [*pou*] the Argonauts breathed more easily’, 2.607) or regarding the facts of his story (1.972–975):<sup>17</sup>

He [Cyzicus] too, I suppose (*pou*), was just sprouting the first beard of manhood. In any case (*nu*) he had not yet been blessed with children, but his wife ... was untouched by the pains of child-bearing.

Such ‘micro-arguments’ conducted with interactive particles (here: *pou*, *nu*) are common in the *Argonautica*.

(4) The narrator evaluates characters and events much more frequently than Homer: the narrator-text of the *Argonautica* contains numerous evaluative terms, including many words that are (almost) exclusively used by characters in Homer.<sup>18</sup> Apart from offering the occasional

<sup>17</sup> For *pou* of assumed thoughts, words, facts cf. also 1.636, 996, 1023, 1037, 1140, 1222, 2.1028, 3.926, 4.557, 1457, 1397 (with 1436, where a character states what the narrator assumed ...). It also appears in similes to suggest the ‘arbitrariness’ of a chosen vehicle or its details: 1.537, 3.758, 1283, 1399.

<sup>18</sup> Hunter 1993a: 105–111. Apollonius also adopts the ‘generic’ qualifications that

‘unbiased’ judgment (Caeneus was ‘a noble warrior but not better than his father’, 1.58; the killer of Canthus ‘was by no means a lesser man’, 4.1489), he dispenses praise and blame in accordance with his ‘hymnic’ goal: the Argonauts are praised, criticized is whoever sins against the laws of the gods and opposes the Argonauts (crimes which often coincide).

Throughout the poem the narrator presents the Argonauts as models of religious observance. He lets them build altars and perform sacrifices and rites wherever they go, and constantly comments that their behaviour is ‘proper’ (*themis*). When celebrating the wedding of Jason and Medea ‘they prepared a mixing-bowl of wine in honour of the blessed gods, as is proper (*hē themis*), and with correct ritual (*euageōs*) brought sheep to the altar’ (4.1128–1129); after murdering Apsyrtus, Jason ‘cut off the dead man’s extremities; three times he licked the blood, and three times he spat the pollution out from his teeth, as is the proper way (*hē themis*) for killers seeking to expiate murder by treachery’ (4.477–479). In the last example, the emphasis on religious observance is particularly remarkable: the killing of Apsyrtus and the mutilation of his corpse are not beyond reproach. The narrator, however, insists on evaluating his heroes’ behaviour in a positive way. Where this would be hard to do, he withholds comment.

The narrator’s preoccupation with *themis* also appears from his interest in customs (*themistes*) which are at variance with those practised by Greeks (and sanctioned by the gods). If the Argonauts do not suffer harm from such customs, the narrator presents them without moralizing judgments, as in his description of the Mossynoeci (2.1018–1022):

The customs of these people are quite at variance. Everything that it is proper to do openly, whether in the public assembly or in the marketplace, all of this they carry out at home; everything that *we* do in our houses, this they do out in the streets and without incurring censure for it.

When different ethics pose a danger to the Argonauts, the narrator does not spare his critique, as in his introduction of the Bebrycian king Amycus (2.1–9):

There were the stalls and lodge of Amycus, the *arrogant* king of the Bebrycians (...), most *outrageous* of men, who imposed upon his guests

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Homer *does* use, e.g. *nēpios/oi* ‘the poor fool(s)!’ (2.66, 137, 4.875), *skhetlios/oi/ē* ‘the wretched man/men/woman!’ (1.1302, 2.1028; 3.1133; 4.445, 916, 1524).

an *improper* ordinance (...). At that occasion too (...) he *insolently scorned* to inquire of the Argonauts' mission and identity (...)

The Lemnian women and Amazons receive similar introductions (1.609–619, 2.985–989).

Occasionally, narratorial comments take the form of gnomic utterances. These all breathe a pessimistic spirit. A man in a simile wanders far from his own land 'as indeed *we* wretched men often do wander' (2.541–542). The wedding of Jason and Medea is both a joyful occasion and a sad one, because 'necessity forced them to lie together at that time. It is a fact that *we* tribes of suffering men never plant our feet firmly upon the path of joy, but there is ever some bitter pain to keep company with our delight' (4.1165–1167).<sup>19</sup>

### *The narratees*

Although the narrator does not explicitly identify his audience, it is clear for example from his 'sociological' comments (above) that he assumes that his narratees adhere to Greek customs and respect the Greek gods. This broadly defines them as virtuous inhabitants of the Hellenized world, an audience 'bound' to admire, and be proud of, the exploits of the famous Greek heroes of the past.

First-person plurals may create an effect of 'shared focalization'. Apart from 2.1021, 542, 4.1166 (above), see e.g. 'everything that *we* do in our houses' (2.1021); 'as indeed *we* wretched men often do wander' (2.542). The narrator also often invites his narratees to cross the distance between here and now and there and then, and to imagine themselves on the scene with the poem's characters on that long ago day. This is sometimes achieved by simple means: the boxers Amycus and Polydeuces are 'neither in physique nor in stature similar *to behold*' (2.37); the wings of the Boreads are 'a great marvel *to see*' (1.220). Sometimes focalization is transferred to characters who, like the narratees, witness the events of the story: 'on that day all the gods looked from heaven upon the ship and upon the generation of half-gods who sailed the sea, best of all men' (1.547–549). The narratees may also recognize themselves in 'anonymous eye-witnesses' and 'anonymous inter-

<sup>19</sup> For similar comments see 1.82, 458–459 (only apparently more optimistic), 1035–1036; 4.1504.



locutors': 'if someone were to count all branches (of the river Thermodon), he would find them four short of a hundred' (2.974–975; → Herodotus); 'this is what each citizen said as he saw (the Argonauts) rushing forward with their weapons' (1.240–241; → Homer). Finally, there is the 'indefinite second-person' device. When the Argonauts face a giant wave at the entrance of the Bosphorus, the narratees are made to go through this ordeal (2.171–176):

*You* would say that there was no escape from a miserable fate, as the violent wave hangs like a cloud over the middle of the ship. But it drops if *you* happen to have an excellent pilot. So the Argonauts too came through by the skill of Tiphys—unharmd but terrified.

Elsewhere they are invited to imagine what no character actually experiences, such as the spectacle of the Planctae when Hephaestus' furnace was still clouding up the air: 'you would not have seen the rays of the sun' (4.927–928). Here the narratees are made to consider how badly the Argonauts' passage of the Planctae might have ended if Hephaestus had not extinguished his fire<sup>20</sup>—compare the 'if not'-passages of Homer (→), which likewise suggest what *might* have happened (if not ...). Such passages are also common in the *Argonautica*: the sons of Boreas would have killed the Harpies 'if swift Iris had not seen (...) and checked them' (2.284–287); the Argonauts would have delayed in Mariandynia even longer 'if Hera had not put great boldness into Ancaeus' (2.864–866).<sup>21</sup>

The narrator most pervasively engages his narratees' expectations, and anticipates their reactions, in digressive passages. The Catalogue of Argonauts, for example, provides innumerable examples (1.23–233). When the narrator introduces Eurytion and Erybotes, he seems to realize as he is speaking that his words may need clarification (1.71–74):

In the group too were Eurytion and bold Erybotes, one the son of Teleon, the other of Irus son of Actor—that is to say (*ētoi*): glorious Erybotes was the son of Teleon, Eurytion the son of Irus —

and not the other way around, as 'the one ... the other' (*ho men ... ho de*) suggests. The clause 'not even the son of mighty Pelias himself (...) wished to remain in his father's house' (1.224–226, 'presentation through negation'), evokes and contradicts the expectation that Pelias'

<sup>20</sup> Other second-person forms occur in 1.726, 765/767; 3.1265 (cf. 3.1044); 4.238 (simile), 429 (ecphrasis), 997. See Byre 1991.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. 1.493, 863, 1300, 2.993, 3.1142, 4.22, 905, 1653; similarly figures e.g. in 4.638–639, 1305–1309.

son would not have wanted to take part in what his father had devised as a deadly undertaking. Heracles enters the poem in the same way: ‘not even the mighty Heracles (...), so we are informed, scorned Jason’s needs’ (1.122–123). Here it seems hard to deny that the expectations addressed are not only based on reasoning (the great Heracles might have been too busy or unwilling to join lesser heroes for an expedition) but also on literature: in earlier *Argonauticas* Heracles was not always part of the crew. ‘We are informed’ (*peuthometha*) acknowledges the existence of such sources—and implicates the narratees in the suppression of alternative accounts.<sup>22</sup> One step further is the narrator’s explanation that the prophet Idmon ‘was *not really* a son of Abas *but rather* a son of Apollo himself’ (1.142). This makes no sense at all unless we already know that Idmon is sometimes said to be a son of Abas, for the *narrator* has not told us. In other words, Apollonius tends to construct complex communicative situations. Compare also, for example, the following digression on the tomb of Idmon, an Argonaut killed on the way to Colchis (2.841–855):

And as you know (*dē toi*), the tomb of this man rises in that land. On it is a marker that is visible also to people of later generations: a ship’s roller made from wild olive, green with leaves. It lies just below Cape Acherusia. And if, under the Muses’ influence, I must also tell this without constraints: Phoebus instructed the Boeotians and the Nisaeans to pay honours to this man as ‘Protector of the City’ and to establish a city around this roller of ancient wild olive. But rather than the descendant of god-fearing Aeolus, Idmon, it is Agamestor whom they glorify to the present day.

So who else died, then (*dē*)? Because once more at that time the heroes raised up a tomb over a lost companion—for *two* markers of those men may still be seen. It was the son of Hagnias, Tiphys, who died, so they say [*phatis*]; he was not fated to sail any further.

Notable in this and other aetiological passages are expressions that imply a great distance in time and space between the world of the narrator and narratees and that of the story. One of these expressions, ‘ancient wild olive’ (*palaigeneos*), recalls ‘the famous deeds of *ancient* men’ (*palaigeneōn*) in the poem’s first line. Distance is also created by the temporal adverb *tote*, ‘at *that* time’, and by the pronoun for remote

<sup>22</sup> Compare 1.133–138, where 135 *idmen*, ‘we know’, makes the narratees accomplices to the invention of four otherwise unattested generations of Danaids, in a passage where the narrator apparently ‘sets the narratees straight’ as in 1.71–74 (cf. esp. 134 *ē gar*).

deixis, *keinos*, in the phrases ‘in *that* land’ and ‘*those* men’ (→ Homer).<sup>23</sup> Other expressions explicitly link the remote past with the time of narration (the ‘continuance’ motif): ‘to the present day’, ‘visible also to people of later generations’, and ‘may still be seen’.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the narrator asks a question, reasons, adduces the Muses and sources, and engages his narratees’ expectations with interactive particles. The first words of the passage, *kai dē toi*, translated as ‘and as you know’, mark what follows as an elaboration upon what went before (i.e. a digression, *kai*), call for the narratees’ special attention (*toi*), and suggest that what follows should not come as a surprise to them (*dē*).<sup>25</sup> An even more complicated rhetoric of anticipation is implied by the second paragraph. ‘So who else died, then?’ (*tis gar dē thanen allos*).<sup>26</sup> Why this question should (*dē*) occur is explained in the next two clauses, which lead back to the evidence, which has an implication, which evokes a question—evidence: there are *two* tombs at the site > implication: two Argonauts died > known: Idmon died; question: who else died? > answer: Tiphys died.

The expressions ‘to be seen’ and ‘so they say’ create an interesting problem of perspective: to whose perception do these verbs refer, and when, where, and how does it take place? In other words, what communicative situation is imagined here? I would suggest that there is no single answer, but that Apollonius ‘contaminates’ a number of fictional communicative situations. In this aetiological context it is hard not to be reminded of the narrative framework of the first half of Callimachus’ *Aetia* (→), where the narrator interviews the Muses, asking them to explain the origin of phenomena (‘why, Muses, is it that ...’). But the lines also display the ‘rhetoric of *enargeia*’ (‘placing before the eyes’), the illusion that the narratees are travelling the route of the Argo with the narrator as their guide. In this setup the attention of the narratees is fixed on the tombs because the narrator is pointing them out (‘to be seen’) and telling the story that goes with them, for which he relies on a source (‘they say’). Also evoked is the ‘rhetoric of

<sup>23</sup> Compare *keinēi aiēi* ‘in that (far) land’ at 4.534; *ēmati/ēmar keinōi/o* ‘on/during that day (in the past)’ at 1.547, 1070–1071; 2.760, 1097; 3.850, 922.

<sup>24</sup> Greek *eiseti nun* and *kai opsigonoisin idesthai* (cf. 1.1062; 4.252) and *eti phainetai*. Typical expressions linking past to present are (*eis*)*eti* (*nun*), *exeti* (*keinou*), *ex hou*, (*es*)*aiei/aien*.

<sup>25</sup> Interactional particles regularly used by the narrator include *mēn*, *kaitoi*, *ē*, *ētoi*, *ē gar*, and *mentoi*.

<sup>26</sup> For similar questions see 2.1090–1092 and (explicitly addressed to the Muses) 4.552–556.

personal observation and communication' of Herodotus—though it is not taken to the point where the narrator actually claims personally to have visited Heraclea Pontica (autopsy) and asked questions about the tombs. It is certainly suggested, however, that the narratees *could* go and verify the narrator's words. Finally, there is the rhetoric of shared tradition: narrator and narratees both know about the tombs because they know the same stories—according to the fiction of the *Argonautica*: from hearing poems. In the actual context, however, in which the *Argonautica* was produced and first received, 'they say' means 'they write', 'to be seen' is entirely hypothetical, and the whole digression is a bonding exercise for Apollonius and his readers, who together indulge their encyclopedic interests and assert their erudition. Yet one wonders how many of Apollonius' contemporary readers actually knew about the two tombs before they encountered this passage (the 'rhetoric of shared reading' is surely also to some extent a fiction).

*Secondary narrators and narratorial alter egos*

Characters speak 45 per cent of the *Iliad* and 67 per cent of the *Odyssey*, but only 29 per cent of the *Argonautica*, of which the largest part is taken up by dialogue. In other words, the poem's narrator tends to speak more in his own voice than Homer, and less often yields the floor to secondary narrators.<sup>27</sup> Interesting in this respect are several passages where the narrator 'usurps' a potential embedded narrative, such as his report of Jason's tale to king Lycus, which summarizes the entire narrative up to this point (2.762–771). It is attractive to think that Jason is here robbed of a chance to act the role of Homer's Odysseus, who is allowed to narrate his own adventures at length, and that Apollonius is hinting at the possibility of an *Argonautica* focalized by its main hero. Details in the narrator's report may indeed be attributed to the focalization of Jason, who is trying to impress his host Lycus and presents embarrassing facts in a favourable light. However, other embellishments must be attributed to the narrator who, as we have seen, is also inclined to give a positive spin to the Argonauts' deeds.<sup>28</sup> This convergence of the

<sup>27</sup> The resulting loss of dramatization is compensated by the interaction between narrator and narratees, and by a significant increase in embedded focalization and indirect speech (Fusillo 2001).

<sup>28</sup> The clearest example is the statement that Jason told Lycus 'all they had *done* at

focalization of narrator and character is illustrative of a general tendency: virtually all secondary narrators of the poem to some extent reflect the primary narrator. In the passage under discussion this mirroring is especially clear: Jason reiterates the main narrative, his first words echo the poem's proem, and his narratee reacts as if he had been listening to an inspired bard ('as Lycus heard Jason's story unfold in due order, his spirit was bewitched': 771). Other character-narratives recall the primary narrative in other ways. Lycus tells Jason the *aition* of games celebrated at Heraclea (2.780–785); Jason describes Thessaly to Medea in Herodotean style (3.1085–1095); and the greatest scholar of all is Argus, son of Phrixus, who, setting out to explain an alternative route from the Black Sea to Greece, launches into a long mytho-geographical excursion that leads back to the dawn of human civilization (4.257–293; cf. also 2.1141–1156, 1200–1215).

However, the narrator's true text-internal *alter egos* are the Argonauts' own inspired singer, Orpheus, and the seer Phineus, who echo Homer's (→) Demodocus, Phemius, and Tiresias also in this metanarrative role. Orpheus, son of the Muse Calliope, is significantly the first Argonaut listed in the Catalogue, directly after the Muse-invocation that closes the proem (1.23–32). The position and exceptional length of Orpheus' 'lemma' may be read as a metanarrative indication of the 'primacy of the narrator' in the poem. Moreover, it is suggested by the emphasis on Orpheus' power to cast a spell, and by the indication of his moral qualities implied by the fact that Jason recruits him 'in obedience to the urgings of [his teacher] Chiron', how the poem's narrator would like to see himself honoured by his narratees (represented by 'the hard mountain rocks' of barbarian Thrace moved by Orpheus' lyre, i.e. not the easiest audience): as a spiritual guide with enchanting powers. Moreover, Orpheus' mother is the Muse of epic, and Orpheus himself is, like Apollonius, a 'man of Apollo' by profession and birth (because according to one tradition he was Apollo's son). All this suggests that with Orpheus, the narrator is the first man to step on board the Argo to be Jason's trusted helper—on the path of his quest, the path of song, and the road to immortality. On this journey he will, hopefully, likewise enchant his narratees.<sup>29</sup>

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Dolionian Cyzicus': *Jason* cannot possibly have covered up the embarrassing fact that at Cyzicus the Argonauts had *killed* their royal host.

<sup>29</sup> Meanwhile there is a striking contrast between the 'naïve' spell, which the poem here and elsewhere presents as the (desired) effect of narration, and the intellectual

Though Orpheus' metanarrative role corresponds to that of Phemius and Demodocus, the narrator 'handles' him in a different way. This is signalled, for example, by the way in which he presents Orpheus' first song (1.496–511). The narrator of the *Odyssey* always introduces his bards' words in indirect speech ('he sang how ...'), but after a few lines shifts to the free style—a setup that allows the voices of narrator and text-internal singer to blend naturally (→ Homer). Apollonius, however, maintains the indirect speech for no less than eleven lines before finally switching to the free style. This is probably not merely an experiment with indirect speech, but a metanarrative statement. The narrator of the *Argonautica* does *not* want his voice to converge with that of the intratextual singer. He retains control over the narrative while the singer retains responsibility for his song. This arrangement at one point causes an amusing authority crisis (2.705–710):

[Orpheus sang] how once at the foot of the rocky ridge of Parnassus the god [Apollo] killed the monster Delphyne with his bow, when a young boy still in his nakedness, still rejoicing in long curls—be gracious! *Eternally*, lord, your hair is uncut, *eternally* it remains unravaged. So does holy law (*themis*) proclaim, for only Leto herself ... may hold it in her dear hands.

Who is responsible for the sacrilege of suggesting that Apollo's hair was at some time cut ('*still* rejoicing in long curls')? Does the narrator correct his own clumsy representation of Orpheus' song or is the song itself at fault? It seems impossible to decide, but what is clear is that both ideas are equally inconceivable in Homer. The context of this song is also illustrative of Orpheus' position within the poem's cast of characters. He functions as a mediator between the Argonauts and the gods, acting as their master of ceremonies in contexts that require religious action—in this case an epiphany of Apollo. In his song Orpheus provides the origin (*aition*) of the name of Apollo's main cult site, Delphi, and of the custom of hymning Apollo with the word *hiepaian*, thus mirroring the primary narrator as a singer of *aitia* and of a hymn to Apollo. In the 'normal' action of the story Orpheus takes no part. Like the narrator, he is not an actor but an observer, commentator, and spiritual guide.<sup>30</sup>

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involvement which Apollonius the author requires from his readers if they are to be equally impressed.

<sup>30</sup> In this respect Orpheus shows closer resemblance to the 'wise adviser' self-images of Herodotus (→) than to Homer's Phemius and Demodocus, who are primarily

Unlike Orpheus, the narrator's other major *alter ego*, the seer Phineus,<sup>31</sup> receives ample opportunity to voice his own words. Phineus' first words and his invocation of Apollo in 2.209–214 echo the narrator's proem, proving his 'Apollonian' omniscience to primary and secondary narratees alike. As he describes his own fate (2.215–239), he invokes all his rhetorical skills to secure the Argonauts' assistance—and conveniently omits that the Harpies who plague him are a punishment incurred for abusing his omniscience. His secondary narratees sense the truth which the primary narratees already know, because the narrator has just given them *his* account of the story (2.178–193). Repetition of information is in fact very common in the *Argonautica*. Many stories and facts are related more than once, by different narrators, with a different focalization, and with a different goal. Where, as here, the character's version follows that of the narrator, the primary narratees are led to believe that they can judge the character's words against the 'facts'. Yet this only holds true to a certain point, because the narrator's account is not necessarily entirely objective either: he has his own agenda and pre-occupations (which imply a negative view of sacrilegious persons such as Phineus).<sup>32</sup>

Phineus' potential as a narratorial self-image is fully developed in the long monologue (2.311–425) in which he gives the Argonauts instructions for their journey to Colchis, exploiting his 'Apollonian' omniscience. In exploring the device of prolepsis by an omniscient character-narrator, Apollonius' goes far beyond his Homeric model, Tiresias' prophecy in *Odyssey* 11. While Tiresias provides a bare outline of events to come, Phineus, after he has provided detailed instructions for passing the Clashing Rocks, offers an equally detailed description of the people and places which the Argonauts will pass along the Black Sea coast, in a style which is almost undistinguishable from that of the primary narrator. In fact, his ethnographical, geographical, and aetiological excursions are so adequate that when the Argonauts reach the places he described, the narrator sometimes provides *less* detail, merely rephrases

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entertainers of their superiors. For other reported songs of Orpheus see 1.496–515, 569–579; and 4.903–911. See further Busch 1993; Clare 2002: 231–260; Clauss 1993: 26–32, 66–95; Fusillo 1985: 60–63; Hunter 1993a: 120–121, 148–151; Nelis 1992; Pietsch 1999.

<sup>31</sup> E.g. Clare 2002: 74–83; Feeney 1991: 60–75; Hunter 1993a: 90–95; Manakidou 1995.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. the double presentation of the Lemnian women (1.609–639: 657–707) and Amycus (2.1–10: 11–18).

Phineus' words or even verbally repeats them. There is indeed little honour to be gained in retracing the steps of a narrator of the same interests and authority. The close similarities between the two accounts have the effect of mutually confirming their reliability. Such confirmation is welcome, because the authority of both narrators is open to question. The primary narrator is as much a fallible historiographer as he is an inspired epic singer; and Phineus explicitly forewarns the Argonauts that the rules of prophecy prevent him from telling *exactly* what will be (2.311–316):

Listen to me now. It is not permitted (*ou themis*) for you to know everything precisely, but as much as is pleasing to the gods I will not conceal. I have already before made a mistake regarding the purpose of Zeus by recklessly prophesying it in order and to the end. For this is the way he himself wants it: that to humans the god-speak of prophecy be revealed imperfectly, so that they will still be ignorant of part of the gods' purpose.

The metanarrative implications of this passage are hard to deny, if difficult to pin down. At any rate, it is tempting to see the prophet's desire and, at the same time, inability to 'tell everything precisely', 'in order and to the end', as reflecting a dilemma faced by the '*hypophet-backed*' narrator of the past.<sup>33</sup>

### *Conclusion*

We have seen that the narrator of the *Argonautica* engages in an overt, self-conscious, pervasive, and variegated dialogue with his narratees, his sources, and the Muses, in which he displays a distinct personality. This personality can be understood from the poem's narrative goal, the literary tradition that it reflects, and the social-intellectual milieu in which it was created. Congruous with his aim of 'hymning' the Argonauts and Apollo, the narrator shows a strong awe for the gods and for the heroes of the past about whom he narrates, and an outspoken disapproval of those who oppose either. He shows characteristics of the divinely inspired epic bard and hymnic and Pindaric singers of praise, which evoke the illusion that the *Argonautica* is conceived and performed in front of an enchanted live audience. But at the same time the poem operates other communicative fictions, which are to a vari-

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<sup>33</sup> Compare also Phineus' words in 2.388–391, which (beside Call. *Aet.* fr. 1.3) echo the narrator's words in 1.648–649 and 1.915–917.



ous degree incongruous with the fiction of epic performance and with each other, and are indebted to other models. In treating the Muses as his interlocutors, the Apollonian narrator resembles the narrator of Callimachus' *Aetia* (→). He appears as a Herodotean 'oral historian' in his frequent references to physical evidence and (oral) sources, and in general in his critical attitude and use of 'historiographical' authentication strategies (diametrically opposed to those of the epic bard). He also appears as an 'Alexandrian' scholar who seizes every opportunity to parade his learning in front of his narratees, whom he engages in scholarly discourse—with the crucial difference that there is no mention of reading and writing, but merely of hearing, seeing, speaking, and singing. This emphasis on face-to-face communication creates an intimacy that compensates for the writer's physical distance from his readers in the actual reception context for which the *Argonautica* is ultimately intended.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CALLIMACHUS

*M.A. Harder*

Apart from the hymns and epigrams the work of Callimachus has been preserved only in fragments and the corpus studied for this chapter is comparatively small.<sup>1</sup> Even so, Callimachus' work presents an important step in the history of ancient Greek narrative, because it develops and modifies techniques of earlier authors, engages in a dialogue with contemporary poetry, and altogether shows a high degree of self-conscious sophistication.

#### *Narrators*

What kind of narrators do we find and how do they manifest themselves in the text of Callimachus? The situation varies according to the genre in which they appear.

In the hymns there is usually an overt narrator who gives information about his motivation for singing about a certain god (*hh.* 1, 3, and 4) or about an occasion in which he/she is actually taking part while telling the story (*hh.* 2, 5, and 6; the so-called mimetic hymns). As is pointed out in the introduction to this volume, in the second group we may postulate a suppressed primary narrator and consider the narrator as secondary.

In *h.* 4 there is an external primary narrator, who at the beginning of the poem is briefly characterized as a singer-poet who feels obliged to sing of Delos in order to win Apollo's favour:

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<sup>1</sup> The corpus consists of the hymns and the *Aetia* (particularly the larger fragments). Other narrative texts, like the *Hecale* and *Iambi* fr.191 have been adduced when relevant (for a general narratological analysis of the *Hecale* see Lynn 1995: 7–117). As the corpus is small and fragmentary, conclusions must be treated with some caution. For the text of Callimachus see Pfeiffer 1949–1953; Lloyd-Jones–Parsons 1983 (fragments quoted from this edition are indicated with *SH*); Hollis 1990.

When, my soul, will you sing of holy  
 Delos, the nurse of Apollo? Truly all the  
 Cyclades, which are the most holy islands in the sea,  
 are well served with songs, but Delos wants to carry the first prize  
 from the Muses, because Phoebus, the master of song,  
 was first washed and wrapped and praised by her.  
 Just as the Muses hate the singer who does not sing  
 of Pimpleia, Phoebus hates the man who forgets Delos.  
 I shall now give a portion of my song to Delos, in order that  
 Cynthian Apollo will praise me because I care for his dear nurse.  
(h. 4.1–10)<sup>2</sup>

In this passage Callimachus gives his narrator more of a *persona* than was usual in the Homeric hymns (→), where we usually find only one formulaic line to announce the narrator's intentions or a request to the Muse to sing, although the address of the Delian chorus in *h. Ap.* 165ff. provides an example how the figure of the hymnic singer may be elaborated and may have inspired Callimachus. In his poems the rudimentary *persona* of the Homeric hymns seems to have acquired a more developed personality, constructed in such a way that it draws attention to the responsibilities of the hymnic singer towards his patron-god and to the function of the genre in celebrating the gods. In the actual narrative (about Leto's search for a place where she can give birth to Apollo) the narrator is occasionally visible, as in the various apostrophes of characters in his story (mainly Delos, as the hymn's subject, in 27–55, but also Hera in 106–107 and 215–216), and particularly in the invocation of the Muses in 82–85, where we get a glimpse of the narrator asking and receiving information which is strictly speaking outside the scope of the hymn:

Tell me, Muses, my goddesses,  
 is it true that the oaks were born when the Nymphs were born?  
 'The Nymphs rejoice when rain feeds the oaks,  
 but the Nymphs cry when the oaks have lost their leaves.'<sup>3</sup>

Apart from this digression the narrator is practically omniscient and his narration is subsequent (as can be seen in the references to the past in 39–40, 49 and 253–254), apart from 166–190, where Apollo as

<sup>2</sup> Unless indicated otherwise the translations are my own.

<sup>3</sup> The punctuation as established by modern scholars implies that in 84–85 the Muses' answer is given in direct discourse and that, as in *Aetia* 1–2 (on which see below), the idea of a dialogue between a poet which the Muse-invocations in Homer and Hesiod suggest, was taken literally. See further Mineur 1984: 117–118; Harder 1988: 3–14.

a secondary narrator tells about the war with the Celts in the future. At the end of the hymn the narrator briefly reappears in the hymnic farewell in 325–326, which again recalls the conventions of the Homeric hymns.

In *h.* 3 we are dealing with a similarly overt external primary narrator: 1 gives a brief motivation for the song; next, we find explanations (47–48, 172, 244–245), evaluative and metanarrative comments (64, 136–137, 255), apostrophes of Artemis, which form part of an extended passage of second-person narration (72–190), and instances of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ motif (77, 145). As in *h.* 4, there are also brief ‘dialogues’ in which the narrator asks for information: a series of three questions and answers in 113–135 (where the first answer may be attributed to Artemis, but the second and third, which refer to the goddess in the second person, most likely derive from the narrator himself) and a series of brief questions in 183–186, a passage which comes close to the ‘*aporia*’ motif:

Which island, which kind of mountain pleased you most?  
Which harbour, which kind of town? Which nymph did you love  
most of all and which kind of heroines did you take as companions?  
You must tell me that, goddess, and I shall sing about it to the others.  
You loved ...

At the end of the hymn there is a conventional hymnic farewell and request to receive the song favourably (268), but the farewell is preceded by two other occurrences of *khaire* in 225 and 259, each followed by a series of brief references to (other) stories from Artemis’ career.

In *h.* 1 we are again dealing with an overt external narrator: the motivation for the song in 1–2 includes a slight hint of the occasion at which one should celebrate Zeus (libations), but that occasion is not referred to again in the rest of the poem. Other signs of the narrator include frequent apostrophes of Zeus, rhetorical questions (1–3, 62–63, 75, 92–93), the ‘*aporia*’ motif (4–5), anonymous spokesmen, including poets (14, 39, 45, 51, 59–60), instances of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ motif (18–20, 40–41), evaluative and metanarrative comments (63–64, 65, 68–70, 85–87), a quotation from Hesiod (79), and a typical hymnic farewell (91–96). Taken together, the narrators of *Hymns* 1, 3, and 4 display an interesting mixture of epic, hymnic, and historiographical (→ Herodotus) aspects.

The ‘mimetic’ hymns *hh.* 2, 5 and 6 have a dialogical frame, and the stories of Tiresias (*h.* 5.57–136), Erysichthon (*h.* 6.24–117), and—perhaps—the episodes from Apollo’s career (*h.* 2.58–112) are recounted

by a kind of ‘master (or mistress) of ceremonies’,<sup>4</sup> who at the beginning and end of the poems gives instructions to young men (*h.* 2) and women (*hh.* 5 and 6), who seem to be participating in a ritual event, e.g.:

You bathpourers of Pallas, come out everyone,  
come out. The mares just now began to neigh,  
I heard the sacred mares; the goddess too is ready to come.  
Hasten, fair women of Argos, hasten now. (*h.* 5.1–4)<sup>5</sup>

Athena really comes now, so make welcome  
the goddess, girls, whose duty the task is,  
with acclamation, with praying, with joyous answering cries.  
Hail, goddess, look after Inachian Argos.  
Hail as you drive out, and as you drive back in again  
your horses, and protect the whole Argive estate. (*h.* 5.137–142)

These secondary narrators are less visible than in *h.* 4: there are no apostrophes, apart from the pathetic address of Erysichthon’s mother in *h.* 6.83 (the address of the bathpourers in *h.* 5.134 and to Demeter in *h.* 6.116–117 signal the return to the ritual frame). Sometimes, however, there are brief evaluative comments, as in *h.* 5.78 ‘poor fool’ (about Tiresias unwittingly seeing the naked Athena) and 6.36 ‘shamelessly’ (about Erysichthon’s men rushing into Demeter’s sacred grove).<sup>6</sup> In *h.* 2 the situation is more complex, in that it is not entirely clear whether the voice that tells about Apollo must be attributed to the (secondary) narrator or to the chorus of young men functioning as a tertiary narrator. In 8 the narrator urges the young men to sing, in 16 he praises them for having started the music, in 17–21 he asks the other participants to be silent, and then in 25 to shout the ritual cry *hiē hiē* for Apollo (the addressee of this request is not entirely clear), and in 28–31 he concludes with a promise that Apollo will honour the chorus, who in return will sing about him for more than one day. Although a change of voice in 32, where the praise of Apollo begins, is not made explicit, it is at least hinted at by the preceding passage and the effect is that the voices (of narrator and young men) merge. In 97 (‘we hear *hiē hiē paizon*’) it seems most likely that the voice is that of the secondary narrator again, but the ‘we’ could also be the chorus hearing

<sup>4</sup> For this description of the poetic *persona* in these hymns see Hopkinson 1984: 3 n. 2. On the ‘mimetic’ hymns in general see e.g. Hopkinson 1984: 11 n. 4; Bulloch 1985: 5–8; Harder 1992: 384–394; Depew 1993: 57–77. One may compare the mimetic poems in Theocritus (→).

<sup>5</sup> Translations from *h.* 5 are taken from Bulloch 1985.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. also *h.* 6.56 and 68.

the other participants joining in. The effect of this merging of voices may be to suggest an enthusiastic crowd taking part in the celebration of Apollo, and it recalls the indeterminacy of the encomiastic voice in Pindar and Bacchylides (→). In contrast with *hh.* 5 and 6 the narrative parts of this hymn contain several apostrophes of Apollo (particularly in 65–104, about the foundation of Cyrene and the origin of the ritual cry).

In all the hymns the narrators draw attention to the fact that they depend on a long tradition: in *h.* 4.28–54 the narrator states that there are already many songs about Delos, asks the island what it would like to hear, and then suggests that he should tell how, after a long period of floating in the sea, the island was eventually allowed to settle in a fixed position because it received Leto for the birth of Apollo. This passage recalls the ‘*aporia*’ motif, which, as in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (→), suggests the quantity of stories available to the narrator. In *h.* 5.55–56 the narrator explicitly states that he has heard from others the story of the blinding of Tiresias, which he will tell to the women while waiting for Athena’s epiphany (‘and meanwhile I shall speak to these women; the tale is others’, not mine’); in *h.* 6.18–23 the narrator lists a number of possible stories about Demeter, from which he eventually selects the edifying story of Erysichthon. Thus the narrators present themselves as a trustworthy and erudite medium for the transmission of stories that were already told elsewhere.<sup>7</sup> The references to anonymous spokesmen in *h.* 1 (including the ‘ancient singers’ in 60), to the richness of material in *h.* 2 and to the narrator’s role in the transmission of knowledge in *h.* 3 fit in with this picture.

In the *Aetia* there is a great variety of overt narrators,<sup>8</sup> and the presentation of the stories is more complicated than in the *Hymns*. In *Aetia* 1–2 the aetiological stories are told within the framework of a dialogue: there is an internal primary narrator, ‘the old Callimachus’, who tells, to a primary narratee of whom we find no explicit traces in the fragments, how he has dreamt that as a young man he was brought to Mt. Helicon, where he asked the Muses the origins of rituals and related matters.<sup>9</sup> The embedded narratives are therefore pre-

<sup>7</sup> This technique may be related to Callimachus’ famous statement ‘I sing of nothing which is unattested’ (fr. 612).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. Harder 1990: 287–309; Cameron 1995: 351–354; Fantham 1998: 17–18.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *Schol. Flor.* 15ff. (in Pfeiffer 1949: 11) (‘he [sc. the old Callimachus], who had just spoken the prologue to the *Aetia*, told) how in a dream he met the Muses on Mt. Helicon and received from them the explanation of the *aitia*, being a young man ...’

sented as ‘answers’ by the Muses, functioning as external secondary narrators, who respond to the questions of ‘the young Callimachus’, who thus acts as the external secondary narratee. This practice recalls the way in which the Muses are used in Homer (→) to explain the narrator’s omniscience. However, in the *Aetia* these roles are not fixed, as ‘the young Callimachus’ sometimes inserts long digressions in his questions, in which he displays his own knowledge (such as the catalogue of Sicilian cities in fr. 43.28–55, which represents *in nuce* a series of foundation-stories), and perhaps adds stories on his own account (as has been thought about the story of Heracles and Thiodamas in fr. 24–25).<sup>10</sup> Thus both ‘the young Callimachus’ and the Muses function as secondary narrators as well as secondary narratees, and the old convention of the Muse-invocation is reworked creatively.<sup>11</sup>

In *Aetia* 3–4 the framework of the dialogue is no longer used, but instead there is a great variety of primary narrators, each with a distinct *persona*, which sometimes evokes a certain literary genre. Some of these narrators are external, like the ‘scholar-poet’ in fr. 67–75, who tells the love-story of Acontius and Cydippe and is characterized by his garrulity (fr. 75.4–9, where he rebukes himself for almost telling an unsavoury story about Hera and cuts himself short in a Pindaric manner),<sup>12</sup> and by the fact that he quotes his source at length (fr. 75.54–77). This narrator is obviously overt, as is shown most clearly from fr. 75, which is the longest and best preserved fragment of the *Aetia*. Narratorial interventions which reveal the narrator’s presence include: apostrophes of Acontius (40, 44–48, 51, 53, 74–75), an instance of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ motif (51), a gnomic statement (8–9), and evaluative and metanarrative comments (13–14, 44–49, 74–77).<sup>13</sup> Another external narrator is the ‘epinician poet’, who offers a victory song to Berenice in *SH* 254–268 and includes a myth about Heracles.

Other narrators are internal and in a voice that recalls the ‘I’ in dedicatory or funeral epigrams recount their own experiences, such as the ‘lock of Berenice’, which tells of its catasterism in fr. 110 and shows a delicate mixture of pride and regret (cf. especially fr. 110.75–78), or the

<sup>10</sup> See Hollis 1982: 118.

<sup>11</sup> On the complex interaction between Callimachus and the Muses see also Lynn 1995: 154–164, who observes that, strictly speaking, the Muses ‘are *his* mouthpieces, the product of his own dreaming mind’ (155).

<sup>12</sup> On this passage as a Pindaric *Abbruchsförmel* see Harder 1990: 296.

<sup>13</sup> For further discussion see Harder 1990: 287–309; and on the narrator in fr. 75 in general Lynn 1995: 203–238.

dead poet Simonides in fr. 64, who tells how his tomb was destroyed by a tyrant of Acragas.<sup>14</sup>

Secondary narrators seem to have been rare in *Aetia* 3–4, but there is one instance of a reported narrator, Xenomedes in fr. 75.54–77. Here we find the Cean history of the fifth century BC prose-author Xenomedes presented in indirect discourse by the primary narrator, who takes care to remind the primary narratee that he is summarizing another author by repeatedly inserting markers of indirect discourse (cf. 56 ‘beginning to tell how ...’, 58 ‘and how ...’, 60 ‘and how ...’, 64–66 ‘he put in *hubris* and death by lightning and ...’, 70 ‘and [he told] how ...’, 74–75 ‘and he told about ...’). Thus the primary narrator stays in control, but the way in which he begins and ends his summary shows that he also poses as some kind of ‘reader’-narratee of Xenomedes’ story: 53–54 ‘we heard about your [sc. Acontius]’ love story from ancient Xenomedes, who once preserved the whole island in a book of stories’ and 76–77 ‘the old man, devoted to the truth, told of your passionate love, from where the boy’s story came quickly to our Calliope’. As elsewhere, Callimachus creates a picture of a narrator who is part of a chain of transmission.

A special case is fr. 178, where the convention of stories being told at a symposium is used, and ‘Callimachus’ tells how he met the merchant Theogenes of Icus at a symposium in Alexandria, where he heard from him about the cult of Achilles’ father Peleus at Icus. It has been suggested that this fragment may be from *Aetia* 2,<sup>15</sup> and in that case the dialogue with the Muses may have been even more complex than indicated above: the passage may have interrupted the dialogue, since ‘the old Callimachus’ may have reminisced about an earlier event, or ‘the young Callimachus’ may have told the Muses about this symposium and quoted Theogenes as a tertiary narrator.

The motivations for narrating in both *Hymns* and *Aetia* are sometimes given explicitly, and, as with the narrator’s *persona*, here too one may observe differences according to the genre at hand. The hymnic genre presupposes a focus on the gods, and, indeed, we see that in *h.* 4 the decision to sing about Delos is motivated by a wish to please Apollo. In *hh.* 5 and 6 the motivation for telling the stories of Tiresias and

<sup>14</sup> On Callimachus’ play with the conventions of the epigram see further Harder 1998: 96–99

<sup>15</sup> See Zetzel 1981: 31–33, whose suggestion has been received favourably by a number of scholars.



Erysichthon respectively is related to the ritual context and also shows the need to respect the gods: in *h.* 5.51–56 the narrator indicates that narrative has to kill time before the epiphany of Athena, but at the same time warns the men of Argos, who should beware of seeing Athena naked; in *h.* 6.18–21, the narrator, who has first rejected the story of Demeter's search for Persephone as too sad, considers a few other possibilities and then settles for the story of the punishment of Erysichthon 'so that one may avoid transgression' (*h.* 6.22).

In the learned *Aetia* curiosity and a wish for knowledge are presented as an important factor, but one should bear in mind that, as in other authors, e.g. Pindar (→), the explicit motive need not be the only or even the main reason for telling a story. In *Aetia* 1–2 there are some passages in which it is suggested that the stories are being told in order to satisfy the curiosity of the secondary narratee, i.e. of 'the young Callimachus', who asks the Muses for explanations, as in the case of the Theodaesia in Haliartus:

Thus she finished her story, and I wanted to know this also  
 – for my amazement was secretly fed –  
 why near the water of Cissusa the Cretan festival of the Theodaesia  
 is celebrated by the town of Cadmus, Haliartus. (fr. 43.84–87)

In *Aetia* 3–4, too, some *aitia* are introduced by questions (e.g. fr. 79), which may suggest a similar motivation, and in fr. 178.21–30 'Callimachus' says that he longs to hear about the ritual at Icus:<sup>16</sup>

and tell me everything that my heart desires  
 to hear from you, in answer to my questions:  
 why it is an ancient custom for you to honour the leader of the Myrmidons,  
 Peleus, how it is that Thessalian matters are connected with Icus,  
 for what reason a girl carrying an onion ... (?). (fr. 178.21–25)

Other *aitia* are presented without an explicit motivation, such as the story of Acontius and Cydippe in fr. 67–75, where, however, the summary of the narrator's source in fr. 75.54–77 may create an impression of the 'scholar-poet' eagerly collecting his material.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> In *Hec.* fr. 253.1–6 (= 40 Hollis) a similar question by Theseus seems to have motivated Hecale's telling of her life-story, which took up at least 100 lines; see Hollis 1990: 175–177.

<sup>17</sup> The rather fragmentary source-indication at the end of the story of Melicertes in fr. 92 ('if the old Leandrian stories say something ...') and the reference to an inscribed pillar in the first line of the story of Androgeus in fr. 103 ('o hero at the stern, because

I conclude that there is a predominance of overt narrators in Callimachus, which may be related to a Hellenistic awareness of taking position in a long and rich literary tradition. In this respect one may point to some recurrent features of these narrators: (1) primary as well as secondary narrators are often presented as telling the stories because they are in some way knowledgeable, either as Muses, or because they rely on an earlier tradition of song, stories and the scholarly work of earlier authors, or report as 'eye-witnesses' about their own country or experiences; (2) the narrators are often given a *persona* and a motivation for telling their story that seems to be intended to underline the text's genre or generic pretensions; (3) the narrators may be part of complex patterns of interaction in which the roles of narrator and narratee may change and overlap and are not always clearly defined, so as to suggest an intricate chain of transmission. A specific aspect of all Callimachean narrators, regardless of their status as primary, secondary or tertiary narrator, is the way in which the text may create an ironic distance between poet and narrator by means of allusions to other authors, which invite the readers to look at that text from another angle than the one suggested by the narrator, to supply information from other sources,<sup>18</sup> or in the case of the future narrative in *h.* 4 (on which see below) to realize that the narrator's future has become their own past. This kind of distance between poet and narrator may also be observed in other Hellenistic poets, such as Apollonius of Rhodes (→), Theocritus (→) and Lycophron (→).

The more scanty remains of the *Hecale* and *Iambi* fr. 191 fit in with these observations. In the *Hecale* the knowledge of the primary narrator is not explicitly accounted for, but in the embedded stories the secondary narrators are presented as trustworthy: Hecale is knowledgeable because she tells her own life's story (fr. 40–49 Hollis), and the old crow, which tells about Erichthonius and the early history of Attica, because it witnessed the events as a young bird.<sup>19</sup> In *Iambi* fr. 191 we find as it were the 'first attestation' of a story: Hipponax comes from Hades to tell the moralizing story of the golden cup of Bathycles (32–77), which each of the Seven Sages modestly passed on, when he was offered it, to the quarrelling philologists of Alexandria and he asks them

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the pillar sings this ...') may be part of other explicit references to the activities of the 'scholar-poet' consulting his sources.

<sup>18</sup> On this use of intertextuality in the *Aetia* see Harder 2002: 189–223.

<sup>19</sup> Hollis 1990 on *Hec.* fr. 73.13–14.

to write it down (31), i.e. he provides them with a story which they may pass on to others so that it will become part of the tradition. As to the adaptation of the narrator's *persona* to the genre, the fragments of the epyllion *Hecale* suggest a covert external primary narrator, perhaps intended to recall the narrators of epic texts; cf. e.g. the poem's opening in fr. 230 (= 1 Hollis) 'Once there lived an Attic woman in the hills of Erechtheus'; an instance of the 'there was a place/person X' motif.<sup>20</sup> *Ia*. fr. 191 is presented as a speech by Hipponax, who was part of the iambic canon and, therefore, well suited to be the narrator of the first poem of Callimachus' *Iambi*.

### *Narratees*

The visibility of the primary narratees varies according to the genres used by Callimachus. In *hh.* 1, 3, and 4 the hymnic narrator does not explicitly refer to a primary narratee: in *h.* 4 the first line is addressed to the narrator's own heart and other addresses are directed towards characters in the poem. In *hh.* 1 and 3, too, the 'you' is always the god, though *h.* 3.186, 'I shall sing about it to the others', suggests that there will be human narratees in the future. In *hh.* 5 and 6 the 'mimetic' form of the hymns brings along secondary narratees, who are addressed several times in the ritual instructions and addresses which precede and follow the narrative (*h.* 5.1–4, 13–17, 27–32, 134–138; 6.1–2; 118–119). The addresses underline the identity of these narratees as female participants in a ritual, and in *h.* 5.33–34 ('Come out, Athena; here is company to satisfy you, daughters of the mighty Arestorids') a brief description of them for the benefit of the goddess helps to complete the picture. Sometimes there is a complex pattern of addresses of secondary narratees and apostrophes of characters, as can be observed at the beginning of the story of Tiresias in *h.* 5:

Pelasgian men,  
beware lest unwitting you see the queen.  
Whoever should see Pallas, the city's guardian, naked  
shall look on this city of Argos the very last time.

<sup>20</sup> E.g. *Il.* 2.811; 6.152; *Od.* 4.844–847; 9.508–510; 15.417–418; 20.287–288 and de Jong (2001: ad 3.293–296).

Lady Athena, you come out, and meanwhile I shall speak  
to these women; the tale is others', not mine.

Girls, ...

(*h.* 5.51–57)

Here the narrator first addresses the men of Argos, for whom the tale's warning seems to be intended, then the goddess, whose appearance is eagerly awaited, and then the women who are present at the ritual and must be entertained with a story to shorten the time of waiting. Because in the rest of the hymn only the women are addressed, one may assume that the men, though part of the fictional Argive world of the poem, were not supposed to be present at the ritual scene. At the beginning of the story of Erysichthon in *h.* 6.22, too, a wider audience may be implied by the impersonal phrase ('so that one may avoid transgression'),<sup>21</sup> but this is not certain and 'one' could also apply to the women who are the primary narratees. In *h.* 2 the situation is more complex as there are several addressees within the text: the sinners who must leave the scene in 2, an anonymous eye-witness in 4, the bolts of the doors which must open of their own accord in 6–7, the young men who must sing in 8, the people who must be silent in 17, the people who must cry *hīē hīē* in 25, and finally Apollo in 65–79. As with the narrators of this hymn, it is hard to pin down a specific narratee and in fact there seems to be a deliberate merging of addressees, including even the doors of the temple, so as to create an impression of general involvement of all concerned.

The most elaborate characterization of narratees is given in *Iambi* fr. 191.26–30, where 'Hipponax' describes how the philologists swarm around him and orders them to be silent, and in 33, where he tells one of the philologists not to turn up his nose at him. As far as we can see, there is no breaking of the dramatic illusion in this poem, but it has been observed that the philologists of Alexandria would include the historical Callimachus,<sup>22</sup> and readers of Callimachus' *Iambi* could enjoy the notion that Callimachus had obeyed Hipponax' instruction to write down his tale (31).

In the *Aetia* we have no signs of primary narratees in *Aetia* 1–2, where the framework implies that the emphasis is on the Muses and 'the young Callimachus' as secondary narrators and narratees. In *Aetia* 3–4, however, there are some instances of primary narrators addressing or referring to a primary narratee, e.g. fr. 64.5–6, an instance of the 'indef-

<sup>21</sup> Translations from *h.* 6 are from Hopkins 1984.

<sup>22</sup> See D'Alessio 1996: 1, 9.

inite second person' device ('if *you* have heard of a certain Phoenix'), fr. 75.13–14, where a statement in the first person plural about 'the illness *we* send to the wild goats' involves both narrator and narratees, and fr. 75.48–49, where the narrator calls to witness those who have experience of Eros, in order to support his view of Acontius' delight in his wedding-night, which could be considered a variant of the 'anonymous witness' device. These passages seem to appeal to the narratees' erudition<sup>23</sup> and knowledge of the world, and the reader of the poem may feel that this invitation to cooperate includes himself.

A special case is found in the *Victoria Berenices*:

Let him find out for himself and cut away some of the poem's length,  
but what he said to him in answer to his questions, that I shall tell:  
'Old father, the other matters you will hear when we are at dinner,  
but now you will hear what Pallas [said to me?] ...' (SH 264.1–4)

Here the primary narrator promises to tell what Heracles—who has just returned from killing the Nemean lion—said to Molorcus, but invites the primary narratee to find certain information (presumably about the story of Heracles killing the Nemean lion)<sup>24</sup> for himself 'so that he may shorten the poem', and Heracles neatly cooperates with the narrator, because he too does not tell Molorcus the story of the killing. Thus the primary narratee, though present in the text, is here temporarily refused the role of 'narratee', but, instead, is asked to lighten the task of the narrator.

In all these texts the question of the narratees is complicated by the fact that Callimachean narrators are much given to apostrophe the gods (e.g. fr. 18.6; 67.5–6), themselves (e.g. fr. 75.4–9, reminiscent of Pindar [→]), or the characters in their stories. In the last case the apostrophes may even give rise to long sections of second-person narration, as in e.g. *h.* 4 (Delos), fr. 23 and 24 (Heracles) or fr. 80 (Pieria).<sup>25</sup> In such passages the primary or secondary narratees are reduced to accidental listeners.

Sometimes secondary narratees are visible too, and they may be intended to steer our reception of embedded narratives. In the *Aetia*

<sup>23</sup> On Callimachus' technique of appealing implicitly to the reader's cooperation in decoding his learned texts as a *captatio benevolentiae*, see now Schmitz 1999: 152–178.

<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of the question what was left out see Fuhrer 1992: 71–75. There is a similar case of omitting a central fact of the story, i.e. the cleansing of Augeas' stables, in Theocritus 25 (→).

<sup>25</sup> A number of other *aitia* in *Aetia* 3–4, of which only the beginning is preserved, begin with an address, e.g. fr. 90 'There, Abdera, where now ... leads ... the scapegoat',

there are some examples of this, as in fr. 7, where Calliope addresses ‘the young Callimachus’ as follows:

First of all make yourself remember Aegletes and Anaphe,  
the neighbour of Laconian Thera, and the Minyans,  
beginning with the time when the heroes sailed from Cytacian Aeetes  
back to ancient Haemonia. (fr. 7.23–26)

Here the secondary narratee seems to be invited to cooperate with the narrator: he must activate his memory and find the right starting-point for the story that will explain the scurrilous ritual for Apollo at Anaphe. This technique recalls that of the activation of the primary narratee in *SH* 264.

Two instances of more elaborate introductions of *aitia* seem to serve a similar purpose of steering the reception of the primary narratee. The first is fr. 43.28–55, where a question of ‘the young Callimachus’ includes a long catalogue of well-known foundation stories of Sicilian cities, which serves to draw attention to the unusual and obscure nature of the ritual at Zancle (a founder’s cult in which the founder is not called by his name) and to the speaker’s urgent need for explanation. The primary narratee may thus be steered towards curiosity and grateful acceptance of the story when it is finally told by Clio to ‘the young Callimachus’ as secondary narratee (fr. 43.56–83). The second is fr. 178.1–34, where the primary narrator, ‘Callimachus’ (who will become the secondary narratee), tells how he has met Theogenes at a symposium, how pleased he was that they shared a preference for talk over much drink, and how he asked him, as a native of Icus, about the ritual for Peleus on that island. This long introduction of the story of Theogenes again seems to prepare the primary narratee for something special, as it invites him to share the secondary narratee’s curiosity as well as his faith in Theogenes as a narrator. Furthermore it may serve to remind the reader of the worth of stories, which surpasses that of the transient material joys of the symposium (for a similar notion cf. fr. 43.12–17).

In conclusion one may say that the Callimachean narratees are presented as active participants in the process of storytelling, either as

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or a question, like fr. 79 ‘Why do they call ...?’; in fr. 84–85 such a beginning introduces a story told as second-person narrative, but in the other cases the evidence allows no conclusions as to the narrative situation. See further Harder 1998: 109. In contrast with Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes (→) does not address the main characters of his stories.

the respectful audience of a hymnic singer or a fierce iambic poet or as the learned and curious readers of a scholarly work.

### *Narratives*

Callimachus' narratives are often moralizing (as in *hh.* 5 and 6; *Ia.* fr. 191) or aimed at the explanation of present situations or rituals (as in *h.* 4 and the *Aetia*). In *hh.* 1, 2, and 3 they contain a series of episodes from the career of the gods celebrated in those hymns.

The narratives are presented as subsequent narration and the way in which the stories begin sometimes helps the narratees quickly to get a picture of the main issues, locations and characters. In *hh.* 5.51–56 and 6.22–23 the moralizing purpose is explained beforehand and then the actual narratives begin with an introduction of the situation (*h.* 5.57–59: Athena's love for Chariclo, the mother of Tiresias, who will suffer a great deal when the goddess punishes her son) or setting of the story (*h.* 6.24–30: a description of Demeter's grove, which will be destroyed by the evil Erysichthon). In a similar way in *h.* 4 the need to sing about Delos (1–10) is followed by a description of the island (11–18), which leads to the story of how Delos, formerly called Asteria, became a 'fixed' island, because it allowed Leto to give birth to Apollo on its soil (28–274). In the episodes from the gods' careers that we find in *hh.* 1, 2, and 3 the narratives are presented in a less formal manner: in *hh.* 1 and 3 there is a chronological scheme, starting at the birth and early youth of Zeus and Artemis respectively and following their career and the acquisition of their attributes (the first stage of which, *h.* 3.4–40, is presented in the form of a dialogue between Zeus and Artemis). However, whereas *h.* 1 has a strong focus on Zeus's career and his establishment as the king of the gods, which prepares the narratees for the praise of his human equivalent Ptolemy, *h.* 3 briefly refers to a number of other narratives about Artemis, such as e.g. the stories of Britomartis (189–207), Agamemnon (228–232), Lygdamis (251–258) or Oineus (260–262). Thus the narratees of *h.* 3 are referred to a wealth of other material, which could be adduced in order to enhance the goddess's fame even further. In *h.* 2 the episodes are narrated without regard to chronology: 47–54 relate Apollo's stay with his beloved Admetus, 55–64 his building activities as a four-year-old child, 65–96 his role in the foundation of Cyrene, 97–104 his early defeat of the serpent at Delphi, and 105–112 a brief dialogue with

Momus in which he appears as the authoritative god of poetry. The lack of ‘order’ in the arrangement of the narratives may be related to the idea of a ‘non-continuous’ poem in the *Aetia*-prologue (fr. 1.3).

There are two instances of narratives that are not in the past tense. In *h.* 3.142–169 the traditional episode of the young god’s first arrival on Olympus is replaced by a description in the present tense of the way in which Artemis is ‘now’ (145) received on Olympus, whenever she arrives there with her hunting-spoils, eagerly awaited by the ever-hungry Heracles; we are dealing with the simultaneous iterative narration also found in Hesiod (→). In *h.* 4.166–195 the unborn Apollo as a secondary narrator tells Leto about the war with the Celts which will take place in the future (but which is already the past for the primary narratees).

Patterns of introductions and beginnings being tuned to each other can also be observed in the *Aetia*. In *Aetia* 1–2 the questions which precede the narratives inform the reader beforehand of the story’s subject and purpose, as in fr. 7.19–20 ‘and why, goddesses, do the people of Anaphe sacrifice with shameful words and those of Lindus with words of bad omen ...?’ and in the motivation at the end of the extended question in fr. 43.54–55 ‘... for in none of these towns does the man who once built its wall go to the customary feast without being called by his name’ (as in Zancle, the anonymous founder-cult of which had raised the speaker’s curiosity). Then the narratives begin with a quick survey of the main characters and locations, as in fr. 7.23–26 (quoted above) and fr. 43.58–60 ‘people from Cumae and Chalcis, led by Perieres and the arrogant Crataemenes, went to Trinacria ...’ In *Aetia* 3–4 some of the narratives seem to have a similar indication of the contents at the beginning, as they start with requests or questions (e.g. fr. 76 and 79), while other narratives start without such an introduction, but with a brief survey of the main facts, as in fr. 67.1–8:<sup>26</sup>

Eros himself taught Acontius his art, when  
the boy burned with love for the beautiful girl Cydippe,  
– for he was not very clever—, in order that he would be called  
by the name of lawful husband all through his life (?),  
because, lord, he came from Iulis, she from Naxos,  
Cynthian, to your Delian sacrifice of oxen,  
he a descendant of Euxantius, she of Prometheus,  
both beautiful stars of the islands.

<sup>26</sup> Similarly e.g. fr. 84 ‘when you came from Pisa, Euthycles, having defeated men ...’ about the Olympian victor Euthycles.



This introduction was followed by an elaborate description of the beauty of Cydippe and Acontius and its effects on the people around them (fr. 67.10–15 [?]; fr. 68 and 69); it is not clear how many lines were occupied by this and at which point the description of the events at Delos began.

In *Ia*. fr. 191.26–30 (which follow the lacunose 12–25) the description of the unruly crowd of philologists may suggest the moral of the following tale, and the fact that the ancient summary of the poem<sup>27</sup> states explicitly that ‘Hipponax’ told them not to be jealous of each other, suggests that something to this effect has been in the text. The narrative then begins with a description of the rich and fortunate Bathycles, who enabled the Seven Sages to show their generosity towards each other. The *Hecale* starts with a simple description of the situation of Hecale in fr. 230 (= 1 Hollis) (quoted above).

The narratives’ endings often refer back to their beginning so that a sense of closure is achieved; thus *h.* 4.273 mentions the fact that Delos is now a ‘fixed’ island; *h.* 5.131–133 draws attention once again to Athena’s power; *h.* 6.116–117 finishes the story of Erysichthon with a moralizing remark. In the last two hymns the end of the narrative is also marked by a return to the ritual scene (*hh.* 5.137–142; 6.118–138). In the *Aetia*, some ends of narratives are preserved and show varying markers of closure. In fr. 43.78–79 the explanation is given for the anonymity of the founder-cult at Zancle, and thus the end of the narrative refers back to the questions at the beginning. In some other *aitia* there are traces of hymnic closure, as in fr. 7.13–14, which contain a farewell and request for lasting fame to the Charites, who were the subject of the preceding narrative (fr. 3–7), and fr. 23.19–20, which is part of a farewell to Heracles, whose adventures with a Lindian farmer had been the subject of fr. 22–23. The story preceding that about Zancle concluded with a short programmatic passage about the worth of stories surpassing that of the ephemeral pleasures of the symposium (fr. 43.12–17). The story of Acontius and Cydippe seems to end twice: in fr. 75.50–52, where Acontius’ offspring is mentioned, the love-story ends, but it is followed by an extensive summary of the narrator’s source, the Cean history of Xenomedes of Ceos, which ends with a reference to the ‘boy’ Acontius in fr. 75.77,<sup>28</sup> thereby recalling the narrative’s beginning in fr. 67.2. The

<sup>27</sup> Printed in Pfeiffer 1949: 163.

<sup>28</sup> The way in which Acontius is here called a ‘boy’ also suggests that the narrator has been dissociating himself gradually from his involvement with his main character:

summary may be read as an elaborate footnote providing background information about Acontius and his native Ceos.<sup>29</sup>

The narrative of the cup of Bathycles may end in *Ia*. fr. 191.76–84, where the cup comes back to Thales, to whom it was given in the first place, but the text is too fragmentary to be certain. The end of the *Hecale* is lost, but the ancient summary (printed in Hollis 1990: 65) indicates that it ended with an *aition*.

The way in which the narratives are presented often shows a certain concern with issues of communication. Generally speaking, Callimachus' narratives are part of poems which were of a literate rather than an oral nature,<sup>30</sup> but within these poems the oral transmission of stories is frequently enacted and the narrator poses as an oral narrator (the 'feigned orality' motif), as in *hh*. 5 and 6, where the narratives are presented as orally performed in front of an audience. Sometimes Callimachus even seems to create a certain tension between the reality of written communication and the fiction of oral communication within his poems. Thus in *Aetia* 1–2 the fiction of a dialogue between the Muses and 'young Callimachus' recalls the tradition of early oral epic, which at the same time is being modified because 'the old Callimachus' has written it all down. The same applies to fr. 178, where the oral convention of storytelling at a symposium is presented in writing. In the *Victoria Berenices* (*SH* 254–268), the encomiastic effects of a prominent position in a written work are combined with an evocation of oral praise, as the poem derives part of its impact from its position at the beginning of the third book, but at the same time recalls the Pindaric epinician with its convention of oral performance.<sup>31</sup> Similarly, in *Ia*. fr. 191, the poem evokes an oral situation, but in 31 'Let there be silence, and write down my tale', oral and written transmission are linked and the poem as a whole seems to have been placed emphatically at the

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in fr. 75, 40, and 44, where Acontius finally wins Cydippe and enjoys his wedding night, the narrator apostrophizes him as 'Acontius', in 53 and 74 just before and after the summary of Xenomedes he addresses Acontius as 'Cean', as if drawing attention to his public position as ancestor of the ruling family at Ceos, and in 77 the *aition* ends, as it began, with a third-person reference to Acontius as a boy.

<sup>29</sup> See further on this passage Harder 1998: 103–104.

<sup>30</sup> For a general discussion see Bing 1988. This view has recently been challenged by Cameron 1995, but his arguments for performance of Callimachus' poems are not compelling and do not detract from the primarily literate nature of the poems.

<sup>31</sup> For a detailed comparison of the *Victoria Berenices* and the conventions of the Pindaric epinician see Fuhrer 1992: 86–134.

opening of the collection of *Iambi*. Again we may observe an ironic distance between poet and narrator, reader and narratee.

The status of the stories about the gods in the hymns is traditional and seems to affect the way in which they are introduced, as in *h.* 2.30–31 where a large amount of material for songs about Apollo is indicated; *h.* 5.56, where the story of Tiresias is said to be derived from others; *h.* 4.28–29, where the story of Delos is presented as one of a large corpus of songs; and *h.* 6.18–23, where one of many stories about Demeter is chosen. In the last two instances the great diversity of the tradition is also emphasized.

The stories in the *Aetia* range from early myth (e.g. the story of the Argonauts in fr. 7–21 or the stories of Heracles in fr. 22–25), via the archaic and classical period of Greek history (e.g. the colonization stories in fr. 43,<sup>32</sup> the love-story in fr. 67–75, or the story of the tomb of Simonides in fr. 64), to the Ptolemaic court in third-century BC Alexandria (as in fr. 110). Here too we have evidence that the status of these stories could affect the ways in which they are accounted for: in fr. 7.19–22 stories about the Argonauts and Heracles are attributed to the Muses; in fr. 75.54–77 the story of Acontius is attributed to the historian Xenomedes of Ceos; while in fr. 110 the Ptolemaic fiction of Berenice's lock turned into a star is told by the lock itself which adduces the authority of the astronomer Conon (fr. 110.7–8). In fr. 43.28–55 the catalogue of Sicilian cities and the subsequent question creates the impression that the young scholar-poet has learned a great deal from his researches, but the fact that in the end only the Muses are truly omniscient is brought to our attention when they have to supply additional information about the ritual at Zancle.

### *Conclusion*

The narrators and narratees in Callimachus' texts are overt and self-conscious, highly interested in narratives, and hence the process of storytelling and the transmission and reception of knowledge receive full attention. Important matters are the role, credibility and motivation of the narrator, the cooperation of the narratees at various levels, the steering of their reception of the stories, and issues of communication

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<sup>32</sup> Similarly the anecdote in *Ia.* fr. 191.32–77.

(including the notion of feigned orality) and the status of the narratives. The character of Callimachus' narrators, narratees and narratives well reflects his position as a scholar-poet in third-century BC Alexandria and his need to carve out a position for himself with respect to the long literary tradition of which he forms part.



## CHAPTER SIX

### THEOCRITUS AND MOSCHUS

*R. Hunter*

The Theocritean corpus, as it appears in modern editions, does not reproduce ancient collections of bucolic poetry,<sup>1</sup> and may cover as much as five centuries of Greek poetry. Although there is no good reason to doubt that the majority of poems are indeed the work of Theocritus of Syracuse in the first half of the third century BC, the corpus offers us the best available glimpse into the workshop of poetic forms which Hellenistic poets inherited and fashioned. Narrative is at the heart of this variety. The corpus contains narrative poems which use traditional modes inherited from hexameter epic and hymns, embedded narratives by the primary narrator which depend upon a framing dialogue between primary narrator and addressee, embedded narratives by secondary narrators, and poems which are wholly 'mimetic' and dialogic; as in Plato (→), this last category may be thought to presuppose a suppressed primary narrator, particularly if the poems are read rather than 'performed'.

If all the poems of the corpus are thus, in some sense, 'narratives', it is nevertheless the case that, for example, the meetings of Battus and Corydon in *Idyll* 4 and of Comatas and Lacon in *Idyll* 5 are not normally thought of as 'narrative poems', though both of course allude to past and current 'narrative situations'. To label such poems 'narratives' is not, however, merely a terminological subterfuge; rather it is a helpful way of recording an important literary fact. The genuine bucolic poems of Theocritus inscribe within themselves a sense of tradition, of an already known world of rustics engaged in hexameter song and disputation, and hence of a creator of that artificial 'natural' world whom we may in different contexts call 'narrator', 'poet', 'author'. The artifice of metre, dialect, and poetic allusion never allows us to imagine that we have unmediated access to a rural reality, and that sense of distance is

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Gutzwiller 1996.

in part our consciousness of the poetic presence of a creative (though sometimes suppressed) narrator. In post-Theocritean bucolic, our sense of familiarity, of stepping into a textual world frozen since we last left it, is more overtly aroused by poets who pay homage to ‘the founder’ by imitation of, and variation from, the base which his usage had authorized and by constant allusion to Theocritean situations and characters; bucolic is thus a remarkable instance of the very rapid invention of tradition.

### *External narrators*

External narrators appear throughout the corpus.<sup>2</sup> *Idyll* 18 reports the performance at Sparta of a maiden choir celebrating the wedding of Helen and Menelaus. Though formally a narrative, and one in which the narrator is overt in the manner with which the poem begins (‘Once then [*en pok’ ara*]<sup>3</sup> in Sparta at the palace of golden-haired Menelaus ...’), this poem is very largely devoted to the wedding-hymn (vv. 9–58); there is no return to the narrative frame at the end. Such a structure has analogues in earlier narrative forms as widely separated as choral lyric (cf. Bacchylides 20, another Spartan wedding-song, Bacchylides 5.56–175, the story of Heracles in the Underworld)<sup>4</sup> and Platonic dialogue (the *Symposium*), though it is clearly the former that is evoked here (cf. esp. vv. 7–8). In recreating a lyric form and telling of a mythical event, Theocritus relies, as do the lyric poets themselves, on an audience able to contextualize the narrated moment within a larger, and in this case very famous, story. In the case of *Idyll* 6, however, a rather similar form is used for an apparently less familiar occasion:

One day, Aratus, Daphnis the cowherd and Damoetas  
Gathered their herd into one place. Damoetas’ chin

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<sup>2</sup> *Idyll* 23, which is certainly post-Theocritean, is the completely uncontextualized story of a hopeless love: ‘a passionate man loved a cruel youth ...’ The central section of the poem is given over to the final speech of the ill-fated lover, but the guiding presence of the narrator is highly visible through the use of emotive and judgemental language (e.g. vv. 1–2, 60) and the repeated ‘moral’ of the story (the power of Eros, vv. 4–5, 63). The poem is also unusual in that no motive is given for this non-mythical narration: the most ‘natural’ context for it would, in fact, be as part of an attempt by the narrator to win over his own beloved. Cf. further Hunter 2002.

<sup>3</sup> For ‘then’ (*ara*) as marking the narrator’s choice of where to begin cf. 22.27, Hunter 1996: 149–150.

<sup>4</sup> Both Bacchylidean narratives begin with *pote*, ‘once upon a time ...’

Was red with down, while the other's beard was just coming.  
 It was noon in summer, and the two sat down by a spring.  
 This was their song. Daphnis had made the challenge, so he began.  
 (6.1–5, trans. Verity)<sup>5</sup>

The bulk of the poem is devoted to the exchange of songs between Daphnis (impersonating, as an internal secondary narrator, a 'friend' of the lovesick Cyclops) and Damoetas (responding as the Cyclops himself); the songs are divided by a verse from the external primary narrator (v. 20) and a five-verse conclusion, corresponding to the opening, seals a frame around the poem.<sup>6</sup> Critics dispute as to whether the Daphnis of this poem is the 'mythical' Daphnis of (for example) *Idyll* 1 or rather to be understood as a contemporary herdsman taking his name from the legendary figure. In either case, however, the abrupt beginning of the narrator, here made overt by the address to Aratus, exploits the narratees' foreknowledge and draws it into collusive pleasure; whereas, however, in *Idyll* 18 our pleasure derives from our familiarity with the imagined mythical world which the narrator conjures up for us, in *Idyll* 6 it derives from our familiarity with the world of bucolic poetry: we do not need to be told *about* 'bucolic song contests' because we are entering a literary world created as timeless and ever-present.

The narration of the grim fate of Pentheus in *Idyll* 26 also begins in *mediis rebus* (with, on this occasion, no inceptive particles), 'Ino and Autonoe and Agaue of the white cheeks, three themselves, led three *thiasoi* to the mountain', and the narrative ends by reversing the movement of the opening verses and sealing the story with a closural pun in two highly alliterative verses: 'they came to Thebes, all splattered with blood, bringing from the mountain not Pentheus but grief (*penthēma kai ou Penthēa*)', vv. 25–26. The pun is a marker of the narrator's arrangement of his material, but his overt presence in this opening section of the poem had already been signalled in a number of ways. First, there is the manner in which the women's ritually correct practice is described (vv. 8–9) and the explanatory glosses of v. 11 ('an ancient mastich-bush, a plant growing in the area') and vv. 13–14 ('the holy things of frenzied Bacchus, which the uninitiated do not see' [though the omniscient

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Verity-Hunter 2002.

<sup>6</sup> *Idyll* 27, the dialogue between 'Daphnis' and a girl he is seducing, has a similar closural frame, apparently by an external primary narrator (vv. 67–72), but the opening of the poem is lost, so we cannot say more.



narrator may do]],<sup>7</sup> which suggest a contemporary significance for this narrative set in the distant mythic past; secondly, the violent language with which the dismemberment of Pentheus is described ('they divided out the rest of his flesh') reveals the narrator making lexical choices among possible modes of expression, just as verbal echoes of Euripides' *Bacchae*<sup>8</sup> reveal the learned narrator as a negotiator between texts. Nevertheless, despite these clear signs, what follows the narration still comes with a shocking suddenness:

I do not care. Nor let anyone else have a thought for one hated by Dionysus, not even if he suffer more grievous things than this and be in his ninth year or even entering his tenth. May I myself be holy and pleasing to the holy; thus has the eagle honour from aegis-bearing Zeus. A better fate attends the children of the pious, not of the impious.

Farewell to Dionysus, whom Zeus most high set down on snowy Dracanus when he had unbound his great thigh. Farewell to lovely Semele and her sisters, Cadmean women honoured by many heroines, who at the instigation of Dionysus, performed this deed in which there is no fault: let no one object to the things of the gods. (26.27–38)

Whatever the import of these mysterious (and textually very difficult) verses,<sup>9</sup> the sudden first-person revelation of the narrator<sup>10</sup> and the hymnic farewell to Dionysus confer upon the narrative that has preceded an aetiological and exemplary status.

*Idyll* 24, the story of the infant Heracles strangling the snakes and of Tiresias' prophecy of his future greatness, seems also to have been structured as 'once upon a time ... (*poka*)' narrative, which is then concluded by a first-person hymnic *envoi* in which the narrator asks Heracles to grant him 'victory'; unfortunately, the end survives only in the most tattered scraps, and we can say nothing in detail about how the narrative may have been contextualized at its conclusion.<sup>11</sup> In this

<sup>7</sup> The power of writing to evoke mental images within us (*enargeia*, *phantasia*) is obviously relevant here, where such power is seen to promote an illicit and voyeuristic desire. A related phenomenon is the experience and fate of Tiresias in Callimachus' *Hymn to Athena*, another poem in which our emotional ambivalence about a narrated divine tale is set against the demand for piety.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Cairns 1992: 5–9.

<sup>9</sup> Some reference to the story of the daughters of Minyas is not improbable, cf. Gow ad loc.; White 1999: 54–56.

<sup>10</sup> Cairns 1992 argues that this is not the narrating poet, but the 'choir' that is imagined to be performing. If the eagle of v. 31 evokes what ancient readers at least took to be a familiar image for the poet in Pindar, this would certainly reinforce the strength of the first-person intrusion (cf. Cairns 1992: 22–23).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Gow 1952: II 436.

poem, the presence of a learnedly innovative narrator is most strikingly revealed (before the conclusion) by a virtuoso handling of traditional epic technique (see esp. the ‘waking and dressing’ scene of vv. 34–53) and by an elaborate textuality which reworks scenes of (particularly) Homer and Pindar at the level of close detail: the narratee of this poem is closely familiar with earlier literature.<sup>12</sup> So too, the concentration upon homely detail and the witty domestication of epic characters, whose effect depends crucially upon our acquaintance with what is ‘normal’ in hexameter narrative, focus our attention upon the narration as a literary act and hence upon the narrator as a *poiētēs*. Not for a moment can we imagine that we are being offered unmediated access to ‘narrative fact’.

The act of narration itself is also a focus of attention in *Idyll* 22, the *Hymn to the Dioscuri*, but here the principal technique is the juxtaposition of contrasting narrative styles in the telling of two ‘duel’ stories, a juxtaposition which foregrounds the choices open to every self-conscious narrator.<sup>13</sup> Unlike the poems we have just considered, *Idyll* 22 opens with an extended first-person introduction (‘We hymn the two sons of Leda and aegis-bearing Zeus ...’), and then, in a surprise variation on the traditional epic and hymnic ‘*aporia*’ motif, ‘Where shall I start?’ (cf. *Idyll* 17.11), the narrator reveals that he intends to celebrate the brothers separately:

O pair of helpers for mortals, beloved pair; horsemen, lyre-players, athletes, singers, with Castor or with Polydeuces first shall I begin to sing?  
In hymning both, I will sing of Polydeuces first. (vv. 23–26)

There is an obvious danger for any mortal in choosing one brother ahead of the other, so the narrator takes the evasive steps of stressing their unbreakable ‘twoness’ (vv. 23–24) and implicating the twin gods themselves in the chosen order: whether or not we imagine a ‘pause’ after v. 25, v. 26, in which the choice is made, is to be understood to be spoken ‘under the inspiration of’ the Dioscuri themselves.<sup>14</sup>

The story of Polydeuces’ boxing victory over the brutish Amycus (vv. 27–134) is a virtuoso example of narrative inventiveness—a *locus amoenus*, the *ekphrasis* of a man who resembles a work of art, (an unparalleled) stichomythia and no other direct speech, extensive rewriting of Homer and (probably) Apollonius of Rhodes, and an archly expressed

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Hunter 1996: 11–13; Fantuzzi-Hunter 2002: 275–286, 344–359.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Hunter 1996: 58–59; Sens 1997: 14–15.

<sup>14</sup> The ordering is therefore not (represented as) ‘arbitrary’, *pace* Sens 1997: 95.

claim of complete dependence upon the knowledge of the goddess Muse (vv. 115–117), immediately before the most elaborate and ‘technical’ boxing description of the whole poem,<sup>15</sup> all play their part. Castor’s killing of the hapless Lynceus (vv. 137–211) is also narrated by an external primary narrator, but the contrast of tone with the Polydeuces narrative could not be more marked—the apparent moral certainties of the latter (Amycus is a ‘gluttonous’ [v. 115] bully) give way to the ambiguities which attend recognition of man’s weakness in the face of the divine; the hymnic and encomiastic apostrophes to the god of the earlier narration (vv. 85, 131–132) are not repeated in the bleak tale of the death of Lynceus and his brother. There is also a clear contrast of structural form. It is debated whether the central section of the second narrative is devoted to a speech by Lynceus or to a pair of pre-fight speeches (*à la* Homer) by Lynceus and Castor,<sup>16</sup> but in either case the form is markedly more traditional than the *poikilia* of the Polydeuces narrative.

One remarkable example of narrative experimentation is *Idyll* 25, a probably non-Theocritean poem, which presents three ‘scenes’, all apparently told by a primary external narrator, from the story of Heracles and King Augeas.<sup>17</sup> The poem opens *in mediis rebus*, ‘Him did the old man address ...’, with an abruptness (and an initial *de*) that have been taken by most readers as signs that the opening of the poem is lost. In the first section (vv. 1–84) the newly arrived hero learns from a humble rustic about the king and his estates; in the second section (vv. 85–152) Heracles and the king admire the extraordinary royal herds, and in the third (vv. 153–281) Heracles, as an internal secondary narrator, narrates the story of the Nemean lion to the king’s son, Phyleus, as the two of them leave the royal property. The narrative form of the scenes, which together form a *crescendo* of confrontations between Heracles and animals (dogs, a marvellous bull, and finally the Nemean lion), is carefully varied. In the first, Heracles asks questions and receives a long and full answer; in the second, there is no direct speech, and in the third Heracles’ narration is characterized by the full panoply of epic devices, including similes, while it remains bound by the non-omniscience of an internal narrator (cf. 195–200).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Gow on 119ff.; Zanker 1987: 87.

<sup>16</sup> For the arguments cf., e.g. Sens 1997: 190–191.

<sup>17</sup> On this poem cf. Kurz 1982; Zanker 1996; Hunter 1998b; Fantuzzi-Hunter 2002: 286–291.

The narrative form in the third scene is of a very common type. Phyleus suspects that his travelling partner is the great hero of whom he has heard (from an anonymous tertiary narrator, vv. 164–173) and he asks the stranger to satisfy his curiosity: ‘Come tell me then first, so that I may know in my mind ... and also tell me how you killed that dreadful beast ...’ (vv. 177–182). The narratee’s thirst to know is perhaps the most common of all motives for narration, and in return Phyleus receives from Heracles as full an account as he can give (‘I will give you a detailed account of what happened concerning this monster, since you desire to hear it ...’, vv. 195–196). Heracles’ narrative is also marked by strong final closure which clearly demarcates the ‘boundaries of narrative’: ‘This then, my friend, was the death of the beast of Nemea ...’ (v. 280).

The very clarity of narrative form and content, however, throws into relief the novelty of the poem as a whole. The three scenes can be fitted, easily enough, into the outlines of the story of Heracles and Augeas familiar from our main sources (Apollodorus 2.5.5, Pausanias 5.1.9–10), but the central ‘fact’ of that story (the cleaning of the stables) is never mentioned (contrast the full narrative of the killing of the Nemean lion), and any unifying narrative is left entirely implied, to be supplied, with whatever level of detail, by each narratee. This is a much more radical technique than, say, the typical lyric practice of allusive narrative. There is in fact no real parallel in Greek narrative poetry for such a chronologically linear account in which we are merely given excerpts from ‘the full story’, each of which is, however, itself detailed and coherent; this exploration of narrative continuity and disjunction foregrounds the role of the poet, the creating intelligence which turns ‘events’ into narratives. Mimetic and diegetic forms were drawing closer together in certain areas of poetic practice, just as their distinction was being theorized and hardened in critical discussion.

A different kind of narrative exploration is on show in *Idyll* 13. The poem begins with a personal address to Nicias of Miletus, a figure who occurs elsewhere in the corpus as a friend of the poet:

Love was not born for us alone, as once we thought,  
 Nicias, whichever god it was who fathered him.  
 We were not the first to be beguiled by beauty,  
 We who are mortal, and cannot see tomorrow. (13.1–4, trans. Verity)

The exemplification of this sentiment is the story, told by the same poetic voice but now acting as an external primary narrator, of the

loss of Heracles and his beloved squire Hylas from the Argonautic expedition. There is no return to Nicias at the end of the poem, which arrives at its destination ('Phasis', the river of Colchis, is the last word, v. 75) at the same time as does Heracles. In this it is contrasted with the otherwise apparently similar *Idyll* 11, where another gnomic thought addressed to Nicias (that 'the Muses' are the only remedy for love) is illustrated by the story of the lovesick Cyclops and, for the bulk of the poem (vv. 19–79), the song he sings (as an internal secondary narrator) to the beloved Galatea. In the final two verses of *Idyll* 11 the primary narrator returns with a teasing reference to Nicias' medical profession:

So by singing the Cyclops shepherded his love,  
And more relief it brought him than paying a large fee.  
(11.80–81, trans. Verity)

In *Idyll* 13, Theocritus' highly descriptive version of the Hylas story very likely reacts to the epic version of Apollonius of Rhodes,<sup>18</sup> and the use of a personal narratee (Nicias), in place of the traditional absence of specified primary narratees for epic narrative, as in Homer (→), is part of the transformation of epic narrative material into a different poetic mode. So too, the primary narrator reveals himself at work in covering the Argonautic journey to the Phasis twice over: first in a rapid survey of 'the bare facts' (vv. 16–24) and then again at a more leisurely pace (vv. 25–75), with the loss of Heracles and Hylas to the expedition occupying the centre of attention (vv. 36–75).

### *Internal narrators*

Narratives by an internal narrator are common in Greek drama, and two of Theocritus' poems with strong links to the tradition of mime, offer internal narrators who tell their stories within a quasi-dramatic structure. In *Idyll* 14 Aeschinas tells his friend Thyonichus the story of his unhappy affair with a girlfriend, Cynisca, whose affections have now gone elsewhere. This vivid tale of a disrupted drinking-party may be related to on-stage narratives of elaborate banquets, which seem to have enjoyed remarkable popularity in the comedy of the fourth and third centuries.<sup>19</sup> Aeschinas' unbroken narrative occupies the greater

<sup>18</sup> The matter is very disputed, and detailed arguments cannot be rehearsed here; much bibliography is readily available in Köhnken 2001.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Fraenkel 1912: 9–32.

part of the poem (vv. 12–56), but variety of tone and effect is achieved by the quotation of direct and colloquially lively speech in the mouth of more than one character (both male and female); so too, the external narratee, Thyonichus, is drawn directly into the narrative ('Then I hit her on the temple, once, then again—you know me, Thyonichus', vv. 34–35). Moreover, at the conclusion of his speech, the telling of past events is not neatly demarcated from deliberation with Thyonichus about the future (vv. 50–56). All of these techniques are designed by the poet to minimize the distinction between conversational exchange and 'narrative', understood in a narrow sense. The use of hexameters for such a mimetic exchange creates a tension between form and content, a tension that is advertised rather than concealed by the opening verses, in which frequent use of verse-splitting (*antilabē*) sets the colloquial tone for the whole poem. Theocritus thus accommodates his narrative form to the traditions of popular mime, but in such a way that the formal novelty of his undertaking remains visible. Such a procedure, which is a form of literary history within creative poetry itself, finds many parallels in the literature of the third century.

In *Idyll* 2 there is only one speaker, the internal primary narrator, but the associations of the poem are again with the mime tradition. In the first part of the poem a woman called Simaitha performs a magic ritual, with the help (or hindrance) of a slave-girl, to try to win back her faithless lover Delphis (vv. 1–63). When the slave goes to perform a rite at Delphis' door, Simaetha is now free to tell her story: 'Now that I am alone, from what point shall I bewail my love? At what point shall I begin? Who brought this misery upon me?' (vv. 64–65). There is a certain realism in only laying bare her soul once the slave is out of the way, but the emphasis upon a connection between being alone and narration is part of Simaitha's self-presentation as a heroine from drama and 'literature', for it is unhappy lovers and, above all, characters in drama<sup>20</sup> who relate their stories to the heavenly bodies—the moon-goddess is in fact the external narratee of Simaitha's story, as the repeated refrain, 'Take note, lady Selene, whence came my love', makes clear. It is perhaps not unfair to ask *why* Simaetha tells her story. On the one hand, it is important that avenging divinities such as the moon-goddess, who is intimately connected with magic, should be fully acquainted with the wrong which has been done (cf., e.g. Electra's lamentation to the

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Plautus, *Mercator* 3–5 'I won't do what I've seen love make others do in comedies—tell their woes to Night or Day or the Sun or the Moon.'

stars in the *parodos* of Euripides' *Electra*), but there is also a clear self-positioning by Simaetha within what she conceives to be a familiar pattern: Simaetha must narrate her story because (as she imagines) that is what women in her position do. It was, above all, Euripidean drama (→) that had licensed lengthy female narration and complaint. As in *Idyll* 14, Theocritus exploits the tension between the formality and literary affiliations of unbroken poetic narrative and the relatively low status of mime; in these poems 'narration' is denaturalized, so that it becomes a specific literary form associated with the higher registers of poetic expression. The sly acknowledgment of the presence of an audience (of watchers or readers) in 'Now that I am alone ...' reinforces this sense. Thus, in adopting a self-conscious role fashioned by tradition, Simaetha apes narrators as paradigmatic as Odysseus in the *Odyssey* in wondering where to begin (the '*aporia*' motif, for which cf. *Od.* 9.14, → Homer), perhaps the most crucial choice facing any narrator.<sup>21</sup>

One Theocritean poem, however, is entirely devoted to the recollections of an internal primary narrator: this is the famous *Thalysia* (*Idyll* 7). The narrator, Simichidas, who introduces himself at first only as 'I', recalls an occasion when he went with two friends from Cos town into the countryside to join in the harvest festival of an old Coan family. On the way they meet, 'with the aid of the Muses',<sup>22</sup> a goatherd called Lycidas whom Simichidas invites to an exchange of 'bucolic song'. Lycidas sings a song about his passion for Ageanax, and in reply Simichidas sings of the hopeless passion of his friend Aratus for a boy called Philinus. Simichidas and his friends reach Phrasidamus' farm where the celebration takes place in a marvellous *locus amoenus*. The opening of this extraordinary poem, 'There was a time when I and Eukritos were going from town towards the Haleis ...', finds its closest analogues in the opening of certain of Plato's dialogues (cf. *Lysis*, *Republic*), but the poet and his very self-consciously 'literary' narrator<sup>23</sup> seem specifically to evoke the *Phaedrus*—a walk in the countryside in the heat of the day and an exchange of performances designed to win over a beautiful boy; it is as though the *Phaedrus* has been transposed into a narrative related by Phaedrus.

<sup>21</sup> On Simaetha as narrator cf. esp. Andrews 1996.

<sup>22</sup> One implication of this is that the meeting will be memorialized in song, as of course it was. For the limited role of the Muses in Theocritus' bucolics cf. Fantuzzi 2000.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Hunter 2003.

*Embedded narratives*

Embedded narratives, by both external and internal (e.g. *Idyll* 5.41–42) narrators, play important roles in the bucolic poems, and the founding myth of the bucolic world is ‘the sufferings of Daphnis’ (*algea Daphnidos*) which are sung in *Idyll* 1 by a shepherd called Thyrsis to an unnamed goatherd for the price of a milking-goat and a marvellously decorated wooden bowl; the exchange of narrative is here materialized in the barter economy of humble rustics. The song itself, punctuated by the folkloristic technique of refrains, is represented as a traditional one, or perhaps merely on a traditional theme (cf. vv. 19, 23–24); the external narrator is thus the bucolic equivalent of a very skilled rhapsode performing a celebrated passage from Homer, and he proudly identifies himself (‘I am Thyrsis of Etna, and sweet is the voice of Thyrsis’, v. 65), not perhaps unlike the narrator of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (→).

Thyrsis begins *in medias res*, with an indignant question to the Nymphs about their whereabouts when Daphnis was wasting away. The reasons for Daphnis’ condition and subsequent death are never made explicit. Such an allusive narrative mode is familiar from the victory odes of Pindar and Bacchylides (→) and choral narration in Aeschylus (→) and Sophocles (→), but the mode itself becomes central to the concerns of the passage in a way that might be thought typical of Hellenistic self-consciousness:

First of all came Hermes from the mountain and said, ‘Daphnis, who is tormenting you? For whom, my friend, have you conceived so great a passion?’ ... The cowherds came, the shepherds and the goatherds came: all asked what misery had befallen him. Priapus came and said, ‘Poor Daphnis, why are you wasting away? In her search for you the girl roams by every spring, through every glade ...’ (vv. 77–83)

Here the different characters embody different levels of knowledge and curiosity: Hermes, who seems to believe that Daphnis himself is in love with an unknown person, the human rustics who know only that Daphnis is suffering terribly, and Priapus who thinks he knows the whole story—Daphnis is suffering for no real reason. This dramatization of ignorance, desire to know and probably delusory self-satisfaction at the head of the story is, in part, an anticipation of, and hence stimulus to, the reception of the story by the primary narratees. It also foregrounds, however, the strikingly oblique mode of a narrative at the heart of which lies a bitter confrontation between the only two characters who certainly do know the true situation, Aphrodite and



Daphnis himself; we the audience never learn ‘what has happened’, except perhaps that Daphnis’ suffering and death may be viewed either as a victory for *erōs* or a victory over *erōs* (vv. 97–98, 103). What matters is what an audience or a community, whether of goatherds or readers, makes of the ‘the idea of Daphnis’.<sup>24</sup>

### *Conclusion*

The poetry of Theocritus and his imitators is important evidence for a self-conscious concern in third-century and later Greek poetry with narrative experimentation. Thus, Apollonius (→) explores (*inter alia*) the rhythms of a long epic narrative and the limits of epic ‘repetitiveness’ and authorial discretion, how episodes of varying length play off against recurrent thematic patterns; so too, in the *Hymns*, *Hecale*, and *Aitia*, Callimachus (→) experiments with the inherited modes of form and voice imposed by genre and metre, and seeks to recuperate within hexameter and elegiac poetry some of the narrative techniques of archaic and classical choral lyric, notably that of Pindar and the choruses of Attic tragedy, which had long since died out. Particularly for scholar-poets such as Apollonius and Callimachus, it is tempting to see in these developments the influence of, and a reaction to, Platonic and Aristotelian theorizing about narrative form, as well as of the intensive study of the great narrative works of the past which was carried out at Alexandria and elsewhere. For Theocritus, however, two contemporary phenomena are of particular importance. One is the dominance of (relatively) short poetic forms, which worked against fullness of expression and narrative explanation; this tendency reaches its peak in ‘narrative’ epigrams and epigrams consisting merely in snatches of conversation. Secondly, the ever-increasing expectation of reception through reading blurred the boundaries of, to use the traditional Platonic terminology, ‘mimesis’ and ‘diegesis’ and allowed poets to create potentially elaborate instances of ‘feigned orality’ (cf. the addresses to Aratus in *Idyll* 6, to Nicias in *Idylls* 11 and 13, and to Diophantus in the post-Theocritean *Idyll* 21) and to produce a new range of ‘mixed’ narrative forms.

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. further Hunter 2003: 230–231.

*The Europa of Moschus*

The *Europa* of the Syracusan poet Moschus (mid-second century BC) is the only surviving example of what was probably a common poetic form in the later Hellenistic period: a self-contained mythic narrative of relatively short compass (in the case of the *Europa*, one hundred and sixty-six hexameters) in the voice of an external primary narrator. No motive is given for the narration and there is no invocation of the Muses: the poem is presented, in the *in medias res* mode already familiar from Theocritus ('Once upon a time the Cyprian sent a sweet dream over Europa ...'), as a single incident within the broad tapestry of received story, but the opening word 'Europa', the girl who gave her name to the land mass, reveals at once that this is a story whose ramifications are very much still present.

The *Europa* tells the story of Zeus's abduction and seduction of the beautiful Europa; the god took the form of a bull, tricked the girl into sitting on his back, and then carried her westwards across the sea from Phoenicia to Crete, where, as Zeus tells her, she is to conceive his 'glorious sons, who will all hold the sceptre of power among men' (160–161). And so it came to pass: Zeus made love to her, thus procreating the people of 'Europe'. The poem's simple structure, which moves from Europa's prophetic and erotic dream to another, but shared, bed,<sup>25</sup> a structure which suggests unmediated, progressive narrative, is reinforced by a narratorial voice which, on the whole, remains largely covert. The (omni)presence of the omniscient narrator, who knows, for example, the details of Europa's dream and her emotional state during it, the divine history of her basket, and the fact that Zeus fell in love 'at first sight', emerges perhaps less frequently than one might have expected: cf. 5, a 'learned commentary' on the timing of the dream; 7, 'Europa who was still a virgin', suggesting the narrator's knowledge of what is coming; 38, *mega thauma*, 'a great marvel' describing Europa's basket; 72–73, a narratorial prolepsis with *mellein* of a familiar epic type, 'Not for long was Europa to amuse herself with flowers ...'; 74, the interactional particles *ē gar dē*; 76, Aphrodite 'who alone can even conquer Zeus'; 80–83, the mannered, quadruple denial that this was any ordinary bull; 84, the interactional particles *dē toi*; 97–98, describing the divine bull's lowing, 'you would say that you were hearing the

<sup>25</sup> The movement is marked, as often, by verbal repetition (*lekheon* 'bed' 16 ~ *lekhos* 164).

sweet sound of a Mygdonian pipe’, an instance of the ‘indefinite second person’ device; 113, the bull travels over the water ‘like a dolphin’.<sup>26</sup>

Another aspect of the narrator can be gathered from the thickly allusive textuality of his writing, his re-writings of *Odyssey* 6 (Nausicaa) and Book 3 (Medea) of the *Argonautica* of Apollonius. This marks the narrative as, in one sense, a replaying of previous narratives and identifies the narrator as a *poiētēs*, self-consciously making choices within the ocean of tradition. In perhaps no other passage of the poem is the controlling power of the narrator so strongly marked as in the meeting of Europa and the divine bull on the seashore. Europa and her companions have come to the shore to gather flowers, as Nausicaa and her friends went to wash clothes. In Homer a naked male appears, whom the poet compares to a lion (*Od.* 6.139–147), and his terrifying appearance causes all the girls except Nausicaa to run away. Nausicaa is won over by his pleas, and a bath and new clothes (and a little help from Athena) restore the hero’s handsome grace that turns female heads (*Od.* 6.227–237). Moschus unpacks the powerfully unspoken possibilities of this scene by having not a rough and haggard man appear, but the very embodiment of male sexual power, a glorious bull; in explicit contrast to the Homeric scene, ‘the appearance of the bull did not cause the maidens to flee, but all felt a desire (*erōs*) to approach and touch the lovely bull ...’ (89–91).<sup>27</sup> Such games with the literary tradition are very strong markers of narratorial presence.

In contrast to these overt games, there is a very striking narratorial discretion in the *Europa* concerning the double aetiological focus of the narrative—the founding of the Cretan royal house and the origin of the name of Europe; these are given little prominence. The second theme plays over the narrative of the dream in which Europa saw herself being fought over by two women, who were in fact continents (the ‘mainland’ opposite Asia is still nameless, 9), but the idea is never really developed. Aetiology, teleology, and narrative consequence are replaced by the portrait of a (paradoxically) universal experience (the passage of a young girl towards physical sexuality and motherhood). A certain epic grandeur and amplitude is indeed lent to the poem by the devices of the opening dream and the *ekphrasis* of Europa’s marvellous basket,

<sup>26</sup> Hunter 1993: 132–133 (with further bibliography).

<sup>27</sup> There seems to be a verbal echo of Theocritus 13.48, the effect of Hylas’ beauty upon the water-nymphs. It is tempting to believe that Moschus wants us, in the light of his reworking, to activate the sexual sense of *mixesthai* at *Od.* 6.136.

for these suggest pattern and importance: only great events achieve this double mirroring. Both devices, however, emphasize retrospective interpretation: significance emerges ‘after the event’, a pattern which allows the events themselves to seem ordinary and everyday, almost ‘unepic’. In the contrast between such a tone and the remarkable nature of what is being described, it is fair to see once again the self-conscious concern in third-century and later Greek poetry with narrative experimentation.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> For a much fuller account of the *Europa* cf. Fantuzzi-Hunter 2002: 291–301.



PART TWO

HISTORIOGRAPHY



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### HERODOTUS

*I.J.F. de Jong*

In discussing the narrator of the *Histories*, I take as my point of departure the Homeric narrator. For the Herodotean narrator, as his proem makes amply clear, places himself in the tradition of the Homeric narrator, in that, he, too, is the guardian of the *klea* of men from the past. At the same time, this proem, in replacing a Muse-invocation by a reference to Herodotus' own investigation (*historiē*), signals a crucial difference between this narrator and his eminent predecessor. Indeed, the Herodotean narrator is an intriguing mixture of an epic storyteller and a historian.

#### *Resemblances to the Homeric narrator*

The Herodotean narrator<sup>1</sup> resembles the Homeric narrator, in that he is external, omnipresent, and omniscient. Let us examine these three characteristics in turn. The main story of the *Histories* covers the years 560–478, which means that Herodotus (c. 484–425) could theoretically have been an internal narrator for at least part of his story, as are Thucydides and Xenophon. Nowhere, however, does he play a role in the events he recounts, and he is therefore an external narrator. Whereas the Homeric narrator occasionally refers to the 'now' of his own time in order to stress the difference with the heroes of the past, the Herodotean narrator likewise stresses differences between 'then' and 'now', using the 'reference to the narrator's own time' motif (e.g. 1.173.2),<sup>2</sup> but more often points out the continuance of customs or monuments (e.g. 1.52: Croesus sent two gifts to the oracle of Amphiaraus.

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<sup>1</sup> De Jong 1999: 220–229.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. 1.50.3.



‘Both of these still lay *until my time* in Thebes’).<sup>3</sup> What is remarkable in these passages is the frequent use of the imperfect, even though the narrator is referring to the present of his own time: e.g. ‘For many states that were once great have now become small; and those that *were* great in my own time were small in the past’ (1.5.4). Is the narrator, true to his own maxim of the instability of fate, anticipating that his own present may once become the past?<sup>4</sup>

The omnipresence of the Herodotean narrator appears most clearly in such private scenes as Gyges watching the naked wife of Candaules in her bedroom (1.10) or Darius lying in bed and discussing his military strategies with his wife (3.134). In later books he has equally easy access to all camps, Greek and Persian, Athenian and Spartan.

The omniscience of the Herodotean narrator is clear from his knowledge of how events will end, which he shows in prolepses (e.g. 1.8: ‘After a little while Candaules—for he was doomed to end badly—said ...’), and from the access he has to the thoughts of his characters, in the form of embedded focalization (e.g. 1.86.9: ‘Cyrus, realizing that he, being himself a human being, was burning alive another human being, who had once been not less fortunate than himself, fearing retribution, and knowing that there was no stability of human affairs, ordered the fire to be quenched.’). We may add here his ability to quote *verbatim* the words of his historical characters, even when they were spoken in remote times or places, or privately.

So much for the similarities to the Homeric narrator, which confirm pseudo-Longinus’ qualification of Herodotus as ‘most Homeric’ (*Subl.* 13.3). However, there are also differences, which in fact considerably modify the picture just sketched.<sup>5</sup>

#### *An overt narrator*

The first difference is that, in sharp contrast to the covert Homeric narrator, the Herodotean narrator is overt: in his proem he ‘seals’ his work, referring to himself in the third person (‘This is the publication

<sup>3</sup> Cf. 1.66, 92.1, 93.3, 173.3; 3.183.3; 4.12.1, 204; 5.88.3, 115.1; 6.119.4; 7.107.2, 178.2; 8.121.1. Here and elsewhere I quote the translation of Godley, with minor changes.

<sup>4</sup> For the imperfects see Rösler 1991 and Naiden 1999.

<sup>5</sup> Just as Herodotus in many other respects distances himself from Homer; Marincola 1997: 6–7, 225–226 and Boedeker 2000: 103–105.

of the research of Herodotus of Halicarnassus ...'), and in the ensuing nine books repeatedly steps forward *in propria persona* (using first-person forms), though more often in the early books than in the later ones. I distinguish three types of narratorial interventions: the narrator speaking as (1) narrator, (2) historian, and (3) commentator.<sup>6</sup>

*Ad 1.* The Herodotean narrator regularly reveals his own presence by referring to his activity as organizer of the text: 'I will now tell',<sup>7</sup> 'let so much be said about',<sup>8</sup> 'I return to my *logos*',<sup>9</sup> 'as I have said earlier', or 'as I will tell later'<sup>10</sup> (no such cross-references appear in the Homeric epics, where links between different sections of the story are marked by verbal repetition). His cross-referencing is not systematic: in places where one would expect a cross-reference, we do not find one (e.g. 7.114, where mention is made of the Persian habit of burying people alive, an instance of which is recounted in 3.35); conversely, a back-reference sometimes follows after just a few sentences (e.g. 1.61.1).

*Ad 2.* Most narratorial interventions refer to the narrator's role as a historian. We see him at work while interviewing witnesses or locals, e.g. 2.54.2:

The priests of the Theban Zeus told me that two priestesses had been carried away from Thebes by Phoenicians; one of them was taken away and sold in Libya, the other in Hellas. When I asked them how it was that they could speak with so much certainty, they replied that their people had sought diligently for these women and had never been able to find them, but had later learnt the tale which was now told me.<sup>11</sup>

inspecting sites or monuments, e.g. 2.44.1–2:

Wishing to get clear knowledge of this matter from a place where it was possible to do so, I took ship to Tyre in Phoenicia, where I heard that there was a very holy temple of Heracles ...<sup>12</sup>

reasoning, e.g. 7.238.2:

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<sup>6</sup> Schepens 1980: 46–51; Dewald 1987; Marincola 1987; 1997: 6–8; and Fowler 1996: 70–71.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 1.15, 75, 95, 177; 2.102, 105, 147, 155; 3.6; 4.14, 38, 145, 5.65; 8.55.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. 1.92.4, 140.3; 2.34.2, 35.1, 76.3, 117.6; 3.3.1, 113.1, 119.1, 136, 138.4; 4.31.2, 15.4, 32.2, 36.1, 45.5, 96.2, 199.2; 5.62.1; 6.55, 100.1, 153.1; 7.100.1, 152, 153.1. See Lateiner 1989: 44.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. 1.95.1, 140.3; 4.82; 5.62.1.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. 1.18.2, 61.1, 75.1, 85.1, 140.3, 169.2; 2.38; 3.106.2, 159.2; 4.79, 145.1; 5.36.4, 62.1; 6.19.2, 3; 7.108.1, 110, 115.2, 213; 8.2.1, 55, 95.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. 2.3.1, 91.5, 104.1, 113.1.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. 2.12.1, 29.1, 75.1, 106.1, 131.3, 148.1, 5, 150.2; 3.12.1, 4; 4.195.2; 5.59; 6.47.1.

[Xerxes has Leonidas' head cut off and impaled.] It is plain to me by this proof especially that while Leonidas lived king Xerxes was most incensed against him of all people; else he had never dealt with his dead body so outrageously. For the Persians are of all men known to me the most wont to honour valiant warriors.<sup>13</sup>

and evaluating stories, e.g. 3.56:

When the Lacedaemonians had besieged Samos for forty days with no success, they went away to the Peloponnesus. There is a foolish tale which says that Polycrates bribed them to depart ...<sup>14</sup>

In short, we see him performing the *historiē*, *akoē*, *opsis*, and *gnōmē* which he lists in 2.29.1 and 99.1 as the tasks of the historian, and to which he had referred under the general header of *historiē* in his proem. Drawing attention to his activity as a historian in such an explicit manner is one of the main ways in which he establishes his authority.<sup>15</sup>

A special characteristic of this narrator is that on occasion he explicitly refuses to narrate something, e.g. 2.171.1–2:

On this lake they enact by night the story of the god's suffering, a rite which the Egyptians call the Mysteries. Although I know more about these matters, how each of them is, let me be silent. About the rites of Demeter, which the Greeks call Thesmophoria, let me be silent about those, too, except for what is allowed to say.<sup>16</sup>

Most of these instances of *praeteritio* are occasioned by religious prudence (and one is reminded of the reticence of the narrator in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* [→] with regard to the Eleusinian mysteries: 479–482),<sup>17</sup> the other ones by various considerations: *damnatio memoriae*, fear of not being believed, a desire to emphasize what he does recount, or the fact that something has already been told by someone else. Similarly, the narrator occasionally assures that he does not recount all, but concentrates on what is 'worthy of telling', or apologizes for including a 'digression' (*parenthēkē*).<sup>18</sup> Although there is some discrepancy between

<sup>13</sup> Cf. 1.75.3–6; 2.27, 104, 120; 5.3.1; 7.137.1–3, 238.2; 8.8.3, 13, 53.1, 73.3, 77, 129.3; 9.65.2, 71.2, 100.2.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. 1.51.3, 182, 214.5; 2.5.1, 12.1, 28.1–2, 45, 106.5, 120.1, 131.3; 3.3.1, 9.1–2, 16.7, 56.2, 80.1; 4.5.1; 5.10, 86.3; 6.121–124; 7.214.1; 8.8.3.

<sup>15</sup> Marincola 1997: 63–67.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. 1.51.4, 193.4; 2.123.3, 170.1, 171.1–2; 5.72.4; 6.55; 8.85.2; see Lateiner 1989: 65–69, 73–75.

<sup>17</sup> Harrison 2000: 182–191.

<sup>18</sup> 1.177, 194.1; 3.125.3; 5.65.5; 6.43.3; 7.171.1. On the Herodotean notion of 'digression', see Cobet 1971: 45–82.

the theory of those assurances and the practice of his text (which, at least to modern tastes, seems to contain a great deal of digressional material), they make clear that the narrator has a clear notion of what constitutes the subject matter of his narrative: everything related to his theme (the conflicts between Asia and Europe, culminating in the Persian Wars of 490–479) and ‘amazing deeds’ (*erga ... thaumasta*).<sup>19</sup>

The narrator does not, however, suppress stories that he does not believe. As he says more than once,<sup>20</sup> he feels it is his duty to recount all versions.<sup>21</sup> He even occasionally turns to the writing of virtual history, of what might have been, e.g. 1.191.5:

Now if the Babylonians had known beforehand or learnt what Cyrus was planning, they would have let the Persians enter the city and killed them. For they would have shut all the gates that opened on the river and themselves mounted the walls that ran along the river, and caught the Persians as in a trap.<sup>22</sup>

*Ad* 3. More often than the Homeric narrator, the Herodotean narrator explicitly comments on the deeds of his characters. He calls customs ‘very wise’ (1.63.2), advice ‘very useful’ (1.170.1), the death of Polycrates ‘unworthy of himself and his designs’ (3.125.2), and the blinding by the Thracian king of his own sons ‘a monstrous deed’ (8.116.1).

Like the Homeric narrator, the Herodotean narrator is not hampered by nationalism when attributing praise or blame:<sup>23</sup> the words spoken by Xerxes during the scourging of the Hellespont are called ‘barbarian and godless’ (7.35.2), but that same Persian king is called ‘the most worthy to hold command, because of his beauty and stature’ (7.187.2). Whether he is equally impartial where the Greek *poleis*, notably Athens and Sparta, are concerned is a matter of much discussion and a subject too complex to be discussed here.

Sometimes the narrator couches his opinion in a general saying, e.g. 8.3.1:

The Athenians waived their claim [to be leaders of the fleet], deeming the safety of Hellas of prime importance and seeing that if they quarrelled over the leadership Hellas must perish, which is a right thought; *for an internal war is as much worse than a united war as war is worse than peace.*

<sup>19</sup> For the latter category, see Barth 1968.

<sup>20</sup> 2.123.1, 130.2; 4.173, 195.2; 6.137.1; 7.152.3.

<sup>21</sup> Occasionally he does leave out alternative versions: 1.95.1; 2.70.1.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. 7.139.

<sup>23</sup> For Herodotus’ impartiality see Marincola 1997: 164.

Alongside the explicit narratorial interventions, the Herodotean narrator has many more implicit ways of making clear his view. One is to insert at the moment of a person's success a prolepsis about that same person's end, which, in accordance with the principle of the instability of fate, is usually a negative one (e.g. 7.213, where, at the moment Ephialtes is ingratiating himself with the Persian king, the narrator reveals that he will later be killed). In this subtle and implicit way the narrator makes clear that crime does not pay, or that too much prosperity leads to ruin. Another technique is that of suggestive juxtaposition (→ Homer): e.g. in 3.40–43 there is a telling contrast between Polycrates, who is advised to throw away what is most precious to him and has to search a long time for it among his many possessions, and the simple fisherman, who spontaneously offers his king the biggest (and most valuable) fish he has ever caught.

*A partially omniscient narrator*

A second difference between the Homeric narrator and the Herodotean narrator is that the former 'relies on' the Muses, eyewitnesses of the past (and thereby 'authenticates' his omniscience, which is of course no more than poetic licence), whereas the latter relies on autopsy, eyewitness reports, traditions, and his own reasoning. This means that in point of fact he is not always omniscient: indeed, in many places he indicates that he is not able to tell something (e.g. 1.49: 'As to the reply which the Lydians received from Amphiaraus ... I cannot say what it was, for nothing is recorded of it, except that Croesus held that from this oracle too he had received a true answer'),<sup>24</sup> or makes clear that he is only guessing (e.g. 3.13.4: 'Cambyzes received in all kindness the gifts of the Libyans; but he seized what came from Cyrene and scattered it with his own hands among his army. This he did, I think, to mark his displeasure at the littleness of the gift').<sup>25</sup> Also, he is not always omnipresent: there are moments where he reaches the 'borders' of his story (e.g. 4.16.1: 'As for the land of which my history has begun

<sup>24</sup> Cf. 1.5.3–4, 57.1–2, 160.2; 2.3.2, 28.1–2, 103; 3.121.1; 4.16.1–2, 81.1, 96.1; 5.66; 6.14.1, 82.1; 7.26.2, 60.1, 133.2, 153.3, 187.1; 8.8.2, 87.1, 2, 112.2, 128.1, 133–136; 9.8.2, 18.2, 32.2, 84. Cf. also the 'X did y, either because ... or ...' passages in 1.61.2, 86.2, 191.1; 2.181.1; 7.2; 8.54.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. 1.51.4, 193.4; 2.123.3, 170.1, 171.1, 2; 6.95.2, 98.1.

to speak, no one knows exactly what lies northward of it; for I can learn from none who claims to have been an eyewitness').<sup>26</sup>

### *An epideictic narrator*

Having examined the prominent presence of the Herodotean narrator in his narrative, we are left with the question of the origin of this new—in comparison to his main model Homer—style of presentation. As regards his frequent comments on the characters and actions of his story, Bowie (2001: 64) has suggested that in devising his narratorial *persona* Herodotus may have been influenced by elegiac and iambic historical narrative. An even greater influence was the work of the scientists of his time (doctors, sophists, and physicists): their epideictic speeches display all the typical features of the Herodotean narrator's style, such as his many first-person interventions, conclusions of the type 'let so much be said about' (discussed above) and second-person forms, rhetorical questions (to be discussed below in the section on narratees).<sup>27</sup> In this context it is relevant to note that the Herodotean narrator presents himself as a speaker rather than a writer (as does the Thucydidean narrator): almost without exception, he refers to his narrating activity as *legein*, not *graphein*. This may be a relic of the *Histories* as lectures,<sup>28</sup> but we could also be dealing with a variant of the 'feigned orality' which we also find in Pindar (→), Apollonius of Rhodes (→) and Callimachus (→): although he is obviously writing a text, the Herodotean narrator behaves as an epideictic speaker.

In sum, the Herodotean narrator has the *persona* of a historian, poses as an epideictic speaker, and allows himself the liberties of an epic singer.

### *Secondary and reported narrators*

The *Histories* feature fewer secondary narrators than the Homeric epics. There are a handful of external secondary narrators, such as Solon,

<sup>26</sup> Cf. 4.45.2; 5.9.1. Nesselrath 1995.

<sup>27</sup> De Jong 1999: 227–229 and Thomas 2000: 235–248.

<sup>28</sup> For a discussion of the question whether the *Histories* started as lectures, see Johnson 1994.

who tells Croesus the story of the Argive youths Cleobis and Biton (1.31); Socles, who recounts the stories of the Corinthian tyrants Cypselus and Periander to the assembled Greeks (5.92); and the Tegeans and Athenians, who recount the story of the Heraclidae (9.26–27). There is a slightly larger number of internal secondary narrators who—usually quite briefly—recount events in which they and often their narratees have participated (e.g. 7.10, where Artabanus recalls in the presence of Xerxes his advising Darius not to undertake an expedition against the Scythians).<sup>29</sup> In most cases the embedded narrative functions as a—persuasive or dissuasive—paradigm, a function that is often made explicit (e.g. 9.26: the Tegeans and Athenians ‘claimed that they should hold the second wing of the army, *justifying themselves* by tales of deeds old and new.’).<sup>30</sup>

An intriguing internal secondary narrator is Cambyses, who in 3.65 tells an audience of Persians about the murder of his brother Smerdis and the dream that led him to it. He now knows that he interpreted the dream incorrectly and killed his brother without reason, and this insight leads to a highly emotional story, which is interspersed with narratorial comments: ‘When I was in Egypt, I saw in my dream a vision, which I wish I had never seen ... I acted with more haste than wisdom; for [as I know understand: *ara*] no human power can turn fate aside. But I, foolishly, ... did wholly mistake what was to be ...’ Here we are close to tragedy (note *hamartēn* in 69.4), as a character ruefully looks back on what he has done.

The *Histories* abound in what we might call reported narrators, i.e., narrators whose stories are presented in indirect speech; e.g. the story of Arion and the dolphin as told by the Corinthians and Lesbians (1.23–24) or the account of Miltiades’ vicissitudes after Marathon as told by the Parians (6.134). Herodotus is particularly fond of including local inhabitants among his reported narrators. Reported narratives may also be marked not by indirect speech, but by the simple tag ‘as the X say’, inserted before or after the narrative or in both places. In fact, the entire *Histories* is based on the *logoi* of others, even when the narrator does not explicitly say so (for obvious reasons; this would have resulted in a text entirely in indirect speech). The Herodotean narrator introduces reported narrators when there are different ver-

<sup>29</sup> Cf. 1.117.3–5, 120.2; 3.36.1–2, 73; 7.8.a, 10.a.1, 104.2, 209.2.

<sup>30</sup> Gould 1989: 55–57.

sions of a story (e.g. the stories about Io in 1.1 and 5),<sup>31</sup> or when he wants to stress the source of a story (e.g. the well-known ‘Rhampsinitus and the thief’ story in 2.121, which forms part of a series of Egyptian *logoi*). In itself, the use of reported narrators does not automatically mean that he is distancing himself from these stories.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, in the case of the Egyptian *logoi* of Book 2, the repeated references to Egyptian priests as his source are intended to increase the authority of what he is recounting. When he is sceptical or critical, he usually—although not always—makes this clear in a narratorial intervention (e.g. in 3.56, ‘There is a foolish story ...’). In these instances we see the birth of one of the most distinctive aspects of ancient historiography, the polemic with predecessors.<sup>33</sup> A kind of shorthand variant of the reported narrators are the anonymous spokesmen: whereas the former are specific (‘the Persians/the Lesbians say ...’) and responsible for an entire story, the latter are anonymous and invoked only to modify—negatively or positively—certain *details* of a story, usually in the form of *legetai*, e.g. 1.159 (‘But while he did so, a voice *it is said/they say* came out of the inner shrine calling to Aristodicus’).<sup>34</sup> This device appears to be a continuation and expansion of the occasional anonymous spokesmen in Homer (→), introduced in the form of *phasi*, ‘they say’.

The primary narrator regularly intervenes in the reported narratives, in order to add comments addressed to the primary narratees, e.g. ‘The Persians say that next certain Greeks (*they cannot tell who*) landed at Tyre in Phoenicia and carried off the king’s daughter Europa. *These Greeks must, I suppose, have been Cretans*. So far, then, the account between them stood balanced. But after this the Greeks became guilty of a second wrong’ (1.2). All in all, one gets the impression that, although formally presented by other narrators, the reported narratives are very much the product of the primary narrator. This observation is confirmed by the fact that the indirect speech is often dropped after a few sentences or, conversely, the primary narrator suddenly slips into indirect speech (both phenomena are exemplified in the episode of Cyrus and Croesus after the fall of Sardes: 1.86–91). In other words, primary and reported

<sup>31</sup> Groten 1963 and Lateiner 1989: 76–90.

<sup>32</sup> Harrison 2000: 25–30. The other view (indirect speech suggests distance) is in fact the *communis opinio*, see e.g. Gould 1989: 50–51.

<sup>33</sup> Marincola 1997: 218–226.

<sup>34</sup> Westlake 1977: 361–362. Sometimes the subject of *legetai* is specified, e.g. 1.87.1, just as, conversely, sometimes the subject of *legousi* is not specified, e.g. 9.120.4.



narrative in the *Histories* are less fundamentally distinct from each other than would appear at first sight, and the primary narrator exercises a tight control on all levels of the story.

### *Narratees*

The Herodotean primary narratees are not as overt as the narrator: in some places they are specified as Greeks (e.g. 3.80.1 or 103), but there are no further indications as to what kind of audience the narrator envisages for himself.<sup>35</sup> However, their presence is acknowledged in various ways:<sup>36</sup>

- the ‘indefinite second person’ device (e.g. 1.139: ‘You shall find, if you search, that not some but all Persian names alike end in this letter’).<sup>37</sup>
- passages featuring an anonymous interlocutor (often *tis*) with whom the narratees can identify (e.g. 5.54.1: ‘If someone desires a more exact measurement, I will give that too’).<sup>38</sup>
- passages featuring an anonymous witness with whom the narratees again can identify (e.g. 4.19: ‘But to the east of these farming Scythians, for someone who has crossed the river Panticapes, the nomadic Scythians live ...’).<sup>39</sup>
- rhetorical questions (e.g. 1.75.6: ‘Some say that the ancient channel was altogether dried up. But I do not believe this; for how did they then pass the river when they were returning?’).<sup>40</sup>
- *gar*-clauses, which provide explanations to questions which the narrator assumes the narratees will have (e.g. in 1.10, where having recounted that, after the Lydian queen was seen naked by her husband’s servant Gyges, she was ashamed and decided to take revenge, the narrator has tens to add ‘for among the Lydians and most of the barbarians it is held a great shame that even a man should be seen naked’, thus answering his narratees’ implied question as to why the queen would be upset).

<sup>35</sup> Flory 1980; Gould 1989: 15–17; and Malitz 1990: 327–328.

<sup>36</sup> Lateiner 1989: 31–33.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. 1.199.4.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. 2.6.2, 146.1 (*bis*), 148.2, 179; 3.6.2, 38.1, 122.1; 5.45.2; 7.126, 139.5.

<sup>39</sup> Cf. 1.51.1; 2.5.1.

<sup>40</sup> Cf. 2.11.4 (*bis*), 15.2, 22.2, 45.2, 3; 57.2; 125.7; 4.46.3; 7.21.1 (*bis*).

- ‘presentation through negation’-passages, which contradict the narratees’ expectations or create new ones (e.g. 1.10: when Candaules’ wife realizes that she has been seen naked, ‘she did not cry out nor let it be seen that she had perceived anything’; this is an unexpected reaction and raises the question of what the queen is up to).

To this list of devices the Herodotean narrator adds the use of interactional particles: *kaitoi* (e.g. 8.86: ‘The barbarians, no longer fighting orderly or using their heads, were bound to end as badly as they did. *And yet* they proved themselves that day much better than off Euboea ...’; this counters a conclusion which the narratees might otherwise have drawn on the basis of the preceding, viz. that the barbarians are fighting as badly as never before),<sup>41</sup> *mentoi* (e.g. 1.172.1: ‘The Caunians, to my mind, are aboriginals; they themselves, *however*, say that they came from Crete’; the narratees are invited to note the contrast),<sup>42</sup> *dēn* (e.g. 1.59.4: ‘Wounding himself and his mules, Pisistratus drove his carriage into the market place, pretending to have escaped from his enemies, who *allegedly* had wanted to kill him when on his way to the fields’; the narrator draws his narratees’ attention to the deceit),<sup>43</sup> and *ara* (e.g. 6.110.1: ‘The Eretrians ... asked help from the Athenians. These did not refuse the help. ... But *it turned out* that the designs of the Eretrians were not sound at all ...’; the narratees are alerted to the fact that things are different from what one might expect).<sup>44</sup>

### *The main narrative and the digressions*

As in the Homeric epics, the beginning of the main narrative is prominently marked (with both a proem and an indication of the starting point: Croesus, the first barbarian of whom the narrator knows for sure that he conquered Greeks). The end is not signalled in the same way, and the question whether closure is effected in the *Histories* is a matter of dispute.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>41</sup> Cf. 2.142.2, 148.2; 3.15.3, 152; 4.77.1; 8.71.1, 112.3; 9.71.3.

<sup>42</sup> There are some 86 instances in narrator-text (as against 30 in speech).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. 1.73.5; 3.74.4, 136.2, 156.1; 6.1.1, 39.1; 8.5.1, 6.2; 9.66.3, 80.3, 99.3.

<sup>44</sup> Lateiner 1989: 31–33.

<sup>45</sup> Dewald 1997.

In the course of his main narrative the narrator tends to vary his pace: some parts are recounted in summary fashion, others scenically, i.e., with much detail and speech. Some of the latter parts are real gems and, featuring ring-composition, closure, and the *leitmotif* style, stand out as self-contained units. An example is the ‘Atys and Adrastus’ story in 1.34–45.<sup>46</sup> At the beginning of the story Croesus considers himself the most fortunate of all mortals. But then he has a dream in which the death of his favourite son is foretold. He takes very concrete steps to avert the danger. At that point Adrastus, a man in the grip of misfortune (*leitmotif*), comes to his palace, because he has unintentionally killed his brother. It is this man who then accidentally kills Croesus’ son and makes the dream come true. The story ends with Adrastus’ suicide (closure), because he realizes that he is the most unfortunate of men (*leitmotif* and contrastive ring-composition with beginning). Though forming a self-contained unit, the story is firmly integrated into the main narrative, in that it provides the primary narratees with a first proof that Croesus’ fortune, like that of all men, can change, just as Solon had warned him (1.32); for Croesus himself this moment of insight will not come until later (1.91).

The main narrative is frequently interrupted by digressions.<sup>47</sup> These are of two types: ethnographical/geographical or historical. The historical ‘digressions’ are in fact analepses or prolepses, which are usually marked off by means of ring-composition, narratorial interventions which announce or conclude a section (see above), or by anaphoric and cataphoric pronouns (*hōde*, *hōs*, *toionde*, etc.). These anachronies are almost invariably functional (hence my use of the term ‘digression’, with its connotation of irrelevance, between inverted commas): they either provide background information which helps the narratees to understand the unfolding of the main story (e.g. the analepsis on Athenian history in 5.55–96, culminating in the increased tension between Athens and Persia, explains why the Athenians accept Aristagoras’ request for help against the Persians), or they clarify the main story by providing an analogy (e.g. the analepsis on the reforms of Cleisthenes the Sicyonian in 5.67–68, which is intended to explain the behaviour of

<sup>46</sup> Cf., e.g. ‘Polycrates and the ring’ in 3.39–43, ‘Xerxes and the wife of Masistes’ in 9.108–114. Discussion of these semi-independent stories told by the primary narrator in Long 1987; Erbse 1992; Van der Veen 1996; and de Jong 1999: 242–251. For reasons why these passages should not be labelled ‘novellae’ see de Jong 2002: 257–258.

<sup>47</sup> Cobet 1971 and de Jong 2002.

Clisthenes the Athenian).<sup>48</sup> The ethnographical/geographical ‘digressions’, which in narratological terms are descriptions, have often been seen as relics of Herodotus’ early career as an ethnographer and geographer. However this may be, the Herodotean narrator has thoroughly integrated them into his narrative, inserting them, for example, at the moment an oriental king undertakes a military expedition against another people, and thereby providing his narratees with the information necessary to understand what follows. Thus the fact that the Scythians are nomads (4.46.3) explains why Darius will not be able to defeat them, and the description of Babylon (1.178–187) clarifies the ensuing account of the siege of this city. Where the narrator gives *more* information than his story demands, as is often the case, this is in line with the announcement in his proem that his *historiē* encompasses ‘what is wrought by human beings’; he describes the world as it was then known to mankind.<sup>49</sup>

*Narratorial alter egos and the function of the Histories*

Like the Homeric narrator and his singers Phemius and Demodocus, the Herodotean narrator uses the device of the narratorial *alter ego*: certain characters in his story seem intended as images of himself. In the first place, we may think of Solon,<sup>50</sup> Artabanus, and Demaratus. All three are wise advisers who in some cases have at their disposal information about unknown people and places or about the past; thus Artabanus informs Darius about the Scythians, and Demaratus tells Xerxes about the Greeks. This provides us with an important clue to the function which the Herodotean narrator sees for his *own* work: in addition to the typically epic function of preserving the glorious past, it provides information about that past and about other people, on the basis of which political decisions can be taken.<sup>51</sup> An *alter ego* of a somewhat different nature is Periander in the story of the poet Arion and the dolphin (1.23–24). Having been forced to jump into the sea by sailors and then miraculously saved by a dolphin, Arion returns to

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<sup>48</sup> Gray 2002.

<sup>49</sup> Cobet 1971: 85–140.

<sup>50</sup> Shapiro 1996.

<sup>51</sup> Dewald 1985 and Christ 1994. Whether Herodotus has a specific warning in mind for the Athenian readers, is a matter of discussion; see most recently Moles 2002.

Corinth and tells Periander what has befallen him. The latter does not believe his tale and arranges for a confrontation with the sailors, who first claim that they safely transported the poet to Taras. When they then see him alive in front of them, they are forced to admit their crime (and, we may conclude, Periander now believes the tale of the dolphin). There are in fact many incredulous characters in the *Histories*, who disbelieve reports of facts, past or present, but who eventually revise their own views by collecting information. Thus Periander seems the *alter ego* of both the narrator, who likewise investigates the stories told to him (like him, Periander is said to *historieisthai*: 24.7), and the narratees, whose scepticism with regard to the narrator's stories must be abandoned when they are confronted with his proofs (autopsy, spokesmen, or logical reasoning).<sup>52</sup> The briefest but most pregnant self-image of the Herodotean narrator is that found in 5.36: 'All the rest favoured revolt, except Hecataeus the historian; he advised them that they would be best guided not to make war on the king of Persia, recounting to them the tale of the nations subject to Darius and all his power', in short, the tale which is told in—part of—the *Histories*.

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<sup>52</sup> See Packman 1991.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THUCYDIDES

*T. Rood*

Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) has traditionally been seen as a model of scientific history writing. But many readers in recent years have reacted against idealized readings of Thucydides as an objective historian. They see his unmediated presentation of events, and his reluctance to allow competing versions into his text, as designed to blind readers to his role in shaping his version and persuade them that it is true. But Thucydides' narratorial style has also been seen in more positive terms. Scholars have increasingly presented a Thucydides who is not so restrained and objective after all.<sup>1</sup> And Hanson has polemically celebrated a Thucydides who is 'selective and guarded, not promiscuous, in his disclosures', and whose personal voice is 'mysterious and subtle', 'possess[ing] a certain dignity by the restraint in its use'.<sup>2</sup>

Thucydides' role as a paradigm of impersonal scholarship makes closer exploration of his narrative *persona* desirable. This chapter will discuss first the primary narrator, and his interaction with his narratees, and then other narratives included in the work. It will raise questions about Thucydides' place in the development of Greek narrative, about the move from works composed for oral performance to works written to be read, and about the political implications of narrative modes.

#### *Narrator*

'Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote up the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians ...' (1.1.1). The first event Thucydides' history records is its

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<sup>1</sup> Note especially Connor 1977 and 1984; he makes the case for a 'postmodernist' Thucydides who is very different from the positivist historian praised by earlier generations.

<sup>2</sup> Hanson 1998: 139.

own composition. Who is the narrator? As the preface continues, the initial third-person form gives way, as in the prefaces of Hecataeus and Herodotus, to first-person forms ('from the evidence which I can trust ... I think that previous events were not great', 1.1.2). The run of the sentence shows that the speaker of these first-person utterances is Thucydides. So it is Thucydides who starts by narrating his own act of composition, and Thucydides who narrates the Peloponnesian War itself.

What sort of a narrator is 'Thucydides'? 'Thucydides' is a contemporary (he 'wrote up the war ... beginning when it was first breaking out') whose home city was one of the participants in the war ('an Athenian ... the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians'). But he is also an internal narrator in as much as he later appears as an agent: 'they sent to the other general in Thrace, Thucydides the son of Olorus, who wrote this ...' (4.104.4). Herodotus (→), by contrast, finds a place in his own text only through his activities as traveller, researcher, and writer: that is, he is an external narrator.

That Thucydides the character is 'the son of Olorus' and Thucydides the writer is 'an Athenian' demands explanation. By giving a patronymic on his first appearance as general (as he does with other high-ranking characters,<sup>3</sup> and by using third-person forms for his own actions, he suggests that he treats himself in the same way as he does other characters. He anticipates the technique of Xenophon's *Anabasis* [→] and Caesar's *Commentaries*—except that, unlike Xenophon and Caesar, he states within the text that the character is the writer. By calling himself 'an Athenian', on the other hand, he looks back to his predecessors, who introduce themselves as 'Hecataeus, a Milesian' (*FGH* 1 F1a) and 'Herodotus, a Halicarnassan'. It is not (as the common translation 'Thucydides the Athenian' suggests) that 'Thucydides' is classifying himself as someone famous (contrast the use of the definite article in the cultural notice about Thucydides at D.S. 12.37.2, and at e.g. Th. 1.126.12, 138.6). Rather, these openings give information that, later in the history of the book, is given paratextually, on the title page rather than in the text proper. But 'Thucydides' reference to himself as 'an Athenian' does not simply attach him to his predecessors. The allusion to the author's nationality has a methodological point that it lacks in Hecataeus and Herodotus. By revealing that he belonged to one of

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<sup>3</sup> Hornblower 1994: 161–162.

the protagonists in ‘the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians’, and by calling the war by that neutral formulation, ‘Thucydides’ suggests that he had access to good sources, and that he was not parochial. (So too his statement that he began at the start of the war, and foresaw its greatness, boosts his authority as narrator and thinker.) In the second preface, by contrast, where he writes that ‘the same Thucydides, an Athenian’ has written up to the point when ‘the Spartans and their allies put an end to the rule of the Athenians’ (5.26.1), the narrator’s identification as an Athenian seems emotive.

Thucydides also refers to himself in another way: by name alone, without either patronymic or nationality. He does this in the formula found at the end of many war-years (e.g. ‘the second year of this war which Thucydides wrote up ended’, 2.70.4). Presumably it is because he is closing smaller sections of the work, rather than opening one of its major divisions, that he omits his nationality. But the fact that Thucydides does frequently use first-person forms confirms that the third-person form is a framing device.<sup>4</sup>

How often, and in what contexts, do ‘Thucydides’ first-person interventions appear? They are rare enough for it to be practical to give a complete list here. He uses them to refer back to earlier passages (5.1.1; 6.94.1), to explain why he has included a section (1.23.5, 97.2), to introduce a new section (2.48.3; 3.90.1; 5.26.6) or announce what a new section will prove (2.48.3; 6.54.1), and to express an inability to say something (3.113.6; 5.68.2; 6.2.1). He also uses them ‘for statements of opinion, reasoning, inference, autopsy, and methodology, that is, anything that affected the history *qua* history’:<sup>5</sup> that is, as metanarrative narratorial comments. Methodological instances of the first person are particularly interesting because they show how ‘Thucydides’ separates his role as agent (where third-person forms are used) from his role as enquirer. He uses the first person to state that he was present at some of the speeches and events he describes (1.22.1–2), and that his exile helped him to gather information from the Peloponnesian side (5.26.5). More complex is his statement about the plague at Athens: ‘I will show the symptoms, I who myself fell ill and myself saw others suffering’ (2.48.3). Gribble claims that here ‘the first person refers to the narrator as an actual agent in the narrative’ (he contrasts the use of third

<sup>4</sup> Though hardly a seal to separate books, *pace* Hemmerdinger 1948.

<sup>5</sup> Marincola 1997: 184 n. 52.



persons in 4.104).<sup>6</sup> But the passage is methodological. The use of participles (rather than main verbs) for the illness and for the claim of autopsy suggests that the passage is primarily explaining why Thucydides is able to give such a good description of the plague. Besides these occurrences, first-person forms are used to limit the chronological scope of narratorial judgments (7.86.5; 8.24.4, 68.2, 97.2; also 1.1.4, 13.4, 18.1, 7.87.5, 8.41.2, where the first-person plural is used) or foreground their subjectivity (1.23.6; 2.17.2; 3.89.5: three contentious statements of causation, and 7.87.5), to speculate about the future (1.10.2; 2.54.3), to mark uncertainty about characters' motivation (1.93.7; 8.56.3, 87.4) or even (apparently) about a fact (8.64.5), to mark a story as one handed down by tradition (2.102.6: another first-person plural), and for reasoning and statements of opinion in 'digressions' dealing with past history, such as the *Archaeology* and the account of the fall of the Pisistratid tyranny at Athens (1.3.1, 2, 3, 9.1, 3, 10.4; 6.55.3).

The relative paucity of Thucydides' first-person appearances has led to the suspicion that Thucydides manipulates his narratorial stance so as to impose his judgment on narratees without their being aware of it.<sup>7</sup> It has even been claimed that 'the third person narrator of the opening sentence yields to a new speaker, the war itself'.<sup>8</sup> But Thucydides' activity as writer is underlined by the year-end formulae, his activity as narrator by the first-person forms listed above. It is underlined, too, by techniques such as 'if not' situations and 'presentation through negation'; by small temporal shifts as well as by the larger temporal and intellectual range of passages where Thucydides analyses Athens' defeat (2.65), civil war (3.82–83), or the Athenians' complex dealings with Alcibiades (6.15.2–4); by other explicit judgements (about characters, for instance, before they make speeches [1.139.4; 3.36.6]; compare the introduction of Nestor at *Iliad* 1.247–252); and by generalizations about human nature (4.108.4) or 'what a crowd tends to do' (2.65.4; 4.28.3; 6.63.2; 8.1.4).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Gribble 1998: 48 n. 46.

<sup>7</sup> E.g. Loraux 1986: 149.

<sup>8</sup> Connor 1984: 29, also Kurke 2000: 150, alluding to 1.21.2: 'this war will show (*dēlōsei*) those who look at it from the facts themselves that it was greater than previous ones'. But note that *dēloun* is commonly used, as here, in contexts where recipients' response to what is shown is at issue (1.73.1; 2.48.3), and of letters or inscriptions (1.129.1, 134.4, 137.4; 7.10, 16.1); and that 'this war' implies the war that Thucydides is going to narrate—a narration that begins when 'the war begins' (2.1.1).

<sup>9</sup> Hornblower 1994: 148–160; Gribble 1998; and Rood 1998, index, s.v. 'narrator' on

Expressions of uncertainty further undermine claims that Thucydides' story tells itself. 'Thucydides' fails to express himself with full confidence more often than is sometimes realized (and notably when he is discussing Spartan or Persian actions and motives: 2.18.5, 20.1, 57.1; 3.79.3; 5.54.1, 65.3; 8.46.5, 50.3, 94.2). He also sometimes blurs numerals (e.g. 'two or three times' at 2.4.2; cf. 3.76.1; 4.38.3; 5.10.9; 6.101.6; 7.79.6; 8.74.2). Such expressions of uncertainty are often thought to reinforce the narratee's belief in statements of fact about which no doubt is expressed. That is, scholars have it both ways. Both Thucydides' apparent certainty, and his occasional uncertainty, are taken as means of boosting his authority.

How plausible are such readings? Certainly, expressions of doubt may affect some narratees' belief in other statements. But variants can also have distinctive effects of their own. Phrases such as 'two or three times' tend to appear in vivid sections of narrative like the night-time attack on Plataea (2.4.2). At 5.65.3, the alternative 'either ... or', unique in Thucydides, give a further touch of Herodotean colouring to the account of the uneasy peace.<sup>10</sup> When the Thucydidean narrator reports what 'is said' (*legetai*) to have happened in a place in the distant past, he exploits the mythical aura of that place—of the strait between Italy and Sicily, say, 'the so-called Charybdis past which Odysseus is said to have sailed' (4.24.5). The historicity of Odysseus' travels is scarcely at issue here. Or is Thucydides subtly alluding to a famously embedded narrative? Hornblower notes that 'Homer notoriously distances himself from the Charybdis story ... by having Odysseus recount his own adventures to the Phaiakians. ... [Thucydides] says, in effect, that Homer says that Odysseus, etc.; *legetai* is thus doing a kind of double duty.'<sup>11</sup> If this is right, we have an (early) example (in prose) of the 'Alexandrian footnote'—'the signalling of specific allusion by a poet through seemingly general appeals to tradition'.<sup>12</sup> But perhaps this passage is just an illustration of the narrator's qualified omniscience.

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narrative interventions in Thucydides; also, on counterfactual statements, Flory 1988 and Rood 1998: 278–280.

<sup>10</sup> Rood 1998: 106, with n. 100.

<sup>11</sup> Hornblower 1991–1996: II 182.

<sup>12</sup> Hinds 1998: 1–2. On Thucydides' use of *legetai*, see Westlake 1977.

Particularly worth discussion is the sole passage where Thucydides reveals the different stories that his sources told him about an event in the Peloponnesian War: ‘this is what the Thebans say, and they say that the Plataeans swore an oath; the Plataeans do not agree that they promised to give the men back at once, but only if after discussion they came to some agreement, and they deny that they swore an oath’ (2.5.6; the nearest parallels are 1.138.4, 6, from an excursus about the past). This passage is interesting for four reasons: ‘Thucydides’ names as his source not individual eyewitnesses, but ‘the Thebans’ and ‘the Plataeans’; he reports not what they *said*, but what they *say*, that is, what they still say at the time of narration; he does not judge which side is right; and the disputed episode comes right at the start of the war. Why did ‘Thucydides’ include this discrepancy, and no others, even though they too may have contained (or even been) important facts? It would be facile to regard this passage as a cynical ploy to instil belief in the rest of Thucydides’ narrative. Rather, the citation of what ‘the Thebans’ and ‘the Plataeans’ say points (as often in Herodotus) to the continuing political importance of stories about the past—at a time when Plataea itself had been destroyed by the Spartans to gratify the Thebans (note how the Plataean story is explicitly cast as a response to the Thebans). At the same time, Thucydides’ refusal to decide between the two accounts itself emphasizes the hostility of Plataea and Thebes. The dispute also prepares for the complexities of the Plataean debate (3.52–68), where the difficulties of moral judgment about the past are a major theme. And one of the messages of the Plataean debate, that perceived self-interest drives out considerations based on past behaviour, may itself explain why the political use of stories about the past are not going to be a major theme of Thucydides’ history. ‘Thucydides’ nods, in the symbolically rich Plataean setting, towards a Herodotean manner of writing history—a style that he then moves away from.

The Thucydidean narrator’s expressions of uncertainty cannot be reduced to tools for persuading narratees of his reliability and objectivity. Even to talk of the ‘objectivity’ of the rest of Thucydides’ narrative is anachronistic. In those parts of his work where his narratorial *persona* is covert, he is following in the footsteps of Homer, and also, to a lesser extent, of Herodotus (→), whose first-person interventions become much less frequent the closer he gets in space and time to his own time. The Herodotean influence is greatest, however, in those parts of Thucydides’ work where his narratorial presence is overt, as

when he interprets the distant past in the *Archaeology* with the help of very Herodotean modes of reasoning.<sup>13</sup>

There do remain important differences between the narrators in Herodotus and in Thucydides. Marincola (1997: 9) notes of the *Archaeology*, for instance, that ‘the narrator is just as present ... but he is not as intrusive as in Herodotus’. Thucydides is more critical than Herodotus of other people’s attitude towards received information (1.20.1–3; 6.54.1). The way he opposes his own rigorous methods to the slack pleasure-seeking of other people mirrors, indeed, the opposition between the unwavering Pericles, Athens’ supreme leader, and the volatile Athenians.<sup>14</sup> Hence the temptation to take Thucydides’ narratorial *persona* as far more elitist and autocratic than Herodotus’, and to relate it to his work’s (alleged) status as a written, and so more autonomous, text, a possession for private study.<sup>15</sup> But other explanations can also be suggested for Thucydides’ reserve. In some parts of his work, he was aiming not at ‘objectivity’, but at vividness—a vividness that would convey something of the suffering caused by the Peloponnesian War.<sup>16</sup> To interfere too often in his own person, to say who (if anyone) told him that their bodies shook as they watched the final sea battle at Syracuse (7.71.3), would have been to spoil some of his greatest effects. But at the same time the narrator does occasionally intervene at the end of vivid narratives to make ‘pathos statements’<sup>17</sup> about the scale of suffering (e.g. 7.30.3)—statements that recall the summaries found in tragic messenger speeches. The only safe conclusion is that Thucydides creates a greater sense of a controlling and single-minded purpose in his narrator than does Herodotus. Whether this sense of control becomes apparent in his interaction with his narratee will be examined in the next section.

### *Narratees*

To whom does ‘Thucydides’ address his account of the war? He does not say. There are no second-person addressees in the narrative. ‘Thucydides’ does address the narratees in two rhetorical questions (7.44.1;

<sup>13</sup> Fowler 1996: 76–77; also Marincola 1989a on the phrase *dokei moi*, ‘seems to me’.

<sup>14</sup> Crane 1998: 38 on the analogy between Pericles and Thucydides, with further bibliography in his n. 7 (and add Murari Pires 1998).

<sup>15</sup> E.g. Crane 1996.

<sup>16</sup> Rood 1999: 166; Kurke 2000: 151–152; and more broadly Walker 1993.

<sup>17</sup> Immerwahr 1985: 447; cf. Lateiner 1977.

8.96.2), and again when he argues that the smallness of Mycenae does not mean that it could not have once been powerful: ‘*it is not reasonable* to be distrustful and to look at the appearance rather than the power of cities’, but one should think that the expedition from Mycenae against Troy was, in its time, the greatest ever, ‘*if it is right* to trust Homer’s poetry’ (1.10.3). Elsewhere he employs the ‘anonymous interlocutor’ device (often *tis*) with whom the narratees can identify (as when ‘Thucydides’ refers to calculations that ‘one’ could make on the basis of facts or arguments that he has given: 1.10.1, 21.1; 5.20.2–3, 26.2–3; 6.55.1). What ‘Thucydides’ makes explicit, however, is his idea of his ideal readers: ‘it will be enough if my work is judged useful by those who want to have a clear picture of the past and of the similar things which will happen again at some time’ (1.22.4; cf. also 1.21.2, ‘those who look at the war from the facts themselves’). He also makes clear that he foresees readers in the future for the ‘possession for all time’ that he has written (1.22.4).

How does the teller of the narrative relate to its recipient? Towards the end of his preface, Thucydides says that he has written an account of the causes of the war ‘so that no one should ever have to seek how so great a war arose for the Greeks’ (1.23.5). Thucydides’ explanation of why he wrote the causes of the war has been taken as a sign that he wanted to prevent any future research on the war (‘it is difficult to imagine a more unHerodotean remark’).<sup>18</sup> One might contrast his attitude towards the causes of the plague at Athens: ‘let each man, doctor and layman, say about it as he thinks’ (2.48.3; cf. the similar expression at 6.2.1). He goes on to suggest that his description of the plague is worth studying because it reveals, if not the ultimate cause of the disease, at least some of the causes of its spread. With the war, by contrast, Thucydides thought it helpful to state explicitly his own view of its cause—not least because it was ‘so great a war’, that is, so long and disastrous a war (as the reader realizes after 1.23.1–3). He is not preventing future research (translations like Gould’s, ‘so that no one need ever again investigate’, are misleading), but making sure that narratees should at least have an explanation to hand.<sup>19</sup>

Thucydides’ statement on the usefulness of his history also points

<sup>18</sup> Gould 1989: 111.

<sup>19</sup> For the topos of preventing narratees having to search for something, cf. Plb. 1.3.9, 12.6 (where the importance of the topic is also stressed), 3.57.2; 4.40.1; 6.11.4, 14.1; D.S. 1.1.4, 6.1.

to the narratee's active engagement in the work. Scholars have long noted the fact that he does not say what sort of advantage the narratee is meant to gain: is it simply a better understanding of the world, or is it an understanding that has practical use? Thucydides' lack of precision is itself revealing. He leaves it to readers to make of his history what they will. 'The political lessons and the utility of the Histories ... derive not from Thucydides' explicit comments or implicit theorizing, but from the reader's own involvement in the work.'<sup>20</sup>

### *Secondary narrators*

Further light can be shed on the authority of the narrator in Thucydides by examining how the primary narrative relates to the narratives embedded within it. We have already seen that Thucydides was reluctant to allow one type of secondary narrator into his text (oral sources giving variant stories—the reported narrators of Herodotus [→]), and that this reluctance to admit competing voices creates a sense of strong narratorial control. How do other competing voices appear in the *History*?

It is as rare for Thucydides to cite written evidence such as inscriptions as it is for him to cite oral sources. Inscriptions and letters, many of which are narratives, are more common in digressions dealing with the past.<sup>21</sup> In his excursus on Themistocles' life in exile, for instance, Thucydides includes (in direct speech) a letter Themistocles writes to Xerxes in which he tells, rather allusively, how he has harmed and helped Xerxes in the past, then argues that he deserves to be repaid for the good he has done—'writing about the warning to retreat from Salamis and the non-destruction of the bridges over the Hellespont, which he falsely pretended was due to him' (1.137.4). The primary narrator here interferes with the text of a secondary narrator, Themistocles (for the technique, cf. 8.50.2, 4; Herodotus 1.86.5 [→]). That this is the only place where Thucydides edits Themistocles' letter is revealing. He suppresses the details of the narrative, doubtless because he expected the primary narratees to be familiar with Herodotus, and leaves the moral appeal made on the basis of that narrative. From the war narra-

<sup>20</sup> Connor 1985: 11.

<sup>21</sup> For narrative inscriptions, see 1.132.2; 6.54.7, 59.3; on the narrative element in decrees, see Rood 1998: 92.

tive itself there is a letter from the Persian king to the Spartans which is intercepted by the Athenians: ‘much else was written, but the chief point for the Spartans was that he could not understand what they wanted: for many envoys had come, but none said the same thing’ (4.50.2). Even though most of his letter is omitted, the Persian king appears here as a narrator, and a useful one too. His letter fills a gap in the primary narrative’s treatment of Spartan–Persian diplomacy. That diplomacy was doubtless difficult for Thucydides to hear about, and difficult in its own right. Introducing the intercepted letter explains how Thucydides learnt about secret discussions, and shows that the more detailed discussions that he omits were futile.

Whereas the letter sent by the Persian king to the Spartans adds details not found in the primary narrative, the much longer letter that the Athenian general Nicias writes to the Athenians at home about their growing problems in Sicily (7.11–15) covers ground already familiar from the primary narrative. The extent of the repetition focuses attention on Nicias’ reliability—especially as he wrote the letter so that his message would not be distorted, and the Athenians could deliberate about the truth (7.8.2). (Thucydides reports the letter as it is read out to the Athenian assembly: hence the narrative in the letter is doubly embedded.) Nicias gives some details not found in the earlier narrative; and he glosses over his own responsibility for some recent developments.<sup>22</sup> Exploring the contrast between Nicias’ letter and the surrounding narrative is important for what it reveals about Nicias, and especially about his interaction with his secondary narratees. The defensive tone taken by Nicias as he tells his story to the Athenians is a telling contribution to Thucydides’ analysis of the troubled relation between the Athenians and their leaders. The gap between Nicias’ presentation in his secondary narrative and Thucydides’ primary narrative could also be interpreted as a critique of democratic knowledge—or at least as a comment on the difficulties involved in any form of decision-making.<sup>23</sup>

As with Nicias’ letter, the interest of the narratives made by Thucydides’ speakers derives not least from how they supplement, complement, or clash with the primary narrative. First, it will be helpful to make some general points about the speakers themselves. Often they are not individualized (‘the Athenians’ or ‘the Thebans’ speak). Unlike

<sup>22</sup> For a more detailed discussion, see Rood 1998: 189–191.

<sup>23</sup> Contrast Shrimpton 1998: 74–75.

the primary narrator, they are all very conscious of their narratees, whom they are attempting to win over (and who may even be gods, as with Archidamus at 2.74.2). As in Homer, characters use far more emotive language than the primary narrator: talk of ‘freeing’ and ‘enslaving’, for instance.<sup>24</sup> They tend to use first- and second-person forms even when they are talking about past events in which neither the narrators nor the narratees could have been involved. That is, Athenian speakers, addressing Spartans, assimilate past and present Athenians and Spartans (a usage common in actual deliberative speeches like Andocides 3). Thucydides’ speakers are mostly making deliberative speeches, and so focussing on the future, not the past (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b13–18). But they often support their plans for the future by telling stories about the past. Their narratives tend to be short but multiple. They may begin by explaining how they come to be making a speech (e.g. 1.32.2, 120.1; 4.17.1); later narratives may be introduced by *gar* (e.g. 1.34.2, 140.2; 3.54.2).<sup>25</sup> Typically, these later narratives are interlaced with analysis. But speakers who are not (primarily) offering advice about the future, like the Plataean speakers whose lives are threatened (3.52–59), have to confront the past more urgently.

How do their narratives relate to Thucydides’ primary narrative? Often speakers tell a story already told by ‘Thucydides’; sometimes they even use the same words (1.108.3 ~ 4.95.3). At other times the story speakers tell has been told by Herodotus.<sup>26</sup> In such cases, ‘Thucydides’ presumably expects his narratees to take the accuracy of the story for granted, and to be concerned rather with the use these speakers make of the past. But, as with Nicias’ letter, secondary narrators may add details about recent events not contained in Thucydides’ earlier narrative of those events. The Plataeans, for instance, say that the Theban attack on Plataea occurred at a sacred time of the month (3.56.2)—a delay which ‘categorises the item as one relevant to the rhetoric of praise and blame (the point in Book 3), not one that affected the Theban decision to attack ... still less one that might explain, as it might have done in Herodotus, why the Theban attack failed’.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Rood 1998: 238 n. 50.

<sup>25</sup> See de Jong 1997 on this technique.

<sup>26</sup> Hornblower 1991–1996: II 133, who takes such passages as evidence of Thucydides’ familiarity with Herodotus.

<sup>27</sup> Pelling 2000b: 69. For other examples, cf. e.g. 1.40.5, 41.2 (the Peloponnesian League meeting in 440 BC, with the contrasting explanations of Badian 1993: 139 and Rood 1998: 217–219); 2.13 (detailed financial information given by Pericles, including



The use of familiar stories about the past is self-consciously examined in the longest, and most clearly delineated, of all the narratives in Thucydides' speeches: the account of the Athenian role in the Persian Wars given by Athenian speakers at Sparta. To dissuade the Spartans from declaring war, the Athenians turn to the past—but not the very distant past: 'What need is there to speak of remote events, which are attested more by the voice of tradition than by the experience of our audience? We must speak of the Persian Wars and events you know of yourselves, although we are rather tired of continually raising the subject' (1.73.2–4). The Athenians then tell the stories of Marathon and Salamis, stories that are all too familiar not just to the speakers, but also to their narratees, the Spartans, and to 'Thucydides' own narratees. Why, then, does Thucydides include this familiar story? At one level, the embedded narrative has a structural role within his *History*. It prepares for the *Pentecontaetia* (1.89–118), Thucydides' account of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, during which the Athenians rose to power. The link between the two narratives is not just a matter of textual and chronological succession: echoes within the *Pentecontaetia* of the Athenians' earlier self-characterization suggest that the story they tell about their performance against Persia is itself one of the drives to power.<sup>28</sup> That is, here Thucydides does hint at the historical importance of stories about the past. Further evidence for Thucydides' interest in the ideology of narrative is supplied by Pericles' Funeral Oration (2.35–46). The story told by the Athenian speakers at Sparta is one that was commonly told in Funeral Orations. But Pericles refuses to tell the story of the deeds of their fathers' or their own generation 'to people who know it' (2.36.4). Here 'Thucydides' and Pericles' narratees coincide: 'Thucydides' audience does not need to know what has already been told in the Athenian speech at Sparta and in the *Pentecontaetia*, Pericles' audience does not need to be told what it knows anyway.<sup>29</sup>

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an iterative narration about tribute paid to Athens); 3.62.3 (the Theban constitution in 480, with Pelling 2000b: 264 n. 31); 6.16.2 (Alcibiades' performance in the chariot race at Olympia: perhaps a correction of the epinician poem written by Euripides for this victory, quoted by Plu. *Alc.* 11.2–3, who noted the divergence from Thucydides); 6.38 (alleged oligarchic plot at Syracuse: but the speaker, Athenagoras, is shown to be unreliable in other ways).

<sup>28</sup> Rood 1998: 244–246.

<sup>29</sup> Similar coincidences between primary and secondary narratees occur in Homer (→).

To view Pericles' refusal to narrate as driven only by the demands of Thucydides' own narrative is to underplay the significance of his gesture. Pericles refuses to narrate not only the story of the Persian Wars, but also the Athenians' great mythical achievements—deeds that the Athenian speakers at Sparta pointedly passed over (1.73.2, quoted above; contrast dismissals of the past by way of a transitional formula, as at Hdt. 9.27.5; Livy 9.34.14). It is, moreover, not just the Athenians' refusal of mythical narrative that demands explanation. Xenophon includes mythical narrative in diplomatic speeches (e.g. *Hell.* 6.3.6), and there is no reason to think that similar speeches were not made in the Peloponnesian War. The absence of mythical narrative in Thucydides' speeches may be because he makes his speakers share his own scepticism about knowledge of the distant past (cf. 1.73.2). But it also points to a theoretical interest in, and suspicion of, the use of narrative within speech.

An interest in the role of narrative in speech also emerges from variations between diplomatic speeches. In the debate at Athens over how to punish the Mytilenaeans, allies whose revolt has just been crushed, neither of the two Athenian speakers, Cleon or Diodotus, has much use for narrative. But Diodotus does include one narrative (apart, that is, from his impersonal history of the ideology of punishment at 3.45): 'if you destroy the demos of the Mytilenaeans, *who had no share in the revolt, and when they got weapons, they willingly handed over the city*, you will do an injustice to your benefactors by killing them' (3.47.3). This coincides with his only appeal to justice. His deliberative speech becomes, briefly, forensic. Most telling as an examination of the use of narrative in speech is the Plataean debate. As in the Mytilene debate, the introduction of narrative is linked with Thucydides' exploration of justice. The Plataeans have surrendered to the Spartans, and have been asked whether they have done the Spartans any good in the war (3.52.4). Rather than answer this question, they ask permission to make a speech. They then tell a story about their past relations with Athens, Sparta, and Thebes. Their problem is that they are telling it to people who know it already (3.53.4)—and that it is a story that must end (3.59.3). Unlike Scheherazade, they cannot postpone death. The Spartans repeat their question, the Plataeans answer 'no', and are killed. But by telling a story they do at least expose the hollowness of the Spartan notion of justice.

*Conclusion*

We have seen that, unlike, say, Nestor and Phoenix in Homer or Solon and Socles in Herodotus, characters in Thucydides are not much given to sustained storytelling: they tend rather to insert snippets of narratives dealing, rather generally, with their own or their opponents' past behaviour. Nor does Thucydides, unlike later Greek novelists, play with different narrative levels through elaborate framing devices. Such experimentation would perhaps have been at odds with the seriousness of his historical analysis. And it is the (emotional and moral as well as political) seriousness of this analysis that explains why Thucydides adopts so engaged, yet so elusive, a narrative voice. He explains how he has gone about the task of collecting information, and then tells his story. When he does intervene, his analysis reinforces the impression of intellectual and emotional commitment.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, readers are left with much interesting work to do by the infrequency of Thucydides' narratorial interventions, and by the absence of a narratee within the text to guide their responses.

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<sup>30</sup> Cf. Gribble 1998: 43.

## CHAPTER NINE

### XENOPHON

*V. Gray*

Ancient historians claim to present a true account, and the historical narrator has a special need to persuade his narratees that he is telling the truth. *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* engage their narratees with various kinds of narrative devices, some of them from Homer, others new, which are designed mainly to inspire their belief in what they say.<sup>1</sup>

#### *An anonymous narrator*

Part of the historian's strategy to secure a positive reception was the projection of a persuasive *persona*. The preface was the place for this. Hecataeus' preface claims superior judgment (*FGH* 1 F 1a); Herodotus (1.1–5) asserts the greatness of his subject and displays his research method in his account of an early conflict; Thucydides (1.1–22) goes much further, identifying himself, revealing his experience, demonstrating the greatness of his theme, displaying his research method, and asserting his effort and his greater reliability over others (→ Thucydides); and later historians followed his lead.<sup>2</sup> The narrator of *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* on the other hand discards the preface;<sup>3</sup> he suppresses his identity and plunges the narratees directly into the events. His virtual absence as a personality from his text not only makes the events appear reliable because unmediated,<sup>4</sup> but projects an unspoken impartiality;

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<sup>1</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 1356a1–4, 1.2.3 indicates that speakers persuade their audiences by projecting a persuasive character and making the audience emotionally disposed to accept the persuasion, as well as by presenting them with logical proofs. Xenophon's narrators also adopt these modes of persuasion. Marincola 1997: 128–129.

<sup>2</sup> Marincola 1997: 34–62 (greatness), 63–86 (method), 128–174 (experience, effort, impartiality etc.).

<sup>3</sup> The idea that *Hellenica* originally did have a preface has not met with acceptance: MacLaren 1979.

<sup>4</sup> Gribble 1998: 41.

for he makes himself appear like one of those historians praised by Lucian, who says that the historian's absence from his text projects his 'justice' where praise and blame are concerned. Lucian indeed named Xenophon as such a historian, and went on to describe the objective historian as 'a stranger in his text, a man without a city', who has no interest in the glorification or vilification of himself or his characters, who neither spares friends nor grudges enemies.<sup>5</sup>

The narrator of *Hellenica* needed to assure his narratees of his impartiality because he often intervenes to praise and blame contemporary characters. This was even more true of the author of *Anabasis*, who is a main character in the events recounted.<sup>6</sup> 'Xenophon, an Athenian' first appears during the battle of Cunaxa, as an interpreter (1.8.15); but from the third book he takes on a leading role, when the Greeks have lost their leaders (he is mentioned no fewer than 230 times). No mean device was needed to persuade the narratees to believe that the man who writes about his own adventures does not falsify them to his own credit.

Xenophon therefore not only removes himself from *Anabasis*, but actually attributes the narration of his own deeds to another, who describes 'Xenophon' in the third person. This narrator remains unnamed within the work, but *Hellenica* 3.1.2 summarizes the first four books of Xenophon's *Anabasis* and names as its narrator 'Themistogenes of Syracuse'. Since no such person has been found as a candidate for authorship,<sup>7</sup> most commentators follow the view that Plutarch advances, namely that Xenophon created Themistogenes as a fiction in order to make the record of his own achievements more persuasive.<sup>8</sup> The same strategy is found in Isocrates, who adopts it to the same end.<sup>9</sup> However, it is the first time it appears in historical writing. And as if

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<sup>5</sup> *Hist. Conscr.* 38–41; for the naming of Xenophon: 39; cf. D.H. *Pomp.* 5; Gray 1990; Marincola 1997: 158. Modern historians accuse Xenophon of prejudice, particularly toward his Spartan characters.

<sup>6</sup> *Hellenica* in contrast does not directly describe Xenophon's own achievements, although 3.2.7 may refer to him as 'the commander of the mercenaries of Cyrus'.

<sup>7</sup> Krentz 1995: 157. His name, 'Born of Themis', suggests a narrator who tells the truth.

<sup>8</sup> *Plu. Mor.* 345 E expresses this view, in a discussion of whether the larger glory goes to the characters or their narrator. Cf. Marincola 1997: 186; MacLaren 1934; Anderson 1974: 81.

<sup>9</sup> Isocrates addressed one work to Nicocles of Cyprus in his own voice: *Ad Nic.* He addressed another to the subjects of Nicocles, calling this work *Nicocles*. Instead of using

to confirm his objectivity, the narrator of *Anabasis* does not hesitate at times to criticize the character Xenophon, e.g. in the account of how he consulted Socrates about the wisdom of seeking the friendship of Cyrus the Persian (*An.* 3.1.4–9). Socrates warned him that the Athenians might blame him, because Cyrus had helped their enemies defeat them in the recent war, and he told him to consult Delphi, but Xenophon asked not whether he should go to Cyrus, but what gods would secure him a safe return. This presents Xenophon as unwise, since his decision eventually leads to his exile. The narrator Themistogenes can also praise the friends of the Xenophon-character, such as Cyrus (*An.* 1.9), without the impression of bias that would be attached to the author, and he can show further objectivity by both praising and blaming Xenophon's friend Proxenus (*An.* 2.6.16–20).

The anonymous narrator of *Hellenica* reinforces his persuasive *persona* when he continues Thucydides' unfinished history unannounced, beginning with a phrase that usually connects events within a continuous work: 'not many days after this'.<sup>10</sup> Narrators of historical texts traditionally desire to appear superior to their predecessors,<sup>11</sup> but too much competition could destroy the impression of trustworthiness and make them appear unreliably self-promoting.<sup>12</sup> The narrator of *Hellenica* avoids this impression by not even bothering to indicate that he has taken over from his great predecessor; this narrative ploy has provoked speculation that the work was actually based on Thucydides' notes.<sup>13</sup> *Hellenica*'s conclusion confirms that the narrator sees the record of events as a continuum ('let this be the limit of my writing; what happened after this will perhaps be of interest to another'), but again modestly characterizes him as just one in a line of writers. He may show another aspect of his *persona* in his proleptic reference to the period of even greater 'confusion and indecision' that followed his

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his own voice, he introduces Nicocles as narrator, and makes him say that the king will instruct his own subjects more persuasively than the author could.

<sup>10</sup> The continuation *Hell.* 1.1.1–2.3.9 is much discussed: Gomme–Andrewes–Dover 1981: 437–444; Krentz 1989; Gray 1991.

<sup>11</sup> Marincola 1997: 57–62. D.L. 2.57 notes that Xenophon could have claimed Thucydides' unfinished books and published them as his own work, but published them instead under the name of Thucydides 'for the glory of' Thucydides.

<sup>12</sup> Plb. 12.7–11. Marincola 1997: 218–236 notes Xenophon's lack of polemic self-definition, but accepts that there are covert polemics (227).

<sup>13</sup> Marincola 1997: 237–257 on the characterizing force of continuation.

chosen end-point. Hornblower notes that a refusal to deal with ‘guilt and misery’ can show the narrator superior to others who delight in them.<sup>14</sup>

*An overt narrator and his narratees*

Even if the narrators of *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* are not dramatized, i.e. lack an explicit personality, they are overt narrators, in the sense that they comment abundantly on their own narrative, interventions which are all aimed at equally undramatized narratees.

By far the largest group consists of first-person interventions. The ‘continuation of Thucydides’ (*Hell.* 1.1.1–2.3.9) has no examples, but one appears at *Hellenica* 2.3.56, another at 4.3.19, and they become regular thereafter (4.4.12, 4.5.4, 5.1.4, 5.3.7, 5.4.1, 6.2.32, 6.2.39, 6.5.50, 7.2.1, 7.5.8, 19). Different periods of composition have been held to account for this distribution, but it might also be interpreted in terms of the narratologist Prince’s ‘persuasive rhythm’, the narrator increasingly expressing his dominance over the narratees.<sup>15</sup> The battle of Mantinea (7.5), which is the climactic event of *Hellenica*, is more heavily marked with narratorial interventions than any previous event. The same pattern of engagement is observable in *Anabasis* 1, which reaches a climax in the account of the battle of Cunaxa and the death of Cyrus, where we find the first—laudatory—narratorial intervention (*An.* 1.9.24). In general, *Anabasis* has fewer first-person comments than *Hellenica*, but sometimes we hear the Xenophon-character evaluating in the narrator’s place, as when he puts the rhetorical question to his army: ‘To cross a difficult ravine and put it behind you when you are about to fight, is not that an opportunity worth seizing?’ (*An.* 6.5.18). This is like the rhetorical question of the *Hellenica* narrator about the folly of Iphicrates (*Hell.* 6.5.52—‘To being up many, but still fewer than the enemy, how is this not complete folly?’).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Hornblower 1994: 156. D.H. *Pomp.* 3 does not admire Thucydides because he writes mainly about disasters.

<sup>15</sup> Prince 1980: 22. Henry 1966 dismisses the ‘composition problem’, but it has been a major feature in scholarship.

<sup>16</sup> Another example: *An.* 7.7.23, where the Xenophon-character evaluates the virtue of being true to one’s word. Other examples of characters sharing the narrator’s evaluations: *Hell.* 4.8.4 (Dercylidas uses the narrator’s evaluative comment of 7.2.2);

Scholars have tried to identify a coherent programme of ‘what is worthy of report’ in the first-person interventions in *Hellenica*.<sup>17</sup> In fact, we find that their function is to validate praise and blame, more specifically to characterize the narrator as a person who is able to discriminate between what is and is not worthy of praise, and who in this proves superior to his narratees. This makes them quite unlike the narrators in Herodotus (→) and Thucydides (→). He acknowledges that what he says is not immediately praiseworthy in their eyes, but will prove to be praiseworthy on reflection. An example is a passage on Theramenes (*Hell.* 2.3.56), where the narrator says: ‘I know that these remarks (he has just recounted some jokes that Theramenes told as he was led off to die) are of no worth, but this seems to me to be worthy in the man, that with death at hand, neither wit nor playfulness departed his soul’. This proves that the apparently unworthy is in fact worthy.<sup>18</sup> When we recall *Hiero* 2.3–5, where it is said that the ability to discern what the majority do not marks the philosopher, this characterizes our narrator as a philosopher.<sup>19</sup> This does not exclude him from being a historian. Indeed, in *Hellenica* 7.2.1 he puts himself in their company when he declares that ‘all the other historians (*sungraphēis*)’ remember the single deed of the large polis, but he thinks it still worthier to record the many fine deeds of the small polis.

The narrator of *Hellenica* may intervene to mark the beginning or the end of narratives, in the manner of Herodotus (→), but mainly when he is about to narrate events that occurred at the same time as a preceding set of events. This does not always involve a first-person remark (3.2.21, 31; 3.3.11, 3.5.25, 4.2.1, 4.2.23 etc.), but the first person marks prolepses and analepses where the content is of special significance (6.5.1, 7.3.4, 7.4.1, and see below). Sometimes, in addition to bringing attention to the process of narration, this type of intervention authorizes the account by characterizing the narrator as a man of discrimination, as at 4.8.1: ‘This is how the land war went. Events at sea and on the coast

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2.3.52–53 and 56 (Theramenes uses the same words of Critias’ vice as the primary narrator uses of Theramenes’ virtue).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the discussion in Tuplin 1993: 36–40.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Hell.* 7.5.8, 7.5.19 and 7.2.1, where the ordinary expectation of the narratees is represented as what the other historians normally praise; *An.* 1.9.24.

<sup>19</sup> D.L. 2.48 sees Xenophon primarily as a philosopher and writes ‘foremost among philosophers, he also wrote history’. D.H. *Pomp.* 5 calls Theopompus a philosophic historian, because he uncovered virtue and vice and revealed things that are not easy for the majority to know.



that occurred while these were going on, I will report now, and I will record what is worthy of report and pass over those unworthy.’

Apart from first-person interventions the Xenophontic narrators have many more devices that mark their presence and above all engage their narratees. These, and the implicit forms of evaluation to be discussed later, often validate events that strain ordinary belief and persuade the narratees to believe them. They also guide the narratees’ interpretation of events:

- instances of the ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ and ‘continuance’ devices. The *Hellenica* narrator makes three references to his own times, the first time to show that the Athenians have remained loyal to the oaths they swore at the end of their civil war (2.4.42), the second time to note the continuance of Tisiphonus in power in Thessaly (6.4.37). The first implicitly praises the Athenians, the second seems to show that the dynasty was long-lasting and therefore in some sense better than what preceded. Their functions in *Cyropaedia* (→) are comparable. However, the description of a battle as unique ‘at least among those in our times’ (*Hell.* 4.3.16) uses the contrast between past and present to show that the narrator is not willing to over-exaggerate (i.e. prove unreliable) by proving it greater than battles of the ancient and venerable past.
- lessons which the narrator draws for the narratees, which may be shared by the characters. An example is *Hell.* 5.2.7 (‘men acquired wisdom in this respect at least, not to let a river run through their walls’); the characters were victims of their lack of this wisdom, as well as the narratees and the larger ‘mankind’ that they represent.<sup>20</sup>
- prolepses/analepses. The narrator of *Hellenica* usually narrates events in sequence, but uses prolepses and analepses (the story of the disaster at Lechaëum: 4.5.11–17; of Jason’s dynasty: 6.4.33–37, Phlius: 7.2.1–46, of Euphron: 7.3.4–12) to mark the importance of a theme (in these cases the remarkable insecurity of tyrannical houses, remarkable loyalty, remarkable treachery, great disaster); the narrator thus shows the narratees that he will allow important events to spill over the time-frame. The analepsis at 4.5.11–17 secures a dramatic effect by delaying an account of a calamity

<sup>20</sup> Cf. *Hell.* 6.2.19; 7.1.32 (cf. 7.2.9); *An.* 3.4.19–20 generalizes in the present tense for the narratee what the Greeks as characters learned from their sufferings about marching in the formation of the ‘square’.

until after the (praiseworthy) reaction to it. The main prolepsis in *Anabasis* is the narrator's account of what happened to Xenophon after the end of the expedition, which recounts how he returned from Asia, settled in Scillus, and fulfilled his vows to the god (*An.* 5.3). This confirms that he did obtain the safe return home that the god had promised in the episode in the third book (above), and thus acquits both of their obligations. Another prolepsis reveals Xenophon's future exile to the narratees, in precisely the manner of Herodotus (→), being strategically placed at the very time Xenophon is in all innocence preparing to return home (7.7.57); the effect is pathos.

- *tekmēria*. The narratees sometimes need logical proofs to produce belief, as in *Hell.* 6.4.13: 'the fact that Cleombrotus and his men were at first victorious in the battle may be known from this proof: they would not have been able to take him up and carry him off still living, had not those who were fighting in front of him been holding the advantage at that time'.<sup>21</sup> The narrator's appeal to *tekmēria* appears first in Herodotus, but whereas this aligned the narrator of historical texts with the—medical and physical—scholars of his time, by now it marks him more as a law court pleader persuading his jurors.
- *hōs eikos*. The appeal to 'what is natural' often validates by contrast responses that are unnatural. The recognition that the narrator knows the difference engages the sympathy of the narratees to accept the truth of what is unnatural: e.g. Theramenes 'as was natural' complained about the injustice he suffered, in contrast to the *boulē*, his jurors, who were terrified into unnatural silence (*Hell.* 2.3.55). *An.* 2.2.19 describes an uproar 'as is natural, when people are in great fear', in order to contrast the abnormal self-possession of their generals.<sup>22</sup>
- qualification. The *Hellenica* narrator engages his narratees in the common belief that the gods cause the inexplicable, but he projects a persona properly aware of the limits of his own knowledge, and of the scepticism of the narratees in this area. To this end he qualifies the gods' agency: the seer was driven 'as if by some divine fate' (2.4.19; cf. 7.5.10); 'the god, it seemed, was leading them

<sup>21</sup> Cf. 5.2.6; *An.* 1.9.29–30.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Hell.* 6.4.16; 7.2.15; 5.21; *An.* 3.2.24. Other passages contrast a first natural reaction with a later unnatural one without this device: *Hell.* 2.2.3–4; 4.3.13.

on' (6.4.3; cf. 7.5.13). He attributes the massacre at Corinth to the gods: 'the god brought it about', but adds a rhetorical question as if he is not sure that the narratees' will agree: 'how could a man *not* think it divine agency?' (4.4.12). He offers double motivation 'either a god or men' for the narratees to choose (7.4.32, 7.5.12–13). Herodotus (→) uses *praeteritio* to convey this sense of delicacy. *Hellenica* 5.4.1 is more forthright because the overthrow of tyrants by a mere seven men, and the defeat of the previously undefeated Spartans, are so inexplicable that even the narratees must think the gods responsible, but the narrator still feels the need to support it further by presenting it as one among many other instances where the gods have punished wrongdoers. *Hellenica* 7.4.3 suggests that Lycomedes' death was caused by a god because the coincidence involved was too bizarre to explain otherwise. Not unexpectedly, because he says that the outcome confounded the expectation of the entire world, the narrator abandons equivocation in the climax of the work: the god *did* do it (*Hell.* 7.5.26).

The narrator of *Anabasis* has a more secular *persona*.<sup>23</sup> He credits little to divine agency even in a qualified manner (*An.* 1.4.18 has characters give a divine explanation of an event which proves false; 5.2.24 combines divine and human: 'someone' set fire to a house, causing the enemy to run, and this 'fate' teaches Xenophon what to do; the unknown agent is a sign of divine intervention: *Hell.* 4.5.4; *An.* 4.7.26). His characters however, particularly Xenophon, acknowledge the role of the gods in their affairs instead (*An.* 3.2.6–13).

- gnomic utterances. *Hellenica* 4.5.6 comments on how conquerors provide a great spectacle to the viewer, which makes the narratees appreciate the contrast when the erstwhile conquerors are defeated and travel at night to avoid being a spectacle of another sort (4.5.18). At 7.3.12, juxtaposition of the condemnation of Euphron by the Thebans and the contrasting honour done to his dead body by his citizens evokes the interpretation: 'Thus, so it seems, most people judge their benefactors to be good men'. This sends a message about the power of benefaction, which characters recognize elsewhere, and how it proves greater than other virtues (cf. the sentiment at 4.8.4).

<sup>23</sup> Tuplin 1993: 215 notes that this is unusual in an author who in his other works is so devoted to the gods.

- rhetorical questions. The rhetorical question is used to engage the narratees in an agreement with the narrator, on the things that lead to good morale for example: ‘Wherever *men* do this, how is it not likely that they (would) not (have been) be heartened?’ These matters are usually incredible in some way and require some logical thought from the narratees. Other rhetorical questions attribute incredible slaughter to the gods (*Hell.* 4.4.12), incredible folly to Iphicrates (6.5.52), incredible courage to cavalry (7.5.16).
- the ‘presentation through negation’- device. This is used to anticipate and confound the narratees’ expectations (and thereby actively engage them in the evaluation). This happens not only in passages of praise and blame, e.g. *Hell.* 5.1.4, where the narrator confounds their expectation that he should have written about some achievement that is great by ordinary standards and thereby makes his own judgments appear controversial and more perceptive,<sup>24</sup> but also in other passages: e.g., *Hell.* 5.3.20, where Agesilaus did *not* feel pleasure in the death of his rival ‘as *a man* (i.e. you, the narratee) would have expected’; the effect is of course to make the judgment of Agesilaus exceptional in its compassion.<sup>25</sup> The confounded expectation is often shared by the characters. Tissaphernes, for example, shares the expectation of *Hell.* 3.4.21 that Agesilaus will deceive.<sup>26</sup> Frequently characters also confound the expectations of the narratees when they ‘do not delay’ (*Hell.* 3.2.10). *Hellenica* 4.1.18 is expectation based on inferior numbers.
- the ‘anonymous interlocutor’ device, which occurs in *Hell.* 5.1.4, 19; 5.2.7; 5.3.7.
- visualization. Rhetoric persuades law court judges that alleged events did really occur by producing witnesses (as well as *tekmēria* and proofs of plausibility). The narrator uses the technique of visualization to secure belief by using the ‘anonymous witness’ device, which draws in the narratees. For example, after the Spartan defeat at Leuctra, the ephors forbid all forms of public mourn-

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Hornblower 1994: 152–158, who reads negative presentation as polemic against (real) audience expectations.

<sup>25</sup> Other examples use the same device to various other ends: *Hell.* 2.4.19; 7.5.8–13; *An.* 3.4.14.

<sup>26</sup> The expectation that Lysander will not take action is shared by the Spartan authorities (*Hell.* 3.5.18; cf. 3.5.3; 4.8.35–37).

ing: 'And on the following day *one* could see those whose relatives had been killed going about in public with bright and cheerful faces ...' (*Hell.* 6.4.16).<sup>27</sup>

- 'if not'-situations. Another means to engage the narratees is by confronting them with what might have happened, as e.g. in *Hell.* 7.5.10 above, Epaminondas 'would have' taken Sparta, 'had it not been' that a Cretan 'by some divine luck', warned the absent Spartan army.<sup>28</sup>

The narratorial interventions therefore organize the narrative, mark the narrator's areas of interest, reveal his discrimination, establish his lack of prejudice, and persuade the narratees to develop their ordinary perceptions to match the narrator's more philosophic ones. Two sets of narratorial interventions are particularly rich in their implications, which balance praise and blame for two individuals: Teleutias the Spartan and Iphicrates the Athenian.

### *Example I: Teleutias the Spartan*

The first narratorial intervention concerning Teleutias takes the form of a summary judgment, which evaluates the enthusiasm of his men for Teleutias as their commander at the moment he is leaving them and sailing home (*Hell.* 5.1.4): 'I know that in these (events) I am narrating neither an expenditure nor perilous undertaking nor any memorable stratagem, but I swear that this seems to me to be worthy for a man of worth (*andri*), to consider, what Teleutias did to create such dispositions in those he ruled. This is an act of a man of worth, most worthy of narration, more worthy than great expenditures or perilous undertakings.' 'Presentation through negation' represents the ordinary perception of the narratees, which the narrator can understand, but he then reveals the hidden worth that the narratees have not seen, inviting them to be 'real men'—one who after reflection might appreciate the achievement of Teleutias, another 'real man'. The distance closes between narrator, narratees, and character. The summary judgment on Teleutias prefaces the ensuing narrative, guiding the narratees to read

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Hell.* 3.4.16–20; *An.* 1.5.8, 9; 2.3.11; 4.7.13–14.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Hell.* 5.2.41; 6.2.23; 7.5.10; *An.* 4.1.11 for other expectation-raising near-misses.

it in terms of the evaluation: the commanders who replace Teleutias provide negative models (5.1.13). Teleutias then returns to the fleet to confirm the narrator's earlier positive evaluation. The first proof is in character-text: Teleutias announces his intention to secure provisions for his men and share their hunger until he does so (5.1.14–17). The second is in narrator-text: his attack on Piraeus (5.1.19–24). This passage begins with a very similar summary judgment involving the narratees: 'if anyone supposes that he was foolish/unwise to sail against those who had many ships with only twelve, let him consider the calculation he made'; the use of the 'anonymous interlocutor' device suggests that the narrator is in fact addressing a large public. Whereas they only find folly, the narrator detects hidden reason. Teleutias' own discernment is then evaluated, first in the account of his reasoning (5.1.20), and then in the narrative, where the 'presentation through negation' device highlights the foolish course that he did not take, in order to endorse the wise course that he did take: when he neared Piraeus he took no action, but moved at dawn; he did *not* allow anyone to harm a cargo ship, but encouraged them to harm the triremes; he thus secured provisions, kept the ships manned and the men willing (5.1.21–24).

The same material does not always evoke narratorial comments. Thus, the enthusiasm that their men showed for Hermocrates (1.1.27–31) and Agesilaus (4.2.1–5) is not evaluated. This makes Teleutias special, and could suggest prejudice in the narrator, but he evaluates another act of Teleutias in terms of blame within a very short space (5.3.5–7). Summary judgments again preface and close this section. They do not use presentation through negation but engage the narratees in a different way. The narrator recounts how Teleutias in anger pursued the enemy close to their walls, and then interrupts his account to make the following comment: 'Many others too have pursued the enemy closer to the walls than is opportune and got back badly, and these too ... were compelled to retreat in complete confusion.' The generalization ('many others ...') leads the narratees to anticipate a specific outcome and thus creates a (horrified) suspense. Indeed, Teleutias' death and the slaughter of his men follows. A closing summary judgment then draws the larger lesson: 'From such sufferings as these I say that mankind is instructed most of all that it is not right to punish even servants in anger (for often masters have suffered more harm than they inflicted in anger), but to attack an enemy in anger without calculation is a complete blunder. Anger does not look ahead, whereas reason

looks to avoiding suffering no less than inflicting harm on the enemy.’ This passage confirms that the narrator poses as a philosopher, who considers the whole of mankind as his narratees.

*Example II: Iphicrates the Athenian*

The Athenian Iphicrates is subject to the same evaluation as Teleutias the Spartan. The narrator thus proves willing to praise and blame both Spartans and Athenians, indicating that he has no partiality for *poleis* or individuals. The narrator first praises his campaign against Corcyra. The Athenians had appointed him because his predecessor had wasted time in trying to find trained crews (*Hell.* 6.2.13). Iphicrates solves this problem by sailing and training at the same time (6.2.27). The narrator ends the section with a summary judgement, which involves the narratees (6.2.32): ‘I know that all this training and exercise is done when men think they are about to fight at sea, but I praise this, that when he had to proceed in a hurry to where he thought he would fight the enemy at sea, he found a way to make his crews not inexperienced of things relating to fighting at sea in spite of the journey, but not to arrive there more slowly on account of the practice.’ Once again, the narrator suggests that he has greater powers of perception than his narratees, who can see only the surface meaning. Another narratorial intervention follows in a section on Iphicrates’ selection of colleagues for this campaign (6.2.39). ‘I praise this campaign in particular of all of Iphicrates’ campaigns, and further his instruction to choose in addition to himself Callistratus the demagogue, who was not on good terms with him, and Chabrias, who had a big reputation as a general ...’ This evaluation disrupts the natural time sequence, since the selection of colleagues happened before the campaign began, whereas we are now dealing with its first phase. The effect of this analepsis is to strengthen the impression of Iphicrates’ speed, which is a vital element of his praise, because the praise of his selection of colleagues at the beginning of the campaign would have delayed the narrative, whereas its location here, after his speedy arrival is achieved, does not.

The criticism that balances the praise (6.5.51–52: ‘If he was a good general on any other occasion, I do not blame him. But his actions on that occasion, I find to have been all useless and even positively unfortunate’) makes a new and direct assault on the question of narrator prejudice, by denying that the narrator is incapable of praising Iphicrates

when the occasion arises. The negative ‘I do not blame him’ confronts the narratees’ expectation that the narrator might be so prejudiced that he is incapable of anything but criticism. (They do not apparently remember the narrator’s previous praise, in a case of contextualized amnesia.) The narrator strengthens the justification of his criticism in this case by appealing to ‘anonymous spokesmen’ who share his critical view: ‘They said that many (of the soldiers involved) turned up for the campaign before Iphicrates’ in the midst of the general enthusiasm, and when he delayed at Corinth ‘many blamed him *epsegon* [the word the narrator uses of his own blame] for delay at first’ (6.5.49).<sup>29</sup> The narrative then supports the narrator’s criticism through ‘presentation through negation’ (though he wanted to prevent the Thebans escaping, he left the best pass *unguarded*), narratorial comment, and appeals to the narratees via the particle *kaitoi* and a negative rhetorical question: ‘Wishing to find out where they were, he sent all the cavalry as scouts. Yet a few are no less able to see than many, and if there is a need to retreat, it is easier for few than many. And to bring up many who are still inferior to the enemy, how is that not complete madness?’ (6.5.52).

### *Implicit forms of evaluation*

Apart from the explicit narratorial interventions, the Xenophontic narrators use a variety of narrative devices that implicitly validate events, guide the narratees’ interpretations and characterize their ordinary beliefs:

- similes and metaphors. The narrator reveals his own world and that of his narratees in similes and metaphors, which are almost all from nature and ordinary life. These evoke emotional engagement in the narratees (cf. *Oec.* 17.15), but mainly make familiar to them what otherwise is difficult to believe or conceive, and are thus persuasive. *Hellenica* 4.4.12 makes the familiarity explicit when it

<sup>29</sup> The narrator often voices his criticisms of commanders through their men, in keeping with his interest in commanders’ relations with their men: e.g. *Hell.* 7.1.17–18 first sets out the advantageous course of action that a commander rejected, and then cites a ‘majority’ to whom the adopted course ‘seemed’ disadvantageous.



defines unimaginable numbers of corpses in a small space: ‘men accustomed to seeing heaps of grain, wood, stones, then gazed on heaps of corpses’. 7.5.10 captures the unimaginable vulnerability of the polis when it describes Sparta (in the absence of her military men) as a nest of chicks, without the adult birds to defend them. This guides the narratees to fear for the chicks, grieve with the absent parents, or admire Epaminondas as the bold killer bird, and expect that the nest will be taken.<sup>30</sup> *Anabasis* uses images to explain sights that the Greek narratees have not seen before; this fits its foreign content: 1.5.1 compares a completely level plain to the sea, a smell to spices; 1.5.3–4 says that the flesh of strange birds is like venison and that ostriches use their wings like sails; 1.7.8 compares the dust raised by a huge army to clouds.<sup>31</sup>

- descriptions. The narrator of *Anabasis* gives an account of a journey and on the way describes—much in the manner of Herodotus (→)—the breadth of rivers and bridges, the stages of the march and rest periods, mentions ‘large and prosperous’ cities, names the rivers that run through them and narrates stories about them (e.g. 1.2.5–9). He describes the customs and flora and fauna too of the lands through which the journey goes (e.g. 1.4.9, 1.5.1–3). Such descriptions are found less commonly in *Hellenica* because it is set in environments dominated by Greek culture (including Greek Asia). However, the narrator does express the love of natural beauty through the eyes of characters, for example the pathetic desire of the feverish Agesipolis for the shade and the cool water of a shrine (*Hell.* 5.3.19). Descriptions also often have a narrative function. *Anabasis* informs the narratees about Persian military arrangements that prove crucial to the understanding of events

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<sup>30</sup> Other examples: the Spartan campaign against Elis is an ‘harvest’ for the Peloponnese, to encapsulate the richness of the plunder and the unbelievable lack of military resistance (*Hell.* 3.2.26); the complete devotion of the *demos* to their champion is captured in the image of bees swarming around a king bee (3.2.28); the description of Ephesus as a workshop of war captures the unimaginable activity (3.4.17); the surprising behaviour of Pharnabazus, constantly changing his camp-site, is like that of nomads (4.1.25); the Spartans compare their allies’ excessive fear of the peltasts to children’s fear of giants (4.4.17); Agesipolis as pentathlete shows the huge range of his competition with Agesilaus (4.7.5); the comparison of Epaminondas’ battle formation with the prow of a trireme makes sense of his unusual dispositions (7.5.23).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. 1.5.6; 2.3.15; 2.4.13; 5.4.28.

- (1.8.22; cf. 3.4.35). *Hellenica* 4.1.15–16 describes Pharnabazus' fine palace estate in Phrygia because it is about to be ravaged.
- juxtapositions. The organization of the narrative itself can also evaluate, as for example when the prolepsis on the remarkable loyalty of the Phliasians (*Hell.* 7.2) is juxtaposed with the prolepsis on the remarkable treachery of Euphron (7.1 and 3).

*Secondary and reported narrators*

The Xenophon-character in *Anabasis* 5.7.13–26 and 5.8.8–11 recounts narratives to the men for the sake of information, in these cases to correct their impressions. The second example is interesting because the primary narrator has already told of Xenophon's admirable role in the march through the snow, but has not mentioned this incident (4.5), which 'Xenophon' now tells in his own defence. The primary narrator had no need for such defence and this perhaps shows the degree to which he is objective about Xenophon. Reported narrators in *Hellenica* take the form of anonymous reporters of victories or defeats; their being eye-witnesses is a required quality (4.3.2), like that of messengers in tragedy (→ Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides). The point of these narrations seems to be to evoke a reaction from other characters, which is then evaluated. Thus, the messenger's reported speech of the disaster of the battle of Cnidus (*Hell.* 4.3.10–12) is followed by a description of Agesilaus' reaction to it. This is the case also with the shorter report of 7.1.32, which allows an assessment of the reaction of the Spartans to their first victory in a long time. In another instance (4.5.7–17), a messenger briefly reports a disaster without details and the primary narrator describes the immediate reaction of Agesilaus, but then he gives his own more complete report of the precise nature of the disaster. It is as if the narrator does not want to delay Agesilaus' worthy reaction by letting the messenger give him too full a report in the first instance. It is significant that the reaction is the point of most embedded narratives also in Xenophon *Cyropaedia* (→). *Hellenica* 1.1.23 contains a laconic secondary letter-narrative: 'Ships gone, Mindarus dead, men starving, what to do?', but here too it is Pharnabazus' reaction to the defeat that takes centre stage. This focus is in keeping with the primary narrator's interest in the evaluation of action.

Historians persuade narratees to believe the unbelievable, such as great numbers, by referring to their own autopsy or another source of

information.<sup>32</sup> Xenophon agrees that witnesses are authoritative,<sup>33</sup> and even though his primary narrators make no reference to autopsy, they do use anonymous spokesmen, characters involved in the action as eye-witnesses, a source of persuasion known from Herodotus (→) onwards. They are mostly unnamed, and they confirm the primary narrator's account on details that defy ordinary belief. They have special interest for modern historians because they look like sources, but they are once again also a rhetorical feature.<sup>34</sup> *Hellenica* 7.5.12 points this way when it substitutes 'it is possible to blame ... it is possible to say' for the more concrete 'they blame ... they say'.

The only named spokesman is Ctesias. The narrator recounts the charge of Cyrus at Cunaxa and the wounding of his brother, King Artaxerxes, but uses Ctesias to confirm the power of the blow Cyrus gave Artaxerxes 'right through the breastplate' (*An.* 1.8.26–27).<sup>35</sup> Ctesias 'says' that he treated the wound. His description as 'the doctor' points to his special value as an eye-witness, for a doctor is close to the casualties; he later 'says' how many died on the king's side. We have to go outside the text to discover that Ctesias 'speaks' as an historian as well as a doctor (Ctesias did declare that he was an eye-witness: *FGH* 688 T 8). The narrator uses this same pattern of shared authority when he describes in his own voice how Cyrus routed those around the king, but introduces anonymous spokesmen (*legetai*) to verify his sensational slaughter of their commander 'with his own hand' (1.8.24).<sup>36</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Marincola 1997: 80–83.

<sup>33</sup> Marincola 1997: 69. Agesilaus tells Dercylidas that he would best report his news to the allies because 'you were present' (*Hell.* 4.3.1–2); Ctesias is cited for the wounding of Artaxerxes because 'he was at his side' (*An.* 1.8.26–27). Characters for this reason dramatize their encounters with protagonists in their speeches (*Hell.* 3.3.4–11; 6.1.2–17). Clearchus dramatizes the trial of Orontas by Cyrus (*An.* 1.6.5) as the only Greek eye-witness present; the narrator says that there was 'no ban' on him telling the story, to highlight the openness of Cyrus' judicial procedure. The obituaries of Cyrus and Clearchus also appeal to 'what was said' by those with personal experience of their leadership (*An.* 1.9.1; 2.6.1).

<sup>34</sup> Tuplin 1993: 39 n. 91 sees them as a stylistic quirk of the later *Hell.* This needs some refinement; see Gray 2003.

<sup>35</sup> There is a pattern in which the narrator vouches for some stages of an action, but leaves the most sensational to the spokesman; *An.* 1.8.18 has the narrator vouch for two phases of the action, leaving spokesmen to verify the culmination, that they clattered on their shields to frighten the horses.

<sup>36</sup> Anonymous spokesmen verify also: the enormous numbers who opposed Cyrus: deserters before the battle and survivors afterwards (*An.* 1.7.13); the almost unbelievable lack of Greek casualties at Cunaxa (*An.* 1.8.20), a long retreat (1.10.1), a large number of wagons (1.10.18).

The narrator makes a similar use of spokesmen in *Hellenica* too, e.g., when he describes the campaign of Derdas in his own voice, but lets an anonymous spokesman verify the enormous number of cavalrymen he personally killed over a ninety-stade pursuit (5.3.2).<sup>37</sup> The other kinds of material that attract spokesmen in *Hellenica* are sensational in other ways. The dramatic strangling of Mania by her son-in-law is one good example.<sup>38</sup> Sometimes, spokesmen mark the first part of a remarkable contrast, such as the depth of the Spartan line, to contrast with the remarkable depth of the Theban line (*Hell.* 6.4.12).

The actions of the gods also attract spokesmen: they vouch for Jason's sensational intentions concerning the festival of Delphi; the god alone 'is said' to have known his intentions toward the sacred treasures (*Hell.* 6.4.29–30); they also report the four ominous events preceding Leuctra (that the girls killed themselves after being raped, the temples opened of their own accord, the gods were heralding victory, Heracles' arms were missing) and their interpretation that these were all human contrivances (*Hell.* 6.4.7–8).

The equivalent of spokesmen in some cases is 'seeming to be', which is used to mark superlative reputations, as in *Cyropaedia* (→). Dercylidas is described as 'a man of worth seeming very much to be resourceful' (*Hell.* 3.1.8), Thrasybulus as 'seeming very much to be a good and fine man' on his death (*Hell.* 4.8.31). The equivalence between 'seeming' and 'being said to be' (which is also used of reputations: *Hell.* 3.2.27) is spelled out in the case of Dercylidas: 'for he was called (evidently 'said to be' by others) "Sisyphus"'.

Xenophon's narrators occasionally give us unresolved alternative accounts or motivations, some of them attributed to spokesmen (*Hell.* 3.5.19; 5.4.7; 6.2.39; 6.4.37; 7.4.32; 7.5.12; *An.* 1.2.25, 1.8.29–30). While these could express uncertainty and characterize them as less than omniscient,<sup>39</sup> they also often give the narratees two angles on the central characterization to which they point, and thus through dissonance on detail produce consonance on the substantial point. The killers of the Theban tyrants gained entry to their drinking party disguised as respectable citizen women or as clowns—but both point to the low-life

<sup>37</sup> *Hell.* thus verifies: a large quantity of cash (6.2.16); enormous numbers of sacrificial beasts (6.4.27–28); vast numbers of helots (6.5.29).

<sup>38</sup> Such as remarkable sayings (*Hell.* 1.6.32; 2.3.56; 4.4.10; 7.1.30 and 32; 7.4.40); unbelievable beauty or luxury (*Hell.* 3.2.27; 3.3.8; 3.2.10; 5.4.57; 6.2.6; 6.4.8); remarkable actions or reactions (*Hell.* 3.5.21; 4.8.36, 6.4.37, 6.5.49; *An.* 1.2.12, 1.2.25, 1.10.7).

<sup>39</sup> So Breitenbach 1950: 23–26.

interests of the killers as the reason for their downfall; Alexander of Pherae is killed by his wife either because he is abandoning her for her infertility or because of his violence toward the boy she has asked him to spare—but both point to the lack of friendship toward her that made him kill her; the courage of the Spartans could come from the gods or sheer mad desperation—but both indicate how superhuman it was; and Menon's men perish either because they plundered friends or because they became lost—but both point to their essential lack of discipline.

### *Conclusion*

The narrators of *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* characterize themselves by their absence as personalities and at the same time their presence as narrators. They use explicit narratorial interventions, but also orchestrate the reception, above all the acceptance of their at times sensational information, through more implicit devices. *Hellenica* reveals in particular the narrator's ability to perceive behind appearances, which is the mark of the philosopher, in matters of praise and blame. The narratees of both works have limited discernment of virtue and vice, which need evaluation to be appreciated, and limited expectations, in which anything excessive (numbers, behaviour, conditions, achievements, spectacles, customs etc.) must be made familiar (through visualization, contrast with 'what is natural', qualifications, images), supported with evidence (proofs), or attributed to reliable first-hand witnesses (anonymous spokesmen). They have to be persuaded and educated by a superior narrator.

## CHAPTER TEN

### POLYBIUS

*T. Rood*

Hamilcar brought the mercenaries to such a pass that ... they were at last driven by famine to eat each other: the divine power was bringing on them a fitting retribution for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbours. (1.84.9–10)

Polybius, historian of Rome's rise to universal rule, and connoisseur of punishment,<sup>1</sup> makes everything explicit. 'Es gibt keine Polybiosfrage'—'Polybius presents no problems.'<sup>2</sup> But there are problems in assessing the place of this explicit Polybius in the history of Greek narrative. It used to be conventional to claim that Ephorus, writing soon after Xenophon, inaugurated a 'new phase of Greek historiography' by 'attempt[ing] the fusion of rhetoric and history'; that 'a still lower level was reached by Duris of Samos in the theory that history must affect the emotions'; and that 'it was left for Polybius two centuries later to affect the redemption of Clio from the bondage of fiction'.<sup>3</sup> No one nowadays would be satisfied with this simplistic story. It rests on an uncritical assumption that the Thucydidean way of writing history is *the* way to write history, and on a naïve belief that that mode of historiography is itself free from rhetoric. And it founders on the almost complete loss of the historians writing between Xenophon, in the first half of the fourth century BC, and Polybius, in the second half of the second century BC. We have to reconstruct lost historians from later writers who used them (such as Diodorus, Plutarch, and Arrian), from unrepresentative excerpts in writers such as Athenaeus, and not least from the hostile comments of Polybius himself. The dangers of circularity in assessing what sources later historians used, and of underrating the capacity of those later historians to adapt their sources, remain great.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For Polybius' (occasionally sadistic) moralizing on punishment, cf. e.g. 2.60.7; 4.18.7, 81.5; 5.28.9, 56.13, 111.7.

<sup>2</sup> Howald, quoted by Walbank 1948: 157.

<sup>3</sup> Barber 1935: 159.

<sup>4</sup> Important accounts of other historians between Xenophon and Polybius that

The problems of writing a narratological history of Greek historiography between Xenophon and Polybius are greater still. One can (imagine that one can) get an idea of the tenor of some authors from later historians who drew on them, and from the comments of later critics. A stronger narratorial presence would presumably be demanded by the stress on praise and blame associated with historians such as Ephorus (Polybius himself praises Ephorus for his ‘expressions of his personal judgments’, 12.28.10 = *FGH* 70 T23), and by the methodological, and often polemical, prefaces that became standard once book divisions were introduced.<sup>5</sup> A less intrusive narrator might conversely be expected in the visual and emotive mode of historiography associated with Duris of Samos. But this assumption would apply only to narrative passages: we know that Duris himself intruded into his narrative by making methodological criticisms of his predecessors (*FGH* 76 F1, from the preface, and naming Ephorus and Theopompus). Our problems stem from the facts that authors who used these historians were interested in their content rather than in their style; and that one needs their actual words to form an idea of how they presented themselves as narrators. Thus while we know of some historians who were characters (i.e. internal narrators) in their own works—Alexander’s general Ptolemy (*FGH* 138), for instance, or his admiral Nearchus (*FGH* 133), we do not, on the whole, know how they presented themselves.<sup>6</sup> In some cases, however, the actual words do survive, and fruitful parallels can be drawn with features of Polybius’ narratorial style. Thus there are a number of first-person forms, as well as rhetorical questions, in Theopompus’ famous description of the debauched court of Philip II, a passage cited by Polybius himself (8.9.6–13 = *FGH* 115 F225a; cf. also F210).

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touch on some narratological aspects include Flower 1994 on Theopompus; Pearson 1960 and Bosworth 1988 on the Alexander historians; Hornblower 1981 on Hieronymus; Pearson 1987 on Timaeus. For Athenaeus as a source for historians, and for Polybius himself, see Pelling 2000a and Walbank 2000; and for the problems posed by Polybius’ polemics, see Walbank 1962 and Schepens 1990. For Diodorus, see the contrasting views of Sacks 1990, who stresses Diodorus’ own thematic shaping, and Stylianou 1998: 1–139, who, e.g. sees shifts in the style of moralizing judgment as reflecting shifts of source (pp. 5–10).

<sup>5</sup> Book divisions were perhaps introduced by Ephorus: cf. *FGH* 70 T10; also F7 for the prefaces of Ephorus and Theopompus as similar, and *FGH* 115 F24 for the abusive prefaces of Anaximenes and Theopompus.

<sup>6</sup> We can, however, observe the use of first-person plural forms in geographical

There are also problems in attempting a narratological analysis restricted to Polybius alone. Only the first five (of forty) books of his history survive in full. For the remaining books, we rely on the use of his work by later historians and on Byzantine excerpts that do not always keep to Polybius' own phrasing. It is also unfortunate that we cannot compare his narrative persona in his other works, all of them lost (a monograph on the Numantine War, a biography of Philopoemen, a tactical treatise that would presumably—like other such treatises—have offered narrative examples). But analysis of the existing parts of Polybius' history is still worthwhile for the light it can shed on the development of a scholarly mode of historical narrative, and on the political implications of such a mode of narration. In this chapter, I will examine first the character of the primary narrator in Polybius, then the various narratees addressed in the work, and finally the shifting weight given to different types of secondary narrative.

### *The primary narrator*

'Polybius' is an external narrator in the earlier parts of his work, and an internal narrator in its later stages. He begins with two preliminary books (the *proparaskeuē*), which treat events from the First Punic War down to 220 BC, that is, before he was himself born. In books 3–30, he fulfils the promise made at the start of the work: to tell of 'the means and system of polity through which the Romans in fewer than fifty-three years succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government' (1.1.5). He first appears as a character towards the end of this second part. It is in the final section of the history—where he reports 'the condition of each people after all had been crushed and had come under the dominion of Rome, until the confusion and disturbance that afterwards ensued'—that Polybius appears as a character most often. Indeed, he claims that he was induced to write about this final period of confusion and disturbance 'as if starting on a fresh work ... chiefly because I not only witnessed most but took part and even directed some of the events' (3.4.12–13).

While the character Polybius only appears towards the end of the work, the narrator 'Polybius' is a dominating presence from the start.

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works such as Ps.-Hanno's account of an expedition down the west coast of Africa (*GGM* 1.1–14).



As Marincola says, ‘the Polybian narrator combines a largely unobtrusive narrative of the deeds with a highly intrusive explicator of that narrative’.<sup>7</sup> A good example of this fondness for commenting on the narrative comes in the account of the Second Punic War, where the Romans are besieging Capua, which is held by the Carthaginians, while Hannibal is outside the town trying to force the Romans to abandon the siege: ‘It seems to me that events at that time would puzzle not only the Carthaginians, but anyone who heard of it. For who could believe that the Romans, who had been beaten in so many battles by the Carthaginians, and did not yet even dare to face the enemy in the field, nevertheless refused to retire or to abandon the open country?’ Here the comment, and the rhetorical question, are responses to a problem felt both by characters and by narratees—a problem that threatens the cohesion of Polybius’ narrative. Hence the need for an explanation: ‘It seems to me that the reason of this conduct on the part of both was that both had perceived that Hannibal’s force of cavalry was responsible for the Carthaginians’ victories and the Romans’ defeats. So ... events at that time around Capua happened for both sides with good reason’ (9.3.5–11). The strong narratorial presence offers the reassurance that events are after all explicable.<sup>8</sup>

The intrusiveness of the Polybian narrator is also seen in his use of evaluative words within the narrative, and in the tone in which those evaluations are expressed. He is ready to speak of how the Illyrian queen Teuta acted ‘with a womanly temper and irrationally’ (2.8.12, cf. 4.8), and of how the Spartans ‘were liberated through Antigonus and through the generous zeal of the Achaeans’ (4.16.5). Often a political bias can be readily detected in the narrator’s judgments. It is Polybius’ own Achaeans, and not the Macedonian king Antigonus, who are credited with a ‘generous zeal’; and evidently the ‘liberation’ they procured is itself evaluative.<sup>9</sup> Conversely, it is the Achaeans’ enemies, the Aetolians, who are castigated as ‘innately unjust and aggrandizing’ (2.45.1). Polybius’ generally earnest narrator can at times seem surprisingly crude.

What is striking about the way in which ‘Polybius’ expresses these evaluations is that he often uses in the narrative phrases that tend to

<sup>7</sup> Marincola 1997: 10.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Davidson 1991: 11–12 on Polybius’ fondness for correcting mistaken views.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Walbank 1957–1979: ad loc.: ‘to the Achaeans Cleomenes was a tyrant; but to many Spartans “liberation” obviously had a different look’.

be used only in speeches by earlier historians such as Thucydides and Xenophon. Frequent in Polybius' narrative as well as in his speeches is the exclamation *nē Dia*, 'by Zeus', which is common in comedy and oratory, but found only four times in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, each time in direct speech, and absent altogether from Thucydides.<sup>10</sup> Polybius also frequently supports his judgments with rhetorical questions: when he describes how the Aetolians elect as general Scopas, 'the cause of all the aforementioned acts of injustice', he first remarks that 'I do not know how to express myself' (the common *aporia*-motif), then says that it 'seems to me the very height of villainy': 'for how can we characterize otherwise such base conduct?' (4.27.2–3). Here the question suggests some uneasiness about offering, within a historical work, judgments in a heightened manner more redolent of the law courts.<sup>11</sup>

The Polybian narrator is no less intrusive when he justifies the methods of his narrative.<sup>12</sup> He explains principles of history-writing: the function of geographical information (3.36–38, 57–59), the use of terminology for causation (3.6–7), the usefulness of history (e.g. 1.35, 3.31–32)—and this despite the fact that he states in the very first sentence of the work that he does not need to explain why history is useful. His sense of a historiographical tradition is far stronger than anything that can be found in earlier historians. He defends the merits of history against such varied competitors as barbershop gossip (3.20.5), invective (12.14. 2–7), political theory (6.5.1–3), philosophy (12.26c), and epideictic (12.28–28a), while criticizing Ephorus' unfair castigation of music as deceptive (4.20.5 = *FGH* 70 F8: from Ephorus' preface, so presumably from a contrast between music and history).

The ordering of the narrative is also subject to the same rigorous narratorial control. The ends of digressions, for instance, are clearly marked as the story returns to the point 'from which we digressed' (*parexebēmen*, e.g. 2.36.1; 4.9.2). Such signalling is also found in earlier historians (Ephorus, *FGH* 70 F191, is very similar), and also in geographical *periploi* (coastal accounts), where the narrator returns to a mainland from an island with the formula *epaneimi ... hōthen ... exetrapomēn* ('I will go back to the point from which I turned aside': e.g.

<sup>10</sup> De Foucault 1972: 313 with n. 2 lists examples.

<sup>11</sup> For Polybius as judge, cf. Vercruysse 1990: 35–36; Darbo-Peschanski 1998: 177–189.

<sup>12</sup> For detailed analyses, see Pédech 1964; Sacks 1981; and on causation, Derow 1979: 9–13.

Scylax 29). Further examples of the precise control exercised by Polybius may be seen in his consciousness of book divisions. Polybius tends to define in advance the limits of each book, and to proclaim at the end of the book that he has fulfilled his promises (the Sicilian universal historian Diodorus followed this practice).<sup>13</sup> He also includes book numbers in some of his frequent cross-references, for instance when he makes a back-reference to a forward-reference (18.28.1). Perhaps it was the vast scope (both temporal and spatial) of the work that called for this degree of definition. Polybius offers at the start of his work a ‘table of contents’ for the work as a whole (3.2–6); he ends it by ‘recalling its beginning and the plan which I laid down at the commencement of my history, and then giving a summary of the entire subject, establishing the connection between the beginning and the end’ (39.8.3); and then, after reiterating the utility of his work and the uniqueness of his theme, he announces that he is appending the periods embraced by the history, the number of books and what he calls the *arithmos* of the whole work, whatever that was (39.8.8; none of this final section—book 40—survives). All that was missing was a bibliography.

Polybius’ judgments on the methods of his narrative can be seen as no less ideologically laden than his judgments on the events of the narrative. His obsessive concern for order in the world of the narrative parallels his concern for order in the world at large. Just as it is fitting that barbarians, mercenaries, women, the masses, and dissolute young aristocrats should be subjected to strong control,<sup>14</sup> so it is fitting that narratives should have a certain order, and that narrators should explain why this is so (e.g. 6.2.1–7). Elsewhere Polybius’ methodological intrusions can be more directly related to his Achaean sympathies. He illustrates, for instance, the tragic style of history that he opposes by quoting from Phylarchus’ pathetic account of the sack of Mantinea (2.56)—a sack in which the Achaean League was involved. And in discussing how the Peloponnese came to be united through the Achaean League, Polybius rejects chance as an explanation (‘one must rather seek a cause’, 2.38.5). Yet elsewhere he *does* assign chance causal force.

<sup>13</sup> There are other similarities between these two intrusive narrators: e.g. the use of the participle *proeirēmenos* (‘aforementioned’)—which appears more than 500 times in Polybius’ extant sections, in places where earlier writers would have, at most, *houtos* or *ekeinos*; cf. Palm 1955: 76, who sees in this use a pedagogical striving for comprehensibility; and de Foucault 1972: 319.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Eckstein 1995, esp. 118–160, on such ‘threats to the social order’, and their part in Polybius’ ‘moral vision’.

Other narratorial interventions could be read as part of the rhetoric of narratorial authority. By stressing at the start of the main part of his work how uncertain is its completion (3.5.7), he makes its completion the more impressive.<sup>15</sup> And the word he uses to define his undertaking is the same as that used of the Romans' project of universal domination (*epibolē*: 1.3.9, 4.2): the ambition of the work matches the deeds it embraces (but the same word is used of Theopompus' project at 8.11.1).

It remains to consider Polybius' techniques of self-reference. Polybius follows earlier historians like Herodotus (→) and Thucydides (→) by using the first person for his appearances in methodological contexts: as an eyewitness (22.19.1; for another claim of autopsy, 39.2.2, we have only Strabo's words), and as a researcher who undertakes the perils of travels (3.48.12, 59.7–8)—a latter-day Odysseus (12.27.10; cf. also Cato's quip at 35.6.4)<sup>16</sup>—and consults inscriptions (3.33.17–18). It is for his appearances as a character that Polybius departs from the precedent of earlier writers (so far as we can tell from our evidence).

Assessing Polybius' references to himself as character is difficult because the parts in which he appears as character are the parts that are preserved only in excerpts. So far as we know, he never explicitly identified the character Polybius with the writer (or identified the prominent Achaean statesman Lycortas as the writer's father).<sup>17</sup> But he did make explicit his criterion for using first- and third-person forms for his own actions:

It should cause no surprise if at times we use the proper name in speaking of ourselves, and elsewhere use general expressions such as 'after I had said this' or again, 'when we agreed to this'. For as we were personally involved in the events that are now about to be chronicled, it is necessary to change the phrases used to allude to ourselves, so that we may neither offend by the frequent repetition of our name nor again by constantly saying 'when I' or 'because of me' fall unintentionally into an ill-mannered habit of speech. What we wish is by mixing these modes of expressions and always using the appropriate form to avoid as far as possible the offence that lies in speaking constantly about oneself, as

<sup>15</sup> But Polybius' conviction that others will finish the task if he does die (3.5.8), a more straightforward assertion of his task's importance, is perhaps evidence that some of the earlier books were published before the completion of the whole work. Walbank 1972: 17–29 offers a good review of arguments about the composition and publication of the work.

<sup>16</sup> Walbank 1948: 172; Marincola 1997; Clarke 1999: 100–101.

<sup>17</sup> Note that he explains at 24.6.5 that he was chosen as an envoy, though too young, because of his father's connections.

such a manner of speaking is naturally unwelcome, but is often necessary when the matter cannot be stated clearly in any other way. Luckily we have been assisted in this by the fortuitous fact that no one as far as we know, up to the time in which we live at least, has received from his parents the same proper name as ours.<sup>18</sup>

Why does this explanation of Polybius' procedure only appear at this rather late stage in the work? In all excerpts from earlier portions of the work, Polybius appears as character in the third person. The explanation itself follows a passage where Polybius has shifted from the third to the first person:

When a letter reached the Peloponnese ... saying that the Achaeans would do well to send Polybius the Megalopolitan ... the Achaeans voted to send him ... And we, thinking that for many reasons we ought to obey the Romans, ... set sail; and arriving at Corcyra ... and thinking that the war was over and that there was no further need of us, we sailed back to the Peloponnese. (36.11.1–4)

Marincola has plausibly argued that this explanation occurred at the point where Polybius' appearances as character were going to start to become particularly frequent.<sup>19</sup> The shift in the immediately preceding passage is not enough in itself to support the view that this is the first time Polybius used the first person: it matters that the phrase 'Polybius the Megalopolitan' appears in a letter. Unfortunately, we do not get a chance to see how Polybius alternated between first and third persons. Subsequent allusions to Polybius' actions come from later historians, not from excerpts. The exception comes right at the end of the work:

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<sup>18</sup> 36.12.1–4: I have here modified Paton's translation to keep to Polybius' own variations between first-person singular and plural forms. Clarke 1997: 96 states that 'Polybios considered the use of the first person singular and particularly self-referential phrases as alien to his project' (that is, his project of universal history). But it is because narratees are suspicious of self-glorification that Polybius is wary of excessive reference to the character Polybius, and so keen to vary his modes of self-allusion. There was nothing wrong with self-referential phrases in themselves. Her further claim that 'Polybius and Diodorus ... wrote of themselves in the first plural, as a general rule' (p. 97) is also misleading. Plural forms are more common for introducing and closing books, but singulars are extremely frequent: in back-references, Polybius uses the singular forms *eipa* and *eipon* (and compounds) eight times as often as the plurals *eipomen* and *eipamen*; he writes *dokei moi* far more than the (more emphatic) *dokei hēmin*; he uses singulars for assertive expressions such as *egō de phēmi* ('but I say': e.g. 3.6.3, 7, 9.5) as well as for weaker parentheses such as *legō dē* or *oimai* ('I mean'); and he sometimes combines the two forms in a single sentence (e.g. 3.5.7; 5.105.9; 31.23.1, 38.8. 14; cf. D.S. 3.38.1; de Foucault 1972: 85).

<sup>19</sup> Marincola 1997: 189–192.

‘having achieved this, we returned home from Rome, having, as it were, capitalized the results of previous political action ... Therefore we pray to all the gods that during the rest of our life all may remain in the same condition and on the same terms, seeing as we do how apt Fortune is to envy men’ (39.8.1–2).<sup>20</sup> The first person is doubtless apt here because of the personal nature of the prayer, and as a bridge to the conclusion of the work.

There is no space here to analyse in detail Polybius’ self-presentation as a character;<sup>21</sup> but the most startling appearance of Polybius in his own narrative demands discussion—the passage where he appears to narrate his own death: ‘each city now took every means to confer the highest honours on him during his life and after his death. And everyone thought that this was fully justified: for had he not perfected and drawn up the laws on the subject of common jurisdiction, all would have remained uncertain and in the utmost confusion. So one should consider this to be the most brilliant achievement of Polybius among all those hitherto mentioned’ (39.5.4–6). Polybius *does* pose problems. ‘This passage derives from the posthumous editor of the *Histories*’<sup>22</sup>—or rather, it is the only evidence for this posthumous editor. And this editor is also a narrator.

The problem posed by this new narrator is the greater because of the style and content of the narrative. It is not just that this narrator adopts typical Polybian phraseology such as ‘one should think’ and ‘aforementioned’: the repetitive Polybius is all too imitable. What is odd is that the narrative of Polybius’ death is so thematically rich at both the intratextual and the intertextual level. The counterfactual claim that ‘all would have remained uncertain (*akrita*) and in the utmost confusion (*tarakhēs*)’ evokes Polybius’ earlier characterization of the ‘confusion and disturbance’ of the period that followed Rome’s assumption of the universal hegemony (*tarakhēs kai kinēseōs*, 3.4.13). And while counterfactual statements elsewhere often emphasize how the chance for a decisive end was missed,<sup>23</sup> here a counterfactual secures the closure of a return to

<sup>20</sup> For the narrator making a wish, cf. 4.32.9.

<sup>21</sup> Especially interesting episodes include 28.7.8–13, 12–13 and 29.23–25 (where Polybius and his father are given a favoured treatment by the narrator in various ways); 31.24.9–11 (details on Polybius’ friendship with Scipio); 31.11–15 (Polybius as adviser on an escape-plot); and 32.3.14 (an Achaean appeal on his behalf).

<sup>22</sup> Walbank 1957–1979: III. 735. Shuckburgh bracketed the passage in his translation as a ‘note by a friend of Polybius’.

<sup>23</sup> E.g. 2.45.5; 3.50.4, 53.1; 4.12.13, 61.3, 87.10. For other counterfactual statements,

civic order. It also sets this strongly closed ending against the ending of Xenophon's *Hellenica*, where the position in Greece after the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC was described as one of even greater 'uncertainty and confusion' than before (*akrisia ... kai ... tarakhē*, 7.5.27, a passage already alluded to by Polybius himself at 2.39.8, on the position in Greece after the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC). This new narrator contrasts the position of Greece under Roman rule with the position in the past when states like Sparta and Thebes were striving for hegemony. He also puts a close to Polybius' own story. When narratees come to Polybius' Herodotean anxiety about whether his prosperity will survive to the end (39.8.2, quoted above), they know that Polybius' prosperity (unlike Croesus) did endure to the end (and beyond). The narrative of Polybius' death contributed by his 'posthumous editor', it emerges, interacts richly with the themes of the history as a whole.

We have seen that Polybius presents an intrusive narrator who is ready to meet at every stage any possible bewilderment on the narratees' part. First-person forms can also, however, be used to assert a link between the narrator and the narratees. They can, for instance, describe supposedly universal properties shared by all 'us' humans (4.21.1, 31.4–5; 5.75.4–6). As with some other techniques, this usage is not found in Thucydides or Xenophon, but it can be paralleled in Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F9, 20, 63, 122a—where it means either 'we' humans or 'we' Greeks) and Phylarchus (*FGH* 81 F66).<sup>24</sup> Closer to the usage of his predecessors is the first-person plural found in the agonistic insistence on the greatness of the First Punic War—'the longest, most continuous, and greatest war that we know of by hearsay' (1.63.4). Here both the claim of greatness and the qualification 'that we know of by hearsay' (*hēmeis ismen akoēi*) recall the manner of the Herodotean narrator, while the criteria of length and continuity recall those used by Thucydides to stress the greatness of the Peloponnesian War (1.23.1, 2.1). Indeed, Thucydides himself had adopted that Herodotean 'that we know of' in his highly agonistic depiction of the Sicilian expedition (7.87.6).<sup>25</sup>

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see e.g. 1.18.11, 20.16, 28.11; 2.33.8, 68.5, 70.3; 3.9.8, 14.4, 68.3; 4.11.7–8, 87.10; 5.11.7–9, 97.6, 110.9–10.

<sup>24</sup> Ephorus *FGH* 70 F97, by contrast, where 'we' are opposed to Boeotians, is for that reason assigned to his *Epikhōrios Logos* rather than to his universal history.

<sup>25</sup> For similar claims, cf. e.g. 2.57.8 ('I do not know if' with a comparative) and 58.4; and for a first-person comment limiting a superlative, 2.14.7.

Polybius also uses first-person plural forms in the phrase *kath' hēmas* to situate himself (and his contemporaries) in time (e.g. 3.26.2; an instance of the 'reference to the narrator's own time' motif) and space.<sup>26</sup> The phrase 'the sea by us' (*hē kath' hēmas thalatta*: 1.3.9; 3.37.6, 9, 10, 39.4; 16.29.6; 34.8.7; cf. also the use of *kath' hēmas* with *hē oikoumenē*, 'the inhabited world', at 3.37.1; 4.38.1) is particularly interesting because it becomes common after Polybius (e.g. in Strabo), and because it has been thought to suggest a Roman perspective (cf. the Latin phrase *mare nostrum*).<sup>27</sup> This interpretation (which could be supported by the use of a similar phrase at Ps.-Scylax 40 to refer to the Saronic gulf, implying an Athenian perspective) would give the phrase a political charge. Yet the phrase 'the sea *par' hēmin* / *peri hēmas*' could also be used in opposition to the Red Sea or the Ocean (Theoph. *HP* 1.4.2, 4.6.1; cf. also Pl. *Phd.* 113a8, also quoted at Arist. *Meteor.* 356a). So Roman usage, and Roman power, are not prerequisites for Polybius' usage.

This example raises questions about the audience for which Polybius was writing his Greek account of a Roman achievement. Polybius himself makes pronouncements about his intended audience, and I turn now to look at these, as well as at other ways in which the narrator draws the narratees into the work.

### *Narratees*

The Polybian narrator interacts most conspicuously with the narratees through the hundreds of rhetorical questions that can be found in the history (several have already been quoted above). The frequency of such questions gives Polybius' work a very different texture from Thucydides' or Xenophon's—and even from Herodotus' work, which does have a handful of rhetorical questions. Perhaps, while Thucydides had avoided elements that seemed too 'oral', rhetorical questions had come by Polybius' time to be an acceptable part of the professional style—an amiable way of introducing a new paragraph. Several such questions can be found in the fragments of Xenophon's near-

<sup>26</sup> Cf. the use of this phrase in sections of Diodorus derived from Posidonius, where it has been thought that Diodorus simply took it straight from his source (Hornblower 1981: 27–28, 263 n. 4); but it has also been argued that the vague phrase was still appropriate for Diodorus (Sacks 1990: 83–93).

<sup>27</sup> See Burr 1932: 115; and Dubuisson 1985: 172 for the Roman connection.



contemporary Theopompus (*FGH* 115 FF124, 225, 263—where there are three in a row); but in Theopompus the tone seems rather more indignant.

A far more rare mode of interaction used by the Polybian narrator is the generalizing second-person address: ‘the current bears towards Byzantion even if you do not want’ (4.44.2). The example may perhaps be explained by the geographical context: compare the second-person singulars at Ps.-Scylax 67 (‘until you come to ...’) and 100 (‘if you go ...’). But Polybius also uses second-person forms in a non-geographical generalization at 1.81.8.

On the whole, however, ‘Polybius’ adopts a fairly impersonal manner of address. He uses forms such as the dative singular of the participle (e.g. 1.35.7); and, in particular, impersonal forms such as *khṛē* (‘one should’) and *hēgēteon* (‘one should consider’)—forms common in scientific writings such as those of Aristotle. Forms in *-teon*, by contrast, are found eight times in Herodotus and fourteen times in Thucydides, and on each occasion they express the words or thoughts of characters (the same pattern is found with the rhetorical question *pōs ou*, ‘how not ...?’). Once more, the historian whose narrative manner is closest to Polybius is Diodorus.<sup>28</sup> The phrase ‘one need not be surprised’ (*ou khṛē thaumazein*), for instance, which is found in earlier texts in representations of speech (e.g. Pl. *Prot.* 326e4, *Leg.* 793d3; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 15.5), is used five times in Polybius (and four times in Diodorus, all from the first five books).

In what ways does Polybius identify his narratees? He starts by claiming that his story is of universal interest: ‘the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme is sufficient to challenge young and old alike to peruse these pages. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know’ how the Romans conquered the world (1.1.5)? And later he states that his work is a possession for all time: ‘it will be clear to people now whether Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and to people in the future whether one should think their government was worthy of praise and admiration or of blame; and the utility of my work for the present and for the future will chiefly lie in this’ (3.4.7–8). A little later, Polybius makes it clear that it is for people ‘eager for learning’ (*philomathountes*)—whom he equates with statesmen (3.7.4–5). And at 9.1.4–5, he defines three types of history, and three types

<sup>28</sup> Palm 1955: 91–92; Hornblower 1981: 264.

of audience: genealogical history, which appeals to those who are fond of a story (*philēkoos*); accounts of the foundations of cities and colonies, which attract the curious (*polupragmōn kai perittos*); and the type that Polybius himself writes—history which treats ‘the doings of nations, cities, and dynasts’, and attracts ‘the student of politics’ (*politikos*). But elsewhere Polybius uses what seems here to be a derogatory expression, *philēkoos*, as a general term for reader (e.g. 4.40.1).

Polybius defines his narratees further through his comments on how they will benefit from his work. The work is said to have a general utility. Through the observations it allows of others’ misfortunes, it offers lessons on human instability and the fickleness of fortune (1.35.7, cf. 1.1.2). Polybius further stresses that his work (as a universal history) is useful to statesmen because it allows causal connections between events to be recognized (3.31–32). Often, however, he offers more restricted advice: practical advice on the use of ladders in sieges (5.98, 9.18.5–9), for instance, or on techniques of fire-signalling (10.43–47). And sometimes he gives advice to, or about, particular Greek states (such advice is far more common in the early part of the work); the Arcadians should keep up their music (4.21.10; cf. 32.10, 33.11–12, advice to Messenians and Arcadians); the Acarnanians are good people to form an alliance with (4.30.4–5). In general, Polybius’ stress on the usefulness of his work recalls Thucydides (→)—indeed, Polybius’ key discussion of the utility of history at 3.31.13 closely echoes Thuc. 1.22.4. Yet ‘Polybius’ interests are more particular; there is not the same easy movement as in Thucydides between the specific incident and the larger awareness of the human condition’.<sup>29</sup> But Polybius’ more particular interests do at least make it easier for us to grasp the audience for which he was writing primarily—an audience of active politicians and generals.

That Polybius’ narratees are conceived as Greek is shown in various ways. He offers advice to (Peloponnesian) Greek states, as we have seen. He translates the Latin *trans* (2.15.9), and promises to improve on earlier accounts of the geography of the west and ‘make these parts of the world also known to the Greeks’ (3.58.8). And he can be seen as aligning himself with a tradition of Greek historiography dealing with Greek resistance to barbarians: ‘I consider that the writers who have chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made

<sup>29</sup> Rutherford 1994: 56.

no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty' (2.35.7: note the shift from first-person singular to plural—to 'us' Greeks).<sup>30</sup>

Polybius was also aware that Romans would be interested in his story. He expresses some concern about how his account of the Roman constitution will seem to those used to it (6.11.3); and the fact that 'the writer knew' that 'Romans above all' would read an account of 'their most splendid achievements' is offered as a mark of its truth (31.22.8–11). Here Polybius seems to define one narratee (the Roman reader) as a way of swaying another (and a more privileged) narratee—the Greek audience. But he does also offer advice to Rome—albeit in a less direct form: 'this happened to them on that occasion and on many others, and it will happen until they correct this daring and violence' (1.37.10). Unlike when he advises Greek states, Polybius here adopts a more detached, Thucydidean pose (for the form of the statement, cf. Th. 3.82.2).

That Polybius regarded his narratees primarily as Greek is further confirmed by the content of the most notable of the secondary narratives presented by speakers in the history. It is to the role of these narratives that I now turn.

### *Secondary narrators*

Polybius reports a conference at Sparta in 210 BC at which two speeches with large sections of narrative are reported: the Acarnanians urge the Spartans to join an alliance that involves Philip V of Macedon, the Aetolians urge them to join one that involves the Romans (9.28–39). What is telling about these speeches is that the secondary narrators look back beyond the start of Polybius' history to focus on examples from earlier Greek history (the Persian Wars, the campaigns of Philip II and Alexander of Macedon, the Gallic invasion) where the issue is 'the preservation of the Greek cities in the face of the threats posed by successive kings and dynasties'.<sup>31</sup> Perhaps here the content of the secondary narratives reinforces the hint offered at 2.35.7 about Polybius' conception of his narratees. He seems to be writing for a Greek audience, about the problems of the Greeks' confrontations with powerful out-

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Millar 1987: 7; Lehmann 1989–1990: 68–69; Clarke 1999: 100.

<sup>31</sup> Millar 1987: 16.

siders. And he is offering them some classic examples (cf. the speakers' stress on how their internal narratees know the *exempla*: 9.28.8, 29.1–2, 5, 30.1).

With so much of Polybius' work lost, it is unsafe to be too categorical about the role of narrative within the speeches, but the debate at Sparta does seem unusual in the space devoted to stories about the past.<sup>32</sup> As one would expect, however, many of the speeches in Polybius' history do contain narratives. But these narratives tend to be as brief and allusive as those told by Thucydides' (→) speakers (see, for instance, Eumenes' speech at 21.20).<sup>33</sup> There are times, however, when a definite resistance to secondary narratives can be detected.

How does Polybius shy away from including secondary narratives? At times he describes people saying 'what was appropriate' (e.g. 5.53.6, 60.3), when what was appropriate may well have included a narrative. Elsewhere he merely gives a summary of a narrative section of a speech, while giving in full the non-narrative component. When Scipio addresses his men, for instance, Polybius writes that 'most of what he said related to the exalted position of their country and the achievements of their ancestors; what concerned the present situation was as follows' (3.64.2); and this non-narrative part occupies some 35 lines. When Aemilius addresses the troops before the battle of Cannae, 'the greater part of his speech was devoted to accounting for his former reverses, for it was particularly the impression created by these that made the soldiers disheartened and in need of encouragement' (3.108.3). Here Polybius does at least proceed to give a version of this narrative component of the speech (20 lines). But it is only after this that he switches from indirect to direct speech (3.109); and again it is this non-narrative section that is longer (50 lines). More conventional is the stress of the victorious general Hannibal on the greater value of deeds over words at 3.111.6. Polybius is also intolerant of seemingly

<sup>32</sup> The 'Polybian' portions of Livy offer some examples of secondary narratives that may be derived from Polybius: e.g. the Macedonian envoy's speech at 31.29.4–16. But comparison of Plb. 23.11.1–8 and Livy 40.8.11–16 shows how Livy transforms his model by introducing Roman *exempla* in a speech by Philip V of Macedon (Chaplin 2000: 80–81; cf. further 23–25 on Livy's independence).

<sup>33</sup> Pédech 1964: 281–289 reviews the use of historical allusions in the speeches. Note that many of them can be found in the excerpts from the later books describing embassies at Rome, and we are often not in a position to compare them with the primary narrator's account of the same events. Polybius' spatially organized chronological scheme itself created a problem for the narratee: as Polybius himself noted, he often had to narrate the dealings of embassies at Rome before their dispatch (28.16.9–11).

irrelevant narrative—of mythical paradigms, for instance. Thus he criticizes Timaeus' version of a speech of Hermocrates in which the advantages of peace were supported by an account of how Heracles founded the Olympic games—a sign of his preference for peace. Again, there are occasions where intertextual parallels raise the expectation of a narrative. The famous speech by Agelaus of Naupactus in 217 warning of 'the clouds that now loom in the west' (5.104.10)—that is, Carthage and Rome—recalls the speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenica* warning of threats to Greece from the north (5.2.11–19, 6.1.4–16). But Agelaus does not have a narrative: Polybius has already provided that.

It is not just in speeches that secondary narratives are found. There are also letters such as military communiqués (e.g. 3.75.1, 85.8); inscriptions such as the ones put up by Hannibal (3.33.18, 56.4); and mythical stories introduced by 'they say' (4.43.2; cf. 2.16.13, of a habit derived from myth) or even by 'the stories (*muthoi*) say' (4.43.6, 59.5). Particularly interesting is the frequency with which Polybius cites, and criticizes, the stories told by earlier historians (e.g. 1.58.5: 'not, as Fabius [Pictor] says, ..., but'; cf. e.g. 3.8.1–8, 26.3). There are, indeed, some quite extensive citations from earlier historians in Polybius' polemical sections, especially in book 12. Earlier historians had reported stories told by sources. Polybius once more shows that he is writing more consciously as a 'pro'.<sup>34</sup> Yet sometimes it seems to be for political reasons that he includes, and rails against, the accounts of other historians (cf. above on his criticism of Phylarchus' account of the sack of Mantinea).

The most pregnant of all the secondary narratives in Polybius' history is a narrative of the future told indirectly, through a citation from a poet. It will be appropriate to close on this episode, since it illustrates well the difficulties in making a narratological analysis of a partly fragmentary author such as Polybius.

Polybius has earlier expressed his admiration for one narrative of the future that has come true—Demetrius of Phalerum's prediction of the fall of the Macedonian empire (29.21). Now he describes how Scipio wept as he looked at the destruction of Carthage:

After being wrapped in thought for long, and realizing that all cities, nations, and authorities must, like men, meet their doom; that this happened to Troy, once a prosperous city, to the empires of Assyria, Media, and Persia, the greatest of their time, and to Macedonia itself, the brilliance of which was so recent, ... he said: 'A day will come when sacred

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<sup>34</sup> Derow 1994: 84.

Troy shall perish, and Priam and his people shall be slain' [*Il.* 4.164–165, 6.448–449]. And when Polybius speaking with freedom to him, for he was his teacher, asked him what he meant by the words, they say that without any attempt at concealment he named his own country, for which he feared when he reflected on the fate of all things human. Polybius actually heard him and recalls it in his history.

(38.22.1 = Appian, *Punica* 132)

The episode is fascinating not just for what it implies about the historical perspectives of empire, but also for Polybius' portrayal of himself. The character Polybius seems to match the narrator Polybius in his love for the explicit. Scipio's Homeric allusion seems too indirect for the insensitive Polybius. Or is the character Polybius so insensitive? Appian's version of the story may be contrasted with Diodorus' version, which survives thanks to a Byzantine excerptor (32.24). And in this version Scipio quotes the Homeric prophecy when Polybius asks him why he is weeping. So we have a Polybius who still has that demand for the explicit—but one who is slightly less insensitive and obtuse.

Whichever of these versions is more true to Polybius' lost original, Polybius' presentation of himself in the episode of Scipio's tears also raises questions about the relationship between his character as narrator and his character as author. Polybius himself is aware of the danger of associating author and narrator: he warns against 'pay[ing] regard not to what Fabius writes but to the writer himself and taking into consideration that he was a contemporary and a Roman senator, at once accepting all he says as worthy of credit' (3.9.4). Yet he also reports that 'Timaeus says that poets and authors reveal their real natures in their works by dwelling excessively on certain matters' (thus he says that 'Homer, by constantly feasting his heroes, shows that he was more or less of a glutton')—and naturally turns this insight against Timaeus himself ('his pronouncements are full of ... craven superstition and womanish love of the marvellous', 12.24.1–5). Anyone exasperated by the nannying intrusiveness of the Polybian narrator may be tempted to apply this pattern of thought to Polybius himself.<sup>35</sup> But the advances of narratology, and the key separation of author and narrator proposed by Genette and others, suggest that we should resist this temptation. It may be better to interpret the character Polybius conversing with Sci-

<sup>35</sup> Contempt for Polybius' 'schoolmasterly temperament' (p. 24) mars the most detailed analysis of his narratorial *persona*, Ibendorff 1930.

pio at Carthage as a narratorial *alter ego*: a man who instructs and speaks freely with powerful statesmen and who is ever quick to search for explanations.

### *Conclusion*

We have seen that Polybius, for all his very foregrounding of the ‘gaze’<sup>36</sup> of participants and narratees, does not share Thucydides’ concern to preserve that clarity of narrative that seems to offer the narratee unmediated access to events. His narrator is much more obtrusive even than the Herodotean narrator. With a *persona* close in some ways to that of some modern academics, Polybius emerges as a professional historian writing for narratees committed to the enquiry into historical causation. At the same time, the controlling voice of the narrator blends easily with the voice of social control.

The excessively didactic and explicit narratorial *persona* that Polybius adopts is confirmed even by a passage where the narrator advises against taking his narrative at face value: ‘finally the king—if one should call the opinions he then delivered the king’s; for it is not probable that a boy of eighteen should be able to decide about such grave matters. But it is the duty of us writers to attribute to the supreme ruler the expression of opinion that prevailed at his council, while the readers should suspect that such arguments and decisions are due to his associates’ (5.24.1–2; note the anacoluthon whereby Polybius cuts the king off without a verb). And yet Polybius here seems to risk destabilizing his narrative by inviting narratees to consider how writers are constrained not just by convention, but also by the power structures that those conventions uphold. Some of his later readers have also suspected that Polybius’ account of the relations between conquering Rome and conquered Greece can be read in some sense against the grain. It is no accident, perhaps, that it is its analysis of how states and individuals respond to shifts in power, as much as the ‘universal’ interest of the subject matter itself, that has given Polybius’ didactic mode of historiography its enduring interest.

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<sup>36</sup> The term adopted by Davidson 1991.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

### ARRIAN

*T. Hidber*

*‘You must know who I am’*

And as to who I am that I make this judgement in my favour, I do not inscribe my name, for it is not at all unknown to men, nor what my native land is, nor my family, nor if I have held any office in my own land; but this I do inscribe, that my native land, family, and offices are this work, and have been even from my youth. And for this reason I count myself not unworthy of the first place in Greek speech, just as I hold Alexander to have been in arms. (1.12.5)<sup>1</sup>

In the ‘Second preface’ to the *Anabasis* there is quite a unique *recusatio* of the historiographical *topos* whereby a narrator provides some information on himself, such as his name, his country of origin, his offices, and his social standing. The narrator claims that he does not need to mention his identity and his background since they are so well known. As this anonymity calls attention to itself (in contrast to Xenophon’s, Herodian’s, or, indeed, Homer’s), it is to be regarded as an expression of striking self-confidence rather than modesty, and the very *praeteritio* clearly shows an awareness of fame and distinguished social status. However, as for the narrator’s identity, only his skills and achievements as a writer as well as his almost lifelong devotion to this work are claimed to be of relevance.

The narrator’s self-definition, then, is based on the identification of himself both with his work (i.e. with the *Anabasis*) and with his topic (Alexander the Great). The dramatic setting of the ‘Second preface’ is instructive: having crossed the Hellespont and being now ready to launch his campaign against the Persians (i.e. to achieve his greatest deeds), Alexander pauses at the tomb of Achilles in Ilium, thereby

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<sup>1</sup> Translation by Moles 1985: 163.



blessing the hero ‘on the ground that he had obtained Homer as herald for his future commemoration’ (1.12.1). It is at this crucial point that the narrator intervenes:

And indeed from Alexander’s point of view Achilles really was to be counted blessed, not least for this reason, that, for Alexander himself, not in accordance with his general good fortune, this area happened to be left free and Alexander’s deeds were not published to mankind worthily, neither certainly in prose nor did anyone compose them in verse [worthily]. But Alexander was not even sung in lyric ... so that Alexander’s deeds are much less known than the most. (1.12.1–2)<sup>2</sup>

This claim is underpinned by the following *sunkrisis* between the march of the ‘Ten thousand’ and Alexander’s achievements, culminating in the emphatic assertion of Alexander’s superiority:

But there is no other single man who performed so many or so great deeds in number or magnitude among Greeks or barbarians. Wherefore I declare that I myself set out on this history, not judging myself unworthy to make Alexander’s deeds known to men. (1.12.4)<sup>3</sup>

Here, the narrator implicitly sets himself in line with Herodotus to whose preface he clearly alludes, and explicitly competes with Xenophon whose *Anabasis* he claims to surpass because of the unrivalled greatness of his topic.<sup>4</sup> There is no sense of inferiority to the old masters whatsoever. Rather the narrator is quite confident to do for Alexander what Homer did for Achilles. And indeed, the very lack of a worthy presentation of the king’s unparalleled achievements, as deplored by Alexander himself, is claimed to be the narrator’s motive for writing and making those deeds known to men. Thus, Alexander, styling himself as a Homeric hero, is calling on the narrator to become his Homer. It is also made clear that the *Anabasis* is expected to equal the king’s achievements in warfare in terms of literature. This parallel is made explicit in the proud last sentence of the work, where the narrator states that he embarked on this history ‘like Alexander not without God’s help’ (7.30.3).

<sup>2</sup> Translation by Moles 1985: 163.

<sup>3</sup> Translation by Moles 1985: 163.

<sup>4</sup> Recent research has made clear many aspects of Arrian’s exceptionally sophisticated ‘self-definition by continuity and contrast’ (Marincola 1997: 253). Cf. Moles 1985; Marincola 1989b; Gray 1990; Marincola 1997: 253–254. Moles 1985: 163 additionally draws attention to the allusion in 1.12.2 (*to chorion touto eklipeis xunebē*) to Thuc.1.97.2

*Superior sources*

In pointed contrast to the narrator's own anonymity, the names of his sources are given at the outset of the work with the very first words of the preface:

Ptolemy, son of Lagus, and Aristobulus, son of Aristobulus—whatever these two say in common about Alexander the son of Philip, these things I have written as entirely true, but where they differ I have selected the version I regarded as more trustworthy and also better worth telling.

(1 praef. 1)<sup>5</sup>

This opening with the names in the nominative is a clever play with convention, since the founding fathers of ancient historiography had chosen this formula at the beginning of the work to advertise their *own* name and country of origin.<sup>6</sup> The first sentence of the work makes clear that the reliability of the historical account is based on the records of the only two trustworthy sources: Ptolemy and Aristobulus who were both eyewitnesses of the events as they took part in Alexander's expedition, but wrote after the king's death, and therefore 'under no constraint or hope of gain to make him set down anything but what actually happened' (1 praef. 2).<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Ptolemy's authority and trustworthiness is stressed by a reference to his distinguished social standing: 'as he himself was a king, mendacity would have been more dishonourable for him than for anyone else' (1 praef. 2). As the *Anabasis* basically reconstructs the remote past, the handling of sources is of utmost importance. Thus, it is not only the narrator's literary ability, but also his consistent restriction to the evidence provided by the only trustworthy witnesses of the events that guarantees the reliability and superiority of his account over those of his predecessors. The latter, then, are dismissed out of hand in a bold and direct call on the narratees:

Anyone who is surprised that with so many historians already in the field it should have occurred to me too to compose this history should express his surprise only after perusing all their works and then reading mine.

(1 praef. 3)

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(*eklipse touto ... to chorion*—marking the beginning of the *Pentecontaetia* excursus). Marincola 1989b: 186–187 suggests that the Second preface might also have been intended to outdo Theopompus' claims in his *Philippica*.

<sup>5</sup> Translation taken from Marincola 1997: 275 and Brunt 1976.

<sup>6</sup> Hec. *FGH* 1 F 1a; Hdt. 1.1; Th. 1.1.

<sup>7</sup> Translation (here and in the following) taken from Brunt 1976.

The earlier Alexander historians are no match for Arrian and, therefore, are not even worth mentioning: Indeed, it is only his *Anabasis* that provides the first adequate and worthy account of the king's great deeds.

*Explicit narratorial interventions*

The presence of this exceptionally sovereign and self-confident narrator is not felt with invariable intensity throughout the work (comprising seven books). Many long stretches of narrative are devoid of explicit narratorial interventions and the story seems 'to tell itself'. This is often the case with records of particular campaigns or with elaborate battle descriptions narrated in one stretch and without a break. Such passages, then, are given a rather 'objective look' and often offer an absorbing read.<sup>8</sup> They are, however, counterbalanced by quite a large number of often rather extensive narratorial interventions framing such narrative stretches or occurring in digressions. Thus, the narratees are from time to time reminded that this text is presented to them by the tough-thinking and self-assured narrator whose *persona* has been so impressively established in the two prefaces.

Most of the explicit narratorial interventions deal with sources and source-criticism, showing the narrator at work as a historian of the distant past—a distant past that is only accessible through written sources. Indeed, sources are mentioned more often than in most other historiographical works of antiquity.<sup>9</sup> Usually Aristobulus and Ptolemy are mentioned as authorities for particular accounts or pieces of information,<sup>10</sup> whereas alternative versions are reported via anonymous spokesmen ('others say', 'some have also recorded', 'a story of the following sort is told').<sup>11</sup> Occasionally other sources are referred to by name, mainly in digressions.<sup>12</sup> In a few instances differences between the

<sup>8</sup> Cf. e.g. Arr. *An.* 1.1.4–1.1.8 (campaigns in Greece); 1.20.2–1.23.4 (siege of Halicarnassus); 2.18.1–2.24.6 (siege and capture of Tyre); 3.13–15 (battle at Gaugamela).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Bosworth 1988: 39.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Arr. *An.* 1.2.7; 1.8.1; 2.11.8; 3.3.3; 3.11.3; 3.17.6; 3.26.2; 3.28.6; 3.30.7; 4.6.1; 4.8.9; 4.13.5; 4.14.1; 4.15.8; 5.14.3–4; 5.15.1; 5.20.2; 5.20.8; 6.10.1; 6.22.4–7; 6.28.3; 6.29.4; 6.29.6; 6.29.10; 7.17.5; 7.18.1; 7.19.3; 7.20.5; 7.22.5; 7.24.1; 7.28.1.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Arr. *An.* 1.1.1; 1.1.5; 1.11.7; 1.12.1; 1.12.10; 2.2.2; 2.4.7; 2.5.4; 2.7.8; 3.2.1; 3.5.7; 3.10.1; 3.27.1; 4.10.5; 4.12.3; 6.11.2; 6.22.8; 6.24.1; 6.28.1; 7.1.2–3; 7.2.3; 7.5.3; 7.6.2; 7.11.9; 7.14.4; 7.20.1; 7.22.1; 7.24.4.

<sup>12</sup> References are made, among others, to Homer (4.1.1; 5.6.5; 6.1.3), Herodotus

accounts of Aristobulus and Ptolemy are noted and (once) are critically commented on:

Thus not even those whose narratives are entirely trustworthy and who actually accompanied Alexander at that time agree in their accounts of events which were public and within their own knowledge. (4.14.4)<sup>13</sup>

There are more instances of conflicting versions, whereby more often than not the matter is explicitly left undecided; only by way of exception is one or the other version given preference, on account of its plausibility. This procedure is clearly designed to demonstrate the narrator's circumspection and prudence:

Alexander was unable to untie the knot but unwilling to leave it tied ... some say that he struck it with his sword, cut the knot, and said it was now untied—but Aristobulus says that he took out the pole-pin, a bolt driven through the pole, holding the knot together, and so removed the yoke from the pole. I cannot say with confidence what Alexander actually did ... (2.3.7–8)

That some divine help was given him I can confidently assert, because probability suggests it too; but the exact truth of the story cannot be told; that is precluded by the way in which different writers about Alexander have given different accounts. (3.3.6)<sup>14</sup>

In a few instances, however, divergent versions are included or alluded to only to be dismissed as falsifications and to prove the narrator's full knowledge of the tradition as well as his soundness of judgment (sometimes displayed in rather lengthy deliberations):

Many other stories have been written by the historians about the misfortune, and tradition has received them as the first falsifiers told them, and still keeps them alive to this day, nor indeed will it ever cease handing on the falsehoods to others in turn, unless it is checked by this history. (6.11.2)

My own obligation has been adequately discharged by including the story, unreliable though it is. (6.28.2)

So much for stories which I have set down to show that I know they are told rather than because they are credible enough to recount. (7.27.3)<sup>15</sup>

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(2.16.3; 3.30.8; 5.6.5; 5.7.2), Nearchus (6.13.4–5; 6.24.2–3; 7.3.6; 7.20.9), Eratosthenes and Megasthenes (5.6.2), Ctesias (5.4.2), Aristus and Asclepiades (7.15.5), Callisthenes (4.10.1–2), and the 'Royal journals' (7.25.1; 7.26.1–2).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 3.3.5–6; 3.4.5; 3.30.5; 4.3.5; 4.14.3; 5.20.2.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Arr. *An.* 2.4.7–11; 2.12.6–8; 3.30.5; 3.30.8–9; 4.9.2–4; 4.14.1–2; 4.14.4; 5.4.5; 6.26.1; 7.1.1–4; 7.15.5–6.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 5.4.3–4; 5.14.3–6; 6.11.1–8; 7.12.5; 7.13.2–3.

A similarly critical, though more indulgent, attitude is displayed towards the mythical tradition, referred to in some digressions:

For my part I cannot gather whether the Theban Dionysus, starting from Thebes or from the Lydian Tmolus, led an army against the Indians, after assailing so many warlike peoples, unknown to the Greeks of that time, and yet subduing none of them by force but the Indians; still, one must not be a precise critic of ancient legends that concern the divine. For things which are incredible if you consider them on the basis of probability appear not wholly incredible, when one adds the divine element to the story. (5.1.2)<sup>16</sup>

All this is perfectly in line with the claim made at the outset, that the *Anabasis* is to deliver the first truly worthy account of Alexander's deeds, since it is exclusively based on the only trustworthy sources and presented by an exceptionally gifted and sharp-witted historian of great literary skills. Frankly admitting a few contradictions in his sources, the narrator strengthens the authority of the rest of his text and of the *Anabasis* as a whole. At the same time, the narratees are given the opportunity, as it were, to participate in the narrator's deliberations and, above all, to appreciate his cautious and critical approach to tradition.

As the *Anabasis* deals with the distant past, its narrator is clearly external; hence, the stress laid on his scrupulous handling of written sources. However, the narrator appears to fill a few occasional gaps in the tradition with references to his own personal experience:

What I do know is that this part of the mainland is capital pasture to this very day and rears excellent oxen. (2.16.6)

This too I cannot decide, yet the quickest way of bridging I know is the Roman use of boats, and I shall here describe it, for it merits description. (5.7.1)

Such references, well known from Herodotus (→) and particularly frequent in Cassius Dio (→), assure the narratees that the narrator is a much-travelled man and well-acquainted with the present-day world too.<sup>17</sup> These very moments the narrator figures himself as an eyewitness, a role which he is forced to leave to his sources with regard to the historical events themselves.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 2.16.1–6; 3.5.7; 4.28.1; 5.3.1–4; 5.4.5; 7.13.3–5.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 1.16.4; 2.5.1; 3.16.8; 5.28.7; 6.20.2.

Another type of narratorial intervention reflects the narrator's role as organizer and commentator. There are a few reminders of what has been told earlier<sup>18</sup> and some references to future writing, the *Indikē*,<sup>19</sup> but on the whole, cross-referencing is accomplished rather by implicit parallels and contrasts than by explicit signs. Stretches of narrative may be introduced by a short narratorial remark pointing at what is going to be narrated:

A story of the following sort is told, and personally I do not disbelieve it. (3.2.1)

At this point it will be the moment for me to relate the tragedy of Clitus son of Dropides and the suffering it caused to Alexander, even though it actually occurred later. (4.8.1)<sup>20</sup>

Likewise, passages may be concluded by a narratorial statement. Some of the closing remarks are short summaries, sometimes adding the year and month (e.g. 2.11.10: 'So ended this battle, fought in the archonship at Athens of Nicocrates and in the month of Maimacterion').<sup>21</sup> Others follow the traditionally historiographical rhetoric of amplification as, for example, the elaborate and somewhat lengthy demonstration that the capture of Thebes by Alexander was the greatest disaster ever to befall a Greek city (1.9).<sup>22</sup> Finally, there are closing remarks in which the narrator applauds or condemns a particular action or conduct (often in the first person), which recall the Xenophon-historian (→):

I too do not think that Alexander showed good sense in this action nor that he could punish Persians of a long past age. (3.18.12)

For my part, I do not approve of this excessive punishment of Bessus; I regard the mutilation of the extremities as barbaric, and I agree that Alexander was carried away into imitation of Median and Persian opulence ... Nor do I at all approve the facts that ... he substituted the dress of Medes for that traditional with Macedonians and that he exchanged the tiara of the Persians, whom he himself had conquered, for the head-dress he had long worn ... (4.7.4)

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Arr. *An.* 5.5.3; 6.17.2; 6.30.1.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Arr. *An.* 5.5.1; 5.6.8; 6.16.5; 6.28.6.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. also e.g. Arr. *An.* 2.6.7; 2.14.4; 2.22.1; 4.10.5; 4.12.3; 4.20.1; 5.23.5; 6.25.2; 6.26.4; 7.12.5; 7.18.1; 7.24.1; 7.25.1.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 2.24.6; 3.15.7; 3.22.2; 5.4.1; 5.6.8; 5.16.1; 5.19.3; 6.16.2; 7.18.6; 7.23.2.

<sup>22</sup> For this sort of argument cf. e.g. Th. 1.2–19; Plb. 1.2; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.2–3; App. *Hist.* 1 praef. 8–10.

I myself strongly blame Clitus for his insolence towards his king, and pity Alexander for his misfortune, since he then showed himself the slave of two vices, by neither of which it is fitting for a man of sense to be overcome, namely, anger and drunkenness. (4.9.1)

Some of these deliberations and judgments evaluate the behaviour of other characters,<sup>23</sup> but most of them are aimed at creating a picture of the disposition and the personality of Alexander.<sup>24</sup> Whereas throughout the work the king's lack of control over his passions and his inclination to take over barbarian customs is censured several times (once in a passage which lists examples of these weaknesses 4.7–14),<sup>25</sup> the long obituary at the end of the work in which all these moral judgments finally culminate (7.28–30) stresses Alexander's unrivalled excellence in almost every respect; his errors now appear to be almost negligible:

If Alexander was at all guilty of misdeeds due to anger, or if he was led on to adopt barbarian practices involving too much pretension, I do not personally regard it as important; only consider in charity his youth, his unbroken good fortune, and the fact that it is men that seek to please and not to act for the best who are and will be the associates of kings, exercising an evil influence. But remorse for his misdeeds was to my knowledge peculiar to Alexander among the kings of old times, and resulted from his noble nature. (7.29.1; cf. also 7.29.2–4)

In fact, anyone who reproaches Alexander should compare his own actions with those of the king, 'and then carefully reflect who he himself is and what kind of fortune he enjoys, that he can condemn Alexander' (7.30.1). Thus, the narrator has to justify his own attitude:

So, while I myself have censured some of Alexander's acts in my history of them, I am not ashamed to express admiration of Alexander himself; I have made those criticisms from my own respect for truth and also for the good of mankind: it was for that purpose that I embarked on this history. (7.30.3)

The narrator's self-criticism once again shows how much he is committed to the truth of his portrayal of Alexander, while the references to divergent versions enhance the authority of the text as a whole. Together these devices underpin the historiographical claim of the *Anabasis* and distinguish the work from an encomium.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. e.g. Arr. *An.* 3.22.2–6 (Darius); 4.7.5–6 (Clitus); 4.12.6–7 (Callisthenes); 7.3.6 (Calanus).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. also e.g. Arr. *An.* 1.17.2; 2.12.8; 3.10.2–4; 4.8.2; 4.9.2; 4.19.6; 5.19.6; 6.13.4; 6.26.1–3; 7.1.4; 7.4.7; 7.8.3; 7.16.7–8; 7.19.6; 7.23.8.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. particularly Arr. *An.* 4.8.2 and 4.12.6–7.

*Secondary narrators*

There is remarkably little character-text in the *Anabasis*. In fact, books 3 and 6 do not even contain any speeches. On the other hand, there is quite a large amount of indirect speech, a form of reporting, in which the narrator remains clearly visible as the presenter and organizer of the account. The most elaborate speech is the king's address to his mutinous Macedonian troops at Opis (7.9.1–10.7) in which he recounts as secondary narrator the events from the time of his father to his own days.<sup>26</sup> Clearly, Alexander speaks as an internal narrator. Whereas he is trying to win over his troops, i.e. the secondary narratees, his speech at the same time provides the primary narratees with first-hand information on the 'prehistory' of the *Anabasis*. The effectiveness of his narrative is demonstrated by its result: the Macedonians 'stunned by his speech' (7.11.2) ruefully give up their mutiny. There is one other case of embedded narrative: Acuphis of Nysa, telling Alexander, how Dionysus once founded his city (5.1.5–6). Acuphis, of course, is an external narrator, and the story he tells is mythological rather than historical. And that is obviously why it is not told by the primary narrator himself. However, it proves congenial to Alexander, who 'also wanted Nysa to be founded by Dionysus, in which case he had already reached the point Dionysus reached, and would go even farther' (5.2.1). Consequently, the story has the effect hoped for by Acuphis, as Alexander grants freedom and independence to the settlers of Nysa.

*Narratees*

The primary narratees are less overt than the primary narrator. Still various signs indicating their presence are occasionally found. There are many *gar*-clauses providing the necessary background information (e.g. 1.25.8: 'For the swallow is a domestic bird, friendly to man, and more talkative than any other bird'),<sup>27</sup> some *if not*-situations (e.g. 1.22.7: 'The city came indeed came near to capture, had not Alexander sounded the retreat'),<sup>28</sup> one instance of the 'anonymous witness' device (1.2.1:

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Bosworth 1988: 101–113.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. also e.g. Arr. *An.* 3.4.1; 4.1.3; 4.2.5; 4.21.3; 5.2.6; 5.21.3; 5.29.4; 6.3.4; 6.9.5; 6.10.3; 6.12.2; 6.20.1; 7.4.5; 7.5.6; 7.15.2; 7.19.5.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Arr. *An.* 4.4.9.



‘for someone who approaches the Haemus, it is three days from the Ister’), and several instances of the ‘anonymous interlocutor’ device (e.g. 5.2.7: ‘if anyone can believe this story’).<sup>29</sup> Parenthetical remarks such as ‘as often happens in such cases’ (1.7.3) may also be seen as parts of the narrator’s interaction with his narratees.<sup>30</sup>

### *Conclusion*

The narrator of *Anabasis* is characterized as extremely self-assured, class-conscious, and even conceited. He assures his narratees that he presents the ultimate version of the Alexander story, the primacy of which is due to the unique use of superior sources as well as his own outstanding intellectual power and narrative skills. Where his presence can be felt overtly, particularly when dealing with sources and source criticism, it resembles in many respects that of the Herodotean narrator (→). On the whole, however, this narrator restricts his overt presence to few but prominent passages, which suffice to show him in perfect control of his task as an inquirer and historian.

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 1 pref. 3; 5.3.1; 5.4.2; 5.20.10.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. also Arr. *An.* 4.20.4; 6.26.1.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### APPIAN

*T. Hidber*

#### *From Alexandria to Rome*

Who I am, who have written these things, many know, and I myself have given an indication. To speak more clearly, I am Appian of Alexandria, a man who has reached the first ranks in my country, and have pleaded causes in Rome before the emperors, until they deemed me worthy to be procurator. And if anyone has a great desire to learn all the rest about me, there is a treatise by me on that subject too. (praef. 15.62)<sup>1</sup>

At the very end of the preface to Appian's *Roman History* the narrator unveils his own personality and presents himself as a provincial, a native of Alexandria, with a distinguished career that has led him from Egypt to Rome and there into the wider surroundings of the centre of imperial power. But at the same time he claims to be well known anyway, and—perhaps a singular case in ancient historiography—for further details refers to his own autobiography. Clearly, the mere existence of the latter must prove also to those who would not read it that the narrator is an eminent man of honour. However, whereas the narrator in Appian's contemporary Arrian (→), whose Roman career culminated in much higher ranks, in a unique *praeteritio* both proudly and playfully passes by the old convention, whereby name, native land, and career are mentioned, in Appian these data are still recorded.<sup>2</sup>

Although the *Roman History* deals with the history of Rome's expansion from its beginnings to the conquests made by Trajan, i.e. with

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<sup>1</sup> Translation by Marincola 1997: 145.

<sup>2</sup> The similarity of the formulation in Arrian (1.12.5: 'And as to who I am that I make this judgment in my favour, I do not inscribe my name, for it is not at all unknown to men, nor what my native land is, nor my family, nor if I have held any office in my own land; but this I do inscribe, that my native land, family, and offices are this work and have been even from my youth') suggests a relationship between the two passages, though it is still debated as to which is prior; cf. Moles 1985: 168; Gowing 1992: 10; and Marincola 1997: 274.

non-contemporary history, the narrator's personal experience acquired during his professional career in Rome and based on his social standing is shown to be not irrelevant to the subject chosen:

Possessing the best part of the earth and sea they [sc. the Romans] have, on the whole, aimed to preserve their empire by the exercise of prudence, rather than to extend their sway indefinitely over poverty-stricken and profitless tribes of barbarians, some of whom I have seen at Rome offering themselves, by their ambassadors, as its subjects, but the emperor would not accept them because they would be of no use to him. (praef. 7.26)<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the narrator, though being external, knows what he is talking about, when he recounts the story of the successful development and rule of the Roman empire. Recording exceptional details and figures concerning Egypt already in the preface (praef. 10.39–42) he also shows himself to be particularly well-informed about his native land, the integration of which into the Roman empire is presented as one of the most important stages of the Roman expansion (praef. 14.60).<sup>4</sup>

As for the narrator's motive for embarking upon his *History*, the unique greatness and importance of his subject matter is brought forward in the first place. The preface begins with an impressive panoramic survey of the peoples and nations under Roman sway, followed by an elaborate comparison with earlier hegemonies, which serves to prove that the Roman empire was the greatest so far in terms of both size and duration (praef. 1.1–10.42). The greatness of the topic, the worthiness of which is underpinned by a reference to the 'many writers' it had already attracted (praef. 12.45), reflects the enormity of the narrator's task and calls both for a new focus and a new form of presentation:

Thinking that the public would like to learn the history of the Romans in this way, I am going to write the part relating to each nation separately, omitting what happened to the others in the meantime, and taking it up in its proper place. (praef. 13.49)

The narrator claims originality with regard to his ethnographic approach and the disposition of his material by nations and theatres of action. This unusual arrangement, intended to avoid frequent changes of the geographical focus and perhaps inspired by the Herodotean

<sup>3</sup> Translation here and in the following by White 1912–1913.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also App. *BC* 1.5.21; 1.6.24–25. Unfortunately, the four books on Egypt and its becoming part of the Roman empire (18–21, still known to Photius [*Bibl. cod.* 57]) have not come down to us.

model<sup>5</sup> as well as by his own provincial outlook, is explicitly linked to the demands of the narratees. The same holds for the narrator's announcement that he will usually omit the full Roman names and 'superfluous' chronological details:

It seems superfluous to put down the dates of everything, but I shall mention those of the most important events now and then.

(praef. 13.50)

For purposes of distinction I shall sometimes mention all the names, especially of illustrious men, but for the most part I shall call these and others by the names that are deemed most characteristic.

(praef. 13.52)

In the preface, then, the narrator presents himself as the sovereign organizer of his comprehensive *Roman History*. At the same time, he calls attention to his role as commentator of the deeds he recounts and provides a general interpretative framework for the successful Roman expansion:

Through good counsel and good fortune has the empire of the Romans attained to greatness and duration; in gaining which they have excelled all others in bravery, patience, and hard labour.

(praef. 11.43)

Neither famine, nor frequently recurring plague, nor sedition, nor all these falling upon them at once could abate their ardour; until, through the doubtful struggles and dangers of seven hundred years, they achieved their present greatness, and won prosperity as the reward of good counsel.

(praef. 11.44)

It is the narrator's expressed aim to demonstrate the impact of the Roman expansion in each region and to compare in each case the qualities of the conquerors with those of the conquered nations and, thus, to explain their achievements:

I have made this research also in respect to each of the other provinces, desiring to learn the Romans' relations to each, in order to understand the weakness of these nations or their power of endurance, as well as the bravery or good fortune of their conquerors or any other circumstance contributing to the result.

(praef. 12.48)

The history of the Roman expansion is presented here as a unique success story, made possible by prudence, bravery, endurance, and other virtues of the Romans on the one hand, and good fortune on the other.

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<sup>5</sup> Brodersen 1993: 358. But Ephorus, Polybius, and Pompeius Trogus may well have been sources of inspiration, too; Leidl 1996: 67.

In this view, the narrator's own (Antonine) time is regarded as the culmination of prosperity, peace, and security:

From the advent of the emperors to the present time is nearly two hundred years more, in the course of which the city has been greatly embellished, its revenue much increased, and in the long reign of peace and security everything has moved towards a lasting prosperity.  
(*praef.* 7.24)<sup>6</sup>

*Explicit narratorial interventions*

After the preface the narrator's presence is felt with varying intensity. Whereas some stretches of narrative—such as reports of military campaigns, sieges, and battles—are virtually devoid of explicit narratorial interventions, the narrator is overtly visible in many framing passages. As in many ancient historiographical texts, mainly three types of narratorial interventions can be distinguished: the narrator as organizer, the narrator as commentator and interpreter, and the narrator as historian and inquirer.

The unusual organization of events often causes the narrator to step forward in his role as organizer of the story, explaining his arrangement and providing connecting links between the different parts of the work. Some of the most elaborate narratorial interventions of this type can be found at the beginning of books, when another theatre of action is introduced. The narrator gives a survey of the topography and briefly touches upon the prehistory in the form of a *praeteritio*, stressing that he only deals with the period and the events relevant to Roman history, e.g.:

What nations occupied it first, and who came after them, it is not my purpose to enquire closely, as I am writing only Roman history. However, I think that the Celts, passing over the Pyrenees at some former time, mingled with the natives, and that the name Celtiberia originated in that way.  
(*Hisp.* 2.5)<sup>7</sup>

The most extensive preface introduces the five books of the *Civil Wars*.<sup>8</sup> An outline of the civil conflicts recorded in these books is given and the organization of the historical material in this part of the work is

<sup>6</sup> Cf. also App. *praef.* 11.44.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. also App. *Ill.* 1 (1)–6 (16); 2.4; *Hann.* 1 (1)–4 (13); *Pun.* 1 (1)–2 (10); *Mith.* 1 (1)–2 (3).

<sup>8</sup> App. *BC* 1.1–6.

explained. Similar prefaces, though on a smaller scale, can also be found at the outset of all the subsequent books of the *Civil Wars*.<sup>9</sup>

Due to the ethnographic rather than chronological approach there is an unusual number of cross-references pointing from one book to the other and indicating to the narratees that a certain story which could be expected to be recorded at that point and in that book, is recounted elsewhere:

What Hannibal himself and what the other Carthaginian and Roman generals after him did in Spain, I have related in the Spanish history.  
(*Hann.* 4 [13])

The details, however, of these events are related more particularly in my Egyptian history.  
(*BC* 2.90 [379])<sup>10</sup>

The cohesion of the narrative is further effected by more casual and unspecific back-references (type: 'as I have related earlier').<sup>11</sup> In a few instances, where the arrangement of the material seemed particularly problematic or a strictly ethnographical account could not be given, the narrator explicitly justifies and explains the organization chosen by him:

It is my intention here to relate this war with Viriathus, which was very harassing and difficult to the Romans, and to postpone any other events which happened in Spain at the same time.  
(*Hisp.* 63 [265])

It has been impossible to distinguish all these exploits by nations, since they were performed at the same time and were complicated with each other. Those, however, which could be separated I have arranged each by itself.  
(*Mith.* 119 [589])<sup>12</sup>

Finally, the narrator's presence as organizer is obvious in numerous (often temporal) transitional phrases providing short summaries and indications as to what is to follow, thereby linking two stories or events evolving in different places at the same time:

<sup>9</sup> Cf. App. *BC* 2.1(1); 3.1 (1); 4.1 (1-3); 5.1 (1-3).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. also App. *Hisp.* 14 (53); 14 (56); 36-37 (147); 101 (441); *Hann.* 1 (2); 4 (13); *Pun.* 2 (10); 4 (17); *Ill.* 4 (11); 6 (16); 30 (87); *Syr.* 2 (5); 51 (260); *Mith.* 11 (34); 22 (85); 64 (264); 114 (557); *BC* 1.6 (24-25); 1.55 (241); 2.17 (61); 2.18 (67); 2.90 (379); 2.92 (385); 2.154 (649); 4.1 (3); 4.16 (62); 5.10 (39); 5.65 (276).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. also e.g. App. *Hisp.* 80 (311); *Pun.* 67 (301); *Ill.* 14 (40); *Syr.* 66 (348); 67 (353); 70 (367); *Mith.* 114 (558); *BC* 1.34 (154); 1.76 (347); 1.100 (470); 2.52 (214); 2.113 (474); 2.124 (518); 2.149 (620); 2.153 (641); 4.83 (349); 5.91 (383); 5.103 (429).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. also e.g. App. *Hisp.* 66 (280); 73 (310); 76 (322); 80 (350); *Pun.* 136 (644-645); *Ill.* 9 (25); *Syr.* 52 (260); *BC* 4.57 (243); 5.145 (601-602). Cf. also Leidl 1996: 69-72.

Such was the situation of Hannibal's affairs; the Romans however ...

(*Hann.* 17 [73])

Such was the third civil strife (that of Apuleius) which succeeded those of the two Gracchi, and such the results it brought to the Romans. While they were thus occupied the so-called Social War, in which many Italian peoples were engaged, broke out.

(*BC* 1.33–34 [150])<sup>13</sup>

These structural devices on the one hand demonstrate the narrator's dexterity in handling his complex material, on the other function as signposts for the narratees.

After having established his commenting voice as early as in the preface, the narrator occasionally reappears in the narrative in the function of interpreter of the actions and events he records. In those passing remarks the narrator expresses his astonishment (*BC* 1.16 [67]: 'It is astonishing to me that they never thought of appointing a dictator in this emergency, although they had often been protected by the government of a single ruler in such times of peril'),<sup>14</sup> his reasoning (*BC* 1.97 [452]: 'This does not seem to me to be inappropriate, for one of his names was Faustus'),<sup>15</sup> or his judgment (*BC* 2.58 [241]: 'Thus did Caesar put his trust in fortune rather than in prudence').<sup>16</sup> At other places he points at divine intervention as the explanation for otherwise incomprehensible forms of behaviour (*Hann.* 12 [49]: 'But divine providence turned Hannibal away toward the Adriatic again').<sup>17</sup> Large-scale comments, however, are restricted to passages of transition, which frame stories or episodes. Explanations as to how an event or action is to be interpreted are rarely given beforehand. Much

<sup>13</sup> Cf. also e.g. *App. Hisp.* 28–29 (114); 76 (322); 82 (358); *Hann.* 17 (73); 33 (137); 47 (206); 55 (228); *Pun.* 13 (50); 24 (97); 34 (143); 74 (338); 77 (359); 97 (456); 106 (501); 131 (628); 135 (638); *Ill.* 18 (52); *Syr.* 9 (34); 21 (93); 22 (101); 28 (137); 38 (193); 45 (231); 47 (241); *Mith.* 17–18 (64); 22 (83); 28 (108); 68 (286); 75 (326); 76 (327); 86–87 (392); 107 (502); *BC* 1.27 (121); 1.32 (141); 1.33–34 (150); 1.49 (219); 1.51 (226); 1.74–75 (345); 1.94 (439); 1.96 (449); 1.107 (501); 2.4 (13); 2.15 (54); 2.44 (175); 2.48 (196); 2.95–96 (401); 3.9 (30); 3.26 (97); 3.32 (124); 3.49 (198); 3.66 (269); 3.75 (305); 3.77 (312); 3.97 (399); 4.4 (14); 4.52 (224); 5.12 (45); 5.104 (430).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. also e.g. *App. Ill.* 15 (44); *BC* 1.103 (481–482); *BC* 2.88 (371–372).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also e.g. *App. Pun.* 66 (295); 71 (324); *Syr.* 69 (366); *Mith.* 118 (582); *BC* 1.39 (175); 1.54 (233); 1.97 (454); 1.103 (479); 1.104 (487–490); 1.115 (538); 2.88 (371–372); 2.111 (463); 5.113 (471–472).

<sup>16</sup> Cf. also e.g. *App. Hisp.* 60 (253); *Syr.* 41 (212–218); *BC* 1.104 (484); 2.7 (24).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. also e.g. *App. Hisp.* 82 (357); *Hann.* 12 (49); 40 (173); 53 (224); *Pun.* 106 (499); 122 (577–578); 132 (629); *Ill.* 5 (12); *Syr.* 28 (139); 28 (141); *BC* 1.113 (526); 2.62 (259–260); 2.63 (262); 2.67 (279); 2.71 (297–299); 2.116 (489); 4.134 (563); 5.87 (365); 5.112 (466); 5.140 (583); cf. also Goldmann 1988: 27–49.

more frequent are interpretative comments at the end of a story,<sup>18</sup> or elaborate conclusions at the end of a particular phase of the Roman expansion. In these passages evaluation is frequently achieved through comparison of the virtues of the conquering Romans with those of the conquered peoples. The endurance and qualities of the latter are paid no less tribute to than to successful Roman generals such as Pompeius or Scipio:

Such was the love of liberty and of valour which existed in this small barbarian town [sc. Numantia]. With only 8,000 fighting men before the war began, how many and what terrible reverses did they bring upon the Romans! What treatises did they make on equal terms with the Romans, which the latter would not consent to make with any other people! How often did they challenge to open battle the last general sent against them [sc. Scipio], who had invested them with an army of 60,000 men! But he showed himself more experienced in war than themselves, by refusing to join battle with wild beasts when he could reduce them by that invincible enemy, hunger. In this way alone was it possible to capture the Numantines, and in this way alone were they captured.

(*Hisp.* 97 [419–420])<sup>19</sup>

Furthermore, important leaders such as Mithridates, Sulla, Caesar or Cassius and Brutus are evaluated in quite extensive obituaries that recapitulate and judge the life and the achievements of the man in question.<sup>20</sup>

On the whole, the narrator's activity as commentator and interpreter seems more perceptible in the *Civil Wars* than in the other surviving books. This part of the work shows many commenting remarks, most of which refer to the pathology of party strife and civil war and particularly to the miseries caused by the proscriptions.<sup>21</sup> As for the latter, numerous instructive examples are recorded for the benefit of the narratees:

<sup>18</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *BC* 1.84 (379–381); 1.105 (491); 2.103 (426); 3.85 (349); 4.16 (61–64); 4.36 (154); 4.115 (479); 4.116 (488).

<sup>19</sup> Cf. also App. *Hisp.* 98 (425); *Hann.* 25 (108–110); *Syr.* 50 (251–254).

<sup>20</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *Hisp.* 75 (318–319): Viriathus; *Pun.* 106 (499–500): Masinissa; *Syr.* 63 (331–334): Seleucus; *Mith.* 112 (540–551): Mithridates; *BC* 1.17 (71–72): Gracchus; 1.20 (85): Scipio; 1.103–106 (478–500): Sulla (a general evaluation precedes the account of Sulla's death); 2.86 (363): Pompey; 2.99 (412–414): Cato Uticensis; 2.149–154 (619–649): Caesar (the most extensive obituary in the surviving books providing a detailed *synkrisis* with Alexander the Great); 4.20 (82): Cicero; 4.132–134 (553–568): Cassius and Brutus.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *BC* 1.20 [85]; 1.58 (259); 1.99 (463); 1.101 (471); 1.102 (474); 2.7 (24); 4.35 (147); 5.17 (68); 5.18 (72); 5.49 (208).



Such are examples of the extreme misfortunes that befell the proscribed. Instances where some were unexpectedly saved and at a later period raised to positions of honour are more agreeable to me to relate, and will be more useful to my readers, as showing that they should never fall into despair, but that hope will always remain to them ...

(*BC* 4.36 [149])<sup>22</sup>

In fact, the period of the civil wars is depicted as the crucial phase of Roman history leading eventually to the present happy state of which it is shown to be the antithesis:

These things took place not in an ordinary city, not in a weak and petty kingdom; but the evil deity thus shook the most powerful mistress of so many nations and of land and sea, and so brought after a long period of time the present well-ordered condition.

(*BC* 4.16 [61])<sup>23</sup>

A third, though clearly less prominent type of narratorial interventions in the *Roman History*, refers to the narrator's activity as historian and enquirer. Sources are hardly ever mentioned by name,<sup>24</sup> though anecdotal episodes and numerical data are frequently labelled as simply being taken over from other authorities ('it is said', 'I have learnt').<sup>25</sup> The veracity of such reports is, however, seldom doubted explicitly.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, a few alternative versions are noted,<sup>27</sup> and in some instances, the narrator asserts that he had been in vain looking for more or clearer evidence:

Thus much I have been able to learn concerning the early history of the Illyrians and Pannonians, and not even in the commentaries of the second Caesar, surnamed Augustus, could I find anything earlier about the Pannonians.

(*Ill.* 14 [42])

Although I have searched, I have not been able to find any clear account of what Antony wrote in reply.

(*BC* 5.21 [83])<sup>28</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Cf. App. *BC* 4.5–51 (16–224); cf. also Gowing 1992: 247–269.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also App. *BC* 1.6 (24); 4.16 (64).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. App. *Pun.* 132 (631); *BC* 2.9 (33); 2.39 (158); 3.77 (315).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *Hisp.* 13 (49); 30 (119); 56 (235); *Hann.* 3 (10); 26 (111); 31 (130); 56 (234); *Pun.* 56 (245); 131 (626); 131 (628); 136 (645); *Syr.* 10 (38); 56 (283); 56 (286); 58 (299); 64 (337); *BC* 1.20 (84); 1.22 (93); 1.61 (274); 1.65 (297); 1.104 (484); 2.8 (26); 2.25 (97); 2.39 (155); 2.60 (249); 2.62 (260); 2.64 (269); 2.71 (296); 2.77 (324); 2.91 (384); 2.102 (421); 2.102 (425); 2.104 (433); 2.109 (454); 4.20 (81); 4.112 (471); 5.8 (33); 5.59 (249); 5.100 (417); 5.116 (484); 5.132 (547).

<sup>26</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *BC* 2.82 (346); 3.84 (347).

<sup>27</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *BC* 1.20 (83–84); 2.70 (289); 2.116 (488); 3.42 (173); 3.77 (315); 4.118 (498).

<sup>28</sup> Cf. also App. *Ill.* 6 (16); 10 (29); 29 (84); 30 (86); *Mith.* 8 (24); *BC* 1.86 (391); 1.100 (467); 2.82 (345).

In one case the narrator also claims to have visited a scene of action in order to conduct his research:

He [sc. Cicero] fled in a small boat, but as he could not endure the seasickness, he landed and went to a country place of his own near Caieta, a town of Italy, which I visited to gain knowledge of this lamentable affair, and here he remained quiet. (BC 4.19 [73])

These occasional remarks, then, quite unobtrusively and incidentally show the narrator's familiarity with the tasks of historiographical enquiry.

### *Secondary narrators*

As in most historiographical works of the imperial period, secondary narrators do not play an important role in Appian's *Roman History*. The bulk of the character-text consists of speeches delivered by generals (Romans and non-Romans alike) before decisive battles, petitions brought forward or offers made by ambassadors as well as answers given by the other side, and debates on legal issues. Conflicting views are thus made plain by the opponents themselves, and the personalities of the characters speaking are highlighted by their own words. Stories, however, are only rarely inserted in such speeches. Historical examples are sometimes cited to back up an argument, or characters reflect on past events and express their own view of events that frequently are already known to the narratees.<sup>29</sup> There is one independent story told by a character: Sulla's recounting of a short parable in the people's assembly, with which 'he terrified them and thereafter ruled as he pleased' (BC 1.101 [472–473]). Otherwise, the primary narrator reserves the telling of the story to himself.

### *Narratees*

The narratees, who are never addressed in the second person, are clearly less overt than the primary narrator. But there are still quite a few traces of their presence to be found in the text such as numerous parenthetical *gar*-clauses that provide necessary background informa-

<sup>29</sup> Cf. e.g. App. *Pun.* 63 (278–282); 83 (386–392); 87 (408–412); BC 2.140–141 (581–591); 3.37 (147–151); 4.91–94 (381–395).

tion (e.g. *Hann.* 4 [15]: ‘When he came to the Alps and found no road through or over them—for they are exceedingly precipitous—...’),<sup>30</sup> occasional instances of the ‘anonymous interlocutor’ device (e.g. *Mith.* 7 [23]: ‘If anyone is eager to know the sequel ...’),<sup>31</sup> one ‘anonymous witness’ (*Hann.* 34 [142]: ‘The port of Tarentum is on the north side as one sails in from the sea ...’), some *if not*-situations (e.g. *Pun.* 91 [429]: ‘They would have been torn to pieces had they not said that they must make their first communication to the senate’),<sup>32</sup> as well as a few instances of presentation through negation (e.g. *BC* 1.11 [43]: ‘What Gracchus had in his mind in proposing the measure was not money, but men’).<sup>33</sup> More prominent and striking a feature that marks the narrator’s interaction with his narratees, however, is the abundance of short explanations inserted throughout the work. Some of them deal with questions of geography or with foreign customs, but most refer to Roman institutions, customs, titles and laws, which were introduced or invented at one point in history but are still in use in the narrator’s own days (the ‘continuance’ motif):

For among the Romans the negative veto always defeats an affirmative proposal.  
(*BC* 1.12 [48])

For it is customary among the Romans for the adopted son to take the name of the adoptive father.  
(*BC* 3.11 [38])

At this time, they say, originated the custom and system of cohorts of night watchmen still in force.  
(*BC* 5.132 [547])<sup>34</sup>

Clearly, the narratees are supposed to wish to share the narrator’s own intimate and partly first-hand knowledge of Roman institutions.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. also App. *Hisp.* 5 (18); 9 (35); 12 (44); 14 (53); 20 (77); 20 (78); 54 (229); 79 (340); 80 (349); 95 (414); *Hann.* 8 (31); 39 (165); *Pun.* 11 (45); 80 (377); 98 (463); 104 (493); 112 (530); 114 (543); 123 (584); 124 (588); 132 (630); *Ill.* 15 (43); *Syr.* 8 (30); 36 (184); 37 (190); 41 (215); 48 (248); 52 (261); *Mith.* 4 (11); 12 (41); 20 (78); *BC* 1.15 (66); 1.57 (251); 1.70 (323); 1.74 (342); 1.86 (389); 1.91 (421); 1.114 (533); 1.115 (534); 1.116 (541); 2.11 (37); 2.31 (123); 2.52 (213); 2.68 (280); 2.82 (345); 2.112 (469); 2.123 (516); 2.128 (535); 2.143 (599); 3.7 (23); 3.10 (35); 3.42 (173); 3.46 (188); 3.46 (189); 3.74 (302); 4.19 (74); 4.128 (536); 5.9 (37); 5.37 (154); 5.79 (334); 5.83 (352); 5.127 (525).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. also App. *Pun.* 124 (589);

<sup>32</sup> Cf. also e.g. App. *BC* 2.64 (268).

<sup>33</sup> Cf. also e.g. App. *Pun.* 124 (588); *BC* 1.104 (488)

<sup>34</sup> Cf. also e.g. App. *Hisp.* 1 (1–4); 12 (47); 75 (319); *Pun.* 71 (323); *BC* 1.38 (173); 1.103 (479); 2.2 (55); 2.7 (25); 2.39 (157); 2.44 (177); 2.61 (256); 2.85 (359); 2.86 (362); 2.96 (402); 2.116 (488); 2.120 (505–506); 2.148 (618); 3.43 (178); 3.94 (389–391); 4.7 (27); 5.97 (403); cf. also Goldmann 1988: 85–115; Van der Leest 1989.

*Conclusion*

The Appianic narrator is characterized by his presence as a distinct personality: a proud citizen of Alexandria, living and working in Rome, who presents himself as a mediator between centre and periphery, and as an official who is in the position to explain 'Rome' and her successful rise to those in the provinces. The narrator also appears quite overtly as an investigator, a commentator (particularly in the books on the civil wars), and most prominently as an organizer of information. The latter, of course, is due to the quite unusual ethnographic disposition of the material the narrator so proudly introduces as the achievement most distinctively of his own.



## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### CASSIUS DIO

*T. Hidber*

#### *A historian by vocation*

The *Roman History*, encompassing the whole period from the mythical origins of the city up to the reign of Alexander Severus, i.e. a span of about 1,000 years, and comprising 80 books was a truly monumental work<sup>1</sup> and an outstanding achievement. Indeed, its proud narrator is showing much concern that its greatness is duly acknowledged by the narratees. In an excursus, preserved in Xiphilinus' *Epitome*, he explains in detail how he came to write such a large-scale work. After his first work, 'a little book about the dreams and portents which gave Severus reason to hope for the imperial power', had met with a favourable response from the emperor, 'divine power' (*to daimonion*) commanded him in his dreams to write a treatise on the period from the death of Commodus probably down to the accession of Septimius Severus.<sup>2</sup> As this first historical work also won 'high approval' 'not only from the others, but, in particular, from Severus himself', he felt the desire 'to compile a record of everything else that concerned the Romans'.<sup>3</sup> And even after Severus' death, the late emperor, the narrator says, appeared to him in a dream encouraging him to continue his history

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<sup>1</sup> Obviously, this was too voluminous a work to survive entirely: The original text is preserved only in books 36–55, in substantial fragments of books 56–60, and in a fragmentary section of books 79(78)–80(79). However, at least the outlines and the structure of the first quarter of the work can be deduced from books 7–9 of John Zonaras' *Epitome of Histories*, whereas the last quarter can be reconstructed from the *Epitome* made of books 36–80 by the monk John Xiphilinus in the second half of the eleventh century; cf. Millar 1964: 1–4.

<sup>2</sup> D.C. 74(73).23.1–2 (Xiph.); translation (here and in the following) taken from Cary 1914–1927. On these two, now lost, minor works—both of which had certainly encomiastical undertones—cf. Schmidt 1997: 2605–2618.

<sup>3</sup> D.C. 74 (73).23.3 (Xiph.).

beyond the end of Severus' reign, 'Come here, Dio. Draw near, that you may both learn accurately and write an account of all that is said and done' (79[78].10.1 [Xiph.]).

But ultimately, it was, the narrator claims, divine power again that gave him the strength to fulfil this huge task:

This goddess (Fortune—*Tuchē*) gives me strength to continue my history when I become timid and disposed to shrink from it; when I grow weary and would resign the task, she wins me back by sending dreams; she inspires me with fair hopes that future time will permit my history to survive and never dim its lustre; she, it seems, has fallen to my lot as guardian of the course of my life, and therefore I have dedicated myself to her.  
(74[73].23.4 [Xiph.])

And in the end, divine inspiration also indicated to the historian in a dream at which point and with which Homeric words he should finish the *History*:

I set out for home, with the intention of spending all the rest of my life in my native land, as, indeed Heavenly Power (*to daimonion*) revealed to me ... For once in a dream I thought I was commanded by it to write at the close of my work these verses:

'Hector anon did Zeus lead forth out of the range of the missiles,  
Out of the dust and the slaying of men and the uproar.'  
(80.5.3 [Xiph.])<sup>4</sup>

Applause from those in power and divine inspiration were not normally considered as legitimate motives for writing history. Whereas the former seemed too closely related to panegyric writing and hardly compatible with historiographical impartiality, the latter was usually a privilege reserved for poets.<sup>5</sup> The Dionic narrator's reference to these incentives, generally regarded as problematic, is remarkable indeed and there are only very few parallels to this kind of call to history.<sup>6</sup> Although, unlike in poetry, divine power is not presented as a source of knowledge or truth but only as a source of hopes and encouragement for the historian to pursue his task, the *Roman History* is still claimed to be sanctioned, as it were, by divine will and, ultimately, to be a work of such a scope that it could not have been completed, if its narrator's

<sup>4</sup> Hom. *Il.* 11.163–164.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. e.g. Luc. *Hist. conscr.* 14; 42.

<sup>6</sup> The only parallel seems to be the statement of the narrator in Arrian's *Anabasis*, that he embarked on his work 'not without god's help' (*Anab.* 7.30.3). Cf. Schmidt 1999: 99–101. For dreams as motives cf. Marincola 1997: 43–51.

confidence had not been strengthened by supernatural powers. In fact, the narrator asserts that he ‘spent ten years in collecting all the achievements of the Romans from the beginning down to the death of Severus, and twelve years more in composing the work’, thereby demonstrating the seriousness of his task.<sup>7</sup> The narrator, thus, appears as a man who was not only guided by divine motivation, but was also well equipped with the intellectual ability necessary to accomplish so much research and writing. Indeed, his great efforts to find out the truth by gathering and examining as much evidence as possible is especially stressed in the case of the imperial period, for which reliable information was particularly hard to find.<sup>8</sup>

Another motive comes into prominence as the narrative reaches Dio’s own lifetime, and the narrator, who so far had been external, turns internal, now often figuring in the world of the narrated events either as an eyewitness or even as an active participant. For this period (from the reign of Commodus, viz. from book 73[72]), the narrator asserts that he was, in fact, better suited for this task than anyone else, given both his writing skills and his privileged access to information as a distinguished senator close to the centre of power. After a detailed report of Commodus’ performances in the arena, he therefore announces a more specific account of the events of his lifetime:

And let no one feel that I am sullyng the dignity of history by recording such occurrences. On most accounts, to be sure, I should not have mentioned this exhibition; but since it was given by the emperor himself, and since I was present myself and took part in everything seen, heard and spoken, I have thought proper to suppress none of the details, but to hand them down, trivial as they are, to the memory of those who shall live hereafter, just like any events of the greatest weight and importance. And, indeed, all the other events that took place in my lifetime I shall describe with more exactness and detail than earlier occurrences, for the reason that I was present when they happened and know no one else, among those who have any ability at writing a worthy record of events, who has so accurate a knowledge of them as I.

(73[72].18.3–4 [Xiph.])

This very self-confident claim is underpinned by the remarkable abundance of information about the historian’s living-conditions and par-

<sup>7</sup> D.C. 74(73).23.5 (Xiph.). In Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities* the narrator also asserts that he spent 22 years working on his history (*Ant. Rom.* 1.7.2); Marincola 1997: 151–152.

<sup>8</sup> D.C. 53.19.1–6.



ticularly his senatorial career, which is why ‘we have for Dio a more valuable record of personal experience than for any other ancient historian’.<sup>9</sup>

The personality of the narrator is therefore that of a well-educated senator, governor and consul, who has dedicated much of his life to his historical work, writing from an exceptionally privileged point of view, and being constantly guided by divine power. Such a figure is clearly designed to inspire confidence. At the same time it is made clear that, where the contemporary part of the *History* is concerned, the narrator’s mere presence at particular events is reason enough for their detailed record, since he claims to be the only man who has both the knowledge and the ability to hand them down to posterity.<sup>10</sup> In this view, later generations are wholly dependent on this record for their information on the period in which Dio lived. The narrator’s extraordinary identification of himself with history is most obvious at the very end of the work, which is not determined by any important historical break, but by Dio’s own retirement from political life. The narrative must come to a close, when the narrator is removed from the ‘battlefield’ of his life as a Roman official near to the centre of power.

### *Explicit narratorial interventions*

The narrator of the *Roman History* is quite overtly present and, on the whole, certainly much more intrusive than, for example, the narrator in Herodian’s *History*, published only two decades or so later. In this

<sup>9</sup> Millar 1964: 7; cf. D.C. 49.36.4; 69.1.3 [Xiph.]; 72.7.2 [Xiph.] (father’s career); 73(72).4.2 [Xiph.] (stay in Rome); 74(73).12.2 [Xiph.] (*praetor*); 75(74).11.2 [Xiph.] (Priscus, a fellow-countryman); 76(75).4.3 [Xiph.] (a friend of the consul’s of AD 196); 76(75).15.3 [Xiph.] (native from Nicaea); 76(75).16.2–4 [Xiph.] (member of Severus’ *consilium*); 77(76).16.4 [Xiph.] (3,000 indictments for adultery in the year of his consulate); 79(78).8.4 [Xiph.] (member of Caracalla’s *consilium*); 80(79).7.4 [Xiph.] (*curator* in Pergamum and Smyrna); 80(80).1.2 [Xiph.] (*proconsul Africae*); 49.36.4; 80(80).4.2 [Xiph.] (*legatus* of Dalmatia and Pannonia Superior); 43.46.6; 80(80).2.1 [Xiph.]; 80(80).5.1 [Xiph.] (*consul ordinarius*); 80(80).5.2f. [Xiph.] (visits to Severus Alexander in Campania and Rome, return to Bithynia).

<sup>10</sup> The narrator’s presence at or participation in events he recounts is stressed in 48.50.4; 73(72).4.2 [Xiph.]; 73(72).7.1f. [Xiph.]; 73(72).18.3f. [Xiph.]; 73(72).21.1–3 [Xiph.]; 74(73).12.2–5 [Xiph.]; 74(73).14.5 [Xiph.]; 74(73).17.4 [Xiph.]; 75(74).2.1 [Xiph.]; 75(74).4.1–5.5 [Xiph.]; 75(74).14.4f. [Xiph.]; 76(75).4.3–7 [Xiph.]; 77(76).1.2 [Xiph.]; 77(76).8.3 [Xiph.]; 78(77).9.6f. [Exc. Val. / Xiph.]; 79(78).3.3 [Xiph.]; 79(78).8.4 [Xiph.]; 79(78).37.5.

respect, Dio seems actually closer to Herodotus (→) than to Thucydides, whose imitator he is generally said to be.<sup>11</sup> However, the narrator's presence is not felt with equal intensity in all parts of the work. Narratorial interventions are particularly frequent in passages dealing with crucial phases of Roman history, such as the transition from the republic to the principate, and in the last books, when he becomes an internal narrator. The following survey of different types of explicit narratorial interventions will focus on books 36–60, which preserve Dio's original text.

Frequently, the narrator calls attention to his role as organizer and narrator of the history. Stretches of narrative as well as digressions are quite regularly introduced by a narratorial intervention (often in the first person, and at places providing evaluations of the events that are going to be narrated):

I will give an account of the so-called camelopard, because it was then introduced into Rome by Caesar for the first time and exhibited to all.  
(43.23.1)

I shall now relate in detail also such of his acts as call for mention, together with the names of the consuls under whom they were performed.  
(53.22.1)<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, narrative stretches (stories, digressions, or the accounts of a whole year) are frequently closed with a short summarizing remark (43.23.1: 'Such was the end of this war'; 48.4.1: 'This was what took place then; in the following year ...'),<sup>13</sup> and the report of the death of an important figure is often followed by an obituary including an

<sup>11</sup> For Dio as an imitator of Thucydides cf. Schmidt 1999: 93, n. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. also D.C. 36.20.1; 36.24.1; 36.49.1; 37.10.1–3; 37.20.3; 37.28.10; 37.29.1; 38.30.1; 38.31.1; 39.7.1; 39.12.1; 39.17.1; 39.44.1; 40.15.1; 40.21.2; 40.31.1; 40.54.3; 41.43.1; 42.10.1; 42.19.3–4; 42.34.1; 43.3.1; 43.24.4; 44.1.1–2; 44.3.1; 44.4.1; 44.11.1; 44.15.1; 44.52.1; 45.10.1; 45.12.1; 46.33.1; 46.34.5; 46.35.1–2; 47.18.1; 47.42.1; 48.13.1; 48.39.1; 48.45.8; 48.49.5; 48.50.4; 49.19.1; 49.30.1; 50.1.2; 50.2.2; 50.4; 51.16.2; 53.21.1–2; 54.26.3; 55.24.1; 56.18.1.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. also D.C. 36.16.3; 37.6.1; 37.9.1; 37.16.5; 37.20.1; 37.22.4; 37.47.1; 37.51.3; 37.57.3; 37.58.1; 38.7.3; 38.14.1; 38.34.1; 39.1.1; 39.29.1; 39.29.1; 39.46.4; 39.56.1; 40.1.1; 40.6.3; 40.11.1; 40.14.1; 40.16.1; 40.30.1; 40.57.1; 41.1.1; 41.3.3; 41.46.1; 41.58.1; 41.59.3; 42.1.1; 42.26.1; 42.27.1; 42.29.1; 42.34.1; 42.44.1; 42.55.4; 43.38.4; 43.46.1; 43.49.1; 44.1.1; 44.35.1; 44.52.1; 44.53.1; 45.10.1; 46.35.1; 46.46.6; 47.11.1; 47.12.1; 47.14.1; 47.15.1; 47.19.4; 48.1.1; 48.4.1; 48.31.1; 48.23.5; 48.34.1; 48.43.1; 48.46.1; 48.51.5; 49.16.1; 49.19.1; 49.23.1; 49.24.1; 49.31.1; 49.33.1; 50.1.1; 50.8.1; 51.1.1; 51.11.1; 51.16.3; 52.41.3; 53.1.1; 53.1.6; 53.13.1; 53.17.1; 53.22.1; 53.22.5; 53.29.1; 53.33.1; 54.5.1; 54.9.1; 54.12.1; 54.30.1; 55.1.1; 55.3.2; 55.9.1; 56.16.4; 56.47.1–2; 57.1.1.

explicit evaluation of that person's life and deeds. Such closing remarks frequently highlight the paradigmatic quality of what has been narrated by referring to (rather commonplace) universal truths, such as the instability of fortune:

Such was the end of Pompey the Great, whereby was proved once more the weakness and the strange fortune of the human race. (42.5.1)<sup>14</sup>

The transition from the late republic to principate is particularly marked as an important caesura by an explicit closing statement, later followed by a positive evaluation of this development:

Such were the achievements of the Romans and such their sufferings under the kingship, under the republic, and under the dominion of a few, during a period of seven hundred and twenty-five years. After this they reverted to what was, strictly speaking, a monarchy ... (52.1.1)

In this way the government was changed at that time for the better and in the interest of greater security; for it was no doubt quite impossible for the people to be saved under a republic. (53.19.1)

Some stories or reports are introduced or closed with the narratorial remark that these events had, in fact, been announced preliminarily by certain prodigies. Such comments imply that the course of history is in one way or other determined by supernatural powers:

And of this, I think, the sea-monster had given them full warning beforehand. (37.10.2)

All the inhabitants who resisted for a time were finally subdued, as indeed, Heaven very clearly indicated to them beforehand. For it rained not only water where no drop had ever fallen previously, but also blood ... (51.17.4)<sup>15</sup>

The narrator also intervenes regularly in order to make casual and unspecific cross-references to what has been narrated earlier ('as I said before')<sup>16</sup> or, though much less frequently, to what is to be recounted

<sup>14</sup> Cf. also D.C. 42.5.1–7; 42.16.1; 51.15.1–4; 54.29; 55.7; 55.7; 56.43.4–56.45.3; 57.14.1; 63.15.1–2; 72.34.2–36.4.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also e.g. D.C. 37.58.2–3; 40.47.3; 44.4.4; 45.17.4–5; 46.33.1–46.34.1; 47.1.2–3; 47.40.2; 48.14.6; 48.43.4–6; 50.8.4–6; 53.33.5; 55.1.5; 67.16.1 [Xiph.]; 79(78).30.1.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 36.13.1; 36.21.1; 37.22.1; 37.52.3; 38.7.1; 38.9.4; 38.13.3; 39.63.5; 40.66.1; 41.14.5; 41.17.3; 41.49.1; 41.60.4; 42.3.1; 42.23.2; 42.50.2; 42.56.2; 43.13.3; 43.20.1; 43.33.2; 43.44.1; 44.13.1; 46.55.5; 47.20.1; 48.14.1; 48.20.3; 48.21.1; 48.22.2; 48.22.3; 48.45.8; 49.3.3; 49.8.2; 49.44.3; 51.23.2; 52.13.2; 52.41.3; 53.13.2; 53.14.6; 53.15.2; 53.20.1; 53.25.2; 54.16.7; 55.5.1.

later on ('as the progress of the narrative will show').<sup>17</sup> Similar interventions mark changes of scene (e.g. 37.47.1: 'while this was the course of affairs in the city, the Allobroges were devastating Gallia Narbonensis'),<sup>18</sup> and make plain chronological deviations from the annalistic scheme:

But these things were done later. At the time he sent a part of the fleet in pursuit of Antony and Cleopatra. (51.1.4)

Now that I have once been led into giving an account of the legions, I shall speak of the other legions also which exist today ... my purpose being that, if one desires to learn about them, the statement of all the facts in a single portion of my book may provide him easily with the information. (55.24.1)<sup>19</sup>

Another frequent type of narratorial intervention refers to the narrator's investigating activity as a historian: in an attitude known from Herodotus (→) the narrator often confesses that he does not know the reasons for a particular deed or how something came to be,<sup>20</sup> refers to alternative versions,<sup>21</sup> or stresses that he simply records what he has heard or read, thereby shifting the responsibility for those reports to his (almost always unnamed) sources.<sup>22</sup> Arriving at the time of the principate beginning with Augustus—a time, in which 'things that happened were kept secret and concealed, and even though some things are perchance made public they are distrusted just because they can not be verified' (53.19.3)—he sets out his method of investigation in some detail:

Hence in my own narrative of later events, so far as they need to be mentioned, everything that I shall say will be in accordance with the reports that have been given out, whether it be really the truth or otherwise. In addition to these reports, however, my own opinion will be given, as far as possible, whenever I have been able, from the abundant

<sup>17</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 53.12.8; 53.29.3; 54.9.1; 74(73).6.3 [Xiph.].

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also e.g. D.C. 38.31.1; 39.6.1; 37.52.1; 39.4.1; 39.45.1; 39.54.1; 40.1.1; 40.11.1; 41.25.1; 41.40.1; 42.15.1; 42.17.1; 46.45.1; 47.31.1; 48.36.1; 48.41.7; 48.45.1; 53.29.1; 53.31.1; 54.5.1; 54.9.1; 56.11.1.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. also e.g. D.C. 37.24.1; 39.17.1; 40.42.1; 44.4.1; 45.16.1; 45.23.7; 46.4.1–2; 48.15.4; 48.16.1; 48.43.4; 48.45.4; 48.15.4; 49.14.6; 49.22.1; 49.35.1; 50.1.2; 51.1.4; 51.19.1; 53.31.1; 56.46.1; 59.15.6.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 36.11.1–2; 37.17.1; 38.13.5; 39.38.4; 43.24.4; 47.3.3; 47.24.4; 48.50.4; 49.4.1; 49.4.4; 50.12.6; 51.22.9; 53.1.2; 53.22.3–4; 54.9.9.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 39.61.1; 39.64.1; 40.27.3; 41.14.4; 41.49.2–3; 51.14.1; 54.4.2; 54.28.4.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 38.13.5; 39.38.5; 40.54.3; 42.2.5; 48.14.4; 49.25.5; 50.12.5; 51.27.2; 53.22.3–4; 54.9.9; 54.35.3–4; 57.3.3–5.

evidence which I have gathered from my reading, from hearsay, and from what I have seen, to form a judgment that differs from the common report. (53.19.6)

As for the account of plots against emperors, to follow the published versions of the affairs the narrator announces:

It is not possible, of course, for those on the outside to have certain knowledge of such matters; for whatever measures a ruler takes, either personally or through the senate, for the punishment of men for alleged plots against himself, are generally looked upon with suspicion as having been done out of spite, no matter how just such measures may be. For this reason it is my purpose to report in all such cases simply the recorded version of the affair, without busying myself with anything beyond the published account, except in perfectly patent cases, or giving a hint as to the justice or injustice of the act or as to the truth or falsity of the report. Let this explanation apply to everything that I shall write hereafter. (54.15.1–4)

This sort of narratorial comment creates the impression of transparency, as the narrator elucidates gaps, contradictions, and possible bias in the sources, which prove his trustworthiness as a scrupulous investigator and reporter.

Another and quite remarkable feature of the narratorial interventions in Dio is the narrator's constant reflection on the choices he makes. Time and again the narrator justifies why he does or does not include certain material in his *History*. He often announces that he will omit certain pieces of information as either not suitable for a historical work or as serving no purpose:

I shall omit those honours which had either been voted to some others previously ... or which, while novel and proposed now for the first time, were not confirmed by Caesar, for fear that I might become wearisome, were I to enumerate them all. This same plan I shall follow in my subsequent account, adhering the more strictly to it, as the honours proposed continually grew more numerous and absurd. Only such as had some special and extraordinary importance and were confirmed will be related. (42.19.3–4)

I need not enumerate them [i.e. the laws enacted by Augustus] all accurately one by one, but only those which have a bearing upon my history; and I shall follow this same course also in the case of later events, in order not to become wearisome by introducing all that kind of detail that even men who devote themselves to such studies do not know to a nicety. (53.21.2)<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also e.g. D.C. 47.10.1 ('I shall accordingly refrain from giving an accurate and

These and similar omissions are claimed to be made in the interest of the narratees, as otherwise the narrative would become wearisome. In this view, detailed enumerations of laws, honours, numbers, dates, actions in war or list of names are considered to be boring and not useful in a historical work. Accordingly, very often only one particularly remarkable or instructive example is provided in order to illustrate the character of a given historical figure or a whole type of events or deeds. At the same time, such statements can give the impression that the narrator has got a complete overview of history, since he seems to know much more than he actually records. They may also be read as apologies directed towards those among the narratees who would, in fact, hope to find the very detail the narrator omits on purpose.

On the other hand, the narrator frequently justifies his record of certain events or data explicitly (and sometimes at length):

This I have written by way of digression from my history, so that no one might be ignorant of the stories told about Caesar. (43.43.5)

At any rate, he [sc. Domitian] spent most of his time at the Alban Villa and did many absurd things, one of them being to impale flies on a stylus. Unworthy as this incident is of the dignity of history, yet, because it shows his character so well and particularly because he still continued the practice after he became emperor, I have felt obliged to record it.

(65.9.4 [Xiph.])<sup>24</sup>

Such narratorial interventions normally serve to justify the inclusion of anecdotal material or digressions, which do not seem to bear any relevance to history at first sight. Again, then, the material is claimed to be selected according to the benefit of the addressees: digressions record what is of general interest, whereas anecdotes can be particularly instructive regarding either the general conditions of human life or the character and behaviour of a particular historical figure.

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detailed description of all such incidents, since this would be a vast undertaking and there would be no great gain to my history, but shall relate what I regard as most worthy of remembrance"); 48.13.1 ("The most of these operations, especially those involving no great or memorable achievement, I will pass over, but will relate briefly the points which are most worthy of mention"); 37.17.4; 38.7.8; 41.2.2; 43.14.7; 43.22.4; 43.24.2; 43.25.1; 43.46.1; 43.46.6; 44.14.3; 47.13.1; 48.13.1; 51.16.2; 51.19.3; 51.20.3; 54.23.2; 54.23.8; 55.3.2; 55.9.1; 55.28.2f.; 59.22.5; 60.11.6.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. also e.g. D.C. 37.10.1; 37.18.3; 38.13.3; 39.17.1; 40.15.1; 45.16.1; 46.35.1; 51.1.1; 53.12.8; 54.19.4; 54.23.1; 57.24.6; 60.26.5; 62.27.3.

*A partially omnipresent and omniscient narrator*

Although, as we have seen, the narrator shows himself remarkably concerned about the availability of evidence, he does not abstain from recording such intimate scenes as a private encounter between Cicero and Philiscus in Macedonia (38.18.1–29.4), a constitutional debate between Agrippa and Maecenas, witnessed only by Augustus himself (52.2.1–41.1), or even a lengthy bedroom-talk between Augustus and Livia (55.14.2–21.4). Obviously, the narrator's omnipresence and omniscience in these and similar instances serve as means to present an in-depth discussion of topics of a wider bearing, such as the right behaviour of an exile, the ideal constitution, or the loneliness of the monarch. In other instances, the narrator also has access to the thoughts, feelings, and even dreams of his characters by means of embedded focalization (e.g. 45.2.2–3: Cicero and Catullus dreaming of Octavius) and thus can make clear the hidden motives of these characters.

*Narratees*

The large amount of narratorial interventions indicates the narrator's interaction with his narratees, even though he never directly addresses them in the second person. There are also numerous other traces of the narratees: instances of the 'anonymous interlocutor' motif (e.g. 47.39.1: 'One would naturally surmise that this struggle proved tremendous and surpassed all previous civil conflicts of the Romans'),<sup>25</sup> *if not*-situations,<sup>26</sup> rhetorical questions,<sup>27</sup> or *gar*-clauses anticipating questions by the narratees which either provide the necessary background information or explain a given detail by referring to 'universal truths', often presented in the form of a *gnome*.<sup>28</sup> However, it is hardly possible to detect a coher-

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also e.g. D.C. 36.16.1; 41.4.3; 41.63.6; 47.17.2; 47.39.1; 50.33.8.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 36.45.5; 36.49.7; 37.16.1; 39.65.2; 40.24.1; 42.26.3; 42.35.3; 43.2.2; 46.40.4; 46.37.5; 54.33.2.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 42.27.4; 47.13.2; 51.4.8; 53.22.4.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 36.24.3; 37.33.1; 38.12.5; 38.16.6; 39.27.3; 39.35.1; 39.58.1; 39.63.6; 40.23.4; 40.61.3; 41.17.2; 41.53.3; 42.1.4; 42.3.3; 42.34.6; 42.40.4; 43.8.1; 43.27.3; 44.51.1; 44.53.4; 45.4.2; 46.34.2; 46.43.3; 46.43.6; 47.29.5; 47.30.4; 48.3.2; 48.16.2; 48.38.2; 48.53.4; 49.21.3; 49.22.4; 49.32.1; 49.44.3; 51.26.3; 53.10.3; 53.15.3; 53.22.2; 54.10.1; 54.10.3; 55.2.1.

ent picture of the narratees. Indeed, a fragment from the first book preserves a statement indicating that the *History* is intended to provide information for a broad audience:

It is my desire to write a history of all the memorable achievements of the Romans, as well in time of peace as in war, so that no one, whether Roman or non-Roman, shall look in vain for any of the essential facts.  
(F 1.1 B p. 12)

The numerous statements explaining why some particular piece of information is or is not recorded, might also be seen as part of a strategy to take into account diverging expectations among the audience as to what was to be included in a historiographical work. Thus, it would be wrong to infer from the regular use of the *we*-form in the records of Dio's experiences as a senator (or even as consul)<sup>29</sup> as well as from his judgment of the emperors depending on the rulers' attitude toward the senators,<sup>30</sup> that fellow-senators were addressed in the first place. As we have seen, it is also made clear that he hopes that his work will be read by future generations too(73[72].18.3 [Xiph.]).

There is an unusual and striking amount of passages pointing to the time of narration (more than fifty in the preserved books alone), such as:

... the festival which they celebrate even now around the altar of Augustus at Lugdunum.  
(54.32.1)

He [sc. Augustus] had the names of all the senators entered on a tablet and posted; and this practice, originating with him, is still observed each year.  
(55.3.3)<sup>31</sup>

Most of these references are designed to explain Roman customs and institutions, or the origin of buildings still in use or extant in the narrator's own day, and thus they further the understanding of many particular aspects of the Roman Empire for a contemporary audience that has got less access to the relevant information in question. However, these

<sup>29</sup> Cf. e.g. D.C. 43.46.6; 74(73).14.5 [Xiph.]; 74(73).17.4 [Xiph.]; 75(74).2.1 [Xiph.]; 75(74).4.6 [Xiph.]; 77(76).1.2 [Xiph.]; 78(77).9.6–7 [Exc. Val./Xiph.]; 79(78).37.5 [Xiph.].

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Gowing 1992: 25–28; Hose 1994: 406–417.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. also D.C. 36.6.2; 36.11.1; 36.20.1; 36.50.3; 37.15.1; 37.18.1; 37.20.2; 37.28.3; 37.46.4; 39.41.1; 39.49.2; 39.50.5; 40.14.4; 40.54.2; 41.49.2; 41.61.4; 43.44.4; 43.46.6; 43.49.1; 43.51.3; 46.46.3–4; 46.50.5; 47.18.3; 47.49.2; 48.35.3; 48.49.5; 49.14.5; 49.37.3; 50.12.8; 51.17.3; 51.20.8; 51.27.3; 52.42.6; 52.43.2; 53.12.8; 53.16.3; 53.17.7; 53.18.4; 53.20.4; 54.18.2; 54.23.8; 54.25.2; 54.34.2; 55.2.6; 55.3.2; 55.8.7; 55.17.7; 55.22.4; 55.23.2; 55.24.1; 55.26.5; 55.27.6; 57.8.4; 57.9.3; 60.7.4; 60.11.5.



explanations can also be seen as having particular importance with a view to future narratees, since they are based on the narrator's own authority as an eyewitness and contemporary. In fact, taken together, these references create a sort of encyclopedia.<sup>32</sup>

It is implied that the narratees have a genuine interest in the history of Rome and the Roman Empire, which occasionally (though not constantly and not following a perceivable pattern) is depicted as 'ours'<sup>33</sup> and, therefore, as the narrator's and—at least to some extent—the narratees' own world.

### *Secondary narrators*

The large amount of character-text and the extraordinary length of some of the speeches and dialogue-scenes have struck many readers. However, characters normally do not tell stories, but only make announcements, exhort or condemn, raise hopes or fears, or discuss issues of a wider impact. Occasionally, though, they insert pieces of narrative in their argumentation. Thus, Pompey, aspiring to the command against the pirates, reminds people of his deeds (36.25.1–3), Caesar, trying to incite his officers, refers to the great *exempla* of the forefathers (38.37.5–38.38.4), or Cicero, trying to convince the Senate to take measures against Antony, enumerates his enemy's outrages (45.26–32).

### *Conclusion*

On the whole, the *Roman History* is clearly dominated by its overt and intrusive primary narrator, who presents himself as a circumspect, trustworthy, and well-informed guide to a historical work of monumental proportions. His presence and self-confidence can at one point be felt even in the words of one of his characters. It is the philosopher Philiscus, who seems to be speaking as a narratorial *alter ego* when he

<sup>32</sup> Cf. also D.C. 55.24.1.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. D.C. F 1.1 [B p. 12] ('I will begin at the point where I have obtained the clearest accounts of what is reported to have taken place in this land which we inhabit'). However, whereas it is e.g. said that 'Nisibis ... now belongs to us' (36.6.2), the Arabians are stated to be 'now subjects of the Romans' (37.15.1).

gives advice to Cicero and recommends historiographical writing as a most noble, worthy, and rewarding activity for a former consul and renowned intellectual:

For if you will take my advice, you will be quite satisfied to pick out a little estate in some retired spot on the coast and there carry on at the same time farming and some historical writing, like Xenophon and like Thucydides. This form of learning is most enduring to every man and to every state ... If, then, you wish to become really immortal, like those historians, emulate them. You have the necessary means in sufficiency and you lack no distinction. For if there is any virtue in such honours, you have been consul ...

(38.28.1–3)



## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### HERODIAN

*T. Hidber*

#### *An elusive persona*

Little is known about Herodian, the man who has left no other traces of his life but his *History of the Empire after Marcus*, which deals in eight books with the imperial history from the death of M. Aurelius in AD 180 to the accession to the throne of Gordian III in AD 238. So little in fact, that by some he is even called a ‘mystery’.<sup>1</sup> This is mostly due to the extraordinarily vague way the narrator of the *History* presents himself, as he hardly conveys any personal information regarding himself. Although he establishes his voice in a proem at the outset of the work, he does not reveal his name (though his *cognomen* Herodian was certainly mentioned in the title), nor his country of origin, nor his social standing, nor the place, nor the time nor any other circumstances of the composition of his work. What is stressed, however, is the (partially) internal status of the narrator:

I have written a history of the events following the death of Marcus which I saw and heard in my lifetime. I had a personal share in some of these events during my imperial and public service (1.2.5)<sup>2</sup>

The remarkable lack of biographical detail in the proem as well as in the narrative may be seen as part of a strategy to demonstrate the historian’s impartiality and authority: the narrator’s historiographical *persona* is that of a completely independent and almost anonymous civil servant, who has witnessed the events and the deeds of the emperors of his own time as an impartial observer unbiased by any local pride, personal partiality or political ambitions. The picture is created of a modest Greek, who has spent at least part of his professional career

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<sup>1</sup> Roques 1990: 1; cf. also Müller 1996: 9.

<sup>2</sup> Translations in this contribution all taken from Whittaker 1969–1970.

in Rome and in the west, and was therefore closer—though far less close than e.g. Cassius Dio—to the centre of power than most of the inhabitants of the Greek-speaking parts of the empire.

At the beginning of the proem this *persona* is established competitively against two groups of predecessors in the historiographical field, both of which are said to have neglected the truth. On the one hand, those historians who, dealing with the more distant past, were primarily concerned with a display of vocabulary and style, and introduced fabulous elements (*to muthōdes*) in order to please their audience, and to win permanent glory for their own learning. On the other hand, those who wrote history based on hatred or in order to flatter an emperor, a city or a private individual (1.1.1–2). None of these predecessors is mentioned by name, but readers might have guessed that Cassius Dio (→) was one of them, who had written not only a comprehensive *Roman History* from the mythical foundation of Rome to his own days, but also two panegyrically flavoured treatises on the events before the accession of Septimius Severus. The Herodianic narrator emphasizes that, in contrast to these predecessors, he is not seeking any personal benefit, but only aims at sharing with his readers the knowledge he has carefully acquired and compiled. It is the significance of the events themselves, compressed into a short time, their astonishing peculiarity and newness (particularly the quick succession of rulers and the reigns of some very young emperors) that have called him to history (1.1.3–6). The argumentation, the formulation, and the tone of the first part of the proem are clearly influenced by Thucydides' famous digression on method (1.21–22). This suggests to the narratees that the work at hand belongs to the historiographical subgenre of contemporary history normally regarded as most trustworthy, because particularly reliable methods such as autopsy and eyewitness-accounts could be used. Thus, the decision to present contemporary history could also be seen as reflecting the narrator's sincere and truthful character. At the same time, he could derive authority from the alignment with Thucydides, who was almost generally acknowledged to have matched the highest historiographical standards of truthfulness.<sup>3</sup>

Apart from the proem (1.1.1–1.2.5), there is one other passage in which the narrator reflects at some length on his narrating activity: at the end of the second book he justifies the lack of detail in his

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. e.g. Luc. *Hist. conscr.* 38–39.

report on Septimius Severus by reminding the narratees of his choice not to write in a flattering manner about a single emperor (as the authors of panegyrical accounts of the life and deeds of an emperor used to), but on the reigns and the most important actions of many emperors he has witnessed during his lifetime (2.15.6–7). This passage almost apologetically rejects, as it were, the narratees' expectations of a panegyrical account, and again stresses the narrator's commitment to truth and to the demanding standards of contemporary history.

*Explicit narratorial interventions*

Whereas the historical author is hardly discernible behind the narrative, the primary narrator is more overtly present throughout the work. The presence of the narrator is explicit at the beginning of every book, where the narratees find a short recapitulating remark concerning the content of the preceding book, such as:

In the previous book a description was given of the death of Pertinax, the overthrow of Julianus, Severus' arrival in Rome and the departure of his expedition against Niger. (3.1.1)<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, explicit, if rather casual, references to what has been narrated earlier can be found at the end of books 3 and 7 as well as in a few other passages of the narrative.<sup>5</sup> Four passages also contain references to events the narrator claims he will relate later on in the text; two of these events, however, are not actually mentioned again in the text.<sup>6</sup> But, generally speaking, in Herodian—as in Thucydides and many other historians<sup>7</sup>—cross-referencing is accomplished by implicit parallels (such as *verbatim* repetitions) rather than by narratorial comments. The activity of the narrator is also revealed, when after a character-speech, the narrative is resumed with a formulaic statement of the type 'after about such a speech ...' (*toiauta tina eipontos autou*),<sup>8</sup> which make clear that the wording of those character-speeches is in fact the narrator's own.

<sup>4</sup> Hdn. 2.1.1; 3.1.1; 4.1.1; 5.1.1; 6.1.1; 7.1.1; 8.1.1.

<sup>5</sup> Hdn. 1.17.12; 3.7.5; 3.9.7; 7.2.1.

<sup>6</sup> The cross-references in question that are not followed-up concern details (Hdn. 4.14.2; 5.3.9), whereas the other two (1.14.6; 7.12.9) are much more unspecific.

<sup>7</sup> Gribble 1998: 64. This method goes back to Homer (→).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Hdn. 2.2.9; 2.10.9; 2.3.11; 2.8.6; 3.6.8; 3.12.3; 4.5.7; 4.14.8; 6.4.1; 7.5.7; 7.8.9;

More important is the structuring function of the narratorial voice. Herodian's narrative can be seen as a series of often quite distinct episodes interlaced with character speeches, digressions, and descriptions. Whereas digressions are only rarely explicitly introduced as such (though the break in the main narrative is usually signalled by a general statement such as e.g. 3.14.6: 'Most of Britain is marshland because it is flooded by the continual ocean tide'), the beginning of a new episode in the main narrative is often highlighted by an introductory remark, and occasionally, the end of a narrative unit is marked by the narratorial voice as well. An introductory remark often looks ahead, e.g.:

At last it became imperative to check the madness of Commodus and to free the Roman empire from tyranny. (1.16.1)

But it was obviously inevitable that Antoninus' life would come to an end and this was how the event occurred. (4.12.3)<sup>9</sup>

A closing narratorial statement either simply recapitulates the immediate effect of the narrated event or additionally refers to its consequences in the future, and its broader paradigmatic quality:

This was the first and foremost reason why young Commodus hated the senate. (1.8.7)

The fact that there was nobody to take revenge on the perpetrators of this savage murder of an emperor [i.e. Pertinax] ... was a prime cause in the development of a shameful state of discipline that had permanent consequences for the future. (2.6.14)

This sort of provocation embittered Maximinus' feelings, making him even harsher and more savage than he was instinctively before. (7.1.12)<sup>10</sup>

The narratorial voice provides an interpretative framework that confirms meanings that are already implicit or explicit in the narrative itself. In addition, it regularly points out the importance of the episode for the further evolution of the events, and thus marks the stages

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8.3.7; 8.7.7. Similar phrases can also be found after reported speeches (e.g. 3.15.3; 4.3.9; 6.4.6).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. also Hdn. 1.9.6; 1.10.1; 1.12.3; 1.14.1; 2.5.1; 3.5.6; 4.9.1; 4.10.1; 4.12.3; 4.13.1; 5.3.1; 7.1.1; 7.9.1; 7.11.1.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. also Hdn. 1.13.6; 2.13.12; 3.4.7; 3.7.8; 3.9.12; 4.11.8; 5.4.12; 5.8.1; 6.1.7; 6.2.1; 6.5.10; 6.6.6; 7.1.12; 7.12.7; 8.7.8.

of the particular reigns and elucidates their line of development: the emperor's attainment of power, his position gradually becoming more and more endangered, and, finally, his losing power (and life) to his successor. Thus, on the whole, a coherent picture is created of the precarious conditions of imperial rule at the time, and patterns are shown of how power was won and (often rather fast) lost.

The obituaries that regularly close the report of the death of an emperor are not very prominent: they are short and rather formulaic (only one of them exceeding one sentence). And whereas the majority of them indeed contain an explicit comment on the qualities and flaws of the ruler (thereby repeating in an extremely abridged, and therefore often unsatisfactory way, what has been narrated before),<sup>11</sup> others simply state that this was how the emperor died after having ruled for a certain number of years.<sup>12</sup> Again, judgments of the particular reigns are given implicitly by comparisons, contrasts, and parallels, rather than by explicit narratorial statements. Of particular importance here is the short sketch of Marcus Aurelius who is introduced as a model emperor at the outset of the work (1.2–4). Thus a standard is provided enabling the narratees to measure the quality of the subsequent reigns.<sup>13</sup>

As in Thucydides (→), the primary narrator only rarely refers to alternative versions,<sup>14</sup> and hardly ever mentions specific sources at all.<sup>15</sup> This is in line with the general invisibility of the historians' *persona*: there are only few places where he critically examines the evidence.<sup>16</sup> It is this method of presentation that creates the impression of an 'objective' narrative, suspended only at a few places by vague remarks

<sup>11</sup> Hdn. 1.17.12; 2.12.7; 3.4.7; 3.7.8; 3.15.2–3; 5.4.12; 6.9.8; 7.9.10; 8.5.9; 8.8.8.

<sup>12</sup> Hdn. 2.5.9; 4.13.8; 5.8.10.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Marasco 1998: 2840–2857; Sidebottom 1998: 2803–2812; and Zimmermann 1999c: 24–41.

<sup>14</sup> The only passages are Hdn. 1.14.2; 3.2.3; 3.7.3; 4.8.4; 4.12.4; 6.6.1; 7.1.8; 7.9.4; 7.9.9; 8.3.8–9.

<sup>15</sup> The only source explicitly referred to is Septimius Severus' autobiography (2.9.4). Marcus Aurelius' speeches and writings (1.3.1) as well as histories of his reign (1.2.5) are only mentioned, but not referred to as sources. Unspecified historians of the life of Severus are mentioned in 2.15.6–7; 3.7.3; 3.7.6. Herodian's main source for books 1–5 is now by most scholars supposed to be Cassius Dio's *History*, though he is never mentioned in the text; cf. Alföldy 1989 and Zimmermann 1999c.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Hdn. 2.9.4; 3.7.6; 7.1.8. Perhaps the most notable exception is 1.11.1: 'Through my research (*historia*) I have discovered why the Romans have an especial veneration for this goddess ...' This is the only occurrence in Herodian of the word *historiē* with the Herodotean sense of 'research'.



such as ‘it is said’, which shift the responsibility for a particular report to unspecified and anonymous sources (the ‘anonymous spokesmen’ device).<sup>17</sup>

On the whole, although intrusions by the narrator are restricted to the passages of transition between single episodes and narrative units, the narratorial voice in Herodian is slightly more intrusive and overt than in Thucydides, but still much less present and intrusive than e.g. in Herodotus, Arrian or Cassius Dio.

*An omnipresent and omniscient narrator*

The Herodianic narrator is omnipresent and at times also omniscient, as he not only recounts intimate scenes, such as the final conspiracy against Commodus (1.16–2.2), or events going on in the closed quarters of the imperial palace, such as the end of Plautianus’ plot against Septimius Severus and Caracalla (3.12), but also has access to the thoughts and feelings of his characters, in the form of embedded focalization: he reports the sorrows of the old Marcus Aurelius (1.3.1–5), knows what impact the repeated conspiracies had on Commodus’ soul (1.8.7), or he can even reproduce the words Marcia spoke to herself (1.17.5).<sup>18</sup> Such signs of narratorial omnipresence and omniscience—not uncommon in ancient historiography since Herodotus (→)—have often led modern scholars to the somewhat misleading labelling of Herodian’s *History* as a (historical) novel.<sup>19</sup>

Although the narrator claims in the preface that he has written down what he had seen and heard in his lifetime, he nowhere figures in the events he recounts. However, he twice explicitly claims to have been an eyewitness of events in the city of Rome: he includes himself among the spectators of Commodus’ performances in the arena (1.15.4: ‘Wild beasts were brought from all over the world for him to kill, species which we had admired in pictures but saw for the first time on that

<sup>17</sup> Such remarks quite often occur in digressions providing antiquarian or geographical information (1.11.1–5; 1.14.4; 1.16.1; 3.4.3; 5.6.4; 6.5.2), but can also be found at places in the main narrative (2.1.6; 3.4.7; 3.7.4; 4.8.8; 6.6.9; 7.1.5; 7.1.7; 8.3.7). Cf. Whitaker 1969: LXIII.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. also Hdn. 2.8.7; 3.11.1; 3.11.8; 3.14.1; 4.13.1; 5.4.7; 5.5.5; 5.7.1; 5.8.6; 6.1.5; 6.6.1; 7.1.2; 7.8.6; 7.9.11; 8.1.5.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Alföldy 1989. This view is rejected by Hidber 1999 and Zimmermann 1999c: 7–13.

occasion') and of the Secular Games given by Septimius Severus (3.8.10: 'In his reign we saw all kinds of different shows in all the theatres at the same time ... these were the ceremonies which were called at the time the Secular Games ...').<sup>20</sup> He also reports that 'we saw some ludicrous pictures' of Caracalla portrayed as a kind of Janus made of Alexander and himself (4.8.2). A few other passages might additionally suggest to the narratees that the narrator could have been present at the events or might have visited the places he describes, e.g.:

Even when one sees the ruins of the wall [sc. of Byzantium] as they are today, one has to admire the skill of the first builders and the power of those who later destroyed it. (3.1.7)

It is not possible to describe the scenes of celebration that day after the arrival of the messengers ... (8.6.7)<sup>21</sup>

Thus, is created the picture of a widely travelled Greek and civil servant who has acquired first-hand knowledge of Rome, and of other parts of the empire during his professional career—a knowledge he now readily shares with his narratees.

### *Narratees*

The narratees are never directly addressed in the second person throughout the work. But in the proem two groups of narratees are mentioned: the narrator's contemporaries, in whose 'recent memory' the time described in the *History* falls, and a future audience which 'will derive some pleasure from the knowledge of events which are important and compressed within a brief span of time' (1.1.3). The first group of narratees guarantees, as it were, the truthfulness of the account for the second group. In fact, there is one passage in which the contemporary narratees are indirectly called to witness, 'But throughout the many years of Alexander's rule no one could recall the name of a person executed without trial' (6.1.7).

Traces of the primary narratees and of interaction between the primary narrator and them are most clearly perceptible in the digressions.

<sup>20</sup> Most scholars now seriously doubt that Herodian was actually present at Commodus' performances in AD 192. The whole passage seems to be a transformation of Cassius Dio's account; cf. Zimmermann 1999c: 285.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. also Hdn. 3.4.2; 5.3.5; 5.6.7–10; 7.7.1; 7.12.1.

There, the narrator mainly explains Roman customs and religious institutions but also provides geographic and ethnographic descriptions of other parts of the world to a Greek audience supposedly not familiar with them, e.g.:

Through my research I have discovered why the Romans have an especial veneration for this goddess, and, in view of the lack of knowledge about this among some Greeks, I have decided to record it at this point.  
(1.11.1)<sup>22</sup>

This story about the goddess of Pessinous ... contains quite interesting information for people who are unfamiliar with Roman history.  
(1.11.5)<sup>22</sup>

As in most ancient historiographical narratives, the presence of the narratees is also perceptible in passages featuring the ‘anonymous interlocutor’ device (e.g. 5.3.7: ‘Given this combination of good looks, youth and splendid dress, one could compare the young man [sc. Elagabalus] to the magnificent statues of Dionysus’), as well as in many *gar*-clauses which seem to anticipate possible questions of the narratees. In Herodian, such explanations often refer to ‘general truths’ such as ethnographic stereotypes or the allegedly typical behaviour of the members of a particular social stratum, and frequently adopt the form of sententious *gnomai*:

The product of the age of Marcus was a large number of scholars, since (*gar*) subjects always model their lives on the ideals of their ruler.  
(1.2.4)

Like a sensible person—he [sc. Saturninus] was a Syrian, and Easterners are fairly sharp-witted—he saw the madness which had taken hold of his commander [sc. Plautianus] ...  
(3.11.8)<sup>23</sup>

Other, though much less frequent features of the interaction between the narrator and the narratees include a few rhetorical questions (7.3.1: ‘What is the point in destroying barbarians, if even more people are being murdered actually in Rome and the subject nations?’),<sup>24</sup> and *if*

<sup>22</sup> Roman institutions or customs are also explained at 1.9.2; 1.10.5; 1.14.2–6; 1.15.9; 1.16.1–3; 3.8.10; 4.2.1–11; 5.4.8; 5.5.7; 5.6.2–3; 6.7.4; 7.5.8; 7.7.1; 7.10.2; 7.12.7; 8.8.5. Similar explanations of practices or peculiarities from other parts of the empire can be found e.g. in 3.2.7–8; 5.3.5–7; 5.6.4; 6.5.3; 6.7.1; 6.7.6–7; 7.2.3–6.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also Hdn. 1.3.1; 1.3.5; 1.6.9; 2.7.9; 3.1.2; 3.2.8; 3.9.3; 3.11.9; 3.14.6; 4.11.3; 4.11.9; 5.8.4; 6.5.3; 7.3.5; 7.7.1.

<sup>24</sup> Another example can be found in Hdn. 2.13.11.

*not*-situations (7.3.1: 'His [sc. Maximinus'] achievement would have won him reputation, if he had not proved so oppressive and fearsome to his own people and subjects').<sup>25</sup>

The picture drawn of the narratees is not very coherent. Basically, they are given the character of Greeks not very familiar with Rome and Roman institutions. But whereas in two passages they are supposed not to know any Latin (5.4.8; 7.5.8), another one clearly presupposes some knowledge of the Roman language (1.12.2). The narratees are also expected to be familiar with at least the more important personalities from late Republican and Imperial Roman history such as Sulla, Caesar, Pompey, Antony, Marius, Germanicus, and the former emperors referred to as *exempla* and in similes.<sup>26</sup> As for their social outlook, the narratees are assumed to share the narrator's elite stance of the rich, which in one case is revealed by the use of the 'we' form (3.9.3: 'After crossing Mesopotamia ... Severus hurried on to Arabia Felix. The name Felix comes from the fact that the country produces aromatic herbs, which we use for perfumes and incense').<sup>27</sup>

### *Secondary narrators*

Although character-text amounts to about 10 per cent of the *History*, there are hardly any secondary narrators. In their speeches, characters express hopes or warnings, and make promises and announcements, but do not tell elaborate stories. Snippets of narrative are inserted only occasionally. But when a character actually 'refers to the past or present, he or she is frequently lying, or sometimes mistaken':<sup>28</sup> Laetus tells the Praetorians that Commodus has died of apoplexy (2.2.6), Septimius Severus lies about Albinus' intentions (3.6.1–5), or Maximinus lies about the life of Gordian (7.8.7).<sup>29</sup> In these instances the primary narratees usually know more than the secondary narratees, and, thus, can easily see through the insincerity of the narratives.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also Hdn. 6.9.8.

<sup>26</sup> A list of similes is given by Sidebottom 1998: 2804 n. 151.

<sup>27</sup> Passages betraying an elite stance are collected by Sidebottom 1998: 2823.

<sup>28</sup> Sidebottom 1998: 2817.

<sup>29</sup> For more references cf. Sidebottom 1998: 2817.

*Conclusion*

In many respects Herodian's primary narrator is the counterpart of his immediate predecessor, the very overt, self-assured and class-conscious narrator in Dio Cassius' *Roman History*: whereas the Dionic narrator is keen to reveal an extraordinary amount of details of his distinguished identity, the Herodianic narrator remains very much in the shadow. And while the former's presence is very overt in his frequent interventions, 'Herodian' explicitly (though rather vaguely) refers to his methodological principles only in two passages at the outset of his work (cited above), then tells his story without stepping in very much. Thus, a coherent analysis of the quick succession of reigns seems to be presented not from a specific, individual viewpoint (such as that of a senator in Dio), but rather from a very general and seemingly unrestricted point of view.

PART THREE

CHORAL LYRIC



## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### PINDAR AND BACCHYLIDES

*I.L. Pfeiffer*

The victory ode is not a narrative genre. Unlike epic, historiography, biography, the novel and most poetry from the Hellenistic era, the main purpose of the victory ode is not to tell a story. A victory ode celebrates a victory won by an athlete. Contrary to what we may expect on the basis of our familiarity with modern sport journalism, the poet of a victory ode does not tell the story how the victory was won: a victory ode is no match report (even short descriptions of the contest do not occur; *Pi. O.* 8.67–69; *P.* 8.81–87; *B.* 5.37–49; 9.27–39, and 10.21–30 are the exceptions confirming the rule). Nor does he engage in giving a detailed report of the celebrations occasioned by the victory. His main interest is to record the factual data that define the victory celebrated (the victor's name, his father's name, his place of origin, the venue of the games, the athletic discipline and the athletic age category) and to enhance the glory of the victor by associating his accomplishment with eternal truths and values and with the exploits of heroes from the (mythical) past. But, although the victory ode as such is not a narrative genre, the majority of victory odes do include narrative sections. For in order to put the victor on a par with heroes, the poet tells stories about these heroes. Most victory odes include at least one longer or shorter narrative account of great heroic deeds. Only nine of the 45 surviving victory odes of Pindar lack such a narrative (*O.* 5; 11; 12; 14; *P.* 7; *N.* 2; 11; *I.* 2; 3); of Bacchylides' eleven victory odes (excluding the ones that are too fragmentary: 7, 8, 12, 14A, 14B) five lack a mythical narrative (2, 4, 6, 10, 14). Often, but not always, the mythical narratives occupy the central portion of the ode. Some odes have more than one narrative section. The theme of the narrative is often, but not always, connected with the victor's homeland or with the venue of the games. The length of these narrative sections varies considerably, as does, for that matter, the length of the odes themselves.



*Demarcating the narrative*

Any victory ode is a hybrid text. Apart from narrative, it may include a variety of different sections, such as direct praise of the victor, praise of his homeland, clan and family, catalogues of earlier victories won by the victor and members of his family, praise of his trainer, gnomic statements, invocations and prayers. This raises the question how we can distinguish narrative from the rest of the ode. Pindar and Bacchylides do not really help us to answer this question. They very rarely provide explicit signals marking off the narrative from its surroundings. On the contrary, their usual practice is to obscure the boundary between the narrative and what precedes it. Often they use a relative pronoun, camouflaging the narrative as a mere afterthought to what proceeded, pretending that it has got out of hand, owing to their spontaneous enthusiasm for the story. The end of the narrative is, as a rule, not formally marked either. There are two typical ways of ending a narrative: the poet either simply ends it and then plunges into a new section without any formal sign warning the audience that he is doing so, or (a procedure occurring especially in the odes of Pindar) he breaks off his narrative abruptly, pretends that it is irrelevant, and urges himself to deal with themes that are more closely relevant to the present victor.

A typical example of this procedure, presenting the narrative as a mere afterthought and rounding it off with the pretence of its being irrelevant, is the story of Heracles setting up the Pillars:

If Aristophanes' son, being beautiful and doing  
 what fits his bodily form,  
 has reached the peak of masculinity, yet to travel further  
 is not easy over the untrodden sea beyond the Pillars of Heracles,  
 which the god-hero placed as renowned witnesses  
 of the limit of seafaring. He subdued the superior beasts in the sea,  
 and, by himself, searched for the currents  
 in the shallows, by which way he arrived at his goal,  
 which send him home,  
 and he made the earth known. My heart, to what foreign  
 cape do you lead astray my voyage?  
 I tell you to bring the Muse to Aeacus and his race.  
 The highest justice follows the precept 'praise the noble'.  
 Desires for what belongs to others are not better for a man to bear.  
 Search at home. Contributory adornment you have,  
 to sing something sweet. (Pindar, *Nemean* 3.19–32)

The victor's ultimate achievement inspires a comparison with reaching the boundaries of the navigable world, the Pillars of Heracles. This reference is expanded with a relative clause (22–23),<sup>1</sup> identifying Heracles as the hero who has erected these Pillars and mentioning their symbolic significance. Then Pindar elaborates upon this relative clause, briefly telling the story of how Heracles came to erect these Pillars (23–26). In line 26 he breaks off this story abruptly by intruding into his own narrative and telling himself that he has let things get out of hand: he should not have told the story of the Theban hero Heracles sailing to the cape of Gibraltar; he should rather tell a story from the mythical arsenal of the victor's homeland, Aegina, a story about Aeacus and the Aeacids; and fortunately there is plenty of suitable material to be drawn from this tradition. Although the narrative certainly has a thematic relevance to the ode as a whole,<sup>2</sup> the poet pretends that it is irrelevant and that he has let himself be carried away by his enthusiasm for the story rather than focusing on what he should have told instead.

It is now well understood that this presentation entails a fictional mimesis of extempore speech; we are dealing with the 'feigned orality' motif. The poet pretends that his ode takes shape on the very spot, during the performance, and that it is a spontaneous outpouring of pure joy, occasioned by nothing but enthusiasm for the victor's achievement, while in fact it is a product that was commissioned and paid for by the victor. Emphasis on the contractual relationship between the poet and victor would detract from the praise, since any poet would say something nice about any victor for the right amount of drachmae. So the poets of victory odes tend to hide this contractual relationship from view, covering it up by means of pretended spontaneity. Thus the fiction of spontaneity as such contributes to the aims of the genre.<sup>3</sup> On the level of this fiction, the narrative is not neatly introduced and rounded off, because it was not planned.

But for our present purposes this fiction presents us with a problem. For, in order to talk about narratives in the victory ode, one should be able to identify these narratives. But it is not an easy task to isolate narrative sections from an ode when the poets themselves tend to integrate these narratives as closely as possible into the drift of their

<sup>1</sup> For Pindar's use of the relative and relative connection, see Pfeijffer 1999a: 37–41 with further references.

<sup>2</sup> See Pfeijffer 1999a: 202–206, 224–228, with further references.

<sup>3</sup> See Carey 1981: 5, and 1995; Miller 1993; Pfeijffer 1999a: 34–41.

rhetoric and blur the boundaries constantly. There are, however, some rules of thumb that may help us. Since the narrative sections in the victory odes nearly always present stories from the (mythical) past, the narratives are marked by the use of the past tense, which distinguishes them from most of their surroundings, dealing with the victor's present state of bliss and hopes for future continuation of his successes and the spreading of his glory. Moreover, whereas the shift from praise to story (and *vice versa*) is mostly blurred, the shift from the present to the past (and *vice versa*) accompanying it is often indicated by means of adverbs (most notably *pote*, 'once', e.g. *O.* 3.13; 6.12–13; *P.* 1.16; 4.10, 20; 8.39; 9.5, 15; 10.31, *N.* 4.25; 5.9; *I.* 1.13) or strategically placed adjectives (e.g. *palaios*, 'ancient', or *proteros*, 'early', e.g. *O.* 3.10–13; *N.* 3.13, 32). Another signal helping to demarcate the narrative is the frequent use of apostrophe accompanying the shift from the past to the present, either calling upon the poet's heart to steer the ode into a direction closer to the present occasion or calling upon the victor's attention (after an allegedly irrelevant digression) for a section that will be closer to his personal interests (e.g. *P.* 8.33; *N.* 3.26, 76; 5.48). Where no apostrophe or temporal adverb is used to indicate the shift from the past to the present, we sometimes find an emphatic first-person statement of the poet, reflecting on his encomiastic duties in a way that is comparable to his urging himself or his heart to steer the ode in a different direction (e.g. *O.* 9.35–36; 13.94; *P.* 1.81; 3.61–62; 10.51; *I.* 5.51). Finally, narrative sections are sometimes concluded by means of gnomic statements, reflecting on a prominent theme of the story and linking it implicitly with the victor's situation (e.g. *N.* 5.16–18).

### *The primary narrator and narratee*

Although the victory odes are performed by a chorus,<sup>4</sup> there can be no doubt whatsoever that the first-person singular or plural occurring in the odes represents the poet, and more often than not the poet specifically in his professional role.<sup>5</sup> He is the primary narrator, being firmly present in the words sung by the chorus. This primary narrator is overt

<sup>4</sup> For the untenable hypothesis of solo-performance see Pfeijffer 1999a: 242–243, n. 8, with references.

<sup>5</sup> See esp. Lefkowitz 1991.

and visible. Especially Pindar refers to himself and his narrating activity in many of his odes, tells us about himself, and comments openly upon his stories, frequently using emphatic first-person statements to do so (as in *N.* 3.26–32). Bacchylides may at first sight seem a less overt and less visible narrator than Pindar, because he is less fond of referring to himself in the first person. However, Bacchylides too comments openly upon his stories, as in the following passage:

‘... What was hateful before is now dear. To die is most sweet.’  
 Thus he [Croesus] spoke; and he commanded his softly walking servant  
 to light the pyre. The girls shouted  
 and raised their hands in the air  
 to their dear mother. For the death one sees coming  
 is the most bitter death for mortals.  
 But when the glowing power  
 of the horrible fire rushed through,  
 Zeus raised a black, hiding cloud  
 and extinguished the fair flame.  
 Nothing is unbelievable if it is accomplished by the concerns  
 of gods. Then Apollo, born on Delos,  
 bore the old man off to the Hyperboreans and gave him a new home  
 together with his daughters with their slender feet,  
 because of his piety, since he had sent  
 the richest gifts of all men to holy Pytho. (Bacchylides 3.47–62)

This is the climax of Bacchylides’ dramatic narrative about King Croesus, who built a pyre in front of his palace when his city was taken by the Persians. But he was saved from the flames by Zeus, who sent a storm to extinguish the flames, and Apollo, who bore him off to live happily ever after among the Hyperboreans. Although the narrator does not intrude into his own story in Pindar’s manner, by means of first-person statements, he does comment openly upon the events twice: first in 51–52, where he gives a general truth on his own account in order to explain the agony of Croesus’ daughters; then in 57–58, where he includes a gnomic statement, again on his own account, in order to add credibility to the unexpected turn his story has just taken. The former comment is formally set off from its narrative context by means of the particle *gar* (51, here rendered as ‘for’), indicating that the sentence it introduces will clarify a question that may have risen on the part of the narratees concerning the preceding event. The shift back to the narrative proper is signalled by the particle *alla* (53, here rendered as ‘but’), which signals that the narrator breaks off his preceding argument and makes a fresh start. After the second authoritative comment

on behalf of the narrator the shift back to the narrative proper is even more explicitly marked by means of the temporal adverb *tote*, ‘then’ (58).

Since the narrator tends to anchor himself in the present occasion of the celebration, often referring explicitly to his professional role and encomiastic tasks, whereas the stories he tells belong to the realm of the mythical past, the primary narrator is external, to the extent that he does not himself belong to the world of the stories he tells. Even in the rare cases that Pindar or Bacchylides tell about the victory itself (see above), they do not refer to themselves as spectators or as being in any other way present at the venue where the victory was won, so as to remain external even in those cases. The closest thing we find in the victory odes to an internal primary narrator, is a remarkable passage in Pindar, where the poet tells about an epiphany:

Rejoicing also myself,  
I throw crowns at Alcmaeon; I sprinkle him with song too,  
because, as my neighbour and guardian of my possessions,  
he encountered me going to the songful navel of the earth,  
and he grasped hold of prophecies with his inborn arts.

(Pindar, *Pythian* 8.56–60)

This passage concludes a mythical narrative about the hero Alcmaeon, put in the mouth of his father, Amphiaraus. The Pindaric narrator presents himself as agreeing with the favourable story Amphiaraus has just told about his son, putting himself on a par with his secondary narrator (see below), and he motivates his enthusiasm for Alcmaeon by referring to the fact that he saw him as a vision in a dream or as a waking epiphany, possibly when he was passing his shrine, while he was travelling from Thebes to Delphi. On that occasion Alcmaeon revealed a prophecy, the content of which is not given.

The paradoxical circumstance of performance, featuring a very present first-person narrator who presents himself through the mouths of a chorus which is being referred to in the third person, is mirrored in the situation of the primary narratee. For the choral performance itself addresses an audience of the victor’s fellow-citizens partaking in the public celebrations of his victory. Moreover, the poets sometimes anticipate more or less official reruns of the first performance elsewhere in the Greek world. The victory ode derives its success from its impact on these audiences. The victor pays the poet in order to make his glory known to his fellow-citizens and fellow-Greeks in the present and the future. Yet, these audiences are not the addressees who are

present in the text. When the poets of victory odes use a second person in order to address an audience for their songs, this second person nearly always refers to an individual, most often to the victor himself. So the communicative situation for the performance of the victory ode is an allegedly intimate one-way conversation from poet to victor, taking place publicly in the form of a choral song addressing an audience of the victor's fellow-citizens and future audiences in different parts of Greece. To put this in narratological terms: in spite of the public character of the choral performance, we find one singular overt, external, and very visible primary narrator (the poet), addressing one singular primary narratee, who is equally overt, external, and visible (the victor).

Outside the narrative sections, the relationship between the primary narrator and the primary narratee, i.e. between poet and victor, is often thematized in a way that underscores the fiction of intimacy and spontaneity in order to hide the contractual relationship from view. Especially Pindar places a great deal of emphasis on his personal bond with his patron. An example is *Isthmian* 8.15b–18, where Pindar emphasises his own personal link with Aegina by referring to the mythical relationship between Aegina and Thebes. Similarly, Pindar may emphasize his commitment to the mythical heroes of the victor's city, as in *Isthmian* 5.20 and 6.19ff. He insists on a relation of guest-friendship (*xenia*) between himself and his patron on many occasions (cf., e.g. *O.* 1.11ff.; *P.* 3.69; 10.64ff.; *N.* 1.19ff.; 7.61; *I.* 2.48). Occasionally he goes further and represents his relationship with the victor as one of *philia* (cf. *P.* 1.92; 4.1; *N.* 3.76) or even as an actual family tie (cf. *I.* 1.1ff. and *I.* 7.37ff., for Theban victors). As has been demonstrated recently by Carey,<sup>6</sup> the vigour of Pindar's personal commitment is especially clear when it is contrasted with the way in which Bacchylides addresses similar topics. In contrast with the 'brief and colourless reference to *xenia*' in B. 5.11, the lines describing Pindar's personal ties with the victor in Pi. *P.* 10.64–66 are charged with emotion, emphasizing 'trust, kindness, zeal, friendship and reciprocity'.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Carey 1995: 94–95.

<sup>7</sup> Carey 1995: 94–95, who further discusses Pi. *N.* 7.61ff. and *P.* 4.299 as similar charged and poignant references to the poet's personal bonds with the victor.

*The status of the primary narrative*

Since the vast majority of stories found in the victory odes relate exploits of the great heroes of the mythical past, the status of these stories is traditional: the narrator *retells* a story known to his audience, or, more precisely, the vast majority of stories found in the victory odes are based on *fabulae* that are familiar to the audience. It need not surprise us that purely fictional stories are not favoured by the poetics of this genre. After all, the poet is the ambassador of truth, or at least needs to present himself as such (as Pindar and Bacchylides explicitly do on many occasions). For the task of revealing to their audiences and to the world how great a man this victor is and how astonishing his accomplishments becomes utterly hopeless as soon as there is the shred of doubt about their sincerity. When the poets want to associate the victor's qualities with great heroes from the past, they evidently prefer to tell stories about these heroes that are comfortably recognizable to the audience rather than made up accounts. Fiction is counter-productive to the aims of the genre.

Because the poets of victory odes can rely on their audience's knowledge about the facts of the *fabula*, they can allow themselves to be fascinatingly economical in their way of forging the *fabula* into a story. Often they rely heavily on the audience's knowledge. Take, e.g. the way in which Pindar tells his Aeginetan audience about Peleus and Telamon murdering their half-brother Phocus:

Of old they prayed that it (Aegina) would be noble in men  
and renowned in ships,  
when they stood by the altar of the father (Zeus) Hellenius  
and together spread out their hands to the sky,  
the famous sons of Endaïs and Phocus, the mighty prince,  
child of a goddess, whom Psamatheia bore  
where the sea-waves are breaking.  
Shame prevents me from saying something big,  
and not hazarded according to Right:  
how they left the famous island,  
and what deity  
drove the valiant men from Oenona.  
I shall halt.

(Pindar, *Nemean* 5.9–16)

The Pindaric narrator can afford to tell a story about fratricide by not telling it. Instead of telling that Peleus and Telamon murdered Phocus and that they were banned from Aegina after which they went to Iolcus and Salamis respectively, he breaks off his narrative in a way that is

in keeping with the fictional mimesis of extempore speech. He merely alludes to the murder in 'something big and not hazarded according to Right' (14) and to the fact that Peleus and Telamon had to leave the island (15–16). It will be clear that this narrative manoeuvre depends entirely on the audience's familiarity with the events of the fabula.

Sometimes the poets explicitly refer to the traditional status of their narrative by mentioning its source. When Bacchylides in his fifth ode begins to tell the story about Heracles descending into the underworld, he marks it as traditional by adding 'as they say' (*legousin*, B. 5.57). Similarly Pindar ascribes some of his stories to 'what they say' (e.g. in *P.* 2.22, in the story about the wheel of Ixion; *O.* 9.49, in the story about Deucalion and Pyrrha; *O.* 6.29, in the story about the nymph Pitana). We are dealing with epinician variants of the 'anonymous spokesmen' device, which originates with the historians. Sometimes Pindar ascribes his stories to *proteroi*, 'men of old', as he does at the end of his story about the Aeacids in *Nemean* 6, where he says: 'Men of old found in such deeds / as those a highway of song, and I myself follow along, making it my concern' (53–54). In *Nemean* 7.20–23 and *Isthmian* 4.37–39 Pindar explicitly mentions Homer as the source of stories about Ajax.

In some passages, however, something strange is going on: Pindar ascribes his story to an older source, but modern scholars have a very difficult time in tracing his version of the story in other mythological sources, let alone in sources preceding Pindar. In *Olympian* 7 he introduces his story about the foundation of Rhodes as follows:

The ancient reports of men  
tell that when Zeus and the gods were apportioning the earth,  
Rhodos was not yet visible in the sea,  
but the island was hidden in the salty depths. (*Olympian* 7.54–57)

In his commentary on this passage Verdenius remarks: 'The attempts made to reconstruct a *Rhodou Ktisis* which could have been used by Pindar, have produced mere hypotheses. This part of the story was probably invented by Pindar himself. ... In order to mask the fact that he partly invented it he applies the same trick as Plato, viz. emphasizing its remote origin (cf. "having heard an old story from a man who was not young," Pl. *Tim.* 21a)'; similarly Young.<sup>8</sup> If Verdenius and Young are right, the reference to earlier authorities is a rhetorical means to camouflage personal mythological inventions or adaptations.

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<sup>8</sup> Verdenius 1987: 74; Young 1968: 87.



A similar situation is found in *Nemean* 1, where Pindar introduces his story about the baby Heracles killing snakes by saying that it is an old story (lines 33–34). Here again Pindar—perhaps together with Pherecydes of Athens—is our earliest authority for this story. And here again scholars have busied themselves in filling up what they believe is a gap in the transmission of texts.<sup>9</sup> However, the passage from *Olympian* 7 proves the possibility of Pindar *pretending* that he draws his material from earlier authorities.<sup>10</sup>

In one passage Pindar explicitly tells us that he does *not* follow the version of his predecessors:

It is proper for a man to speak well of the gods; for less is the blame.  
 Son of Tantalus, I shall tell your story contrary to my predecessors:  
 when your father invited the gods to his most orderly  
 feast and to his beloved Sipylus,  
 giving them a banquet in return for theirs,  
 then the Lord of the Splendid Trident seized you,  
 his mind overcome by desire. (*Olympian* 1.35–41)

The audience knows exactly what Pindar is talking about. They are familiar with the story of Tantalus, who served his own son Pelops at a banquet for the gods, who, upon discovering this, resurrected him from the cauldron, replaced his shoulder (eaten by the absent-minded Demeter) with ivory, and punished Tantalus severely in the underworld. This is the old story, but it is not the story Pindar is going to tell. According to him, this old story is untenable because it implies divine cannibalism (52–55). He believes it was invented by one of Tantalus' envious neighbours (46–51). His predecessors were so uncritical as to accept it, but he will not. He will tell what really happened. Pelops did have an ivory shoulder, but he was born with it (26–27). Tantalus' banquet was very orderly. It was at that occasion that Poseidon fell in love with him and abducted him to the Olympus (37–45). Tantalus was later punished in Hades, but this was for a different reason: he had stolen nectar and ambrosia from the gods (55–64). As a consequence, Pelops was returned to earth (65–66).

Although Pindar invents an entirely new version of the Pelops story, rejecting the *fabula* as the audience knows it and substituting it with a new account differing from it in all major facts and events, it would be

<sup>9</sup> See Braswell 1992: 57, with references.

<sup>10</sup> For a similar interpretation of Pindar's implicit reference to Homer in *N.* 3.52–53, see Pfeijffer 1999a: 212–213, 349–352.

misleading to characterize his story as fiction. His claim is that his new version reveals what really happened. The *fabula* as the audience knows it is argued to be implausible and ascribed to an envious neighbour. Pindar is not inventing a fictional story with familiar characters; he is rather like a modern historian who argues for a different, and in his eyes more plausible, reconstruction of an episode from the past. In this respect Pindar's criticism of the traditional myth about Pelops is not very different from his judgment that Homer exaggerated Odysseus' prowess at Ajax' cost (*N.* 7.20–23).

*Motivation of the primary narrative*

Unlike characters in musicals who suddenly burst out in song and dance for no apparent reason whatsoever, the primary narrators in victory odes are sometimes explicit about their motivations for including a story about the distant past in an ode celebrating the victor's recent achievement. Sometimes they do so in general terms, as, when Pindar introduces a narrative about the Aeacids by declaring that it is his duty to praise them whenever he performs on their native island, Aegina:

And as for you, Aeacids with your golden chariots,  
I declare that I have the clearest duty,  
when coming to this island, to sprinkle you with praises.  
(*Isthmian* 6.19–20)

Another way of motivating the narrative is to mark it explicitly as a story exemplifying a preceding statement, which is also the most common way for secondary narrators in Homer (→) to motivate their narratives, e.g.:

A god, a god one  
should honour, since that is the best of blessings.  
For also the king of the  
horse-taming Lydians, ...  
Croesus, was once saved by Apollo  
with his golden lyre.  
(Bacchylides 3.21–24, 28–29)

The Greek conjunction *epei* (23, here translated as 'for') makes explicit that the story about Croesus it introduces is meant by the narrator to be an example proving the validity of his claim that to honour a god is always the best policy for a mortal. As we have seen above, the story does in fact fulfil this purpose, for the end of the

story reveals that Croesus was rescued from his pyre by Apollo, as a reward for his piety towards the deity. Similarly, Pindar introduces a story about Heracles in *Olympian* 9: ‘Men become brave and wise as divinity determines. For how else could Heracles have had the strength to fight against Poseidon, Apollo and Hades?’ (*O.* 9.28–35, my paraphrase).

Sometimes the primary narrator motivates his narrative by relating it explicitly to the primary narratee. An interesting example is the following introduction of the mythical narrative:

For in wrestling following the footsteps of your mother’s brothers,  
 you do not refute Theognetus at Olympia,  
 nor Clitomachus’ brave-limbed victory at the Isthmus.  
 Exalting the clan of the Meidylids you carry the word,  
 the one that once Oecles’ son stated in riddles when he saw  
 at seven-gated Thebes the sons holding their ground in battle,  
 when they had gone the second road  
 from Argos, the Epigonoι.  
 Thus he spoke as they were fighting:  
 ‘By nature the noble determination is conspicuous  
 from the fathers in the sons. I see him clearly,  
 wielding the coiled snake on his blazing shield, Alcmaeon,  
 the first in the gates of Cadmus. ...’ (Pindar, *Pythian* 8.35–47)

The victor is addressed in lines 35–38. By winning his victory he has proved himself worthy of the reputation of his family-members Theognetus and Clitomachus, who in their days had won significant victories of their own. And by proving that he possesses the same talents as his ancestors, he has confirmed the innate excellence of his clan and thus exalted it. The idea of inherited quality implied by this praise of the victor is then connected to a mythical narrative about Amphiaraus and his son Alcmaeon. Amphiaraus fought bravely before Thebes, but was killed and Thebes was not sacked. Ten years later his son went along with a second expedition against Thebes, the expedition of the *Epigonoι*. This second expedition was successful. Thebes was sacked and Alcmaeon distinguished himself in battle. We hear about Alcmaeon’s bravery, staged as an epiphany, in the words of his father Amphiaraus, who witnesses the climactic moment of his son entering the gates and comments upon the events. In line 38 the narrator makes explicit that the story he is about to tell is directly relevant to the victor himself: he can apply to himself what Oecles’ son Amphiaraus once said, when he saw the *Epigonoι*, with his own son Alcmaeon amongst them, sacking the city of Thebes. The contents of what Amphiaraus said at that occasion

are then immediately given. The connection between Alcmaeon and the victor turns out to reside in the idea that noble determination is an inherited quality.

Sometimes the Pindaric narrator motivates his narrative in practical terms, in a way that ties in with his fictional mimesis of extempore speech. The clearest example occurs in *Pythian* 4. After he has told about Jason, beguiling Medea and with her help accomplishing the task set by her father, Aeetes, of ploughing with fire-breathing bulls, he tells that Aeetes reveals to Jason where the golden fleece is kept, but that he does not expect him to retrieve it, because it is guarded by a huge serpent. Then the primary narrator intrudes into his own story and gives the following motivation for being surprisingly brief about the very climax of the story: 'But it is too far for me to travel on the highway, because the hour is pressing and I know / a shortcut' (*P.* 4.247–248).

It may not be unimportant to note here that the motivation for including the narrative provided explicitly by the narrator never entirely concurs with his real motives for telling this story. The thematic relevance of a narrative included in a victory ode is manifold. The explicit motivation covers at best one single point of relevance, leaving all the rest to the interpretation of the audience. And the point of relevance the poets are explicit about is often a minor point, as, e.g. in those cases where the poet motivates his choice of subject for his story by emphasizing the geographical link between the heroes he tells about and the victor. The stories about the Aeacids following the geographical motivations in *Nemean* 3.28–32 and *Isthmian* 6.19–21 are in many ways directly relevant to the respective victors and the poet's respective thematic concerns. And all these points of relevance are in the stories themselves dealt with more extensively than the geographical link between the heroes and the victor. Even in the example discussed from Pindar's *Pythian* 8, the explicit motivation is to some extent misleading. For Amphiarus' speech is not finished after he has made his point about the importance of inherited quality, i.e. after the expectation raised on the part of the audience by the explicit motivation has been fulfilled. Amphiarus continues for eight more lines (48–55), prophesying that the leader of the second expedition, Adrastus, will be the only one to lose his son, who will be the sole casualty. The narrator's explicit statements about the relevance of his story are misleading in so far as lines 48–55, Amphiarus' prophecy about the outcome of the battle, are irrelevant to the explicitly avowed aim of the mythical example.

This part of Amphiaraus' speech does not bear on the analogy between the victor and Alcmaeon as exemplifications of the power of inherited excellence. Thus the motivation the narrator is explicit about is not his only motive for telling the story.<sup>11</sup>

There are, however, many examples of narratives that are not explicitly motivated. These include all those narratives that are, in keeping with the fictional mimesis of extempore speech, presented as a mere afterthought to the preceding section, e.g. by means of the relative pronoun. In these cases the relevance of the narrative to the ode as a whole and the victor is left entirely to the interpretation of the audience. Here Pindar and Bacchylides *are* like musical characters who suddenly burst out in song for no apparent reason, only with one difference: the audience are taken by surprise, finding themselves all of a sudden in the middle of a song without having realized when it began.

#### *Secondary narrators and secondary narratees*

Both Pindar and Bacchylides make ample use of the possibility of staging characters who tell a story. As a rule these secondary narrators both belong to the story-world of the primary narrative and tell about this same story-world. The typical situation is that the secondary narrator either reveals what preceded the episode that constitutes the primary narrative or prophesies its outcome, and the primary and secondary narratives put together produce one continuous storyline. Since the secondary narrators tend to tell episodes from the primary narrative of which they are a part, and since the status of this primary narrative is traditional, the secondary narratives are also traditional. We do not often find secondary narrators who tell invented stories, the most notable exception being the anonymous envious neighbour in Pindar's *Olympian* 1, who tells the traditional version of the Pelops myth, which is rejected by the primary narrator as a lie (lines 47–51). The scope of the victory ode calls for narrative economy. Whereas the epic poets may use secondary narratives as a vehicle for introducing narrative material that is alien to the main storyline, the poets of victory odes tend to use secondary narrators as instruments to manipulate narrative time: the

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<sup>11</sup> See further Miller 1993: 31–34; Pfeijffer 1999a: 426–456.

use of secondary narrators providing flashbacks or prophecies allows them to concentrate a long story in one dramatic moment.

Most secondary narratees are just as internal as the secondary narrators. One character tells what will happen or what has happened to another character. As a rule the story told is of direct personal relevance to the secondary narratee. One good example among many is Heracles telling Telamon that he will have a son, that his name will be Ajax and that he will distinguish himself as a warrior (Pi. *I.* 6.52–54). Also the elaborate network of secondary narratives in Pindar's majestic *Pythian* 4 follows this same pattern. The story of Pelias usurping the kingship of Iolcus from Jason's father, Jason's secret upbringing by the centaur Chiron, his return to Iolcus to reclaim his kingdom, Pelias' demand that he should bring back the golden fleece, Jason's expedition with the Argonauts in order to capture the golden fleece and the subsequent colonization of Libya by Battus is distributed among the primary narrator and various secondary narrators. The latest episode of the entire *fabula*, the colonization of Libya, is told first in the form of a prophecy by the secondary narrator Medea, who addresses the Argonauts on Thera (13–56). The prophecy is of direct personal relevance to at least one of them, Euphemus, who will be Battus' ancestor. The earliest part of the entire *fabula* is also told by a secondary narrator. We hear about the unjust usurpation, Jason's secret education and his claim to the throne in Jason's own words, when he first confronts Pelias on his return to Iolcus (102–119). Jason's second speech to Pelias reveals their shared genealogy (138–155). The purpose of the expedition of the Argonauts becomes clear in Pelias' response to Jason (156–167). The personal interest of the respective secondary narratees in the stories told needs no arguing. Thus the primary narrator focuses his own story on the dramatic moment of Jason's return to Iolcus and on the expedition itself, revealing the previous history and the consequences of the expedition by means of secondary narrators.

Some of the secondary narratees show strong emotional responses to the secondary narratives. It is clear that these responses are meant to steer our perception of the embedded narrative. Especially Bacchylides uses this type of emotive guidance to great effect. One of the most impressive examples is Heracles' response to Meleager who had just told him in the underworld about his own death:

That was the only time, they say,  
that Amphitryon's fearless son  
wetted his eyes, out of pity

for the fate of this miserable man.

And in response to him

he said: 'The best thing for a man is not to be born ...'

(Bacchylides 5.155–160)

Not all the secondary narrators found in the victory odes are tied to the primary narrative as closely as Jason, Pelias, and Medea in Pindar's *Pythian* 4. If, e.g. we reconsider Amphiaraus' role in the story about the two expeditions against Thebes in Pindar's *Pythian* 8, he seems at first sight a very typically Pindaric secondary narrator, both in his function and in his status. He witnesses the climactic moment of his son entering the gates of Thebes, tells about the disaster of the first expedition of which he himself was a part, and prophesies the outcome of the current expedition (44–55). He is an internal narrator both as a participant of the former and a witness of the current expedition. However, his presence on the battlefield is surprising (and in fact not accounted for), because he died ten years earlier during the first expedition. The primary narratees have no choice but to accept his presence and to conclude that he apparently manifests himself as an epiphany. He remains an outsider to the events that constitute the primary narrative, does not address anyone explicitly, nor is there any sign that anyone in the story is even able to hear what he is saying.

Amphiaraus is also atypical in another respect. For while he is connected to the primary narrative very loosely, he is very tightly connected to the primary narrator. After he has concluded his speech in which he tells about the successes of his son Alcmaeon, the primary narrator puts himself explicitly on a par with his secondary narrator by saying: 'Rejoicing also myself, I throw crowns at Alcmaeon; I sprinkle him with song too' (56–57, discussed above). This is exceptional, for Pindar and Bacchylides are as a rule much more implicit about the relation between the primary and secondary narrator. In most passages it is very difficult indeed to define such a relationship more precisely than to observe that the secondary narrator relates part of the primary narrative.

One of the most interesting narrative manoeuvres to be found in the victory odes of both Pindar and Bacchylides is the blurring of the boundary between primary and secondary narratives, to the effect that the primary narrator merges with the secondary. The central narrative of Pindar's *Nemean* 5 is an illustrative example:

For those men [i.e. the Aeacids] also willingly  
the loveliest choir of Muses

sang on Mount Pelion. In their midst  
 Apollo chased his seven-tongued phorminx with his golden quill  
 and led songs in every kind. First they sang, beginning with Zeus,  
 of holy Thetis  
 and Peleus, and that Creteus' delicate daughter Hippolyta  
 wanted to shackle him  
 by a trick, by persuading the lord  
 who watched over the Magnesians, her husband,  
 with crafty plans to be her accomplice.  
 She rigged a lying, made-up tale,  
 that that man had had a go at their nuptial marriage in Acastus'  
 own bed. This was the other way around.  
 For she tried hard to persuade him and begged him  
 with all her heart. Her steep words stimulated his feelings.  
 Immediately he repulsed the bride, out of fear of the anger  
 of the Father, the god of Guests. He took good notice of it  
 and he approved from heaven, the cloud-maker Zeus,  
 King of Immortals, that soon  
 he would achieve that a sea-goddess, one of the Nereids  
 with golden spindle, would become his wife,  
 after having persuaded her brother-in-law Poseidon,  
 who often comes from Aegae to the famous Dorian Isthmus.  
 There cheerful companies welcome him, the god,  
 with the sound of pipes,  
 and they compete with the bold strength of their limbs.  
 Inborn destiny decides  
 over everything. You, Euthymenes,  
 have fallen twice in the arms of Victory in Aegina  
 and touched elaborate hymns. (Pindar, *Nemean* 5.22–42)

The story about Peleus and Hippolyta is one of the most skilfully narrated pieces in Pindar. What is especially admirable is the way in which the poet has integrated the story in the drift of his preceding argument by breaking up the chronological order of the narrated events and using the chronologically last event, the wedding of Peleus and Thetis, as the 'frame-story' of the entire episode. The chorus of the Muses sang for the Aeacids, represented by Peleus, on Mount Pelion, on the occasion of the celebration of the wedding of Peleus and Thetis. 'That' (*hōs*) in line 26 introduces the story of Peleus and Hippolyta as the subject matter of the Muses' song. Thus the chorus of Muses becomes the secondary narrator who tells the story of Peleus and Hippolyta.

The chorus of Muses sings to the accompaniment of Apollo's *phorminx*. The Muses begin with an address to Zeus; they then proceed



with a song of praise about Peleus and Thetis, the newly wedded couple. This ‘hymn’ includes the episode that Pindar quotes (26–36) about Peleus and Hippolyta; this episode does in fact praise Peleus, for it illustrates Peleus’ obedience to the laws of Zeus Xeinios in reward for which Zeus gave him Thetis. ‘First’ (*prōtiston men*) in line 25 characterizes the song about Peleus and Thetis, including the episode about Peleus and Hippolyta, as the first part of the Muses’ performance. A corresponding ‘second’ or ‘next’ (in Greek *epeita de* or something similar), does not follow. Pindar does not indicate where the Muses’ song ends. The closing inverted commas are absent, so to speak. This conveys the suggestion that the remainder of the ode, i.e. lines 41–54 (of which only 41–42 are quoted above), dealing with the victor and his family, is part of the song of the Muses. By leading the audience to anticipate another part of the Muses’ hymn, ‘first’ helps to convey the suggestion that the song of the Muses does not end at line 41 with the shift from the heroic past to the present occasion. The secondary narrator, i.e. the chorus of Muses, merges with the primary narrator, i.e. Pindar, represented by the Aeginetan chorus performing the ode. This strategy is in the first place suggestive of the quality of Pindar’s ode—a specimen of proud self-consciousness which is relevant in the light of the superiority of poetry over other forms of victory immortalization as thematized in the opening lines, and which contributes to the encomiastic aims of the ode to the extent that the victor’s immortalization depends on the quality of the poet’s product (cf. *N.* 4.6–8, etc.). But the trick of not closing off the song of the Muses contributes also more directly to the encomiastic aims of the ode. Pindar exploits the fact of performance. By creating the illusion that the Muses are still singing when the victories are mentioned, the Aeginetan chorus performing the present ode merges with the chorus of the Muses: it is singing for the victor and his family just as the chorus of the Muses sang for Peleus. This in itself draws a complementary analogy between the Aeacids and the victor and his family, and conveys the suggestion that their victories are a reward for their moral behaviour just like Thetis was Peleus’ reward for his abiding by the laws of Zeus.

A comparable strategy occurs in two passages in Bacchylides’ third ode:

The (immense) crowd shouted.  
 Ah, thrice-fortunate the man,  
 who received from Zeus  
     the honour of ruling over the greatest number of Greeks

and knows how not to hide his towering wealth  
under the black cloak of darkness. (Bacchylides 3.9–14)

and:

Lord Apollo  
... spoke to Pheres' son:  
Who is mortal must exalt twin  
thoughts: that only tomorrow you will see  
the light of the sun  
and that you will complete a life  
of fifty more years of deep wealth.  
Delight your heart with deeds dear to the gods. For that  
is the highest of gains.  
Who thinks understands what I am saying. The high  
heavens are unblemished. Water of the sea  
does not become foul. Joy is the gold.  
It is not right for a man to shed his grey  
age and retrieve again the flower of his  
youth. The light of great accomplishments does not  
disappear with the body of a mortal, no,  
the Muse feeds it. Hieron, you have shown  
the most beautiful flower of bliss  
to the mortals. For whom has success  
silence does not bring adornment.  
With the beauty of truth  
someone will sing the gift  
from the sweet-tongued nightingale of Keos.  
(Bacchylides 3.76–98 [*fin.*])

Carey says: 'Only modern printing methods can distinguish whether lines 10–12 are a statement by the poet or a cry by the crowd at Delphi; it is difficult to see how the identity of the speaker could have been brought out in performance. The result is an indeterminacy in the authority for the statement. And for the listener who hears the crowd speaking it is not clear where collective comment ends and authorial comment recommences. In the same way, when Bacchylides cites the advice of Apollo later in Ode 3 (78ff.), it is not clear where the quotation ends. Indeterminacy of speech-boundary is inevitable in narrative performance, wherever beginnings and endings are not formally marked. The point here is not the indeterminacy of the point of transition but the specific effect. The poet's views merge with those of the quoted speakers, leaving unclear the point where external authority

ends and the poet's authority begins.<sup>12</sup> As in the passage discussed from Pindar's *Nemean* 5, it cannot possibly be determined exactly where the primary narrator takes over from his secondary narrators. It is not clear and not intended to be clear whether 'I' in line 85 refers to the secondary narrator Apollo or to the primary narrator Bacchylides. Most editors print the closing inverted commas after line 84, but the possibility of Apollo continuing his speech to the very end of the ode cannot be excluded, especially since the tone of 85–92 is just as oracular as 78–84, and the poet is referred to in the third person in the final line. As a result, it is not clear whether the praise bestowed on the victor, Hieron, in lines 92–98 is uttered by the poet or the god. As in Pindar's *Nemean* 5, this trick of merging the primary and secondary narrators contributes to the encomiastic aims of the ode. For the suggestion is conveyed that the praise of Hieron is sanctioned by divine authority. This subtle narrative technique forms a fitting conclusion to the discussion of the narrators in Pindar and Bacchylides.

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<sup>12</sup> Carey 1999: 20.

PART FOUR

DRAMA



## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

### AESCHYLUS

*J. Barrett*

Narrative in drama is always more than narrative. It is also, of course, the (speech) act of a character on-stage, the utterance of one of the *dramatis personae*. Some aspects of these narratives, therefore, are determined not by the workings of the narratives themselves, but rather by their dramatic contexts. The task of identifying and demarcating narrative in Aeschylean drama is often difficult due to the variety of speech-forms on-stage and the relative fluidity with which they give way to one another. Indeed, the boundaries between these speech-forms are often blurred. While this situation may demand a degree of provisionality in identifying narrative sections, it also suggests that Aeschylean narrative should be seen as one aspect of an interest in the problems and possibilities of various forms of discourse, an interest that is evident in all fifth-century tragic texts. Aeschylean drama, that is, attends to questions such as what narrative is, and what it can do, while deploying its many kinds of narrative amid a wide range of other speech-types.

One boundary that is on occasion blurred in these texts is that between dialogue and narrative. In fact this distinction disappears altogether in dialogical narrative. A form of narrative made possible largely by the dramatic medium itself and exploited in later Greek drama to great effect, dialogical narrative appears relatively infrequently in Aeschylus. Some Aeschylean narratives (which I will consider monological) may consist of lengthy sections punctuated by dialogue between narrator and narratee(s), such as occurs at *Persians* 249–514.<sup>1</sup> Others, however, are emphatically dialogical, such as we find at *Suppliants* 291–324, where the stichomythia between the choral leader and Pelasgus produces a (brief) account of Io's travails. The category of dialogical narrative in Aeschylus includes explanatory narratives produced subsequent to the events reported by a narrator either external (*Supp.* 291–

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<sup>1</sup> The text referred to is that of West 1990.

324; *Pers.* 703–738) or internal (*Pr.* 246–262), as well as a predictive narrative produced by a narrator now external, now internal (*Pr.* 743–781).<sup>2</sup> These dialogical narratives are characterized by fast-paced exchange (often comprised of question and answer), and the pointed participation of the narratee in the production of the narrative. This latter quality, in fact, signals perhaps the most significant aspect of these narratives: they are of great importance to the narratee whose persistent questions underscore the urgency attached to hearing the story.

I divide the (monological) narratives in Aeschylus into three categories: those of choruses, individual characters, and messengers. Elsewhere in tragedy, particularly in Euripides (→), the narrative prologue may be seen as a discrete category, but the extant Aeschylean plays contain only one such prologue (*Eumenides*) and I therefore group it with other character-narratives. As a matter of convenience, I include several passages that might be categorized as catalogues (such as *Pers.* 302–330 and 759–786) or descriptions (such as those of *Septem* 375–652).<sup>3</sup>

### *Chorus*

In choral lyric modes of speech often shift seamlessly into one another. The narrative section of the *parodos* in *Supplikes* (1–18), for example, is initiated by an utterance belonging to the realm of prayer and immediately followed by a return to that realm. This brief ‘narrative’, then, is framed by and forms part of a prayer. In practical terms, therefore, identifying narrative in these choral lyrics must often entail some qualification. It has even been said that tragic choral lyric is ‘an intertextual field, alternately evoking and frustrating *generic* expectations’.<sup>4</sup> It is nonetheless possible to identify passages that are at least principally narrative and to examine their workings as such.

All Aeschylean choral narratives are sung with none but the chorus on-stage.<sup>5</sup> The isolation of the chorus marks the integrity and continu-

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *A.* 1198–1213; *Ch.* 514–539.

<sup>3</sup> On catalogues in Aeschylus see Michelini 1982: 99–100.

<sup>4</sup> Rehm 1996–1997: 47. Cf. Rosenmeyer 1982: 162 and the comment of Kaimio that Aeschylean narratives are framed so that ‘the chorus cannot be said to be only the narrator’ (1970: 86).

<sup>5</sup> Here I follow Taplin who, however, places Danaus on-stage with the chorus from the opening lines of *Supplikes* (1977: 193–194). Perhaps the most controversial case is the *parodos* of *Agamemnon*, where Taplin keeps Clytemnestra off-stage until 258.

ity of their song, as it endows the song—and the narratives contained therein—with a degree of autonomy. This integrity, however, comprises a richly heterogeneous collection of speech types, including a substantial amount of narratorial commentary. The Persian elders' account of the troops' departure for Greece (*Pers.* 12–139), for example, is punctuated at 93–100 by a moralizing claim about the dangers of divine deception, as it is at 116 and 122 when 'the chorus imagine and preemptively utter the kind of cry of lament [*oa*] which a defeat would precipitate'.<sup>6</sup> Much the same happens at *Seven against Thebes* 742–791, where the chorus at 758–771 punctuate their narrative about Oedipus with a metaphorical description of the present crisis ('a sea of trouble drives on a wave ... which crashes around the stern of the city') and an expression of their fear.

With few exceptions Aeschylean choruses produce narratives that are subsequent to the events recounted.<sup>7</sup> The unusual narrative in the first stasimon of *Seven against Thebes* (287–368) deserves notice in this regard. With the attacking Argive army outside the city gates, the chorus of Theban women initiate a prayer that turns into a narrative of events both present and future. They speak of Thebes 'cast into Hades ... its women young and old taken captive and dragged by their hair like a horse' (321–329). The sections of the narrative that concern the future are not prophetic; they constitute rather an account of what the chorus imagine and fear, as they themselves indicate (332).<sup>8</sup>

Kaimio has noted that in Aeschylean choral lyric, use of the first-person singular with reference to the chorus as narrator marks a link between different sections of the song.<sup>9</sup> In this manner are marked the beginnings of narrative sections at *Seven against Thebes* 742, *Suppliques* 538, and *Agamemnon* 104, as are the ends of such passages at *Agamemnon* 248 and 456–460, and *Choephoroi* 638. Such transitional moments typically coincide with a shift in focus between the present and the past events recounted. Narrative sections begin with a shift from present to past at

<sup>6</sup> Hall 1996: ad 116–117.

<sup>7</sup> The chorus of *Agamemnon* produce simultaneous narration at 67–103 and 427–455.

<sup>8</sup> For the spectators, who function as primary narratees, the use of Homeric phrasing (see Hutchinson 1985: ad 287–368) points to the unusual status of this narrative: as an account of imagined events, the chorus' narrative proves to be replete with (traditional) elements familiar from accounts of the sack of Troy. In this regard one may compare *Choephoroi* 585–652, which recounts the 'myths' of Althaea, Scylla, and the Lemnian women. See Garvie 1986: ad 585–651 on the illustrative use of myth in Aeschylus.

<sup>9</sup> Kaimio 1970: 86.



*Persians* 852–856 where the chorus turn to an account of Darius' reign; *Seven against Thebes* 742 and 775; and *Supplices* 538. Narrative sections end with a marked shift from the past back to the present at *Persians* 140 and 904; *Seven against Thebes* 790; *Agamemnon* 248 and 456–460; and *Choephoroi* 638.

These sections may also begin with an indication that the narrative will explain what precedes. The particle *gar* performs this function at *Persians* 12–15, for example, where the chorus explain their anxiety and gloom: 'For all the strength of Asia has gone ... and no messenger or horseman has approached the city of Persians.'<sup>10</sup> The introduction of choral narratives in this way is closely allied with one of their main functions, that of contextualizing the action of the play (for the spectators), and offering a framework for understanding it.

Finally, narrative sections may be metrically distinguished. At *Persians* 140 the chorus conclude the narrative and turn to the present moment, marking this change with a shift from lyric metres back to anapaests. At *Agamemnon* 104 a turn from anapaests to lyric dactyls marks the beginning of a narrative section. This kind of metrical marking is far from typical, but it does represent one technique available to the poet.<sup>11</sup>

As a consequence of the chorus' visible presence on-stage, some aspects of their identity are readily apparent. For example, the chorus by definition constitute a group composed of anonymous individuals who sing with a single voice. In all extant plays of Aeschylus, furthermore, the chorus members are socially marginal in some sense: women (*Th.*, *Supp.*, *Ch.*), slaves (*Ch.*), foreigners (*Supp.*, *Ch.*), and elderly men (*Pers.*, *A.*). And to a large degree their loyalties and interests are evident. Indeed, interspersed with their narratives are expressions of fear, prayer, lament, moral judgment, etc., that serve in part to characterize them.

When the chorus function as (secondary) internal narrators, they can only know what they have seen or heard: they are subject to the restrictions of access and place, as are the choruses of Sophocles (→) and Euripides (→). While Aeschylean choruses often recount events from their own history (e.g. *Pers.* 12–139), they only rarely speak of themselves as agents, and never explicitly mark their narratives as the product of their own eyewitness status. (In the rare narratives that

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Seven against Thebes* 321, 742, and 772.

<sup>11</sup> Where narrative beginning or end coincides with that of the song that contains it, it will likewise coincide with metrical shift.

position the chorus as a prominent agent—e.g. *Septem* 321–368<sup>12</sup>—the chorus are by definition witness to the events recounted.) There are, however, implicit claims to such status, as when the chorus at *Agamemnon* 248 say that they did *not* see what followed the preparations for the sacrifice of Iphigeneia, implying that they did witness what they report up to this point. The chorus of *Persians* leave little doubt in 1–11 that they witnessed what they narrate in 12–139. This general absence of explicit claims to eyewitness status suggests that these narratives are offered as the products of knowledge shared by those who do and might constitute such a chorus (and often also by the theatre audience as well). As the voices of the chorus singing in unison and the anonymity of the chorus members imply, these narratives present themselves as what any member of such a group would, and does, know.<sup>13</sup>

When the chorus function as external narrators, however, recounting ‘ancient’ events that they could not have witnessed, they become omniscient narrators, as in Sophocles (→) and Euripides (→). As such ‘ancient’ stories contain much more than any individual(s) could know, they provide the chorus with a potent narrative device for recounting events remote in time and of privileged, even paradigmatic, status. The chorus at *Seven against Thebes* 742–790, for example, recount the begetting of Oedipus, his self-blinding, and his curse of his sons. Laius, they report, was ‘overpowered by the foolishness of love’ (750), and they speak of Oedipus’ state of mind with some precision (*artiphron, meleos, algei*, 778–780).<sup>14</sup> Narratives of this type freely omit much of the fabula and thus rely on the narratees’ familiarity with the events recounted. It is, in fact, the status of such fabulae as old and well known that enables these choruses to narrate with such authority.

Even when they are internal narrators, these choruses employ several strategies for bypassing their restrictions. They may make use of *ex eventu* knowledge, as at *Agamemnon* 122–123 where the chorus relate that Calchas turned his gaze to the Atreidae and ‘knew’ that they were the hare-eating eagles. The same chorus report at 220–221 that from the moment he decided to sacrifice Iphigeneia, Agamemnon had a change of mind that embraced extreme acts of daring (*to pantotolmon phronein metegnō*). Narratives of events imagined or feared may also enable the

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *Supp.* 1–18.

<sup>13</sup> Kaimio 1970: 240–241; Stehle speaks of (non-dramatic) choral song as ‘community poetry’ (1997: 18 and 26–70, esp. 69); Gould 2001: 326–327.

<sup>14</sup> See also *Supp.* 538–599. Cf. *A.* 750–756.

chorus to bypass some restrictions. At *Seven against Thebes* 345–368, for example, the chorus provide a detailed account of their own city's (imagined) fall. In so doing, they succinctly define the nature of the attacking army as they peer into the mind of an (imagined) attacker who 'wants to have a partner' in his quest for plunder (354). Such strategies may well serve the narrator's interests: at *Agamemnon* 220–221 the chorus incorporate into the account their own view of what transpired as a transgression committed by Agamemnon; and in the *Seven against Thebes* passage the chorus not only offer a vivid picture of their own fear, but they also manage to portray the attacking army as a virtual kinship group characterized by greed and a devotion to plunder.<sup>15</sup>

On occasion, however, the chorus may simply be unhampered by any restrictions. The chorus of *Persians*, for example, describe at 28 not only the outward appearance of the Persian commanders, but also their inward resolve (*psukhēs eutlēmoni doxēi*). Similarly, the chorus of *Agamemnon*, recounting how Iphigeneia was 'bridled' to keep her silent, go on to explain that she 'wanted to address' those about to kill her (242–243) 'because she had often sung for them' (243–245). While the chorus might well have deduced from outward signs that Iphigeneia wanted to speak, the explanation of why she wanted to do so would not have been similarly observable. Moments such as these serve in part to endow the narrative with a reach and amplitude that augment its ability to inform about and to shape (our knowledge of) the events recounted. Such freedom from restriction, that is, serves the poet's twofold interests of representing the events more fully and defining the chorus themselves by putting on display the scope and quality of their concerns: if we glean from the narrative something of Iphigeneia's perspective, we also understand the chorus to be attentive to her as an agent endowed with such subjectivity.

Aeschylean choruses are also self-conscious narrators. At *Choephoroi* 638, for example, the chorus reflect on the interpretive task performed by their narrative:<sup>16</sup> having recounted the mythic examples of Althaea, Scylla, and the Lemnian women, the chorus conclude by asking 'Which

<sup>15</sup> See Goward on the 'double game' played by the Aeschylean chorus: with their 'narrative authority ... they provide the audience with background information, *framing* the play, but at the same time they leave *gaps*' (1999: 48).

<sup>16</sup> Metanarrative commentary appears also at *A.* 104; *Th.* 356; and *Supp.* 580, 590–591. Cf. *proseikasai* at *A.* 163; *exikhneusai* at *A.* 368; and *pou* at *A.* 711. Cf. also *Septem* 742 (the chorus claim to tell an 'ancient' tale); *Supp.* 538 (the chorus say that they are

of these [stories] do I not justly collect?’ Thus do they assert the interpretive propriety of comparing Clytemnestra to these other mythic women.

The isolation of the chorus on-stage during narratives compels us to consider the role of the spectators as narratees. While clearly full members of the world on-stage, the chorus perform a mediating function between this realm and that of the theatre audience,<sup>17</sup> and although they do not directly address the theatre audience, it is nonetheless instructive to consider the degree to which the audience’s function as primary narratees affects our understanding of the narrative.

When the chorus of *Persians* at the play’s opening, for example, refer to themselves as ‘the Persian Faithful’, they offer a self-description consistent with common Greek belief.<sup>18</sup> The (original) theatre audience will find that the chorus think of themselves just as they expect them to do.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, at 93–94 when the chorus ask rhetorically, ‘What mortal man can avoid the god’s tricky deceptiveness?’, the spectator may recognize a familiar theological view.<sup>20</sup> Although we must hesitate to attribute an awareness of this dynamic to the chorus themselves, their mediating function—and the audience’s role as primary narratees—open the way to perceiving such irony. Dramatic irony of all forms, of course, is produced in this and similar ways.

In fact there are more signs of narratees in choral narrative, narratees with whom the spectators may identify. At *Suppliants* 580–589 the chorus address the narratees’ scepticism, when they insist that their story of Io is true. Although the chorus here repeat the claim of ‘the entire earth’ (583) that Io’s child is truly (*alēthōs*, 585) the son of Zeus, this repetition posits sceptical narratees—much as does the original statement of ‘the entire earth’. What might have made sense as part of their protestations to Pelasgus that they are Argive, here finds itself directed at the narratee as an agent armed with some scepticism.

Aeschylean choruses may also call upon knowledge or values shared with their narratees. They may, for example, identify certain stories as

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following an old path in recounting Io’s travails) and 580 (they mark their narrative as a true *logos*).

<sup>17</sup> On this mediating function see Käppel 1998: 72–75; Calame 1994/95: 140–141; Nagy 1994/95: 49–51; Henrichs 1994/95: 66–70; Baur 1997: 44–46. Cf. Kaimio 1970: 82 and Pfister 1988: 76–79.

<sup>18</sup> Belloni 1994: ad 2–4.

<sup>19</sup> Hall 1996: ad 1–2.

<sup>20</sup> Broadhead 1960: ad 107–114. Cf. 865–866 with the comments of Hall 1996.

familiar even to the narratees. Thus do the chorus of *Choephoroi* refer to the story of the Lemnian women at 631 with the definite article (*to Lēmnion*), suggesting that the story, as well as its import, is well known to all. Similes provide the chorus with another method of alluding to shared knowledge and values.<sup>21</sup> At *Agamemnon* 231–234 the chorus sing that in preparing for Iphigeneia's sacrifice Agamemnon ordered his servants to lift her above the altar 'like a young goat'. Here the narratees' presumed familiarity with sacrificial procedure is invoked, as is a presumed understanding of the gravity of Agamemnon's transgression as revealed by the comparison.<sup>22</sup>

The chorus may pose questions that simultaneously serve rhetorical purposes and also posit the narratees as (silent) interlocutor. At *Agamemnon* 681–688, for example, the chorus ask who could have named Helen so appropriately as they underscore the verbal root for destruction (*hel-*) embedded in her name. At *Choephoroi* 638 the chorus justify their narrative at the same time as they place the narratees centrally in the narrative ('Which of these [stories] do I not justly collect?').<sup>23</sup> The chorus may also pose questions that the narratees might ask: having mentioned Io's transformation and suffering, the chorus of *Supplices* ask at 571–573, 'Who then charmed suffering, wandering Io, driven on by the gadfly?' The chorus here go on to answer this question, quite as though it has been asked by the narratee.

More frequently the chorus anticipate the narratees' questions, often marking this anticipation with the connective, explanatory particle *gar*. Such a *gar*-clause introduces at *Persians* 102 the explanation of why the Persian army cannot be resisted, and at 126 the explanation of the fear the chorus have just expressed about the fate of their city. As mentioned above, a *gar*-clause may initiate the narrative as a whole, as at *Seven against Thebes* 321 where it explains the preceding prayer to the city's gods.<sup>24</sup>

The chorus may also use the presentation-through-negation device as a way of incorporating the narratees into the narrative. When the chorus of *Persians* say at 14–15 that no messenger has arrived to tell them the fate of the expedition to Greece, they implicitly acknowledge

<sup>21</sup> De Jong 1987: 93–94. Similes occur at: *Pers.* 128–129; *Th.* 758–761; *A.* 50–54, 231–234, 242–243, and 717–738.

<sup>22</sup> Fraenkel 1950: ad 232.

<sup>23</sup> Similar questions occur at *Pers.* 93–96; *Th.* 772–777; *Supp.* 590–591; *Ch.* 594–598.

<sup>24</sup> Such clauses appear also at *Pers.* 91, 97; *A.* 222, 469; *Ch.* 637.

that the narratee might well expect a messenger to have arrived. Similarly, at 864–867 the same chorus recall how many cities Darius conquered ‘without crossing the Halys and without leaving home’, either contradicting or confirming the narratee’s presumed expectation.<sup>25</sup> At *Agamemnon* 186 the chorus report that Agamemnon, having heard the seer Calchas’ explanation that Artemis demanded another sacrifice, did not blame the prophet. Again, the narratees are imagined as expecting otherwise.<sup>26</sup>

The use of negation, the practices of posing and anticipating questions, and the other signs of attention to the narratees, all work to construct a narratee interested and involved in, as well as essential to, the act of narration itself.

### *Characters*

Character-narratives speak of events in the past (e.g. *Pers.* 176–214, *A.* 1372–1398, *Pr.* 640–686), the present (*Pers.* 803–806, *A.* 320–336), or the future (e.g. *Pers.* 813–820, *Pr.* 700–741, 786–815). We find both continuous narratives (e.g. *Pers.* 176–214, *Supp.* 605–624, *A.* 1372–1398) and those punctuated by dialogue (e.g. *Pers.* 759–822, *A.* 281–350, *Pr.* 436–506). Unlike choral narratives, those of characters nearly always form part of a ‘dialogue’ in that they are addressed to one or more interlocutors.<sup>27</sup> As such, these character-narratives most often respond to a request (e.g. *Supp.* 605–624, *A.* 281–350, *Pr.* 197–241), which in some cases is implicit (e.g. *Pers.* 759–822). When no such request occurs, these narratives often serve an explanatory function (e.g. *Pers.* 176–214, *A.* 1577–1611, *Pr.* 340–376). Some cases, however, appear to be gratuitous and serve a persuasive function (e.g. *A.* 855–894, *Pr.* 436–506).

<sup>25</sup> There is, of course, an implicit contrast with Xerxes’ recent disaster seen as the consequence, in part, of his crossing the ‘natural’ boundary between Europe and Asia. Here again, considering the audience as narratee reveals a larger, added meaning: the spectators will have shared the (Greek) view that the river Halys ‘was the western boundary of Persia proper’ (Broadhead 1960: ad 865–866). Hall judiciously notes that it is not clear why the chorus should share such a view and that ‘a differentiation between Persian and Greek ideals of leadership is almost certainly intended’ (1996: ad 862–866).

<sup>26</sup> As Agamemnon’s rebuke of Chryses in *Il.* 1 might lead audience members to do. Similar uses of negation occur at *Th.* 768; *A.* 228–230, 387, and 396. One may compare the use of alpha-privative, as at *Supplices* 561 (*athikton*) and 580 (*apseudei logōi*).

<sup>27</sup> Of the passages discussed here, only the prologue of *Eumenides* is spoken with no others on-stage.

The category of persuasive narratives points to a purpose shared by all character-narratives: even when responding to a request, these narratives also serve a rhetorical purpose in their dramatic contexts. Although it is clear, for example, that Clytemnestra's account of her suffering (*A.* 855–894) serves her own deceptive purposes, it is equally true that her narrative of the beacons (281–316)—which responds to a request from the chorus—forms part of her attempt to establish her own discursive (and political) authority.

These narratives (or narrative sections) are frequently marked as such at beginning and/or end. At *Agamemnon* 855–860, for example, Clytemnestra begins by declaring that she will not hesitate to speak openly.<sup>28</sup> Narrative endings are often marked with a demonstrative referring to what has just been said.<sup>29</sup> Although many of these beginnings and endings are marked also by an emphatic temporal shift (*Pr.* 199, 471, 740), on occasion a temporal shift alone marks the transition (*Supp.* 261; *Ch.* 579; *Eu.* 30). Both instances of character-narrative in *Persians* (176–214 and 759–822) are metrically distinguished. The Queen's narrative in iambic trimeters is framed by dialogue in trochaic tetrameters.<sup>30</sup> The ghost's narrative in iambic trimeters likewise initiates a shift away from trochaic tetrameters.

A form of ring-composition not infrequently marks the beginning and end of a narrative. The Queen in *Persians* marks her account with references to the night (176, 200) and Clytemnestra marks hers with references to Troy (*A.* 281, 316). Prometheus begins his account of human suffering with reference to this suffering (442) and ends with ironic reference to his own (471), as he frames his narrative of providing *tekhnai* with references to them (477; 506).<sup>31</sup>

Characters may act as external or internal (secondary) narrators, or as a combination of both. Among external narrators, some explain how they come by their knowledge (the Pythia at *Eu.* 1–19), while others do not (Aegisthus at *A.* 1583–1602). Internal narrators may report events they have witnessed (Danaus at *Supp.* 605–624; Orestes at *Ch.* 269–296), or events in which they played an active role (Clytemnestra at *A.* 1372–

<sup>28</sup> Elsewhere: *Pers.* 180; *A.* 1183, 1373; *Ch.* 554; *Pr.* 197, 445, 476, 642, 703, 788, 825, 844.

<sup>29</sup> *Pers.* 200, 786; *A.* 315, 348, 895, 1239, 1393; *Ch.* 297; *Pr.* 469, 816, 842, 873.

<sup>30</sup> All character-narratives, and messenger-speeches, in Aeschylus are in iambic trimeter.

<sup>31</sup> Further examples at *Pers.* 759–760 and 785–786; *A.* 1178–1179 and 1195, 1578–1581 and 1610–1611; *Ch.* 269–270 and 297.

1394; Prometheus at *Pr.* 197–241). Cassandra (*A.* 1256–1294) speaks now as internal, now as external narrator in recounting both her own undoing at Apollo's hands and the future coming of Orestes as avenger.<sup>32</sup>

Internal narrators are subject to the restrictions of access and place; thus, Orestes, reporting the oracle of Apollo, leaves some room for doubt about the reliability of Apollo's pronouncements (*Ch.* 297–298).<sup>33</sup>

Both Danaus and Orestes recount, largely in indirect statement, what others have said. They report, however, proclamations about themselves: Danaus tells of the vote in the Argive assembly and resultant decree that he and his daughters are free to remain in Argos and that they will be protected; Orestes reports Apollo's oracle commanding him to avenge the murder of his father. The double status of these narrators—that of eyewitness as well as subject of the reported speech—shapes these narratives to some degree: although not playing an active role in what they report, each of these narrators occupies a central position in the narrative, as the presence of various first-person forms attests. It is worth noting that Orestes' narrative encompasses declarations of Apollo concerning Orestes himself as well as general statements about what happens to any mortal who fails to fulfil the duty to avenge a murdered kin. This narrative also turns at 286 from indirect to direct speech, although he claims throughout to be reporting Apollo's command.

Other eyewitness character-narrators also prove to be subject to the restrictions of access and place, showing no signs of bypassing these restrictions. Clytemnestra, for example, claims no privileged knowledge in her deceptive account of her suffering (*A.* 855–894) and thus offers a narrative that, though misleading, remains narratologically faithful to her status. Indeed, this narrative emphasizes her *ignorance* as constitutive of her suffering: she heard many rumours without knowing how to evaluate them (863–876). In recounting her sufferings, Io holds Zeus alone responsible, while ignoring Hera's involvement (*Pr.* 640–686). Even though Prometheus mentions Hera at 592, that is, Io cannot place her in the story and thereby displays her limited knowledge as narrator.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Other external narrators: Darius (*Pers.* 800–838); Clytemnestra (*A.* 281–316); Cassandra (*A.* 1215–1238); Apollo (*Eu.* 625–639); Athena (*Eu.* 681–710); Prometheus (*Pr.*, 700–741, 786–876). Other internal narrators: Clytemnestra (*A.* 855–894); Pythia (*Eu.* 34–59); Prometheus (*Pr.* 351–372, 436–506); Io (*Pr.* 640–682).

<sup>33</sup> Garvie 1986: ad loc.

<sup>34</sup> Griffith 1983a: ad 669–682.



Not all character-narrators are subject to such restrictions, however. Clytemnestra's sweeping beacon-speech (*A.* 281–316), which tells of a chain of fire signals from Troy to Argos, describes not only the quality of the wood burned by the guards on distant Messapion (295), but also the diligence and wakefulness of those on Makistos (290–291). Clytemnestra also remarkably claims that the fire at one point burned more than was ordered (301). However we read this line, Clytemnestra as (external) narrator here claims a form of omniscience. But this line also reveals the origin of her narrative: the 'orders' to which she refers, like the 'laws' (*nomoi*) governing the torchbearers mentioned at 312, reveal that her narrative is imagined. The entire system of torches was established ahead of time, of course, and she produces the narrative on the basis of these arrangements, without acknowledgment. Such a surreptitious claim to narrative control serves Clytemnestra's ulterior motive well: she not only (finally) convinces the chorus that Troy has fallen (compare 264–277 and 317–319); she also claims privileged knowledge and a conspicuous form of (masculine) discursive authority, as the choral leader acknowledges at 351: 'Lady, like a sound-minded man you speak wisely.' This narrative control, then, serves as an index of her power in the public realm and of her control of the chorus.

Motivated omniscience appears in character-narratives elsewhere. The prophetic narratives of the ghost of Darius in *Persians*, Cassandra in *Agamemnon*, and Prometheus in *Prometheus Bound* fall into this category.<sup>35</sup> Prometheus demonstrates his privileged knowledge in identifying Io (589–592), as she immediately confirms. On two occasions he mentions that his mother (Themis = Gaia) revealed the future to him (209–218, 873–874). In spite of his access to some privileged knowledge, Prometheus also draws upon his own experience in recounting the Titanomachy. In doing so he relies upon *ex eventu* knowledge. When he says, for example, at 207–208 that the Titans rejected his advice, thinking in obstinate arrogance (*karterois phronēmasin ōiont'*) that they would prevail through sheer force, he reports what he was able to deduce from what they said and did; he does not claim access to

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<sup>35</sup> As do those of Apollo (*Eu.* 625–639) and Athena (*Eu.* 681–710). Darius is called a 'god' at 157 and 643, and 'divine' at 651. Reconciling Darius' prophetic ability with his ignorance of Xerxes' disaster, Broadhead remarks that Aeschylus 'has attributed to Darius such knowledge as suited his dramatic purpose' (1960: ad 739ff.). Cf. Hall 1996: ad 681–851, with references.

their thoughts. One may compare the narrative of Aegisthus at *Agamemnon* 1583–1602. An infant at the time of the events he relates (1605–1606), Aegisthus nonetheless describes in some detail the gruesome meal offered to Thyestes by Atreus. Although he is presumably recounting a well-known story or relying upon *ex eventu* knowledge, Aegisthus' (implicit) claim to such detailed knowledge serves his purpose, even if the purpose itself is largely thwarted: the account he provides supports his claim that the killing of Agamemnon is just revenge for an earlier, even more heinous, act of bloodshed.<sup>36</sup>

Aeschylean character-narratives contain many reflections on the narrating activity. Here, however, it is again important to keep in mind that these metanarrative comments—like the narratives themselves—also perform rhetorical functions on-stage. At *Agamemnon* 855–860, for example, Clytemnestra announces that she feels no shame to speak of her love for her husband; she then says that she will speak of her difficult life while Agamemnon was at Troy. While affirming her self-assurance as narrator and underscoring the authority with which she speaks ('I shall speak of my own miserable life, not what I have learned from others'), she also asserts her (masculine) agency: speaking for herself and of herself in public, Clytemnestra performs the bold appropriation of authority that characterizes her throughout the play. She is able to fulfil these two very different functions, then, by means of these metanarrative comments.

Clytemnestra at *Agamemnon* 315–316 concludes her beacon-speech by saying that her account constitutes proof of her earlier claim that Troy had fallen. This statement is in part a guide for the narratee, but it is also a judgment about her narrative talents. The Pythia of *Eumenides* reflects on her account at 45 when she says 'I shall prove to have spoken clearly'.<sup>37</sup> The Pythia goes on, however, to qualify her description of the Erinyes, saying that she 'calls' (*legō*, 48) them Gorgons but that she cannot compare (*eikasō*, 49) them to images of Gorgons: she offers eyewitness testimony but makes clear that she is at a loss to say what she has seen, thus preparing the narratee for an alarming sight.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>36</sup> An instructive analogue appears in the prologue of *Eumenides* where the Pythia recounts the ancient history of the temple at Delphi (1–19). Unlike Aegisthus, she reveals (at line 4) that she is repeating a story she has heard (*hōs logos tis*). See Sommerstein 1989: ad loc. on the significance of the indefinite *tis*.

<sup>37</sup> See Sommerstein 1989: ad loc. for this translation.

<sup>38</sup> See also *A.* 1373 (Clytemnestra); *A.* 1584 (Aegisthus); *A.* 1183 and 1195 (Cassandra, whose comments are perhaps the more remarkable in that she is possessed throughout:

Prometheus' narratives likewise contain many metanarrative comments. At 197–198, for example, he introduces his account of the Titanomachy by saying that it is painful for him to tell the story, but painful also to remain silent, thus underscoring his emotional involvement in the (story of) events narrated.<sup>39</sup> At 870–876 he employs *recusatio*, saying that it would be too long a story to tell how he will be released, and besides, Io would not benefit from hearing.<sup>40</sup> Not long before this, however, Prometheus tells Io that he will answer any questions since he has more time on his hands than he would like (818).<sup>41</sup>

In character-narratives narratees are essential; indeed, they typically respond to the narratives and thus flesh out, and complicate, the narrator's (perhaps implicit) assumptions and expectations about the effect of his words. Thus, for example, if the Queen of *Persians* equates her fear with that of her narratees (210–211), the chorus do not entirely embrace this equation (215–216). Or if Clytemnestra at *Agamemnon* 348 directs the narratees to recognize that her narrative has been produced by a woman, the chorus respond by saying that she has spoken just like a man (351). For such dramatic reasons, then, character-narratives situate the narratees at the centre of their concern. Such narratives employ *gar*-clauses and use negatives to contradict the narratees' presumed expectation.<sup>42</sup> There are also many cases of more explicit attention to the narratees' role in hearing, and even confirming, the narrative.<sup>43</sup> Character-narratives further incorporate the narratees by asking questions. These may be rhetorical (as at *Pr.* 500–503 or *A.* 1374–1376) or apparently sincere (as at *A.* 1194–1195 or *Ch.* 297).

In the case of Cassandra's prophetic narrative, this attention to the narratees serves in part to thematize the inevitable failure of her prophecies. When the chorus fail to understand her (*A.* 1112, 1130–1133) and

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her metanarrative comments are 'meta-prophetic' as well); *Ch.* 554 (Orestes); *Pr.* 641–642 (Io).

<sup>39</sup> At *Eumenides* 34 the Pythia makes a metanarrative comment to similar effect.

<sup>40</sup> At 827 he similarly says that he omits a great deal from the story he does tell.

<sup>41</sup> Other such comments at: 226–227, 740–741, 788, 801, 824–827, 842–845, 870–876. The many metanarrative comments in *Prometheus Bound*, in fact, constitute something of a theme: with the protagonist chained to a rock, story-telling itself becomes to a large degree the focus of the drama. See Goward 1999: 78–79.

<sup>42</sup> Cf. (*gar*-clause) *Pers.* 765, 767, 772, 802, 816, 821; *Supp.* 262; *A.* 326; *Ch.* 278; *Eu.* 38; *Pr.* 224; (negative) *Pers.* 781, 783, 786, 802, 809–810, 813–814; *Supp.* 622; *A.* 290–291; *Pr.* 206.

<sup>43</sup> Hearing: *Pers.* 211; *A.* 348, 879; *Pr.* 443, 476, 505, 641–642, 683, 703–706, 740, 789, 802. Confirming: *Pers.* 784; *A.* 1184–1187, 1240–1241; *Ch.* 574; *Pr.* 674.

finally confess their helplessness in the face of her enigmatic utterances (*amēkhanō*, 1177), Cassandra promises to speak ‘no longer in riddles’ (1183) as she turns from sung lyrics to spoken trimeters. Although she unambiguously announces the death of Agamemnon at 1246, the chorus, of course, remain confused. Here, the pointed attention to the narratees plays a crucial role in characterizing Cassandra both as narrator and as prophet.

Like choral narratives, character-narratives may also invoke the narratees’ presumed familiarity with existing stories or ‘myths’.<sup>44</sup> Cassandra does so at *Agamemnon* 1232–1236 when she compares Clytemnestra to an *amphisbaina* or ‘some Scylla’, and at 1197 when she identifies the ills of the house as familiar to the narratees because they are ‘ancient in story’.<sup>45</sup>

This pronounced attention to the secondary narratees, suggests that they serve as guides/foils for the spectators, functioning as primary narratees.<sup>46</sup> There is, however, another way in which these narratives may guide the audience as narratees, as they exploit the potential offered by having multiple audiences on-stage, a practice found also in Sophocles (→), Euripides (→), and Aristophanes (→). In *Agamemnon*, for example, Clytemnestra alternately addresses Agamemnon (877–894, 905–907) and the chorus (855–876, 895–905), with Cassandra and the servants on-stage as well. In each case the narratives can only bear different meanings for the various audiences on-stage—as the contrast between Agamemnon’s (reluctant) obedience to Clytemnestra and the foreboding of the following choral song implies (975–1034). Clytemnestra’s account of the sufferings of ‘a woman apart from her husband’ (861–862) is contextualized for the chorus by their experience of her during the previous ten years, whereas Agamemnon may hear her remarks as the generalization she offers, with pointed reference to his own role in ‘abandoning’ her. At the same time, the theatre audience witness multiple narratees listening in, so to speak, on what is addressed to others, and find therein the suggestion that the same narrative may

<sup>44</sup> Cf. the dialogical version of this phenomenon at *Supplices* 291–295 where the narratee’s familiarity is demonstrated, in part, by reference to what ‘they say’ (*phasi*, 291) and to the circulation of a common account (*phatis pollē*, 293).

<sup>45</sup> Rather than invoking the narratee’s presumed familiarity with the myth, Io’s truncated account of Argus’ death (*Pr.* 677–681) demonstrates her limited knowledge as narrator (see above). This brief version does, however, rely upon the familiarity of the audience (as external primary narratee) with the myth (see Griffith 1983: ad 680–681).

<sup>46</sup> Goward 1999: 76–79.

be understood in various ways. Thus do the narratees on-stage constitute a complex ‘model’ for the theatre audience in their role as primary narratees.

### *Messengers*

Although less frequent and less highly formalized in the surviving plays of Aeschylus than in those of later tragic poets, the messenger-speech is among the more familiar of conventional elements in tragedy.<sup>47</sup> This form of narrative appears in *Persians*, *Seven against Thebes*, and *Agamemnon*, the first of which has been called a ‘messenger-speech in its purest and at the same time most ambitious form’.<sup>48</sup> The narrative in *Persians* treats the Persian defeat in Greece; that in *Seven against Thebes* the preparations of the attacking Argive army; and that in *Agamemnon* part of the battle at Troy and the storm that dispersed the Greek fleet. These narratives are eyewitness accounts of events off-stage, as the messenger of *Persians* announces: ‘I was there; I did not hear about it from others, Persians, and I can recount the awful events’ (266–267). Such a claim underpins the conventional messenger’s role and constitutes his very *raison d’être*.

As in Euripides (→) but not in Sophocles (→), the messenger-speeches in Aeschylus are all produced by characters whose role encompasses little beyond bringing the report. These narratives are preceded by dialogue in *Persians* and *Agamemnon*, while those of *Seven against Thebes* begin immediately upon the messenger’s entry. Aside from *Seven against Thebes* 39–68, they all appear in scenes that punctuate the narrative(s) with dialogue, thus producing discrete sections. Indeed these sections can display significant differences: like only *Agamemnon* 636–680 among Aeschylean messenger-speeches, the last of the four sections in *Persians* (302–347, 353–432, 447–471, 480–514) presents a narrator who participates significantly in the events reported, while in the other sections he is an eyewitness who, although an overt narrator, disappears quickly into the background of the reported events. This tendency toward self-effacement at the scene of action proves to be common in the messenger-speeches of later tragedy, particularly in Euripides (→).<sup>49</sup>

<sup>47</sup> On these formal differences see Keller 1959: 3, 7–8.

<sup>48</sup> Rosenmeyer 1982: 198.

<sup>49</sup> De Jong 1991a: 5; Barrett 2002: 34–40.

Messenger-speeches may respond to a question, as do each of the narrative sections in *Persians* as well as *Agamemnon* 636–680. They typically conclude with a summation or judgment: at *Agamemnon* 680, for example, the herald assures the chorus that his account is true; the messenger in *Persians* concludes at 513–514 similarly asserting the truth of his report and adding that it is far from a full account. The scout in *Seven against Thebes* assures Eteocles that he will never find fault with the report (651–652).

Aeschylean messengers are self-conscious narrators. Perhaps the least self-conscious of the three is the figure in *Seven against Thebes* and yet he, too, asserts the clarity of his report (40, 67) and the security of his own knowledge (375, 651–652). The messenger of *Persians* reasserts his knowledge at 341, but he also presents himself as actively editing his narrative. At 329–330, 429–430, and 513–514 he rounds off narrative sections saying that his account is incomplete. At 343 this messenger concludes with ‘So the *logos* has it’ (*hōd’ ekhei logos*) after reporting the number of Greek and Persian ships. However we translate, the messenger here leaves room for some distance between this *logos* and himself, acknowledging that his report is a *logos*.<sup>50</sup>

But the herald in *Agamemnon* takes self-consciousness to an extreme. Two of his three speeches may be considered narrative (551–582, 636–680), but the first of these fits only poorly into this category. The less problematic narrative that recounts the shipwreck (636–680), begins with 14 lines of metanarrative comment. At 551–583 the herald parades a series of events that he *could* narrate, but will not. ‘If I were to tell’ (*ei legoimī*), he begins at 555. And at 563–567 he produces an anacoluthon that begins ‘If one were to tell’ (*ei legoi tis*) and ends ‘Why suffer these things (again)?’ Here not only does his metanarrative comment displace the narrative of the Greek army’s sufferings at Troy; it also questions the value of such a narrative: ‘Why must I speak of those who perished and count their number, and why must the living grieve at malignant misfortune?’ (570–571). He then offers a summary to stand in for such an extended narrative: ‘Having once captured Troy, the Argive army dedicated the spoils to the gods across Greece, nailing them up at their shrines as a sign of past glory’ (577–579).

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<sup>50</sup> Broadhead (1960: ad loc.) warns that *logos* here does not mean ‘story’, offering ‘score’ or ‘tally’ instead, but the other occurrences of this expression in Aeschylus do not support him (*Th.* 225; *A.* 1661; *Ch.* 521). Belloni 1994: ad 337–343.

Like other (mortal) narrators in Aeschylus, messengers are in principle subject to the restrictions of access and place. The messenger at *Agamemnon* 663, for example, speaks of ‘some god’ (*theos tis*) and at *Persians* 345 ‘some daimon’ (*daimōn tis*). At *Seven against Thebes* 545 the messenger speaks of how Parthenopaeus ‘appears’ to him. The herald in *Agamemnon*, furthermore, is unable to report on the whereabouts or condition of Menelaus. As the mention of divine involvement at *Agamemnon* 663 and *Persians* 345 make clear, however, messengers also make inferences that enable them to produce more complete narratives: at *Persians* 372 the messenger reports that Xerxes spoke to the troops with optimistic thoughts in mind (*hup’ euthumou phrenos*).<sup>51</sup> Similarly, these narrators may take advantage of *ex eventu* knowledge to enrich their narratives, as at *Persians* 361–362 where the messenger says that Xerxes understood neither the trick of the Greek nor the ill will of the god.

On occasion, however, a messenger may show signs of bypassing these restrictions altogether. This is particularly true of the messenger in *Persians* whose perceptual point of view implicitly embraces both the expansive vision of the sea battle as a whole (e.g. 419–420) and extreme close-ups such as his description of Matallus’ beard at 316–317. This messenger’s self-effacement as an actor in the events narrated supports this implicit claim to virtual omnipresence: he is virtually absent from the narrative until line 485 when he begins to report the Persian retreat, using third-person forms referring to the Persians throughout.<sup>52</sup> His absence here is noteworthy because he offers such a vivid account of near total destruction: at 464 he reports that *all* (*hapantōn*) on Psyttaleia were killed. His own survival remains unexplained among the carnage on both land and sea, underpinned as it is by his omnipresence.<sup>53</sup>

Although messenger-speeches in Aeschylus share much with character-narratives, they typically position the narratee less centrally in the narrative. Whereas Clytemnestra’s interests depart significantly from those of the chorus in *Agamemnon*, for example, and thus shape her narrative and guide its purpose, Aeschylean messengers cannot be said to have motives of a similar order in producing their narratives. This is principally a consequence of their having little role in the play aside from delivering their report. With the messenger’s rhetorical purpose

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Th.* 392, 491–492, 529–530.

<sup>52</sup> He does use the first-person plural personal pronoun at 406 (*hēmōn*). De Jong 1991a: 5.

<sup>53</sup> Barrett 2002: 32–37.

less central to his role, the place of the narratee in the production of the narrative becomes less pronounced: these narratives work to privilege the ‘events themselves’ in part by deemphasizing the status of the narrative as speech directed at the addressee.<sup>54</sup> These narratives do, nonetheless, display some of the same techniques for incorporating the narratee found elsewhere.

Messenger-speeches anticipate the narratee’s questions with *gar*-clauses;<sup>55</sup> they also contradict the narratee’s presumed expectation with a negative.<sup>56</sup> They employ similes, thus signalling something of how the narratee is imagined to make sense of the events recounted. At *Persians* 424, for example, the messenger compares the slaughtered Persians to a haul of fish. Similes occur four times in the messenger-speeches of *Seven against Thebes*: 53, 381, 393–394, and 498.

Like character-narratives, messenger-speeches invoke the narratee as a knowing subject whose knowledge may support the narrative project. ‘Know well’, the messenger says at *Persians* 337, ‘that if it had been simply a matter of numbers, the Persian fleet would have prevailed.’ He goes on to ask the chorus not to think numbers were decisive (344–347).<sup>57</sup> At *Seven against Thebes* 651–652 the messenger says to Eteocles that ‘You will never find fault with this man [the messenger] for his reports’. Similarly, the herald in *Agamemnon* concludes by calling upon the narratee as knowing subject: ‘Having heard this, know that you have heard the truth’ (680).

Other forms of attention to the narratee include direct address (*Pers.* 353; *Th.* 39, 62) and use of second-person forms (*Pers.* 356; *Th.* 576, 632). It is noteworthy that Aeschylean messenger-speeches pose no questions in their narrative sections, aside from the largely metanarrative *Agamemnon* 551–582.<sup>58</sup> This is one indication of the narratee’s relatively diminished presence here.

<sup>54</sup> For these reasons, it is of particular value to consider the status of the theatre audience as narratee in the case of the messenger. For a discussion of the messenger’s narratives in *Persians* with respect to the audience, see Goldhill 1988a: 192–193.

<sup>55</sup> A few representative examples: *Pers.* 335, 338; *Th.* 427; *A.* 655.

<sup>56</sup> As, e.g. at *Pers.* 373, 417; *Th.* 378, 491; *A.* 668.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. *Pers.* 431, *A.* 681.

<sup>58</sup> Questions occur at the end of sections in *Seven against Thebes* when the messenger asks Eteocles whom he will send to battle, in the form of a metanarrative comment preceding the narrative at *Agamemnon* 646–649, and as the herald turns to the present moment (671–672).



*Conclusion*

Aeschylean narratives assume a wide variety of forms, with narrators adopting a range of positions and attending to the (multiple) narratees in numerous ways. And this rich array of narrative types appears amid the even more varied congeries of speech-forms that constitute Aeschylean dramatic texts. This wide range of narrative types, the variety of narrators and their treatments of the narratee(s), the difficulty of identifying and demarcating narratives, the fluidity with which narrative may turn into dialogue, and the qualities of these narratives that compel us to treat them as embedded in spite of the fact that they are not—all of these point to the unusual status of narrative in this (dramatic) context. The many ways in which these narratives are hedged about with qualification, that is, serve both to complicate our task in understanding them and to clarify one of their key features: like the plays of Sophocles and Euripides, the dramas of Aeschylus incorporate a sustained interest in and experimentation with the workings and possibilities of narrative. Although we may discern patterns, narrative practice in Aeschylus—as in Greek tragedy as a whole—is far from settled. Indeed, the many self-conscious narrators and the pronounced tendency toward metanarrative comment found in the plays suggests as much. The richness of these narrative types, then, should be seen not only as an index of a sophisticated understanding of narrative forms, but also as a sign of experimentation: in addition to being speech-acts in a dramatic context, Aeschylean narratives also constitute a sustained programme of enquiry into the very nature of narrative itself.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Gould 2001: 333–334.

## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

### SOPHOCLES

*I.J.F. de Jong*

#### *Introduction. The forms of Sophoclean narrative*

Like all Attic tragedians, Sophocles makes ample use of narrative in his plays: we have messengers, the chorus, and protagonists who, in the form of continuous narrative, dialogue, or a combination of the two, relate their own or other people's experiences, functioning as secondary or intra-dramatic narrators.<sup>1</sup> The dialogical form of narration is new in comparison to epic and historiography, and it may be useful to start this chapter by taking a closer look at this development. For one thing, dialogue is a natural vehicle for narrative in a dramatic context, and Sophocles, who strives for an unobtrusive presentation of information, often turns to this form. We find dialogical narrative as part of expository prologues, e.g. in *Aj.*, where Ajax' nightly onslaught on the flocks is presented to the spectators in two successive dialogues between Athena and Odysseus (40–50) and Athena and Ajax (91–117).<sup>2</sup> Often narrative precedes the *rheseis* of messengers or reporter-protagonists, e.g. in *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1237–1296, where the report of the death of Jocasta follows on a dialogue (1223–1236) in which the news is briefly announced, and *Electra* 871–919, where in a dialogue Electra Chrysothemis recounts how she found a lock of Orestes' hair, and then proceeds with what she herself calls (892) a full and detailed narrative,

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<sup>1</sup> There is no single systematic study on Sophoclean narrative, but Goward 1999 and Barrett 2002 discuss many of its aspects and forms in general, while Roberts 1989, Kraus 1991, and Markantonatos 2002 specifically discuss the narratives of *Ph.*, *Tr.*, and *OC*, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *OT* 103–131 (death of Laius presented in dialogue between Creon and Oedipus); *Tr.* 61–93 (Heracles' latest exploits, recounted in a dialogue between Hyllus and Deianeira).

which is in a continuous form.<sup>3</sup> The combination of introductory dialogue, which presents the main news and whets the appetite for the full story, and detailed *rhexis* is a logical one and is also employed by Aeschylus (→) and Euripides. In Sophocles a narrative often evolves back into a dialogue which, while not narrative itself, does contain a reaction to the narrative just recounted; an example is *Electra* 764–803, where chorus, Electra, and Clytemnestra react—in dramatically different ways—to the news of Orestes’ ‘death’ in the presence of the messenger, the Old Slave.<sup>4</sup>

Sometimes Sophocles employs dialogical narration when he wants to keep up the pace, rather than slowing down to the detail of a *rhexis*, e.g. in *Antigone* 1278–1316 when, after a detailed messenger-speech on the death of Haemon (1192–1243), the death of Euryclea is reported in dialogue only.<sup>5</sup> On other occasions the dialogical mode of presentation is exploited for special effects, as when the chorus interrogates Oedipus about his sad past (*OC* 510–548), and especially when Oedipus finds out the truth about himself in a series of interrogations of Jocasta (*OT* 726–770), the messenger from Corinth (1017–1053), and the shepherd (1121–1185).

Although Sophoclean drama is full of narrative, there are also moments when narration is avoided altogether: e.g. Odysseus in *Philoctetes* 3–11 briefly touches on the fate of Philoctetes, but then cuts himself short. His avoidance of narration is motivated by the plot (as he himself says, there is no time for conversation), but the story of Philoctetes is not one in which he played a positive role, and hence his reluctance seems to be psychologically motivated as well. Finally, there is the playwright, who saves up the story, which will be told in full and pathetic detail later (263–264, 285–316, 676–718). Likewise, Orestes’ cutting short the story of his own and Electra’s suffering during the past years in *Electra* 1288–1292 (and cf. the Old Slave doing the same in 1364–1366) is not only

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 214–284, 719–747; *El.* 660–679; *OT* 726–770; *Ant.* 223–248, 384–406, 988–997, 1155–1191; *Tr.* 225–247, 663–671, 734–748; *Ph.* 317–342; 542–602; *OC* 324–360, 1579–1585.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 783–812; *OT* 834–862, 1286–1296; *Ant.* 278–331, 441–445, 1244–1256; *Tr.* 291–334, 375–392; *OC* 385–420, 1666–1669.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Tr.* 180–199 (a messenger informs Deianeira how Lichas reported to the Trachinian people Heracles’ victory; the story will be told in full by Lichas himself in 229–290), 1114–1142 (Hyllus tells Heracles about the death of Deianeira, which in 899–946 had been reported in full by the Nurse).

acceptable in terms of plot and psychology, but also understandable from the point of view of the playwright, who had already dealt with this subject in two earlier narratives (254–309, 585–605).<sup>6</sup>

*The marking and function of narrative*

As a rule, when narratives are presented *en bloc*, the beginning and end are explicitly marked. Narratives may start off with an emotional preamble, as they often do in Homer (→), e.g. *Trachiniae* 1–5, where Deianeira introduces the story of her life as follows: ‘There is an ancient saying among men, once revealed to them, that you cannot understand a man’s life before he is dead, so as to know whether he has a good or bad one. But I know well, even before going to Hades, that the one I have is unfortunate and sorrowful.’<sup>7</sup> In the majority of cases we find a metanarrative remark, which announces the act of narrating and often stresses the reliability of the narrator: ‘I was sent for this purpose and therefore will tell you [how Orestes died]’ (*El.* 680), or ‘I was there, dear mistress, and will tell you, and I shall suppress no word of truth. For why should I try to soothe you with words which will later brand me as a liar? Truth is always best’ (*Ant.* 1191–1195).<sup>8</sup> The actual narrative typically starts off with the particles *gar* or *epei*. Sometimes we find epic devices for starting off a story: asking after the main characters (‘What mighty antagonists entered the lists ... Who set out for the ordeal of the contest?’: *Tr.* 503–506; cf. *Il.* 1.8), or the ‘there is/was X’ motif (‘There is a cape in Euboea ...’: *Tr.* 537;<sup>9</sup> cf., e.g. *Od.* 9.508–519).

The end of a narrative may be signalled by the use of the present tense, which describes the situation to which the events of the story have led (e.g. *Aj.* 65: ‘and now he [Ajax] is torturing them, bound as they are, inside his dwelling’),<sup>10</sup> or a metanarrative remark (e.g. *OC* 1665–1666:

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *OT* 685–686 (the chorus declines to tell Iocaste about Oedipus’ altercation with Creon); *OC* 361–364 (Ismene declines to tell Oedipus and Antigone about her own suffering, because there is now more pressing news, viz. the quarrel between Oedipus’ sons), 1148–1149 (Theseus modestly declines to recount his victory over the Thebans; the playwright’s motive is that this battle had already been evoked by the chorus in 1044–1095).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 134–140, 430–433, 1266–1271; *El.* 254–260; *Tr.* 153–154.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 284, 748; *El.* 892; *OT* 707–710, 771–773, 1237–1240; *Ant.* 407a, 998; *Tr.* 472–474, 672–673, 749, 899; *Ph.* 603–604a; *OC* 1291, 1586.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. *OT* 103; *Tr.* 555, 752, 1159, *Ph.* 604b.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 323–327; *Tr.* 36–48, 943a.

'And if anyone thinks I speak foolishly, I would not beg for the credence of those who think I am a fool'),<sup>11</sup> or, most often, a conclusion (e.g. *El.* 307–309: 'When things are so, my friends, there can be no good sense or piety. No, when things are bad, inevitably one's conduct must be bad also').<sup>12</sup> The conclusion is usually accompanied by or evolves into some form of exhortation to action: 'keep good faith' (*El.* 916–919), 'show what you're worth' (*Ant.* 37–38), 'I curse you' (*Tr.* 807–812), or 'I supplicate you' (*OC* 1326–1345). This is an important characteristic of dramatic narrative: it is never told by way of entertainment to while away time, as stories may be in epic, but it always has a function within the plot: characters report events because these events call for action and reaction.

### *Internal and external narrators*

What kind of narrators do we find? Not surprisingly, most dramatic narrators are internal, characters who are recounting events in which they themselves played a role. The degree of their involvement may range from protagonist to affected person to mere witness: Philoctetes is given ample opportunity to recount his miserable life over the past ten years (*Ph.* 263–316) and Deianeira sums up her fearful life (*Tr.* 1–48<sup>13</sup>); an example of a story told by a person affected is the sacrifice of Iphigeneia as recounted by Electra (*El.* 558–579), who wields it as an argument in the *agon* with her mother;<sup>14</sup> typical witness-reports, finally, are the messenger-speeches, which will be discussed below.

A special form of narration consists of a narrator reporting events about which he or she has merely *heard*. In *Electra* 417–427, for example, Chrysothemis reports to Electra Clytemnestra's dream ('They say that she was once more in company with your father and mine ... That is the story I heard from someone who was present when she told

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *El.* 761–763; *Tr.* 289a–290; *Ph.* 389a, 620a.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. *El.* 916–919; *OT* 720–725, 814–833, 1280–1285; *Ant.* 37–38, 1023–1032, 1240–1243; *Tr.* 173–177, 484–489, 807–812, 943b–946; *Ph.* 389b–390, 620b–621, 1343–1347; *OC* 382–384.

<sup>13</sup> Discussion in Hulton 1969: 51–52; Winnington-Ingram 1980: 75–76; and Heiden 1989: 21–30. Cf. *OT* 771–833; *OC* 960–1002.

<sup>14</sup> Discussion in Goward 1999: 111–112. Cf. *Aj.* 284–330; *Ant.* 21–38, 49–57; *Ph.* 603–621; *OC* 361–384.

her dream to the Sun').<sup>15</sup> By presenting the dream in the form of a hearsay report (and secondhand hearsay at that) Sophocles adds to the casualness with which Chrysothemis approaches it. She has not interpreted it (as Electra will shortly do), indeed has grasped so little of its meaning that she almost left the stage without telling Electra about it.

Hearsay narration can be exploited to great effect since—as Sophoclean characters themselves are only too aware (cf. *El.* 885–886 and *Tr.* 67, 425–426, 747)—hearsay is a less reliable source of information than autopsy. One example is *Oedipus Tyrannus* 103–131, where Creon can tell Oedipus about the murder of Laius only indirectly, repeating what the one survivor recounted at the time; finding out the exact circumstances of this event will take up the entire middle part of the play (707–862). The most protracted example is found in *Trachiniae*, where Deianeira is informed of Heracles' attack of Oechalia in a series of hearsay reports: (Hyllus:) they say Heracles was a slave to a Lydian woman the past year, but is now attacking the city of Eurytus (61–93); (messenger:) I heard Lichas say that Heracles has been victorious (180–199); (Lichas:) Heracles has been a slave of the Lydian Omphale for a year (he told me) and because this was due (he said) to Eurytus, he has sacked his city by way of revenge (229–290; here Lichas' reference to Heracles as his source serves to back up the true part of his story and thereby commend the false part); (messenger, correcting Lichas:) in fact, Lichas told the Trachinian people that Heracles sacked Oechalia because he wanted the daughter of Eurytus, Iole (335–374); (Lichas:) I said that I had *heard* that the captive woman is Iole the daughter of Eurytus (395–435) ... yes, Heracles sacked Oechalia in order to get Iole (472–489). The function of this protracted use of hearsay narration is to point up Deianeira's isolation: she is last in a convoluted and unreliable chain of communication.<sup>16</sup>

Only occasionally do we find external narrators. Here speakers, usually the chorus, recount events of what for them, too, already is a mythical past in which they themselves played no role: 'the body of Danae too endured to give up heaven's light in a brass-fastened dwelling, and immured in a tomblike chamber she was held prisoner. And yet she was highly esteemed by reason of her birth, my child, and she was treasurer

<sup>15</sup> Discussion in Goward 1999: 107–108.

<sup>16</sup> Gellie 1972: 62; Heiden 1989: *passim*; Kraus 1991: 83–88; and Goward 1999: 91–96. Cf. *Aj.* 134–200; *El.* 566–579; *Ant.* 21–36; *OC* 374–381.

for Zeus' golden-flowing seed', says the chorus to the absent Antigone (*Ant.* 544–548).<sup>17</sup> As in Homer (→), Pindar (→), and Aeschylus (→) these stories of the past are invoked in order to provide a parallel (whether by way of similarity or contrast) to the situation at hand on stage; the way in which the parallel is intended is not always clear (is the chorus consoling Antigone, exhorting her to accept her fate, shying away from their own responsibility?).<sup>18</sup> They display the typical allusive and elliptical style that highlights certain events (which are necessary for the 'message'), while at the same time leaving out others. Thus in the case of the 'Danae' story, both prehistory (why Danae was immured) and aftermath (her escape with her son in a metal chest) are suppressed, while the nature of her 'honoured house' and 'Zeus' golden-flowing seed' is left for the narratees to fill in. Conversely, the detail in her story that corresponds most closely to Antigone's situation, her imprisonment, is mentioned twice, in terms that recall that heroine's present predicament. Their external status turns these narrators into authoritative speakers: they are not bound by the restrictions of narrators who are themselves part of the events and thereby lack an overview, but can narrate omnisciently, at times embracing 'the whole of human knowledge'.<sup>19</sup> Of course, their omniscience applies only to their competence as narrators; as interpreters of the play's action the chorus is as restricted and as partial as the other participants.

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. *El.* 145–152 (Electra recalls the stories of Niobe and Procne), 504–515 (the chorus relates the chariot race of Pelops, the first of many mishaps in the house of Agamemnon, to which a new one is now about to be added; for the audience, the theme of the disastrous race recalls the scheme of Orestes' 'death' in a race, which is about to be related), 837–847 (chorus and Electra recount the story of Amphiaraus and Eriphyle), 955–965 (Lycurgus), 966–987 (Cleopatra); *Ant.* 823–833 (Antigone recalls the fate of Niobe by way of a parallel to her own sad fate); *Tr.* 503–530 (the chorus recount the story of how Heracles and Achelous fought over Deianeira, illustrating the force of Aphrodite, who is presently responsible for Heracles' infatuation with Iole; thus a story from the recent past has already acquired the status of a mythological tale, known to all); *Phil.* 676–679 (Ixion). Comparable in function are the brief anonymous paradigms presented by Menelaus and Teucer in *Aj.* 1142–1146 and 1150–1156.

<sup>18</sup> Burton 1980: 124–132 and Gardiner 1987: 92–93.

<sup>19</sup> Goward 1999: 22.

*Messengers*

One group of narrators is deserving of a separate discussion: the messengers. As in Aeschylus (→) and Euripides (→), all Sophoclean plays, with the exception of the *Philoctetes*, feature at least one messenger-speech, in which a character, usually anonymous and of low social status, reports offstage events, not seldom the bloody climax of the play.<sup>20</sup> Sophocles, typically, has well integrated this traditional device into his plays. Thus his messengers are characters who (i) sometimes play a role in the rest of the play as well (Lichas and Hyllus in *Tr.*, the Pedagogue in *El.*), (ii) have distinct personalities (notably the guard who reports the two burials in *Ant.*), and (iii) sometimes act as messengers on more than one occasion (the guard in *Ant.*, the second messenger in *Ant.*, who first reports Haemon's death, then Eurydice's). The messengers do not tell their stories of their own accord, as is usually the case in Aeschylus and Euripides, but are sent by one of the characters in their story to report what has happened (and hence to set in motion new action). Thus the messenger in *Ajax* is sent by Teucer to report Calchas' prophecy to Ajax, in an attempt to avert the danger it contains.<sup>21</sup> A final device by which Sophocles integrates and naturalizes this potentially alien element of narrative into the dramatic context is by having it not only preceded by a dialogue (as in Aeschylus and Euripides), but also followed by one, in which the messenger is asked for extra information or joins the discussion about his news (*OT* 1286–1296; *Ant.* 1244–1256; *Tr.* 291–334, 375–392; *OC* 1666–1669). The preceding dialogue, in which, after a brief announcement of the main news, one of the characters asks for detailed information is a fine method of justifying the length of the narrative that is to follow. The same purpose is served by the dramatic quality of the narrative, which includes speeches, historic presents, and many graphic descriptions. Or as one messenger puts it: 'the briefest way to tell my news would be to say that Oedipus is dead. But to tell briefly what has happened nor the words nor the deeds that took place there allow' (*OC* 1559–1560).

Messengers are in principle internal narrators, though their role is often restricted to that of a witness. Indeed, it is because they have been eyewitnesses that they can now act as messengers, and hence this fact

<sup>20</sup> *Aj.* 748–782; *El.* 680–763; *OT* 1237–1285; *Ant.* 249–277, 407–440; *Tr.* 749–812, 899–946; *OC* 1586–1666. Goward 1999: 26–32 and Barrett 2002: 76–101.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. *El.* 669–670; *Ant.* 272–277; *Tr.* 285–286.



is invariably stressed: 'So much as this I know, for I was present' (*Aj.* 748) or 'I saw with my own eyes the dire calamity of my father and did not merely hear about it' (*Tr.* 746–747).<sup>22</sup> Though often no more than witnesses, they are emotionally affected witnesses: 'what we saw next was terrible' (*OT* 1267) or 'such was this event, terrible to relate, and for those who saw it, as we did, the worst disaster of all that I have beheld' (*El.* 761–763); in the latter case, the conventional emphasis which a messenger places on his autopsy has additional significance, in that he is telling a false tale. But the messenger does occasionally play a role in the events, most notably the guard in *Antigone*, who reports the two burials of Polynices (223–331, 384–445).<sup>23</sup> It is precisely his involvement which determines much of the tone of his stories: the first time he is reluctant to report the burial, and even fearful, conscious as he is of his own failure as a guard; the second time, he is both exhilarated and sad to be able to tell who did it and, handing her over, to save his skin.

#### *Overt narrators*

Sophoclean narrators are overt narrators, who reveal their presence as a narrating subject at many points and in many ways. To begin with, there are the metanarrative remarks which, as we have seen, often mark the beginning and the end of a narrative, but which also occur in the course of an account. In the latter case they may have a structural function, emphasizing a new or crucial phase in the story, e.g. *OT* 1169: 'Ah, I have come to the danger point in telling my story.'<sup>24</sup> Next, there are evaluative or emotional qualifications: Electra refers to the relationship of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus as 'their final outrage' (*El.* 271); the Theban priest calls the Sphinx 'the cruel singer' (*OT* 36) and the oracles which Oedipus received 'the shameful predictions of my cruel oracles' (*OT* 796–797); Antigone talks about 'the unhappy corpse of Polynices' (*Ant.* 26); the chorus refers to the sons of Oedipus as 'the unhappy two' (*Ant.* 144); Deianeira calls herself 'unhappy' (*Tr.* 16), etc. Then there are comments, e.g., *El.* 696–697: 'So far, things stood thus; but when one of the gods does mischief, not even a mighty man

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *OT* 1238, 1263; *Ant.* 423, 432, 1192, 1207, 1216; *Tr.* 742–743, 888–889, 912; *OC* 1646, 1654.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Hyllus in *Tr.* 749–812, nurse in *Tr.* 899–946, messenger in *OC* 1586–1666.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. *OT* 800; *Tr.* 678–679.

can escape'; the comment serves to articulate the narrative, marking its climax.<sup>25</sup> Sometimes comments are couched in comparisons, e.g. *Ant.* 424–425: 'Antigone cried out bitterly', says the messenger, 'with a sound like the piercing note of a bird when she sees her empty nest robbed of her young; just so did she cry out, weeping, when she saw the corpse laid bare.'<sup>26</sup> With this pathetic image, the messenger—thus far concerned only for himself and hence critical of the burial—now shows some sympathy for the person who carried it out.

### *Narratees*

Narratives in drama are nearly always recounted to someone: the chorus, but as a rule one or more of the protagonists as well. The presence of these secondary or intra-dramatic narratees is acknowledged with a greater or lesser degree of intensity. The mildest form are vocatives, usually friendly or ingratiating in nature ('my dear', 'friends', 'child'), but occasionally more negative ('you shameless insolence', 'you wretch': *OC* 960, 978). The abundance of vocatives which Philoctetes employs when recounting to Neoptolemus the story of his solitary years in *Philoctetes* 260–316 (cf. 260, 268, 284, 300) underscore the argumentative function of this narrative: soon he will ask his narratee to take him with him. Sometimes the narratee is not present on stage, but apostrophized: a god (*Aj.* 172–181, *El.* 95–102) or the sun (*Ant.* 100–106), called on in their capacity of witness. In some cases a more active involvement of the narratees is solicited in the form of 'there you could have ...' passages (e.g. 'if you had been close at hand to see the nature of her action, you would indeed have pitied her': *Tr.* 896–897),<sup>27</sup> or questions (e.g. 'And then what kind of days do you think I pass when I see Aegisthus sitting on my father's throne ...?': *El.* 266–274).<sup>28</sup>

Where the narratee is actually a character in the story being recounted, we are dealing with second-person narration, often quite forceful in tone: the Theban priest, leading up to a request for help from Oedipus, recalls the king's former help: 'For it was *you* who came to the city of

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 150–161; *OT* 777b–778. See also nn. 8 and 13 for comments at the opening and end of narratives.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 215; *El.* 98; *Ant.* 113; *Tr.* 32–33, 530.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. *Tr.* 365, 692; *OC* 969, 1587–1589.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Ant.* 1194–1195; *Tr.* 742–743; *Ph.* 276–278.

Cadmus and released us from the tribute we were paying, the tribute of the cruel singer ...’ (*OT* 35–36). Conversely, in order to demonstrate the incompetence of Tiresias, Oedipus recalls the seer’s role in the episode of the Sphinx: ‘Why, come, tell me, how can you be a true prophet? Why, when the bitch-sphinx sang her song, did not *you* speak some word that could release the citizens?’ (*OT* 390–392).<sup>29</sup>

There is also a special form where the narratee who plays a role in the story is absent and we are again dealing with an apostrophe. A particularly forceful example is *Ajax* 134–171+182–191, where the chorus of Salaminian sailors give their—incredulous—version of Ajax’ nightly massacre of the herds in the ‘you’ form, addressing their lord Ajax, who is still in his tent. The choice of this form is effective, in that it underscores the chorus’ dependence on their king (which they themselves explicitly acknowledge: ‘little men are best supported by the great ... we have not the strength to defend ourselves against them without you’: 160, 165–166), and leads up to the epode where they actually call out for him to come out of his tent. Finally, a narrator who does not use second-person narration may yet abundantly insert ‘you’ forms, as Hyllus does in his report to his mother of the manner in which she poisoned his father Heracles (749–806): ‘as Heracles was about to sacrifice, there came Lichas bringing *your* gift, the robe of death. He put it on, as *you had instructed*, ... When Heracles asked Lichas through which scheme he had brought the robe, Lichas told him that it was *your* gift alone ... Heracles hurled himself to the ground, uttering many cries and dwelling upon his disastrous marriage with *you* ...’ In this way Hyllus leads up to his forceful conclusion: ‘These are the plot and the action, mother, of which *you* are convicted, for which may avenging Justice and the Erinyes punish *you!*’ (807–809).

In general, the conclusion of a story, containing an exhortation to action, addresses the narratees: thus Tecmessa ends her report to the chorus about Ajax’ madness with ‘Come friends, for this is why I came, go in and help him, if you have any power to do so! For such men are won over by the words of friends’ (*Aj.* 328–330). The most active involvement of the narratees is found in dialogical narratives. Here the narratee actually speaks, and by his questions prompts or steers the narrative: e.g. ‘(messenger:) Teucer gave orders that Ajax be kept within the shelter of the hut and not allowed out alone. (Tecmessa:) And where

<sup>29</sup> Cf. *Aj.* 134–200, 1273–1297; *El.* 11–14, 585–608; *OT* 1017–1053; *Ph.* 1324–1347.

is Teucer, and what is the reason for saying this? (messenger:) He has lately come back. He believes that this departure [of Ajax] seals the fate of Ajax. (Tecmessa:) Ah me, from what man did he learn this? (messenger:) From the prophet who is son of Thestor ...' (*Aj.* 795–801).<sup>30</sup>

Narrators can also be their own narratees, as is often the case in choral narratives, where the members of the chorus address each other (or no one in particular); naturally, in such cases the primary narratees, the spectators in the theatre, will have a greater sense of being addressed themselves than when other narratees apart from the chorus are present (→ Aeschylus and Euripides). When the chorus are narrating events in which they themselves are involved, their internal narration employs 'we' forms. This is the case in *Ant.* 100–147: 'Beam of the sun ..., you who moved off in ... flight the man ... that was raised up against *our* land ... and flew to *our* country ...; he paused above *our* houses. ...; but he went, before his jaws had been glutted with *our* gore ...', etc. This 'we' narrative, recounting the quarrel between Polynices and Eteocles in terms of its effect on the city, presents an effective contrast with the previous scene, in which the same event had been looked at from the point of view of the family by the sisters Antigone and Ismene.<sup>31</sup>

As always, it is important to take into account the different functions which narratives may have for the primary and secondary narratees. Thus the 'argument' function of the mythological examples in *Antigone* 944–987 may be to console or exhort Antigone, and to warn Creon, while their 'key' function may be to suggest to the spectators the catastrophic consequences of thwarted desire. In the same way, the report of Orestes' death in *Electra* 764–803 has different effects on Electra (who is shattered), Clytemnestra (who is sad for a brief moment but otherwise relieved), and the spectators (who know it to be a false tale and can admire the old man's narrative talents).

<sup>30</sup> For other examples, see the discussion of dialogical narrative in the introductory section.

<sup>31</sup> Gardiner 1987: 84–85.

*A Sophoclean speciality: false narrative*

Taking his cue from the Homeric lying tales (→ Homer) and Aeschylus (*Ch.* 674–690), Sophocles loves to insert false narratives. The longest and least complicated instance is the pseudo messenger-speech voiced by the Paedagogue in *Electra* 680–763. It serves to back up the news of Orestes' death, which in turn forms part of the larger scheme of Orestes who, in disguise, enters the palace and kills Clytemnestra and—later—Aegisthus. His death could, of course, have been reported much more briefly, along the lines set out by Orestes in 49–50 ('tell them that Orestes is dead by an accident, fallen from his moving chariot in the Pythian games'), but the Pedagogue actually spends more than half of his tale on an account of Orestes' successes before his accident and the first half of the dramatic chariot race, including a detailed list of the contestants. Of course, this attention to detail serves to increase the authenticity and hence the authority of his invented tale (which will indeed be believed without any reservation by his narratees Clytemnestra and Electra). But the picture painted here of an Orestes proving his mettle in the most heroic of athletic contests (cf. 693–695: 'He was proclaimed as an Argive, by name Orestes, son of Agamemnon, who once gathered the famous armament of Greece') has a considerable effect on Clytemnestra, who briefly takes pride in her son and hence grieves over his death, however desirable it is (766–771), and above all on Electra, who now has all the more reason to regret the loss of such a brother (808–822). At the same time, this invented tale embodies the theme of 'power brought low' (the beautiful and apparently invincible young aristocrat Orestes unexpectedly crashes), and as such it can be said to anticipate, for the spectators, Clytemnestra's impending downfall.<sup>32</sup>

Lichas' report on Heracles' sack of Oechalia in *Trachiniae* 248–290 is not so much false as misleading, focusing as it does on Eurytus' insults and Heracles' revenge, which consists in taking the former's city, but leaving out the crucial fact that he had another motive for wanting this city, viz. Eurytus' daughter Iole.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Macleod 2001: 107–132. To my mind, her suggestion that the tale actually functions as a warning goes too far: the Paedagogue is clearly not trying to warn her.

<sup>33</sup> Analysis in Parlavantza 1969: 28–30; Heiden 1989: 53–64; and Kraus 1991: 84–85.

Two highly intriguing false narratives are those in *Philoctetes* by Neoptolemus (329–390) and the Merchant (542–561). They are a mixture of true and false, and even their false elements are of relevance to the play as a whole. Let us take a closer look at Neoptolemus' tale. Odysseus and Phoenix came to fetch him from Scyrus (true), telling that he was the only one who could take Troy (after the prologue Neoptolemus knows that this is only partly true, since Philoctetes and the bow are also necessary; hence his somewhat bitter comment here: 'whether it was true or after all a fiction': 345). Having arrived in the Greek camp at Troy, he was greeted as a second Achilles (this may be a detail invented to increase the persuasiveness of his tale, but nothing speaks against it being true), but when he asked the Atrides for the armour of his father they refused, as they had already given it to Odysseus. When Odysseus, too, refused to hand it over, he decided to go back to Scyrus (false).<sup>34</sup> Where Neoptolemus unknowingly foreshadows the course of the play itself (until the forceful intervention of Heracles): Odysseus and Neoptolemus have come to fetch Philoctetes, there will be disputes over his bow (865–1080, 1218–1302), and at some point Neoptolemus will decide to go back to Scyrus (1402–1408). Thus for a long time there will be more truth in Neoptolemus' narrative than he himself realizes.

### *Conclusion*

Sophocles' drama features a great deal of narrative and a wide variety of intra-dramatic narrators. This may be due in part to a technical factor (his abandonment of the trilogy, which means that what preceded the play must somehow be presented in the course of the play itself), but much more to a thematic one (Sophoclean characters are often in the grip of the past). His predilection for narrative was a challenge to Sophocles, so much a man of the theatre: how can this undramatic element be integrated into his plays? His solution is to chop up narrative into dialogue or, when it is presented *en bloc*, to frame it by dialogue; to make his characters intensely interested in the content of the narratives, to which they react forcefully; to endow even the most functional

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<sup>34</sup> There are other analyses of Neoptolemus' tale: some consider it a lie from beginning to end; others think that the part about his being refused the armour of his father is true, because when Philoctetes repeats the fact in 1364–1365, Neoptolemus does not correct him.

narrators of all, the messengers, with real personalities or with a role elsewhere in the play. Moreover, he varies the status of the narratives: some are no more than hearsay reports, others are downright lies. In this way they fascinate, puzzle, and surprise both the characters on stage and the spectators in the theatre.

## CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

### EURIPIDES

*N.J. Lowe*

To appreciate the distinctiveness of Euripides' use of narration, we need to bear in mind three general principles governing the use of narration in tragedy. (i) All narration in drama is *embedded* narration; there is thus always a signifying relationship between the embedded narrative content and the framing situation, especially the voice and intentions of the narrating figure in communication with the intradramatic narratees. (ii) It is in the nature of tragic performance that all significant action is in some sense unseen, and mediated through 'narration' in the broadest sense: the past and future, the offstage world, states of mind, the designs of gods are all inaccessible to direct representation, and access comes only through variously problematic categories of verbal report. (iii) Tragic drama actively explores the boundaries between narration and neighbouring modes of discourse—between telling and showing, between narrative and argument in persuasive rhetoric, and especially between narrative focalization and the modality of other, non-narrative kinds of world-building through language.

Precisely because these boundaries are so blurred in practice, it is important for analytic purposes to mark a clear formal distinction between narrative and more strongly modalized forms of mediated action in tragedy—such as the proleptically oriented categories of plans, wishes, prayers, threats, vows, fears (all of which can, but need not, be presented in narrative form); analeptic forms such as regrets and accusations; and beliefs, feelings, and desires about the present. For these purposes, tragic narrative may be circumscribed as dealing with past, present, or future *events* (rather than states of mind, judgment, or gnomic opinion) presented by their narrator as non-provisional *fact* (rather than modalized states of potentiality), whether or not they are actually true—and normally related to the narratee as *news* (except for the special cases of agonistic narrative, where narrative is used to present competing, contested analepses, and choral paradeigma, where analeptic narration expands the causes or significance of present events).



Within this framework, Euripides' distinctive uses of narration are strongly connected to formal elements of structure. Euripidean drama is patterned around formally positioned slabs of narration, each with its own characteristic poetics, and the modulation between these gives the Euripidean play much of its characteristic shape.<sup>1</sup> The following survey addresses the functions of narrators and narratees in the five main narrative loci: prologues, choral odes, narratives in *rhesis* within episodes (including messenger-speeches), agones, and closing narratives. It necessarily omits such extraordinary *sui generis* coups as the dying Alcestis' hallucination (a narration of counterfactual events in present time) and the many passing glides in and out of narrative in dialogue, in the plotting of intrigue, and in non-agonistic *rhesis*.

### *Prologues*<sup>2</sup>

Euripides' pervasive use of the formal prologue was already recognized as a trademark device by his own contemporaries (Ar. *Ra.* 946–947; cf. 1197).<sup>3</sup> The form of a monologue on an empty stage is usually traced back to *Eumenides*, but there the Pythia does seem to imagine a human audience of prospective consultants (31–33), though probably offstage. The two probably post-Euripidean prologues, *Iphigenia at Aulis* and *Rhesus*, use an entirely different form, a later development of the Sophoclean duologue in which the audience eavesdrop on a two-handed conversation: in both cases, a remarkable *nocturnal* summons and instruction, deliberated between the two voices in the Iliadic night-time space between action when armies are silent and plans can be laid.

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<sup>1</sup> In an important discussion, Goward 1999 identifies as the most distinctive feature of Euripidean narrative the use of formal narrative in prologue and *exodos*, and a corresponding diminution in the role of overt prolepsis (dreams, oracles, curses, etc.) in the body of the play; this, she argues, is part of a wider strategy of diminishing the teleological shapeliness of the Aeschylean and Sophoclean tragic universe in favour of a world-picture dominated by chance. Other consequences, noted by Segal 1992, include a more self-conscious marking of literary form and contrivance; new kinds of plotting that require more initial narrative equipment; and a more self-conscious approach to myth.

<sup>2</sup> The key discussion is Erbse 1984, *q.v.* (6–19) for survey of earlier literature; see also Imhof 1937: 26–45; Schmidt 1971; Strohm 1977; Hamilton 1978; Segal 1992; Katsouris 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Among the many discussions see especially Erbse 1984: 3–4; and Dover 1993: 337–339.

The central contention of Erbse's detailed analysis is that what Euripidean expositors tell us is true, and a canon of reliability for the criticism of subsequent untruths. Yet as Hamilton (1974, 1978) and Segal (1992) have shown, the prologues still leave gaps and ambiguities, and their narrators are anything but objective, impersonal authorities; a striking case is Electra in *Orestes*, who at 16 and 26–27 pointedly elides parts of the narrative that sit uncomfortably with her public character. And as we shall see, closer examination also reveals that the so-called 'detached' prologues are full of complex, sometimes contradictory, indications of the presence of narratees within the play which widen rather than limit their narrative's engagement with its context.

The range of prologue narrators is extremely broad: in the nineteen complete plays, we have five gods, a satyr, and a ghost, alongside a spectrum of mortals ranging from title characters (*Andromache*, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, *Helen*) to nameless slave (*Medea*) and peasant (*Electra*). There are nevertheless some revealing patterns that reveal the distinctiveness of Euripides' approach. Where the prologue speaker is a mortal, Euripides consistently presents victims or other impotent or marginal figures; the only male narrators are Electra's nameless husband and the aged Iolaus and Amphitryon, while the named female speakers are consistently captive and/or besieged (often as suppliants). The effect is to enter the Euripidean play from a perspective of wide access to narrative content but limited power over its development. In the prologues, narration is an expression of disempowerment; as speech acts, the prologues express lament, prayer, the abandonment of hope. Heroines who do break out from victimhood to violence (*Medea*, *Hecuba*, *Electra*) are not given prologue narration; viewed initially through other eyes, they are presented as objects of study rather than *ab initio* sympathy. The five divine narrators, and the ghost of Polydorus in *Hecuba*, are a particularly complex group, being privy to information outside the reach of human consciousness. Their narrations are more markedly proleptic, and sometimes have the illocutionary force of command or promise. Yet though gods and ghosts know all, they will not (and cannot) tell all, so that in practice their accounts leave tantalizing spaces for the spectator or reader to fill; and in contrast to the mortal narrators, they are invisible to all the play's human cast,<sup>4</sup> and so do not communicate with the world of the mortal action at all.

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<sup>4</sup> Hecuba is onstage throughout the dialogue of the gods in *Troades* (36–38), yet is oblivious to their presence; the other divine prologists are alone on stage.

This raises a fundamental question: who are the *narratees* of all these soliloquies on seemingly empty stages? Aristophanes' *Ranae* took it for granted it must be the Athenian audience, as regularly in comedy. But there is no explicit audience address of the kind routine in Old and New Comedy;<sup>5</sup> instead, tragedy consistently assumes a Homeric universe with its permanent audience of unseen spectators, whose tacit homologies with the audience in the theatre are central to tragedy's model of the ironic structure of its world.<sup>6</sup> Divine speakers come closer to acknowledging the presence of a theatrical audience, but even these never resort to second persons; instead, their use of deictics and other demonstrative terms (such as Aphrodite's *deixō* at *Hipp.* 9, or Poseidon's words at *Tro.* 36) evokes a subtler pragmatics of implicit expository address to quasi-overt narratees, of whose presence they are conscious but whose actual identity and location in the narrative are left unspecified.

But even mortal prologists do not exposit in a vacuum. Rather, they draw tacitly or explicitly on a range of available narratees on stage: self, unseen gods, textually invisible attendants, or simply landscape, empty air, sunlight. Since all of these are irresponsive, the distinction between communicative address and non-communicative apostrophe is not always solid.<sup>7</sup> These unresponding audiences may also be blurred, combined, or juxtaposed: thus the pedagogue in *Medea* describes the nurse as talking to herself (51), while she herself claims earth and sky as her narratees (57). Iphigenia, similarly, describes her audience as *aithēr* (43; she at least is unattended), yet 37 makes it clear that she is also aware of, though not speaking for the ears of, the listening gods. But while prologue narrators may make free use of such communicative tropes as deictics, interactional particles, and rhetorical questions,<sup>8</sup> they do not address themselves to a *responsive* narratee on stage. Orestes is unconscious during Electra's narration; Hecuba is oblivious to the gods' conversation; and even when the expositor does share the stage with a listener,<sup>9</sup> the intended audience is generally more open.<sup>10</sup> As a rule,

<sup>5</sup> See Segal 1992: 96 on the rhetorical question opening *Heracles*.

<sup>6</sup> See more fully Lowe 1996 (esp. 523–524) and 2000: 180.

<sup>7</sup> On apostrophe as second-person narration → Introduction and → Lycophron.

<sup>8</sup> Ar. *Thesm.* 868 makes fun of this trope by introducing a second party to answer *Hel.* 56.

<sup>9</sup> See the table in Schmidt 1971: 5 with 4 n. 15.

<sup>10</sup> Thus Amphitryon speaks of Megara in the third person, with deictic, at 14 and throughout until she speaks to engage him directly in dialogue at 60 for her

the presence of a responsive listener closes off prologue narration: the arrival of a second character, or of the chorus, forces a suspension of narration, a targeting of address, and a modulation from past to present time.

*Messenger speeches and related narrative rheseis*

In a detailed survey of the engagement of Euripidean messenger-speech narrators both in their narratives and with their on-stage audiences, de Jong shows that messengers play a vital role in constructing the ‘open’ dialogic interplay of perspectives and evaluations that characterize the Euripidean world-picture. Particularly important for present purposes is her demolition of the myth of the ‘objectivity’ of the messenger as narrator, through her exposure of pervasive touches of focalization, references to autopsy, and address to the on-stage narratees.<sup>11</sup> Yet as Barrett demonstrates, there is simultaneously a tendency towards the messengers’ self-effacement as presences in the stories they tell: by ambiguous self-positioning in the scene, by referring to spectators in the third person, by distancing themselves from other spectators mentioned in their narrative, or by instances of focalization that strain the limits of autopsy.<sup>12</sup>

As de Jong points out, the traditional anonymity of the tragic messenger does not mean that such narrators are faceless, disengaged nonentities. On the contrary, Euripidean messengers are all closely aligned with one party to the play’s central dialectic. They are anonymous not because they are characterless ciphers, but because they are slaves, and tragic slaves are always unnamed; 24 out of 30 speakers<sup>13</sup> are slaves, while the peasant in *Orestes* is a feudal dependant of Agamemnon’s family, and the professional herald Talthybius, though a free man,

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supplementary narration. In *Heraclidae*, Iolaus is accompanied by the mute Heraclids, but speaks of them in the third person until Copeus’ arrival at 48 prompts an urgent appeal to the boys to gather close.

<sup>11</sup> Barrett 2002: *passim*.

<sup>12</sup> Barrett 2002 (esp. 74–96), who adduces *El.* 826–829; *HF* 930–934; and *Med.* 1156–1157.

<sup>13</sup> Reckoning from the canon in de Jong 1991: 179–180 (*q.v.* for earlier corpora) and 189–190, but with her definition relaxed for purposes of this discussion to admit also the six narrative *rheseis* and one messenger lyric (the *Hecuba parodos*) excluded from her canon of messenger-speeches as such.

regularly speaks as though fulfilling the role of a servant of the collective commanders. Strikingly, not one of the tragic messengers is female (there is only the *therapaina* in the prosatyrical *Alc.*)—in part, perhaps because they need to ferry news from the public world offstage, but also perhaps for reasons of narrative authority.<sup>14</sup>

The chorus is always present for messenger narratives, and in nine instances it is the sole audience; in *Supplices* it is the principal narratee, though Adrastus is also present; elsewhere the messenger addresses himself primarily to a solo character, but the chorus still offer their own response. In such cases the alignment of sympathies is potentially complex, since the choral perspective may be significantly at odds with that of the principal narratee. Though in a majority of cases the narrator and all onstage narratees are on the same side, in seven the messenger faces a hostile audience,<sup>15</sup> and there are six more where the chorus' sympathies conflict with those of the messenger's principal addressee.<sup>16</sup> Even the messenger's own loyalties can be divided: Hippolytus' groom is Theseus' slave as well as Hippolytus', but champions his young master over the old, while Pentheus' slaves similarly call their master's judgment into question. And to complicate things still further, the on-stage narratees may differ from the messenger and/or from one another in their response to the *content* of the narration; thus, for example, Medea is no friend to Jason's slave, but is delighted by the content of his narration, at the same time as the chorus are sympathetic to the narrator but appalled by his tale.

### *Choral narration*

Unsurprisingly in view of the increased narrative element in the prologue, narrative *paradoi* are rare in Euripides, and limited to cases of immediate autopsy—as in *Hecuba* 98–153 (hesitantly counted with the previous section's narrative *rheseis*, since it brings news to an on-stage narratee), *Ion* 184–218 (strictly, mimetic rather than narrative), and *Iphigenia at Aulis* 164–302. But narrative *stasima* are more common, and

<sup>14</sup> On the gender, status, and authority of tragic messengers see Barrett 2002: 99–101.

<sup>15</sup> *Hec.* 518–582 and 1132–1182; *Tro.* 1123–1155; *IT* 260–339 and 1327–1419; *Or.* 1395–1502; *Bacch.* 1043–1152.

<sup>16</sup> *Med.* 1136–1230; *Hipp.* 1173–1254; *Suppl.* 650–730; *Hel.* 1526–1618; *Bacch.* 434–450 and 677–774.

there is also frequent use of shorter narrative inserts as paradigms or aetiological flashbacks, as well as some lyric recapitulation of events already witnessed or recounted (as at *Or.* 327–331). An inventory of narrative odes would probably include *Andromache* 1009–1046 (the fall of Troy), *Troades* 511–567 (the sack of Troy), *Electra* 432–486 (the shield of Achilles), *Iphigenia in Tauris* 1234–1283 (foundation of the Delphic oracle), *Phoenissae* 1019–1066 (the Sphinx), *Orestes* 807–843 (Agamemnon's murder), and the special case of *Iphigenia at Aulis* 751–802 (a vivid prolepsis of the coming war for Helen).<sup>17</sup>

Euripidean *stasima* are particularly characterized by a movement from general to specific, far to near, impersonal to personal, and light to dark; for narrative odes, this generally entails a transition from past to present and from third-person analeptic narration to more modalized and proleptic forms of first-person discourse such as prayers, hopes, and speculations. Thus a common pattern is for *stasima* dominated by narrative of past events to modulate into a non-narrative reflection situated in the present, in which the choral narrators' present situation and perspective progressively (or abruptly) takes over from a more objective narratorial stance. In *Alcestis* 569–605, the narrative subject of Apollo's labour for Admetus leads to reflection on Admetus' present hospitality and the chorus' prayer that it will be rewarded; at *Andromache* 275–308, a narrative account of the judgment of Paris modulates into counterfactual speculation about a world in which Cassandra's advice had been heeded and Paris done away with at birth.<sup>18</sup>

The identity and authority of these choral narrators follow well-recognized patterns. Euripidean choruses are normally female, and the male choruses in the extant plays<sup>19</sup> are all geriatric (*Alc.*, *Held.*, *HF*), if

<sup>17</sup> On all these passages see Hose 1990–1991 (index locorum ad loc.); cf. Panagl 1971, whose list of 'dithyrambic' stasima excludes the *Andromache* and *Orestes* odes but includes the examples listed in the next note (excepting *HF* 348–441.).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Hec.* 629–656 (Paris and the Trojan War, hence the present sufferings of the chorus of enslaved survivors) and 905–952 (the fall of Troy, hence their prayer for Helen's present or future doom); *El.* 699–746 (the golden lamb of Argos, hence Clytaemnestra's crime and its present consequences); *HF* 348–441 (Heracles' labours, hence the present despair of his family and friends); *Hel.* 1301–1368 (Demeter and Persephone, hence Helen's neglect of their cult as the root of her present suffering); *Phoen.* 638–689 (the story of Cadmus, hence prayer to Epaphus to save the land of his descendants now); and *IA* 1036–1079 (the wedding of Peleus and Thetis contrasted with the imminent sacrifice of Iphigenia).

<sup>19</sup> Evidence for the identity of the choruses in the lost plays is marshalled by Hose 1990–1991: 22–27.

we discount *Rhesus*' Trojan warriors and *Cyclops*' generically obligatory satyrs; aside from these last two, there are no young men or male slaves. All are bystanders or victims, excluded from the processes of power by age or sex, and in the latter case sometimes also by enslavement (*Hec.*, *Tro.*, *IT*, *Hel.*, *Ion*) or alien status (*Phoen.*). They generally align closely with the interests of one party, especially if both the chorus and a central character are female; this is especially the case in plays of intrigue and conspiracy (*Med.*, *Hipp.*, *Andr.*, *Hec.*, *El.*, *IT*, *Hel.*, *Ion*, *Or.*), with only the problematically authentic *Iphigenia at Aulis* following the alternative Sophoclean pattern (*Antigone*, *Electra*) of a conspiracy hatched in the prologue from which the chorus are excluded.

All these choral narrators exhibit a standard narrative competence characterized by (1) unlimited access to earlier myth, whether or not it is closely continuous with their own experience; (2) limited access at the time of their first entry to information about the present state of affairs in the city, based on hearsay rather than autopsy, though not regarded as problematic on that account; (3) restriction of access thereafter to what is reported onstage, supplemented with highly unauthoritative and subjective speculation about offstage and future events. As generally in tragic choruses, the narratorial *persona* is a complex fusion of the communal 'I' of choral lyric (the Pindaric 'I' of the primary narrator is not heard) with the awareness and focalization of their own dramatic character.<sup>20</sup> Only rarely is choral narration overtly addressed to an onstage narratee. Rather, the chorus' narrative stance conforms to the conventions of lyric narrative, addressing itself to an unspecified collective narratee: notionally fellow *choreutae*, but readily extensible, via the chorus' role as embodiments of the consciousness of the community, to embrace the spectators in the theatre (→ Aeschylus and Sophocles).

### *Agonistic narration*

Agonistic narrative is a particularly fluid type, merging readily into other modes of discourse; the narrative element is strongest in *Medea*, *Hecuba*, *Heracles*, and *Troades*, but as Lloyd notes, formal blocks of demarcated narration are the exception rather than the rule in Euripi-

<sup>20</sup> See especially Gould 1996 (stressing the latter element) with Goldhill 1996 (counter-emphasizing the former).

dean agonistic *rheseis*.<sup>21</sup> Instead, the regular pattern is for an argument to drop in and out of narration *ad hoc*. As Dubischar's taxonomy stresses, the pragmatics of the Euripidean agon involve a clear if flexible structure of roles: there is always (1) a plaintiff; (2) a second party who (depending on the type of *agon*) may be either an opponent or a sympathetic sounding-board; and there is optionally (3) an umpire figure, who may or may not be the same as the second speaker. (In *Andr.* and *Supp.* the plaintiff and opponent speak their cases to the judge separately.) The chorus is always present as on-stage (secondary) narratees, and conventionally offers brief verdicts on the speakers' cases, but it is never the principal narratee, whose role defaults instead to the *kritēs* where available or otherwise to the rival speaker, and only in *Heraclidae* does the choral verdict seem to affect the action.

The engagement of narrators and narratees with the narrative element in *agones* is determined principally by these roles. The narrative is overtly focalized, and heavily punctuated with analytic argument. The past exists to validate arguments in the present: to be raked over for grievances and claims on duty, so that the commonest narrative trope is a turn from Then to Now. For similar reasons, agonistic narrative is particularly given to forensic counterfactuals, in either conditional or interrogative form. Thus the core of Medea's case against Jason (475–491) is expressed in a narrative of her services to him and his disservice to her, culminating in a complex counterfactual alternative under which his behaviour might have been defensible. Jason then replies to this narrative at 526–568 by systematically re-narrating the same events with a different motivation, segmenting his retelling into a series of formally itemised forensic responses to the principal accusations embedded in Medea's narrative catalogue. This agonistic exchange of roles between narrator and narratee creates two versions of the same story in which the narrating party is guiltless and all fault lies with the narratee. But both narrations are embedded in longer and more diverse forensic *rheseis* which contextualize the function of narrative as merely one among many modes of verbal contestation, and the construction of rival narratorial identities and authority is itself part of this wider agonistic discourse.

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<sup>21</sup> Lloyd 1992: 24–25, 42.



*Narration apo mēkhanēs and other exodos narratives*

Euripides' predilection for the *deus ex machina* (ten in the extant plays, if we admit *Rhesus* and disqualify *Medea*) and more generally for proleptic narrative in the *exodos* sequence, gives his plays a highly distinctive pattern of closure, discussed in detail by Dunn (1997). The *deus* proper, marking the sudden arrival (often in the midst of crisis onstage) of a new, omniscient voice from an essentially outside world, involves a violent shift of perspective away from the pointedly restricted understanding of the characters into a vertiginous glimpse of lives and ages to come, in which the story of the play becomes continuous with, and aetiologically foundational to, the history of the audience's own world.

As narrator, the typical Euripidean *deus* is omniscient, authoritative, and beyond the reach of simple canons of moral judgment—whence the debate, stretching back to Verrall, over how such figures can be reconciled with the narrative authority of the human body of the play. But they are also partisan and judgmental, supporting one side against the other and sometimes taking sides in divine factions (*Hipp.*, *El.*). Euripidean *dei* speak as though the futures they tell are already written: 'Long ago', says Dionysus at the notorious *Bacchae* 1349 of the events both within the play and beyond it, 'my father Zeus assented to these things'. Such omniscient narration of things to come runs close to the modalized forms of proleptic speech-act such as command, promise, and vow. The closing narrators are more than mere truth-speakers; their very ability to speak with authority about the future gives them a force of incontrovertibility which carries the weight of a determinative order and takes immediate precedence over alternative courses of willed human action.<sup>22</sup>

In three cases (*Med.*, *Held.*, *Hec.*) the *exodos*-narrator is not a god but a mortal narrator who has been central to the conflict in a strongly bipolar play, and now uses the authority of prolepsis in a final clash with the surviving antagonist. The source of such figures' sudden narrative authority, with its epic roots in the clairvoyance of the dying Patroclus and Hector, is not always clearly disambiguated in the text. Polymestor attributes his eerie knowledge of Hecuba's fate to 'Dionysus, prophet to the Thracians' (*Hec.* 1267), and perhaps we are not encouraged to wonder why Polymestor's own blinding was not included in the god's

<sup>22</sup> Bushnell 1988 (contrasting the much weaker narrative authority of Euripidean *manteis*); Barrett 2002: 50.

revelations, while Eurystheus' foreknowledge is similarly due to 'an old oracle of Loxias' (*Held.* 1028). But though Medea has proven supernatural powers, she does not spell out the source of knowledge that allows her so effectively to blur the distinction between what could be mere statement of intent (1378–1380, 1384–1385), effective prediction of an institutional commemoration (1381–1383), and outright prophecy of the bizarrely improbable (1386–1388). This, combined with the strongly partisan status of such narrators in a polarised, agonistic drama, gives their final predictions an elusive, troubling force.

The narratees of the Euripidean *exodos*-narratives are so constructed as to bring out the fundamental duality between primary and secondary audiences which is so fundamental to tragedy's use of the dramatic medium to express a view of the world. The very content of the prolepses underlines the contrast between the on-stage narratees for whom these events are still in the future and the narratees in the theatre for whom they are in the past. This is reinforced by the further concentration on proleptic elements that connect to cult foundations or other narrative traces left in the Athenian audience's own world. Indeed, the authority of the *exodos*-narrators comes primarily from the theatre audience's knowledge that their fulfilment has the double certainty of what has happened and what is still present. In this, as in Euripidean narrative as a whole, the clash of perspectives between different narrators and different levels of narratee seems designed to maximize, rather than to disguise, significant contrasts in the way human experience is viewed and interpreted, and even (as the studies of Segal, Dunn, and Barrett suggest) to interrogate the forms of representation itself.

### *Conclusion*

Narration in Euripidean drama is closely tied to the heightened marking of formal elements which characterizes Euripidean dramaturgy as a whole: not just the formal prologues and *ex machina* speeches which bookend the action with static narrative blocks, but the more highly conventionalized *stasima* and formal debates within the body of the play. The choices and handling of narrator are closely associated with the distinctive Euripidean exploration of issues of power; between prologue and *exodos*, and often in the prologue itself, the initiation of narration is overwhelmingly an activity of the disempowered, and narrative an expression of and a substitute for the access to control of events

that eludes figures marginalized by gender, age, or status. But by the same token, Euripidean drama is interested in modulations of narrative *sensu stricto* into more determinative and empowering kinds of speech-act: communication, persuasive argument, and above all the plotting of intrigue, which provides a mechanism by which the very narrator figures who have been marginalized in the play's initial structures of power can use their powers of narration, hitherto an expression of disempowerment, to convert a sequence of events from a proleptically rehearsed secondary narrative into primary narrative action.

## CHAPTER NINETEEN

### ARISTOPHANES

*A. Bowie*

There has been a good deal of debate, as the Introduction (→) shows, as to whether drama is a legitimate subject for narratological study.<sup>1</sup> Since embedded narratives are unproblematic candidates for narratological analysis, it is on these that we shall concentrate.

#### *Narrative*

Aristophanic narratives do not involve complex play with levels of narration, varied narrators etc., but the most salient feature that will emerge is a general *aversion* from uninterrupted narrating. The audience is not often permitted to wallow in the pleasure of a long oration whose events take them away from the main plot: Aristophanes generally prefers his narratives to be deferred, fragmented, or obscured. The result is that there is a great richness in the modes of Aristophanic narration.

He himself on occasion explicitly suggests the inappropriateness of such orations to the genre. In *Birds*, Peisetaerus' long (and much interrupted) narrative of bird-history and other matters, is prefaced by the following exchange (463–465):

*Pe.* Boy, bring a garland! Recline everyone! Someone quickly bring water for my hands!

*Eu.* Are we going to have dinner, or what?

*Pe.* No, but I've long wanted to make a big, fatted speech.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This uncertainty may explain the near absence of studies of Aristophanes in narratological terms; Dunbar 1995 does however have useful remarks on the technique of various passages of *Birds*, and see too Gelzer 1976. On comic plots in relation to other genres, cf. Lowe 2000: 86–88; Silk 2000: 256–300 ('Causal sequences and other patterns').

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Thesm.* 381–382 where, as the First Woman puts on her garland to speak, the

Lengthy narration seems to require preparation and a certain amount of self-deprecation to be tolerable.

At times, the level of interruption is such that it is difficult to decide when a scene, which conveys a story through jokes, tomfoolery, debate, etc., can reasonably be called a narrative and when not.<sup>3</sup> Since some of the more problematic and interesting passages tend to grow out of more obviously narrative ones, I have not hesitated to include such passages, so long as a narrative can be discerned, running through a good deal of interruption and other interference.<sup>4</sup>

This is not to say that Aristophanes does not narrate: there are long speeches containing narrative, but these are comparatively rare and usually occur in situations<sup>5</sup> or parts of the play, for instance prologues, debates, and parabases, where such uninterrupted narrating is to be expected. There are two notable examples in the first two extant plays, and one in the last.

The longest uninterrupted and formal narrative in Aristophanes is the Sausage-Seller's account of his victory in the Boule (*Kn.* 624–682). We are prepared for a long speech by the Chorus' request 'Tell us how you fought the contest' (614) and their remark that 'I think I'd go a long way to hear this' (620–622), and then by the Sausage-Seller's opening reassurance that 'It's worth hearing' (624). There follows a chronological account of events, linked by temporal markers, and without attempts to break up the narration with intrusive jokes, references to the audience, interruptions by other characters etc. It is a dramatic narrative monologue, and its end is marked by the Sausage-Seller's complete triumph through his monopoly on coriander. This unusual passage may perhaps be explained by the fact that up to this point *Knights* has been a series of confrontational scenes, with quick-fire repartee and very short speeches the norm: apart from the Chorus, no one

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Chorus say: 'Silence, silence: pay attention. She's cleared her throat like the orators: it's going to be a *long* speech.'

<sup>3</sup> This technique is reminiscent of Euripides' 'agonistic narration' (→), but is developed a lot further.

<sup>4</sup> There is an interesting example of highly fragmented narratives, of the expulsion of the tyrants (274–282, 616–625, 631–634, 665–667) and of the Persian Wars (285, 675, 1247ff.), which crop up at various points in *Lysistrata*, but in too piece-meal a way to be discussed in detail here: cf. Moulton 1982: 309–312; Bowie 1993: 178–204.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, the debating speeches of the First Woman (*Thesm.* 383–432) and of Mnesilochus (466–519) contain a good deal of narrative, as does the Stronger Argument's in *Clouds* (961–1023); the Weaker takes a more eristic and fashionably elenctic line.

has spoken for more than six consecutive lines since the confrontation began. Together with the parabasis that it follows, this speech thus provides some 180 lines of respite from the confrontations, which can then resume in a similar manner. The speech maintains the confrontation, but in a different form, as an analepsis. It is unusual too in its use of quoted direct speech.

Dicaeopolis' speech in self-defence before the Acharnians (*Ach.* 496–555) also involves a lengthy narrative (509–557). Here the 'reluctance' to narrate comes out, not so much in the speech, as in the build-up to it: there is a gap of 200 lines between the initial request to be heard at 292, and the actual start of the speech at 496. This deferral is produced by a wide variety of devices. Dicaeopolis makes several attempts to start his defence, offers to speak with his head on the block, brings out the block, threatens the Acharnians' coal-scuttle, persuades them to listen, and seems at last about to speak at 366–367. This is a blind, however, and he then speculates on the difficulties he faces, reminisces about the past and pays a lengthy visit to Euripides to get a disguise. Thus Dicaeopolis' narrative is hedged about by various *captationes benevolentiae*, which, along with the strong tragic colour in the *Telephus* intertext,<sup>6</sup> the Euripidean rags and the tragic language, helps to mediate the introduction of the unusually long speech. After this lengthy build-up, the actual narrative of the war is somehow reduced in prominence: 200 lines of build-up lead to but 46 of narrative, and of those nearly a quarter are an almost unrelieved series of 32 genitives, which bravura passage mark the speech's end.

Such long narratives are then largely absent until *Wealth* and Carion's narrative of events in the shrine of Asclepius. This is introduced somewhat like a tragic messenger-speech and the scene runs for some 120 lines (649–770), with Carion speaking 105 of them: this is really unusual in Aristophanic comedy. His speech is broken up into sections of around twelve lines by one- and two-line remarks by Chremylus' wife, but these remarks are far less disruptive than those we shall see in other plays. In Menander (→), we shall find a greater willingness to use such lengthy narratives.

One might expect straight narrating in prologues, but even here Aristophanes dilutes narrating with jests and other diversionary techniques. Apart from *Acharnians*, where a single figure lists his past plea-

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<sup>6</sup> For the role of the *Telephus* narrative in the play, cf. Foley 1988.

asures and pains, there is a basic pattern involving two characters, who play roles of varying importance, and we can see a development through Aristophanes' career. In *Knights*, the prologue begins with two slaves clearly in great distress, but their dialogue reveals little about the precise causes. Eventually, Demosthenes asks: 'Do you want me to tell the story to the spectators?' (36). Though his narrative is essentially a straightforward, apparently chronological account of some 40 lines, it tells its tale through a series of jokes, as can be seen from 40–45: 'You see, we've got a master who's rustic in his foul temper, a bean-chewer and quick to anger, Demos of the Pnyx, a difficult old man, who's rather deaf. This chap bought at the last new moon a slave, a leather-tanning Paphlagonian, a most villainous and slanderous fellow.' Here, the audience can laugh first at the description of themselves, and then at the realization that the mysterious 'Paphlagonian' mentioned in line 2 is in fact Cleon, the leather-merchant and politician. Indeed, Nicias has explicitly asked the audience to show their pleasure if they like what they see and hear (38), thus actively encouraging laughter, and so interruption of the narrative. Closure is brought simply by the use of a hearty obscenity: 'when the old man beats us, we shit eight times the usual' (70).

*Wasps* builds on this basic form. After initial jesting, Xanthias suddenly asks 'Come on, let me tell the spectators the plot!' (54). This time however the narrative is postponed, first of all whilst Xanthias tells the audience what they must *not* expect (Megarian jokes, Heracles, Euripides, Cleon; 55–63); then by the information that the figure asleep on the roof is his master, suffering from a 'strange malaise' (71); and finally by a guessing-game where members of the audience are imagined as making unavailing attempts to divine the nature of the malaise (73–85). Then the narrative begins, again with an actorial remark 'I'll tell ...' (87). At nearly 50 lines, it is long by Old-Comedy standards but, even more than was the case in *Knights*, it is less a piece of straight story-telling than a series of jokey vignettes. In the first part, seven jokes occupy only 23 lines (91–113), and generally the narrative is broken up into small segments of a maximum of three lines in length. In the second part (114–135), Bdelycleon's measures are ordered temporally by markers ('first', 'then' etc.), but the temporal relationships are less important than the rhetorical: ever more extreme measures are required to cope with Philocleon's persistent ingenuity.

The prologue of *Peace* is of greater technical and comic complexity. That a beetle is being fed we soon grasp, but not why. Food is pre-

pared before our eyes, but its consumption off-stage is narrated first by a slave coming on-stage and then in simultaneous narration by his companion looking off-stage into the house: such narration of contemporaneous action off-stage is found only here in Aristophanes.<sup>7</sup> The audience's uncertainty about what is happening is articulated on-stage, in a brief variant of the guessing-game in *Wasps*. Slave A then employs an elaborate metanarrative motif to introduce the plot: 'I will tell the plot to the boys and to the young men and to the men and to the great men and even to the very great men over there' (50–53).<sup>8</sup> The narrative finally gets under way, but is interrupted after only six lines. On-stage, the Slave quotes Trygaeus' earlier words to Zeus, and is interrupted by very similar words uttered by Trygaeus himself off-stage (56–64):

*Sl.* For days now he's been gawping up at heaven like this, slandering Zeus and shouting, 'Zeus, what have you got in mind? Put down your broom: don't sweep Greece away!' Ah, ah! Be quiet! I think I can hear his voice.

*Tr. [Off]* Zeus, what on earth are you wanting to do to us people? You'll destroy the cities, if you don't watch yourself!

This technique of on-stage words imitating off-stage action is repeated ten lines later. On remembering Trygaeus' command to his 'Little Pegasus' to fly him to heaven, the Slave looks inside again, and his description of Trygaeus flying up is complemented by Trygaeus' actual appearance in the air: narrative and vision, on- and off-stage action finally come triumphantly together, as the play gets under way with the theatrical master-stroke of Trygaeus riding his Beetle.

*Clouds* is undated but almost certainly later than *Peace*. It moves away from the two-slave prologue, but a main narrator still interacts with on-stage characters (a slave or his son); the expository technique is more sophisticated, if less dramatic than in *Peace*. Strepsiades introduces the plot in two equal parts (1–40, 41–78). The first begins with an imitation of the emotional beginnings to set narratives found in high-style poetry, such as Homer (→) and Sophocles (→), as, to set the scene, he uses apostrophes to gods, commands to slaves, monologic description of his debts and exasperated debate with his son. The second part is more explicitly narrative and is again divided into two by the brief entrance

<sup>7</sup> There is simultaneous narrative of action on stage, in Xanthias' description of Philocleon's dancing before and after the arrival of Carcinus' sons (*Wasps* 1482–1515).

<sup>8</sup> Comedy uses these motifs generally in a more self-consciously elaborate way than tragedy (→ Aeschylus).



of the slave: the first part tells simply of the differences between his own and his wife's backgrounds; the second is a more elaborate account of how their son's name was chosen and of the future plans for him held by father and mother, and involves quotation of the direct speech of husband and wife. The pattern of diffuse and emotional reaction to the current situation, followed by a more expository narrative section, recalls the previous plays, but is less stylized. The audience are not explicitly named as the narratees, but gradually become them: the longer the soliloquy goes on and the more narrational it becomes, the more it mutates into implicit audience-address. There are no explicit markers of beginning and end in Strepsiades' account.

In the prologues of *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazusae*, and *Frogs*, Aristophanes makes more use of the dialogic form of narration, much used by Sophocles (→) and strikingly developed by Euripides (→). This is in fact a development of the type discussed so far: there are again two characters on stage, but the subordinate character plays a much greater role in the exposition, and there is no movement to a long narrative by the dominant character.<sup>9</sup> The last two plays also use the dialogic form, but prefaced by a set speech by one character, that in *Wealth* (1–21) being the kind of initial straight narrative of the plot up to this point that has been eschewed elsewhere.

If the early prologues move from diffuse presentation of the situation to somewhat more formal exposition, elsewhere in the plays Aristophanes uses the opposite technique, as for instance in *Peace*. Once Peace has been freed, the Chorus motivate the narration: 'Tell us', they say to Hermes, 'O god most kind, where she went when she was away from us so long', and he replies 'O wisest farmers, listen to my words if you want to hear how she was lost. First of all ...' (603–605). This introduces a long scene (601–705) in which the history of the war is reviewed. To begin with, Hermes adopts a straight narrational style, articulated with the temporal markers 'first ..., then ..., then ...', and interrupted briefly by Trygaeus and the Chorus (615–618, 628–631). At the mention of Cleon (648), things change. Trygaeus begs Hermes to stop his account, and turns to Peace: 'But, Lady, tell me why you are silent' (657). Anger at the spectators will not let her speak to them, so Trygaeus suggests she whisper to Hermes. The narrative then becomes

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<sup>9</sup> The prologue of *Birds* may have been transitional between the two, but the uncertainty over speaker-allocation at the start means we cannot be sure; cf. Dunbar 1995: 132–133.

a series of questions relayed by Hermes from Peace about the current situation in Athens and the likely future, followed by answers from Trygaeus. In contrast to Hermes' earlier speeches, no utterance is now more than three lines long.

We can see something of a development over time in this technique of consecutive passages of a decreasingly formal narration. In *Ecclesiazusae* 311–477, a dialogue between Blepyrus and the Man recounts the preceding night's strange goings-on, and then Blepyrus and Chremes discuss the events in the Assembly. In the first scene (311–371), two fifteen-line speeches by Blepyrus surround 30 lines of dialogue; in the second (372–477), we find familiar features of disruption, as Chremes' account is punctuated by Blepyrus' questions, and there is a mixture of longer and shorter speeches and much use of *antilabē*. The fragmentation of the narrative, however, is much less intrusive than in earlier plays, and the questions are not so much disruptive as designed to amplify and give variety to it.

Finally, where substantial amounts of information need to be conveyed, Aristophanes again avoids lengthy narration, by conjoining sections that vary the amount of uninterrupted narration and combine the two techniques just discussed. There is a complex case in *Birds*. This play has to create its own mythological past and brave new world in the future and, as a result, is notable for the amount of narrating found in it. Peisetaerus' lengthy account of past and future (465–626) is divided into two sections. In the first (465–538), he outlines the shifts in the Persian, Greek, Egyptian, Phoenician and Olympian monarchies from bird- to men-kings. Though he covers an enormous spread of history, interruptions by Euelpides (to be discussed below) mean that his longest uninterrupted utterance is but 21 lines and comes at the very end (518–538); otherwise he does not speak more than five consecutive lines before an interruption comes in. The subsequent long proleptic recital of the establishment and benefits of bird-rule (548–626) begins with another lengthy speech by Peisetaerus (550–569), broken by but a single line of Euelpides (553), but subsequently the recital is very much more broken up by questions and answers than was the earlier section. Straight narrative, interrupted narrative and densely dialogical narrative are thus all deployed to lend variety and complexity to the scene, and much information is conveyed in as entertaining a manner as possible.

*Narrators*

Apart from in the *parabases*, where the chorus tell what the poet wishes them to, all Aristophanic narrators are essentially secondary narrators. As in tragedy, most narrators are also internal narrators: they are either involved in the action or relating contemporary events. In the course of the plays' action, the narrators tell of events they have had a major role in, but in *parabases* the chorus often mention events to which they were more tangential: the Acharnians tell of the trial of Thucydides, son of Melesias, (*Ach.* 703–712), though they were only witnesses. We can include here those short narratives which the choruses sometimes sing in lyrics (especially towards the end of the plays), attacking the morals of individual Athenians; these are in some ways the comic equivalent of the mythic narratives sometimes found in tragedy, and their relation to the plot can be similarly oblique (→ Euripides). For instance, the Knights sing of Lysistratus, Thaumantis, Arignotus and the disgusting sexual habits of his brother Aripkrades (1264–1289), the whole given a specious authority by being introduced by a high-flown Pindaric quotation: 'what is better when starting a song or bringing it to a conclusion than to sing the charioteers of swift horses—and not Lysistratus?' These passages can also have a proleptic quality, as when the Acharnians recount Dicaeopolis' good fortune in terms of the troublesome Athenians who will not now worry him (836–859), or curse their former *choregus* to various fates for leaving them without dinner (1150–1173).

The only major examples of external narrators occur in *Birds*, not surprisingly given its great temporal range. We have already looked at Peisetaerus' account of world history, and the Birds themselves narrate a theogony (685–703). Given that it goes back to the start of time, it would be natural to consider it an external narration, but the Birds manage to talk in such a way that they could be taken as internal to the narrative: they stand as representative of birds throughout history.

Two types of narrative that are prominent in Sophocles (→) also appear in Aristophanes, but are rare: narrations of things that characters have only heard, and false narratives. It is only in *Knights* that we find the former used significantly often, when Aristophanes mocks contemporary politicians.<sup>10</sup> The brief account of Cleon's restricted abil-

<sup>10</sup> There are two brief examples in the Eleusinian *gephurismos* in *Frogs* 426–428, 432–434.

ity as a lyre-player is introduced by 'his fellow students say ...' (985–996), and hear-say introduces the micro-narrative of Cleonymus' gluttony (1290–1299), and the narrative of the meeting of outraged Athenian ships when they learn they are to be commanded by Hyperbolus (1300–1315). One might have taken these as a self-defensive distancing mechanism, disclaiming responsibility for the rumours, were the whole play not a satire on Cleon: the defensive stance is thus revealed as a mere comic pose.

The only significant example of a false narrative is Mnesilochus' account of his own earlier life as a bride and of women's supposed sexual failings (*Thesm.* 466–519), which lands him in such trouble. There are no false narratives which are used to shape the plot as in say Sophocles' *Electra*: Dicaeopolis may aim to deceive in his disguise, but his narrative gives his version of the truth.

The one group who regularly narrate are the chorus, especially in the *parabases*. In this part of the play, they often announce their intention to narrate with phrases such as 'But, removing our cloaks, let us get to the anapaests' (*Ach.* 627), or 'But come now you numberless multitudes, make sure the excellent things we are about to say do not fall uselessly to the ground' (*Wasps* 1010–1012):<sup>11</sup> the *parabasis* is thus marked off as a special part of the play where the chorus can address the spectators as their specific narratees.<sup>12</sup> For the most part, the narratives are fairly straightforward: usually chronological and articulated by temporal adverbs, they do not show especial narrative sophistication nor the reluctance to narrate straightforwardly apparent elsewhere. The chorus act mainly as internal narrators, but they sometimes dip into history, as in *Knights*, when they praise their ancestors for their martial spirit (565–580), or mythology, as in *Birds* (685–703).<sup>13</sup> For the purpose of the parabases, especially in the early plays, they tend to speak as a general 'chorus', rather than in character, though this is not true in plays from *Birds* onwards. They use the first person, but, especially in the '*parabasis* proper', they speak on behalf of the poet in the third person: 'ever since he involved himself with comic choruses, our poet has not yet come forward to the audience to say how clever he is ...' (*Ach.* 627–628;

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Kn.* 503–504; *Peace* 729–733; *Birds* 685–690; *Lys.* 615; *Thesm.* 785; *Frogs* 686–687.

<sup>12</sup> On the *parabasis* and the relationships set up between poet and audience, cf. Hubbard 1991.

<sup>13</sup> For examples outside the parabasis, cf. *Lys.* 782–796, 805–820, introduced by 'I want to tell you a story ...'

they never use second-person narration about the poet). In an interesting variation, there are a few places where they use the first person, but the ‘speaker’ is in fact the poet. This is the case throughout the *parabasis* proper of *Clouds* (518–562), where they recount Aristophanes’ unhappy experiences with the first version of the play. The same technique appears with a sudden shift from third to first person in *Peace*, where 732–753 are in the third person and 754–774 in the first; compare *Acharnians* 656–664, where the metre changes when the person does:

He says he will give you much excellent instruction, to make you happy, and he won’t flatter you or bribe you or deceive you by villainy or swamp you with praise; rather he’ll give you the best lessons. So then let Cleon contrive and plot against me all he wants: I’ll have right and justice on my side, and you won’t catch me going round the city as a coward and pervert like him!

This shift emphasizes the chorus’ role as ‘mouth-piece’ of the poet: the voice of chorus and author fall together.

It is the chorus too, especially in the parabases, who provide the rare examples of second-person narratives, addressed to the audience. These tend to appear very intermittently in the more normal third-person narratives about the poet.<sup>14</sup> Though the poet is usually the focus of the narratives, these parabolic passages are often introduced by ‘we want to criticize you’ (*memphomestha*) or the like,<sup>15</sup> so they are addressed to the audience even if it is not usually the grammatical subject of the verbs. There are two examples outside the parabasis, in *Knights*, where first the chorus describe critically Demos’ political behaviour (1111–1121, 1131–1140; he replies with contrasting narratives of his own), and then later Aristagoras gives Demos an account of what he was like before his transformation (1335–1357; Demos shamefacedly accepts this). Indeed, one could say that much of the contest between Sausage-Seller and Paphlagon is an eristic exercise in second-person narrative, as each contestant constructs a criminal history for the other.

In line with its reluctance to narrate uninterruptedly, extant comedy generally does not, unlike tragedy, have narratives by characters whose sole purpose is to speak a prologue or to bring news as a messenger. The instance of the latter closest to tragic practice is the Herald in *Birds*, who brings news of Athens’ reaction to the bird-kingdom (1277–1307), but this is more a list of bird-like actions done and of bird-names

<sup>14</sup> Cf. e.g. *Ach.* 637–638; *Kn.* 531–536; *Clouds* 532, 577–579, 607–624.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. *Ach.* 676; *Clouds* 525, 576; *Wasps* 1016.

assumed than a straight narrative. The other two Messengers in that play are not allowed to speak uninterrupted (1122–1187). The messenger who brings news of Lamachus' injury has a short speech with a tragic flavour (*Acharnians* 1174–1189), but this fits his role of helping to reintroduce the tragic intertext of Euripides' *Telephus*, earlier applied to Dicaeopolis but now to Lamachus. More usually, the characters themselves bring the news from off-stage. Xanthias' recounts Philocleon's behaviour at the symposium (*Wasps* 1292–1325), and we have already noted above the Sausage-Seller's account of events in the Boule and Carion's lengthy account of the rites in Asclepius' shrine. These characters are intimately involved in these actions, and thus breach the tragic convention that 'Whatever the degree of participation of the messenger, he is never the protagonist of his own narrative.'<sup>16</sup>

As to the identity of narrators, we find that there is a general inclusiveness: social status and (to some extent) gender do not affect access to narrating. We have already discussed the key role played by slaves in prologues; later in the plays, narrating tends to pass to the main characters. It is true that women narrate only in 'women' plays, but this reflects their generally reduced role elsewhere.

Control of narration grants power to its possessor,<sup>17</sup> and this is one way in which comic protagonists are able to achieve their ends. At the start of *Acharnians*, the Assembly is happy to listen in silence to ludicrous narratives by the fraudulent Ambassadors and Theorus, but suppress through the Scythian Archers Amphitheus' attempt to use a narrative of his genealogy to pursue a policy of peace (45–58), and silence Dicaeopolis (59, 64). It is his narrative of the war (496–556) that finally gives him power to enjoy his new world. Similarly, it is his knowledge of history that allows Peisetaerus to impress and persuade the Birds, and Lysistrata wins over Athenians and Spartans through her (somewhat historically distorted) brief narratives of past Spartan-Athenian co-operation (1124–1156).<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> De Jong 1991a: 8.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. e.g. Laird 1999: 1–43.

<sup>18</sup> One may compare here Praxagora's speech which persuades the women to follow her plan (*Ecll.* 214–240): it is notable for a passage of 'refrain narrative', where an account of women's actions is punctuated at the end of each line by 'as they've always done' (221–228). This is unusual, but cf. also 773–776, 799–803, 862–864 in the same play.

*Narratees*

The main difference between tragedy and comedy in ancient Greece is that where tragedy virtually never acknowledges the existence of the primary narratees, the spectators in the theatre, comedy constantly draws them into its action by direct address or invitation to interact with the players. There is less ‘dramatic irony’ than in tragedy, where the disparity between the knowledge of the audience and of the characters is regularly exploited.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, comedy exploits the relationships between narrators and the two sets of narratees in a variety of different ways for comic effect and to make the plays’ points.

*Knights* gives a particular twist to the existence of two sets of narratees by having one of the characters called ‘Demos’. He is absent from the first part of the play, but eventually arrives on stage, so that the audience have to negotiate the fact that they are at once narratees of the play and represented by an actor on stage. This doubling demands from the audience a sophisticated response to the jokes. Similarly, in *Clouds*, when the audience have enjoyed a sense of superiority at Strepsiades’ inability to cope with philosophy in the first part of the play, they are reminded in the *parabasis* (518–533) that this is exactly what happened when *they* watched Aristophanes’ ‘cleverest play’, the first *Clouds*: they have therefore, this time unawares, once again been both narratees and the victims of the humour.

Another special kind of narratee specific to comedy is the *bōmolokhos*, the technical name for a character who constantly interrupts other characters with more or less fatuous remarks. Such figures are not just potentially disruptive of narrative, but also offer ways in which play may be had with multiple narratees. In *Acharnians*, when the Ambassador narrates his trip to the Persian court (65–125), Dicaeopolis acts largely disruptively, but with a purpose. There are in this scene in effect three narratees: the Assembly, Dicaeopolis and the spectators. Each receives the Ambassador’s narration in different ways. The Assembly listens in respectful silence. Dicaeopolis reacts sardonically, making remarks which for the most part appear to be asides to the audience

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<sup>19</sup> But cf. *Acharnians*, where Dicaeopolis, in donning the disguise of Telephus, remarks ‘I must appear a beggar today, be who I am but appear not to be. The spectators must know who I am, but the Chorus must stand there like fools, so that I can mock them in what I say’ (440–444). The chorus then compliantly treat him as a beggar and not Dicaeopolis.

since the characters on stage take little notice. Dicaeopolis' remarks in effect have two functions: to react to the speeches in the Assembly as part of the play, and to mould the reactions of the spectators so that they are not fooled and receive enlightenment about the faults of the Assembly they attend. The narrators, the Ambassador and then Theorus, thus interact in different ways with their narratees, only two of which they are conscious of.

A further variation is found in *Birds*, which shows that the *bōmolokhos* need not always be simply disruptive. In Peisetaerus' account of world history, Euelpides acts as a persistent *bōmolokhos*. The effect is that there are two on-stage narratees (in addition to the audience), the chorus, who are the main ones whose questions give rise to Peisetaerus' account, and Euelpides, a subordinate one who does the interrupting. There are also in fact two narrators, also main and subordinate, because some of Euelpides' remarks also involve telling little stories (492–498, 511–513). The interactions between these three actors are quite complex. The first section (465–538) is motivated by the chorus' amazed reaction to the news that they were once kings of the universe and by their excited questions. Peisetaerus' narrative is then interrupted four times by Euelpides with jokes, which he ignores. At the mid-point, the chorus pose another incredulous question (500), and Peisetaerus continues. Euelpides then interrupts with three more jokes, which are again ignored, but his fourth intervention (517) finally draws a response, and Peisetaerus shifts metre and concludes this part of the narration. At another request from the chorus, he begins again with a proleptic account of what they must do in future (550–626), the first part of which (550–570) is interrupted by but a single exclamation by Euelpides (553) and concluded in the same way. The subsequent part (571–626) is again motivated by the chorus' question, but is broken up by no fewer than twelve questions and comments from Euelpides, with which Peisetaerus now engages.<sup>20</sup> As Peisetaerus becomes more persuasive therefore, he engages more and more with his narratees, and his influence grows.

It is worth noting too that Euelpides' remarks, though both regularly disruptive and ignored, are not hostile, but can actually replicate Peisetaerus' arguments in a more comic form.<sup>21</sup> For instance, Peisetaerus

<sup>20</sup> Some editors give some remarks to Tereus, but this does not affect the point made above: Dunbar 1995: 316–318.

<sup>21</sup> On the agonistic aspect of this scene, cf. Dunbar 1995: 309–310.



illustrates his argument for the power of the cockerel from its name ‘Persian Bird’, and Euelpides interrupts with his story of the loss of his cloak, for which a cockerel was responsible (483–498): narrator and *bōmolokhos* thus function together. Euelpides may interrupt Peisetaerus’ discourse, but his enthusiastic reception of it generates in its warped way an enthusiasm in the other addressees, on-stage and in the audience.

The most complex use of multiple narratees occurs in *Thesmophoriazusae*, where much of the humour in the ‘Helen’ scene comes from the existence of the Old Woman, who is guarding Mnesilochus and plays the *bōmolokhos* in a special way (850–928). She intrudes herself into the action as an unwelcomely uncooperative narratee alongside the audience, when Mnesilochus/Helen enacts the expository prologue of Euripides’ play (864–865):

*Mn.* Many souls perished by Scamander’s streams for me.

*OW.* And you should have too.

Matters are even more complicated when Euripides/Menelaus arrives, at which point the clash between the reactions of ‘Helen’s intended narratee ‘Menelaus’ and of the Old Woman gives the scene its humour. ‘Menelaus’ is told he has come to Proteus’ halls (874–880):

*Eur.* Of which Proteus?

*OW.* You fool, he’s lying, damn it! Proteas<sup>22</sup> died ten years ago ...

*Eur.* And to what land have we plied our ship?

*Me.* Egypt.

*Eur.* Alas! How far we have sailed!

*OW.* You don’t believe the nonsense this villain is talking do you? This here is the Thesmophorion!

Here the roles of narrator and narratee become confused, as Menelaus and Mnesilochus play out their tragedy for the Old Woman’s benefit, but she refuses the role of narratee and in her turn narrates to them the recent events in contemporary Athens. The Old Woman sees only deceit in the clash of narratives and insists hers is the true one; the two men equally insist on theirs—but the audience can enjoy the clash in all its hilarious confusion.

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<sup>22</sup> The joke is helped in the Greek by the fact that ‘Proteus’ the mythical king and ‘Proteas’ the imaginary Athenian both have the same form of the genitive.

Thus, if comedy does not display some of the complexity of narration that can be found elsewhere, it has its own enormous richness in the interrelationships between narrating, narrators, and narratees.



## CHAPTER TWENTY

### MENANDER

*R. Nünlist*

Menander's narratives are best explained as secondary narratives because their narrators are characters who themselves are part of a 'narrative universe' (→ Introduction and chapters on other playwrights). Overall, Menander's narratives show similarities to those of Euripides and Aristophanes. With Euripides he shares a certain fondness for using extended narratives, in particular in the exposition of the plays. Conversely, Menander also provides several examples of narratives which are repeatedly interrupted by the interlocutor, as is common in Aristophanes. Thematically, the majority of Menander's secondary narratives are closely related to the plot of the play itself: most of them are instances of external or internal *analepsis*, occasionally of internal *prolepsis*.<sup>1</sup>

From a formal point of view, Menander's narratives are best divided into 'monologic' and 'dialogic' narratives. The former category assumes that no secondary narratee is physically present on stage. The story is narrated, as it were, on an empty stage, or, as an alternative, the secondary narrator is unaware of another character's presence, and this character therefore cannot be the narratee. Dialogic narratives are spoken to one or several narratees on stage. Here again, two subtypes can be differentiated, though along somewhat different lines. Dialogic narratives can be heavily punctuated as in Aristophanes, or the secondary narrator can be allowed to recount larger sections of his narrative without interruption.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Given the fragmentary status of the Menandrian corpus, some of the observations in this chapter are based on conjecture. As a general rule, evidence from Latin adaptations of Menander's plays has not been used because one cannot be sure how closely they follow their Greek originals. Line numbers refer to the OCT (2nd ed. 1990), quotations are taken from Miller 1987.

<sup>2</sup> Needless to say, the difference is one of degree, not of kind.

*Monologic narratives*

The most prominent of Menander's monologic narratives are the prologues, which can be found (or presupposed) in all his plays. The prologue either opens the play or is preceded by an opening scene.<sup>3</sup> It is either spoken by a divinity or by one of the human characters.<sup>4</sup> In the former case, the narrator is omniscient and external.<sup>5</sup> Human narrators, on the other hand, are internal and their knowledge is restricted to what they are entitled to know.<sup>6</sup> In the case of plays with postponed prologue, this leads to a more or less equal distribution of labour. The information provided by the human character(s) in the opening scene is supplemented by the divine prologue. The latter can supply information to which the human characters are not privy (e.g. the citizen status of an apparent non-citizen), and the divine speaker can make *prolepsis* the outcome of which is certain. Consequently, the prologues regularly observe the chronological sequence 'external *analepsis*—internal *analepsis*—internal *prolepsis*'. In general, the prologue speaker avoids going a second time in detail over ground already covered. See e.g. the explicit cross-reference to the opening scene in the prologue to *Perikeiromene*:

But Someone Else [i.e. the soldier Polemon] was coming up the road, and he saw what was happening [i.e. Glycera hugging her brother Moschion]. He's told you the sequel, how he marched off ...

(*Perik.* 157–159)

As an alternative, the divine speaker may expressly correct the information given by a human character (e.g. *Asp.* 110–112: 'Davus here made a mistake. Cleostratus ... is alive'). The extant evidence suggests that divine prologue narrators are the rule, human narrators the exception. The audience of New Comedy is expected to know beforehand the correct details of the exposition and the imminent happy ending of the

<sup>3</sup> Opening prologue: *Dysk.*, *Sam.*; postponed prologue: *Asp.*, *Epit.*, *Heros*, *Mis.*, *Perik.*, *Sik.* On Menander's prologues in general see Holzberg 1974: 6–113.

<sup>4</sup> Divinity: *Asp.*, *Dysk.*, *Epit.* (conjectural), *Heros*, *Perik.*, *Sik.*, *Ph.* Human character: *Sam.*

<sup>5</sup> The statement that the divine narrators of the prologues are external needs some qualification. Mostly, they make clear that they somehow set in motion the action on stage (e.g. *Asp.* 148; *Dysk.* 44; *Perik.* 164–166). Consequently, they are not entirely external, but they do not enter the narrative universe and the human characters remain unaware of their intervention. It therefore seems preferable to treat the divine narrators as external, particularly in the case of personifications: Chance (*Tuche*) in *Asp.*; Ignorance/Misapprehension (*Agnoia*) in *Perik.*

<sup>6</sup> The distinction made here applies, of course, to dialogic narratives too.

play. In the case of human prologue speakers, however, the audience will not have been left completely in the dark due to generic expectations. As for other generic expectations, divine and human prologue speakers seem to differ in the following way. Whereas the entrance and the narrative of the former seem to be taken for granted, the only extant example of a human prologue speaker justifies his narrative with two metanarrative comments:

Telling the story [sc. how he raped the neighbour's daughter Plangon] will be painful, I reckon, but it will make more sense to you if I explain in some detail what my father's like. ... Then—I'll tell you all about us at one go, I've nothing else to do— ...  
(*Sam.* 5–6, 19–20)<sup>7</sup>

Monologic narratives are spoken on an empty stage with no secondary narratee physically present or presupposed by the narrative. In Menander this situation quite often leads to what is, strictly speaking, a breach of narrative convention: the secondary narrator addresses the primary narratees (i.e. the audience in the theatre).<sup>8</sup> This device, which entails vocatives and verb forms and pronouns in the second-person plural, is common in prologues, but can also be found in other monologic narratives.<sup>9</sup> These addresses can be part of the narrative itself, but more often they mark its boundary at the beginning or the end, e.g. the end of the prologue to *Dyskolos*, which includes a metanarrative comment:

There, that's the outline. Details you'll see in due course, if you like—and please do like.  
(*Dysk.* 45–46, cf. *Sik.* 24)

The prologue narratives are comparatively long (approximately 50 lines), and there are a few instances of explicit cross-reference ('as I said before': *Asp.* 130; *Perik.* 152).

Monologic narratives other than prologues are quite common in Menander.<sup>10</sup> Mostly a character gives a report of what had happened in the meantime elsewhere (i.e. internal *analepsis*), either backstage or off-stage.<sup>11</sup> Unlike the prologue speakers, who are always alone on stage,

<sup>7</sup> The same prologue contains yet another metanarrative comment: 'I hesitate to tell you the rest of the story' (*Sam.* 47). Clearly Moschion is a self-conscious narrator.

<sup>8</sup> This breach of narrative convention, though in a different direction, can be documented from Homer's time on: the primary narrator addresses a character (→ Homer). The present type seems to originate with Old Comedy (→ Aristophanes).

<sup>9</sup> Prologues: *Asp.* 113; *Dysk.* 1, 46; *Perik.* 127–128, 170–171; *Sam.* 5; *Sik.* 24; other monologic narratives: *Dysk.* 666; *Epitr.* 887; *Sam.* 216, 269. Obviously, the device also occurs outside monologic narrative; see in general Bain 1977: 185–207.

<sup>10</sup> On Menandrian monologues in general see Blundell 1980.

<sup>11</sup> Examples include: *Asp.* 149–153 (a variant insofar as Smikrines narrates what he

other monologic secondary narrators may actually be overheard by other characters. This sometimes leads to punctuation of their narratives, of which they themselves remain unaware. A particularly striking example comes from *Misoumenos* where Getas remains unaware of Clinias' remarks for 40 lines until he is finally addressed by him (284–323).

Apart from these punctuated monologic narratives, there are instances of uninterrupted narrative too. Probably the best known example is the monologue by which Demeas opens Act Three of *Samia*. In a speech of no less than 77 lines (206–282; the beginning is lost), he narrates (219–269) what had just happened inside the house when he had to learn that the father of the baby is actually his adopted son Moschion. Demeas is mortified (he wrongly believes the mother to be his concubine Chrysis), but that does not seem to affect his narrative and histrionic skills in the least. For the central piece of his narrative is an elaborate instance of 'speech within speech'. It combines two different speakers neither of whom is Demeas himself (two female servants, one old, one young).<sup>12</sup> Demeas' monologue is, however, exceptional in terms of length and elaboration, and more representative, perhaps, is an internally analeptic monologue like Onesimus' opening of *Epileptas* Act Three:

Half a dozen times I've embarked on the business of going to my master and showing him the ring: and half a dozen times I've got very close to it, been right on the brink of it—and then I funk it. (*Epilept.* 419–422)

Another monologue proves Onesimus to be a highly self-conscious narrator:

He's mad, I swear it, quite loopy, really raving, absolutely crazy! My master, I mean, Charisius. He's fallen into black depression, or something like it. There's no other explanation. You see, he was crouched inside the door here for ages, listening to his wife's father discussing the whole business with her, apparently, and I can't tell you, Ladies and Gentlemen, how he kept changing colour ... (*Epilept.* 878–887)<sup>13</sup>

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did *not* do in the meantime); *Dysk.* 259–265, 525–542, 576–586, 670–688; *Epilept.* 419–422, 879–904, 911–919; *Mis.* 284–310; *Perik.* 537–550; *Sam.* 120–127, 219–269. An example of external analepsis is *Perik.* 300–301.

<sup>12</sup> On this scene and on speech within speech in general see Nünlist 2002. Despite the prominence of this device, Menander does not provide an example of tertiary narrative.

<sup>13</sup> The narrative continues for 20 more lines with regular quotations of Charisius' words.

*Dialogic narratives*

As explained above, the narrative situation is different here because the secondary narrator is speaking to one or several narratees who are present on stage. Consequently, many dialogic narratives are dominated by the interaction between narrator and narratee. For example, the narrative is often the result of a question or a similar request for information by the narratee (*Asp.* 19–20; *Dysk.* 82–86, 409; *Sik.* 125–126, 172). As an alternative, the narrator may introduce his narrative either with a rhetorical/exclamatory question (*Dysk.* 576; *Sam.* 216) or by means of a metanarrative comment ('I want to give you a taste of good news or rather, God willing, of good fortune to come. I want to be the first to tell you.' *Georg.* 43–45; cf. *Perik.* 780).

The narratee's opening question indicates his lively interest in the matter. It is, therefore, not surprising that he then regularly interrupts the narrative (cf. chapter on Aristophanes). A good example comes from *Dyskolos* where Pyrrhias runs onto the stage and reports his disastrous encounter with Knemon. The punctuation of the narrative is in a way 'advertised' beforehand because Pyrrhias begins with the telling metanarrative comment (96–98): 'I can hardly talk, I'm so out of breath. Well, I knocked at the door, and asked to see the owner ...'<sup>14</sup> No surprise, then, that Chaireas interrupts him more than once.

Pyr.: A miserable old crone answered the door, and from the very spot where I stand speaking to you now, she pointed him out. He was trailing around on that hill there, collecting wild pears—or a real load of trouble for his back.

Ch.: He's in a proper tizz. [*To Pyr.*] So, my friend ...?

Pyr.: Well, I stepped on to his land and made my way towards him. I was still quite a way off, but I wanted to show some courtesy and tact, so I called to him and said, 'I've come to see you, sir, on a business matter. I want to talk to you about something that's to your advantage.' But 'You horrible heathen,' he promptly replied, 'trespassing on *my* land! What's the idea?' And he picks up a lump of earth and lets fly with it, right in my face.

Ch.: The hell he did.

Pyr.: And while I had my eyes shut, muttering 'Well, God damn you,' he

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<sup>14</sup> This is a variation of the topical '*aporia*' motif. Pyrrhias' problem is not the wealth of information he is to choose from, but his (alleged) inability to speak without interruption.



picks up a stick and sets about me, saying ‘Business is it—what business is there between you and me? Don’t you know where the public highway is?’ And he was shouting at the top of his voice.

Ch.: From what you say, the farmer’s a raving lunatic.

Pyr.: To finish my story: I took to my heels, and he ran after me for the better part of two miles, round the hill first, then down here to this wood. And he was slinging clods and stones at me, even his *pears* when he’d nothing else left. He’s a proper violent piece of work, a real old heathen. For goodness’ sake, move off!

Ch.: Chicken!

(*Dysk.* 98–123)

In a similarly instructive example from *Perikeiromene*, the punctuation and the request for information lead to what almost looks like a cross-examination:

Pataecus: God, is something still left of my family?

Glycera: Go on, ask me anything you like.

Pat.: Where did you get these things [i.e. the tokens of recognition]? Tell me.

Gl.: I was found wrapped in the embroidery, when I was a baby. ...

Pat.: Tell me, were you alone when you were found?

Gl.: Oh no, my brother and I were exposed together ...

(*Perik.* 779–786)<sup>15</sup>

This externally analeptic ‘narrative’ of Glycera’s lineage (*Perik.* 779–812) is given in almost perfect stichomythia, and in the course of it Pataecus becomes the narrator and Glycera the enquirer. On a different level the function of the stichomythia is paratragic, which is, however, undercut by the presence of Glycera’s brother Moschion who comments on the ‘narrative’ in the form of asides and thereby punctuates it even more.

Similarly to beginning the narrative in answer to a request for information (see above), the narrator may open his narrative with the particle *gar*.<sup>16</sup> In a unique case, the narrator opens his narrative with the ‘there is a place x’ motif (*Asp.* 23).

The narrative itself usually proceeds in chronological order. The sequence is regularly made clear by temporal markers like ‘after this’,

<sup>15</sup> For a similar but much shorter example see *Dysk.* 409–417.

<sup>16</sup> *Georg.* 46; *Dysk.* 525, 597, 670; *Heros* 21; *Perik.* 318, 537; *Sam.* 219. The list combines instances of initial *gar* in monologic and dialogic narrative. See in general De Jong 1997.

‘then’, etc. A recurring feature is to announce the final step of a narrative with a short metanarrative comment which implies the omission of part of it (*to peras*, ‘to cut a long story short’: *Georg.* 49; *Dysk.* 117 [quoted above]; *Epitr.* 287, 533, 891; similarly *Kith.* 92). Finally, the narrator may expressly state that he has reached the end of his story (*Asp.* 82; *Epitr.* 292), or, alternatively, an address to the narratee can indirectly indicate the end of the narrative (*Dysk.* 123).

Although Menander contains a good number of heavily punctuated narratives reminiscent of Aristophanes, dialogic narrative does not *a priori* exclude longer sections of uninterrupted narrative. By far the longest example is the messenger-speech from *Sikyonioi* with no less than 96 uninterrupted lines (176–271), which is likely to owe its existence again to paratragic purposes. After an opening dialogue (169–175) known from tragedy, the messenger explains how he got to know the events (176–186) and identifies himself as one of the large crowd who witnessed the scene (188–192) and commented on it with clamour and sharp remarks (197–199, 202, etc.).<sup>17</sup> Apart from initial references to ‘us’<sup>18</sup> the messenger recedes more and more into the background and lets the events ‘speak for themselves’.<sup>19</sup> He resurfaces when he reports how he left the scene (270–271), which ends his speech and his presence on stage.

The uninterrupted narrative is exceptional but not without parallel. In the arbitration scene that gives the *Epitrepontes* its title, the shepherd Davus is allowed to present his case over a stretch of more than 50 lines with only three short interruptions.<sup>20</sup> The explanation is, of course, generic: forensic speeches must not be interrupted by the opponent. But with his usual care for well-wrought plots, Menander subtly motivates Syrus’ silence. His early attempt to interrupt Davus’ speech is thwarted by the arbitrator, who threatens physical violence in the case of a repetition (‘If you interrupt, I’ll wallop you with my stick,’ 248–249). Syrus is so intimidated by the threat that he only speaks when

<sup>17</sup> Unlike his tragic counterparts, he even identifies himself (187–188), but the details are disputed among scholars (see Belardinelli 1994: ad loc. with bibliography).

<sup>18</sup> *Sik.* 197, 202, 210, 212. It is worth noting that he later refers to the crowd by ‘they’ (244, 245) or simply quotes their remarks (223, 239, 257, 264–266, 269).

<sup>19</sup> Minor counter-examples are an evaluative remark (244) and an oath (216).

<sup>20</sup> *Epitr.* 240–292, interrupted in 247–249, 270 (text and distribution of speakers uncertain), and 274. Davus’ opponent, the charcoal-burner Syrus, is given a similar amount of text (almost 60 lines: 294–352), but only a fraction of it is actually narrative.

prompted (270, 274), and at the end he carefully double-checks whether Davus is indeed done with his speech (293), despite the latter's closing formula 'My case rests' (292).

Interestingly, there is a similar case in *Georgos* (54) where Myrrhine urges the old slave Philinna not to interrupt Davus' narrative. Conversely, Onesimus' threat to recite a complete rhesis from Euripides' *Auge* to Smicrines (*Epitr.* 1125–1126) may not only be indicative of the latter's obtuseness, but may also express general reservations about uninterrupted speeches. Overall, however, Menander does not seem to object to longer stretches of uninterrupted speech, and they often include narrative.

As was mentioned above, most of Menander's narratives are immediately related to the play itself in that they are either analeptic or proleptic. The only exceptions to this rule are a few mythological *exempla* (mostly from tragedy), which are used in order to explain or illustrate a point of the main plot. All these examples are short and presume general familiarity with the narrative in question. As a rule, the purpose of the *exemplum* is humoristic, e.g. when Demeas tries to explain the pregnancy of Plangon to her father Niceratus.

Dem.: Tell me, Nikeratos, have you never heard actors in tragedies telling how Zeus once turned into a stream of gold, flowed through a roof and seduced a girl who'd been locked up?

Nic.: So what?

Dem.: Perhaps we should be prepared for anything? Think! Does any part of your roof leak?

Nic.: Most of it does. But what's that got to do with it?

Dem.: Sometimes Zeus is in a shower of gold, sometimes a shower of rain. Do you understand? This is *his* doing. How quickly we've found the solution!

Nic.: You're having me on.

Dem.: Heavens, no! Wouldn't dream of it. You're surely just as good as Danae's father. If Zeus honoured her, then perhaps your daughter –

Nic.: Oh, dear. Moschion has made a cake of me. (*Sam.* 589–599)

The general preponderance of analeptic narrative in Menander has the effect that the main function of secondary narrative is explanatory. But other functions can be made out too, especially in the case of dialogic narratives. Pyrrhias' narrative (quoted above) has a clear persuasive function ('let's go home'). At the same time it nicely characterizes

Cnemon, who has yet to appear on stage, as the grumpy old man of the play's title and exposes Pyrrhias' own qualities as a vivid narrator. Similarly, Habrotonon's proleptic narrative (*Epitr.* 511–535) is to enlist Onesimus' support and at the same time characterizes her as a clever young lady with good intentions.

In conclusion, long uninterrupted stretches of narrative as in Euripides and heavily punctuated narratives as in Aristophanes coexist in Menander. Whereas the latter tend to be dialogic, the former category comprises both monologic and dialogic narratives. In terms of content, Menander's secondary narratives are closely connected with the main plot of the comedy, most often in the form of an analepsis, which helps to explain the action on stage.



## CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

### LYCOPHRON

*N.J. Lowe*

Imagine a truly omniscient narrator. Imagine that your knowledge of the world is unbounded by space and time: that you, alone among mortals, can see the patterns of cause and effect linking all things in heaven and earth from the beginning of the world to the end of history. From where you stand, a powerless figure close to a centre of power, you can see ripples of consequence spreading out to the horizons of destiny. You see the story of the world extending through you and beyond, a river of time passing beneath your feet and out to a boundless ocean. You know that you can alter nothing, convince nobody, avert none of what you see; that your own life will be short, brutal, unfulfilled, and that soon enough every last member of your family will be slaughtered or enslaved, but that even so the sufferings of generations to come will dwarf the tragedy of the present. And you have a power of language beyond any other: power to make new words, new riddles in which to tell your story. You know that your words will be remembered, reported, pondered, now and in generations yet unborn. What do you say? What kind of story will you tell?

The *Alexandra* of Lycophron attempts an answer to this most daring of narratological challenges. The result is a text of ferocious difficulty, uncertain critical repute, and dizzying narrative paradox:<sup>1</sup> an unstageable dramatic fragment in the form of a play-length messenger-speech, reporting *verbatim* a vast proleptic monologue of impenetrable riddles guaranteed to be disbelieved even if deciphered. Its much-discussed syncretism of genre marries epic, tragic, and lyric *thrēnos* with the mantic voice of lyric and tragedy to create Greek narrative's longest and most ambitious essay in prior narration, with major intertexts including not only the Aeschylean Cassandra and her important lost counterpart

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<sup>1</sup> The key treatments of Lycophronian narrative are Fusillo 1984 and West 1984 (and cf. Fusillo–Hurst–Paduano 1991 and West 1983, 1991/2, and 2000); see also Fountoulakis 1998 and Schade 1999.

in Euripides' *Alexandros*, but the epic laments of Briseis, Hecuba, Helen, and especially Andromache (who anticipates Lycophron's Cassandra in her distinctive proleptic penchant for mourning what has not yet happened).

The *Alexandra*'s central idea is that Cassandra's prophecy should be presented not diegetically but dramatically, with no overt primary narrator ('Lycophron' does not speak) but within a nested frame of multiple speakers and audiences: in particular, that there should be narratees within the world of the poem for whom the events narrated are in the future, unintelligible, and disbelieved, and an audience outside the poem for whom the proleptic content is past, understood, and confirmed. The poem's main narrative (31–1460) is reportedly the direct speech of Cassandra herself, as committed to memory by a peculiarly memorious slave and reported *verbatim* to Priam in the dramatic frame. Equally importantly, however, it is a narrative that addresses itself to a reader beyond this frame, for whom everything that is incredible to Priam and his slave is history fulfilled, and incomprehensible ravings become riddles with determinate solutions. But the most remarkable feature is the *Alexandra*'s extension of this narrative nesting to four or more levels, each characterized by a different twist on the relationship between narrator and narratee, and inviting the poem's readers to reflect on the symmetry between levels and its implications for larger issues of narrative authority (as embodied in the fourfold narrators) and interpretative hermeneutics (as practised by their respective narratees).

<i>level</i>	<i>narrator</i>	<i>narratee</i>	<i>narrative</i>
quaternary	Apollo	Cassandra	inspiration
tertiary	Cassandra	[none]	prophecy
secondary	slave	Priam	messenger speech
primary	'Lycophron'	Ptolemaic reader	the <i>Alexandra</i>

*Apollo, Cassandra, and the narratology of inspiration*

The status of Cassandra's narrative is complicated from the start by its source in mantic inspiration. Unlike her Aeschylean counterpart, Lycophron's Cassandra does not herself explicitly credit Apollo as source of her story; she speaks only of her rejection of his sexual attention (352–353, 1457) and his retaliatory theft of her *pistis* (1454–1457).

Nevertheless, the slave introduces her speech as *entheon* (28), and it is Apollo himself who will guarantee the fulfilment of her prophecies (1458), so we are apparently to assume that her knowledge emanates from the god. Yet the key thing about Apollo as a narrator is that he does not, strictly speaking, narrate; rather, he instils narrative content directly into the consciousness of its recipient. In effect, this is narrative unmediated by any form of actual narration, and part of Cassandra's problem is that the *fabula* instilled in her—the whole of human history—has no intrinsic or pre-formed narrative shape; it is up to her to give it one, and both the intractable vastness of the story and her own deficiencies as a storyteller result in an attempt that is less than lucid to its various narratees. It is never, in fact, explicit how far it is the god, rather than his prophetess, who is principally responsible for the organization of raw history into a *story* (the Herodotean war of Europe and Asia) with a beginning (the rape of Io), a middle (the destruction of Troy and its aftermath), and an end (the final settlement in Lycophron's own times by the enigmatic figures of the Lion, the Wolf, and the Wrestler<sup>2</sup>). One striking passage (229–257) is marked by frequent deictic expressions, present tenses, and first-person references to seeing the scenes she is narrating—suggesting that the events she describes here are unfolding before her eyes in real time as the god prompts, and that her narration is an improvised live commentary on a hallucinatory montage assembled and edited by Apollo.

Nor is it clear whether the story Cassandra tells is the whole of the story implanted by the god. Cassandra's speech stops short at the point when a sudden flaring of self-consciousness drives her back into physical and communicative isolation at 1461. This retreat into silence is apparently *not* the end of her utterance, which continues as an interior monologue and may, for all we or the slave know, have extended her story far beyond its timespan in audible speech:

So much she spoke aloud, and hurrying back in her steps  
 she went inside her prison. But in her heart  
 she wailed the last of her Siren song  
 like a Mimallon of Clarus [i.e. an Apolline prophetess], or a channeller  
 of [the Sybil] Melancraera  
 Neso's daughter, or a Phician monster [Sphinx]  
 incomprehensibly gibbering her tortuous words. (1462–1467)

<sup>2</sup> The principal identifications are conveniently tabulated by Hurst in Fusillo–Hurst–Paduano 1991: 25.



Finally, it is not even certain how reliable a narrator Apollo is, or how much of his story its recipient understands. West intriguingly suggests that ‘Cassandra’s second sight is restricted to what the god cares to reveal’, and that Apollo has withheld, for example, the fact that Ajax’s rape will actually be thwarted, leaving Cassandra to assume the opposite.<sup>3</sup> If this is so, the reader is already enlisted in the completion of major interpretative gaps in the narrative that elude even Cassandra—though there is no extant tradition of a rescue,<sup>4</sup> and it must be doubted whether even Lycophron would wish to stake so much of the interpretability of his text on his readers’ competence to fill a single ellipsis.

*Cassandra: the mantic narrator*

Whether or not we accept this stronger claim, West is surely right to see touches of characterization in some elements of Cassandra’s narration: a history skewed by the perspective of an eponymously anti-sexual figure ‘temperamentally inclined to see *eros* as a perpetual source of trouble’.<sup>5</sup> More daringly, West argues that even the causal pivot of Cassandra’s world history, her attribution of a central causal role to Ajax’s assault, may itself be a subjective distortion imposed by Cassandra’s own troubled outlook on history—that the shape of cause and effect would look quite different if the story of the world had a different narrator. As West points out, the sorrows of the Trojans cannot all be attributed to Ajax’ crime as Cassandra claims; the sins of the Trojans, and especially the crime of Paris, seem played down, though they are the cause of the war and the city’s destruction, as indicated by the setting of her prophecy.

Cassandra is of course an overt, internal narrator—present both as a first-person narrating figure and as a character in the story she tells. The future she narrates, though large, is centrally her own, and is organized accordingly. Her story has four phases: the sorrows of Troy (31–364), the sorrows of the Greeks (365–1282), the conflict of Europe and Asia (1283–1450), and a short reflective conclusion (1451–1460). But each in turn culminates in the story of Cassandra herself: the first in her rape by Ajax (348–364), which then frames the tale of

<sup>3</sup> West 1984: 149 n. 105.

<sup>4</sup> See Gantz 1993: 652 for sources and a cautious assessment.

<sup>5</sup> West 1984: 147.

the Greek sufferings that avenge it (365–386 and 1281–1282); the second in her death and her posthumous vengeance on Ajax' homeland by the thousand-year tribute of the Locrian maidens (1108–1173); the third in the emergence of the Wrestler from her lineage; and the last in the final recognition of the truth of her prophecies (1458–1460).

Cassandra's situation at the moment of narration is very specifically sketched: the occasion is the dawn departure of Paris' ships to Greece (16–22), the place is just outside Cassandra's sea-cave cell on the hill of Ate (29, 349–351, 1462, 1469). Yet it is a mystery to whom, if anyone, Cassandra thinks she is talking. She herself describes her audience as 'deaf rocks, mute wave, and fearsome ocean' (1451–1452), an elemental audience incapable of either hearing or speech, since no human can understand her utterance (1454); she does not acknowledge, and perhaps does not register, the human presence of Priam's slave, whose invisibility to any but the reader recalls the treatment of silent attendants in drama. But her actual narration is characterized by bursts of apostrophe—first to the city of Troy (31, 52, 69, 72), then to Paris (90–146, the longest of several sustained passages of second-person narration), and sporadically thereafter<sup>6</sup>—evoking an eerie sense that some of the time, at least, she is addressing herself to her own vision and a series of figures seen within it.<sup>7</sup>

Yet Cassandra is also a highly self-conscious narrator, aware that her words are true but unbelievable, and that responsibility for this lies outside her own control and (paradoxically) with the very source of her own narrative competence. She anticipates that her prophecies will be remembered in sufficient detail long enough for their truth to be recognized in time:

But he [Apollo] will make my words true. And folk will understand it to  
their sorrow

When there will be no more means to help my fatherland,  
And they will praise the Phoebus-possessed swallow [i.e. me].

(1458–1460)

<sup>6</sup> To Prylis (221); Cassandra herself (258–264); Hector (280, 300, 1189–1216); Troy's enemy *daimōn* (281); Troilus (307–313); Hecuba (315, 330–335, 1174–1188); Polyxena (323–329); the mountains of Euboea (373–378); Odysseus (815); Eggesta (968–973); Setaea (1075–1082); ten Locrian landmarks and peoples (1146–1154); Troy (230–231). Full-scale second-person narration is particularly prominent for close family members; the striking exception is Priam, any apostrophe to whom would have created a perhaps too eerie effect when her words were repeated by the slave.

<sup>7</sup> Comparable situations in Euripidean (→) prologues.

From the moment of its performance, therefore, Cassandra's narrative is conceived as a memorized text rather than a communicative utterance, a speech without a living audience, frozen instead for subsequent iteration and study by a variety of narratees not physically present at the time of narration.

*Priam's slave: narrative as drama*

Nor can we ever be quite sure whose words we are even reading, thanks to the notorious problem of determining where Cassandra's voice ends and the slave's begins.<sup>8</sup> It is often remarked that, despite the clear marking of the formal boundaries (30, 1461), the slave's style is not noticeably differentiated from Cassandra's own, though this is something of a simplification;<sup>9</sup> the first fifteen lines remain broadly within the lexical and stylistic range of tragic diction, eschewing the neologisms, compaction of metaphor, and mythological cryptograms that distinguish the body of the text. It is only at 16 that we meet with a marked change of register, as a sudden barrage of proper names introduces the geography, genealogy, and mythological background of Troy—all of this, however, familiar and readily intelligible to the secondary narratee, if extremely demanding on his primary counterpart(s), or indeed any latter-day reader unequipped with commentary. The one moment in the prologue where the slave's idiom becomes indistinguishable from Cassandra's is the astonishing description of the boats hitting the water at 22–24;<sup>10</sup> this level of gobbledegook is briefly mirrored in the epilogue (1464–1465), which otherwise similarly holds itself within broadly tragic bounds of clarity. Nevertheless, even such momentary leakages of excess from Cassandra's speech to its reporter's confound any attempt at a clear separation between narratorial voices and levels—between *verbatim* quotation and paraphrase, and thus between Cassandra's original narrative and an edited or misremembered re-narration by the slave.

<sup>8</sup> The slave characterizes this particular Cassandran narration as distinctly wilder than her previous utterances (3–4); it is not clear how these earlier prophecies differed in intelligibility, but we are clearly meant to think of Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1178–1330 (and perhaps also Euripides *Troades* 353–461), where Cassandra passes from frenzied lyric to more intelligible but still discredited speech.

<sup>9</sup> See Fountoulakis 1998: 293 for a more measured view.

<sup>10</sup> Green 1990: 177 translates: 'the centipede lovely-faced stork-colored daughters of the Bald Lady struck maiden-slaying Thetis with their blades.'

In contrast to the specificity of Cassandra's own narrative situation, the frame of the slave's report is only very sketchily dramatized, and its narratee is now specific and sentient, but present in the text only as a silent auditor. 1467–1471 makes it clear that the report to Priam follows directly on Cassandra's withdrawal into her cave; we are thus still on the day of Paris' departure for Greece. The opening dialogue borrows from Platonic quasi-dramatic conversational openings (notably the *Symposium*) to suggest a preceding request for information by the narratee but, as in the Platonic models (→), the narratee remains textually invisible. It is left for the poem's own readership to imagine Priam's response to the text they are reading over his shoulder, and to reflect on the similarities with their own response. In some respects Priam's competence in decryption actually exceeds that of Lycophron's readers, since he is in principle better equipped to decipher arcane allusions to past events connected with city and family; so at 335–347, which uses such riddles in referring to Priam's own death. There are also some key passages of comparative lucidity (281–306, 348–372, 1087–1089, 1110–1140, 1281–1282, 1451–1460) where Priam would have to be singularly obtuse not to grasp the narrative outline of what is being foretold. Yet in the final reckoning the poem's readers also know from their vantage of historical hindsight that Priam's powers of both understanding and action are circumscribed: that history will not be changed, and that whatever Priam's response he will take no action capable of averting the fulfilment of the *prolepsis*.

*Lycophron, Ptolemy, and the 'Lycophron question'*<sup>11</sup>

This discussion has sidestepped the notorious 'Lycophron question', since even 'radical unitarians' (who believe our poem to be a second-century pseudepigraphon) see the ascription to Lycophron of Chalcis as more or less pointed—invoking not only an identity for the primary

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<sup>11</sup> West 1984 influentially distinguishes three fundamental positions: 'conservative unitarian', according to which the poem is essentially the uncontaminated work of Lycophron of Chalcis; 'radical unitarian', dating the poem in its entirety to the second century or later; and 'analyst', seeing the Roman references as interpolations in an otherwise Lycophronian text. West's own position might be further distinguished as 'radical analyst' (Tim Cornell's term, from an unpublished paper): she argues strongly for much more extensive Italo-centric interpolation in an original Lycophronian text than earlier analyst critics have dared to suppose.

narrator, but a historical milieu, a perspective on history, and a specific primary narratee in Ptolemy II. Whether that image and that narratee are the actual, historical author and addressee is for present purposes a question of only secondary importance (though for other aspects of interpretation it is of course paramount). Nevertheless, though the text itself says nothing of its author, it has become standard to see the opening and closing lines as deliberately evoking a real or imagined performance by Lycophron himself at the Philadelphian court;<sup>12</sup> and if we accept that Ptolemy is the primary narratee of such a performance,<sup>13</sup> the comparison between Ptolemy and Priam as contrasting narratees becomes a large part of the poem's point. One king is baffled by history, the other sees it entire; one presides over the dissolution of global order, the other over its restoration; and one fatally fails to regard the Apolline authority behind the words of his servant, while the other is fully alert to the truth of inspiration.

Thus the *Alexandra's* nesting of embedded narratives prompts us to see pointed connections between its levels: in particular, between Cassandra's attempt to turn Apollo's mantic gift into narrative and the poet's attempt to tell the shape of world history; and between the two kings' readings of their place in history, and the reader's own decipherment of the enigmatizing text.<sup>14</sup> Seen as a whole, the structure establishes a dynamic hierarchy of metapoetic and political value, with narrative authority deferred upwards through the four levels of narrator, and ultimately from the figure of the poet to the divine figure of his inspiration, at the same time as hermeneutic authority, the power to interpret, devolves downwards to the historical reader for whom the narrative becomes finally intelligible, believable, and true.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> So most recently Kosmetatou 2000: 38–39 (but assuming a second-century date and an Attalid context) and, more cautiously, West 2000: 289 n. 75, following Fusillo 1984: 505–506. The actual performability of the text remains an open question; see Cameron 1995: 81 and the response by West 2000, as well as Fountoulakis 1998 (valuable despite an unpersuasive conclusion).

<sup>13</sup> This is strongly encouraged (*contra* Fusillo, who imagines a collective court audience) by the slave's consistent use of second persons singular; see Fountoulakis 1998: 293.

<sup>14</sup> See Fusillo 1984: 500–506.

<sup>15</sup> See further Lowe 2004.

PART FIVE

ORATORY



## CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

### ANTIPHON

*M. Edwards*

#### *Introduction. Narratology and oratory*

The application of narratological analysis to rhetorical texts raises various issues, some familiar to narratologists working on historical texts, others peculiar to the genre of oratory. Like historical texts, speeches purport to tell the truth about real events, however the overriding purpose of a speech's narrator is to mould those events into a story that is persuasive to his audience, and to that end he will often (it is clear) use deliberate deception. Frequently the author of a speech and its speaker are the same person, though in legal oratory a litigant would routinely call on the services of a professional speech-writer (*logographos*) to compose the speech for him.<sup>1</sup> In these circumstances, therefore, the author and speaker are not the same person, though the pretence is that the speaker has composed the speech himself. The speaker will specifically turn into a primary narrator at the point of the speech where he begins his narrative of the events in question,<sup>2</sup> and this raises the issue of the function of narrative in oratory.

Aristotle divides speeches into three basic classes (*Rh.* 1.3): deliberative (i.e. political), forensic (legal), and epideictic (display). Then, in his discussion of the internal arrangement (*taxis*) of speeches (*Rh.* 3.13–19), he examines the four major divisions of proem (*prooimion*), narrative (*diēgēsis*), proof (*pistis*), and epilogue (*epilogos*), outlining their main features within each of the three classes. In oratory, therefore, the term 'narrative' (or 'narration') denotes that part of a speech in which

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<sup>1</sup> I do not accept the theory of composite authorship of speeches by the logographer in consultation with his client, as propounded by Dover 1968.

<sup>2</sup> Note that the primary narrator will always be male, since women had no legal competence in Athenian courts (where they were represented by their guardian, *kuriōs*) or right to address the assembly and other public gatherings of citizens.



past events are narrated. These are regularly the background to a suit described in the form of a summarized story. The narrative is different in nature and content from the other parts of the speech; it is on this narrative that the attention of this chapter will be focused.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that narratives in practice are by no means always composed in single units: they are frequently broken down into discrete blocks, with a speech containing two or more narrative sections separated by sections of argumentation; and in addition narrative elements will regularly be found in the other parts of a speech, especially the proofs section. It is also the case that deliberative speeches tend to lack a separate narrative entirely (cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.16.11), and we shall concentrate here mainly on the narrative sections of forensic speeches. In these there is a primary narrator, usually internal, who is presenting his version of what happened. The primary narratees in principle are the jurors, who may be either external or internal; but in addition a speaker may address his opponent in apostrophe, who at that point becomes a separate internal narratee.

### *Antiphon*

We shall begin with some general observations on the narrative technique of Antiphon. All three of Antiphon's surviving courtroom speeches have a discrete narrative section (1, *Against the Stepmother* 14–20; 5, *On the Murder of Herodes* 20–24; 6, *On the Chorus-Boy* 11–14). There is, however, a noticeable distinction in strategy between the sole prosecution speech and the two defence speeches. In the latter, echoing Aristotle's recognition that the narrative in a defence speech may be shorter (*Rh.* 3.16.6), the narratives are brief and selective; only the barest details are given of the events in question, and in the *Herodes* even these are punctuated with argumentation (e.g. §21, 'And first consider this ...'). Further information is supplied by narrative passages in the proofs section (5.29–30; 6.21–24, 34–40), and this mixing of narrative and proofs is also found in the works of later orators. In his prosecution speech, on the other hand, Antiphon's narrative is self-contained and clearly is vital to the plaintiff's chances of winning the case, forming over one-fifth of this short speech as a whole. This strategic difference aside, Antiphon's technical practice in introducing and concluding his narratives is consistent over the three speeches. The beginning of the nar-

rative is marked by a narratorial intervention in the form of a meta-narrative comment, much in the manner of a Sophoclean messenger (→), e.g. 'I shall try to narrate to you the truth of what happened' (1.13; cf. 5.19 and 6.10). Narratives in later orators regularly begin with the particle *gar*; this is not Antiphon's practice in the first narrative of the surviving speeches, though the *Stepmother* narrative has a crucial second stage at 1.18, where *gar* does occur, and the second and third narratives of the *Chorus-Boy* speech also have the particle. The endings of the narratives are similarly indicated, either by a concluding remark ('Such were my arrangements for the chorus', 6.14), or by a transitional remark ('Consider now ...', 1.21; cf. 6.41), or by a combination of both ('These are the facts; consider now the probabilities arising from them', 5.25), but in each instance addressed to the primary narratees.

Finally, as one would expect in a forensic setting where the litigant regularly presented his own case, the narrators in speeches 5 and 6 are internal, and their involvement in the actions described is immediately highlighted: 'I sailed' (5.20, with use of the personal pronoun *egō*) and 'When I was appointed *choregus*' (6.11). The narrator of speech 5 comments overtly on his story 'and surely I was not deliberately proposing to send an informer against myself' (5.24), and the narrator of speech 6 is overt at 6.34 ('I must inform you about these things too'). The narrator of speech 1 was in a different position, since the events he describes had taken place several years earlier when he was still a child, and he presumably learned of them only from his father when on his death-bed (1.30). Hence he acts as an external narrator, overt again at 1.18, where the narratees too are external and overt as the second phase of the narrative commences with the commonplace formula 'it would take too long for me to narrate and for you to listen' (cf. And. 3.9; Lys. 23.11).

As an example of Antiphon's practice we will examine the narrative of the sixth speech,<sup>3</sup> where an unnamed Athenian defends himself before the court of the Palladium against a charge of unintentional homicide. He had been responsible for the public duty of training a chorus of boys for the Thargelia festival, one of whom, Diodotus, died after drinking a potion. In the very brief first narrative (§§ 11–13 out of 51) the *choregus* describes the arrangements he made, including the

<sup>3</sup> For commentaries on this speech see ten Berge 1948; Gagarin 1997.

appointment of four deputies to conduct the actual training while he was involved in litigation. Other parts of the story are told later in the speech, when it becomes clear that the present prosecution was part of a continuing legal battle between this wealthy citizen and his political enemies; but the first narrative concentrates on how he acted in his capacity as *choregus*. The narrator is thus internal and overt, commenting repeatedly on his involvement in the arrangements for the training of the boys. In the first half of the narrative this is an explicitly personal involvement: 'I acted as *choregus* ... I fitted out a training room ... I recruited the chorus'; in the second half he is away on legal business, but is still involved vicariously: 'I arranged ... I told him ... I appointed ... a fourth whose duty it was'. He adopts the *persona* of a matter-of-fact and businesslike citizen, who does his duty to the full, both in prosecuting enemies of the state and in training his allotted chorus. An effect of meticulous care is achieved by the thoroughness of the arrangements he describes in the first part of the narrative, enhanced by narratorial interventions: 'as best and most fairly as I could ... the most suitable part of my house'. Further to underscore his fairness the narrator employs the device of presentation through negation, with more interventions (§11):

Next I gathered together the best chorus I could, neither levying any fines nor forcing anyone to provide guarantees nor making any enemies, but everything was done as pleasantly and suitably as possible for both sides, I giving orders and making requests, they readily and willingly sending their sons.

A potential weakness in the *choregus*' position was that he had not trained the chorus personally, and to avoid a charge of neglecting his duty he is at pains in the second half of the narrative to explain his absence and demonstrate that he had appointed suitable deputies. In §12 his 'lack of time' (*askholia*) meant that he could not 'be present and look after them', and he 'happened' to<sup>4</sup> be engaged in legal action of great importance 'to the Council and the Athenian people'. The relevance of this seed will become clear in §35. The impression of the *choregus*' thorough and law-abiding persona is maintained by further narratorial interventions: he prosecutes Aristion and Philinus 'justly and properly', but ensures that the training is 'conducted with all possible care' by a close relative, his son-in-law Phanostratus. He is supported

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<sup>4</sup> Chance plays a role in all three Antiphontean narratives; cf. 1.16; 5.20, 21.

by two other upstanding citizens, Ameinias, whom the narrator considers ‘an excellent man’ and who was experienced in training choruses, as was the anonymous second appointee. These three also had the assistance of a fourth man, Philippus, who was to buy whatever was needed, and in this way the boys would be trained ‘in the best way possible’ with nothing lacking due to the *choregus*’ own indisposition.

At §§21–24 the *choregus* gives a second narrative, describing the behaviour of his opponent Philocrates on the day of the boy’s funeral, when Philocrates first laid his charge in the Heliæa court, and the *choregus* responded by noting that he was about to prosecute Aristion and Philinus the following day and challenging his opponents to question witnesses. The narrator is again internal and overt: ‘I stood up before the court and said to the jurors that ...’; and his persona of thoroughness is maintained, now by the careful description of all the evidence he can adduce to rebut Philocrates’ allegation against him. Narratorial interventions highlight his sense of righteous indignation: Philocrates was bringing a ‘slandorous accusation’ (§21, with repetition of the verb *diaballein* in §22), and it was the imminence of the *choregus*’ own prosecutions that explained ‘these allegations’. Philocrates’ refusal of the commonplace challenge by the *choregus* to examine slaves under torture for evidence builds to the climax of this narrative, which takes the form of another damning narratorial intervention: ‘they well knew that this examination would not supply them with evidence against me, but me with evidence against them that their accusation was totally unjust and unfounded’.

A third stage of the narrative is found at §§34–40, the beginning of which is marked by a metanarrative narratorial intervention (‘I shall show you’) and the particle *gar*. It starts with an analepsis, taking us back to the day of the boy’s death and the day after, and then to the day of the funeral described in §§21–22: ‘they (the prosecution) had been persuaded by my enemies and were preparing to charge me and to proclaim that I was banned from the prescribed places’ (a phrase which recurs in §35, twice in 36 and again in 40). Persuasion hints at bribery, preparation at connivance, and it is the *choregus*’ political enemies who now take centre stage. Both narrator and narratees are overt, as the *choregus* asks two rhetorical questions (who did this and why?) and adds ‘I must tell you about these things also.’ We have clearly reached the crucial moment in the narrative, and in §35 the narrator intervenes to emphasise that the men he was prosecuting had no hope of acquittal

because of the enormity of their offences. Their motive in persuading Philocrates 'to register a charge and to proclaim that I was banned from the prescribed places' is their 'safety and riddance of the whole affair'; and the consequences of the proclamation in this case are precisely spelled out by the ever-meticulous narrator, with the intervention that his opponents would 'not pay the penalty to you for the wrongs they had done'. A second analepsis coupled with another address of the narratees helps to ram home the iniquity of their acquittal: this was not the first time they had 'devised' this scheme (the loaded vocabulary characterizes the opponents as schemers, in contrast to the narrator's straightforwardness), they had used it previously against Lysistratus, 'as you yourselves have heard'.

In the final section of the third narrative the narrator again addresses the narratees ('and you know the sum at which the damages were assessed', §38) and makes further interventions as his story builds to its climax in §§39–40. He is ever mindful of his opponents' treachery and describes how, after a reconciliation between the parties was effected, he met them in a whole series of places, culminating 'by Zeus and all the gods' with the *choregus* and Philocrates standing together on the tribune in the council-chamber and talking to each other. The narrative then ends on a nice note of irony, with the narratorial intervention that the council was astonished to learn that the *choregus* was 'proclaimed to be banned from the prescribed places' by the very same people who on the day before 'had met me and chatted'.

Students of Antiphon's speeches, the earliest in the corpus of Attic oratory, have generally paid scant attention to his narratives, focusing mainly on his techniques of argumentation, and in particular his extensive use of probability-argument. But even the brief survey above indicates that his narratives offer plenty of scope for narratological analysis. The salient features of his method that will naturally recur in later writers of the oratorical genre are, first, the use of the internal, overt narrator, who tells of his involvement in the events that have led to the trial. The exception here is the speaker of speech 1, but he too becomes an internal narrator in the proofs section (at §30, 'just as my father charged me, even though I was still a boy, during his last illness'). The narratees are mostly external, though again in the proofs section the speaker of speech 5 calls on their knowledge of prior events (5.71, 'I think the older ones among you will remember this yourselves'; cf. 6.41). This is a regular tactic, as is the address in apostrophe to the speaker's opponent (e.g. 5.11, an example once more outside the nar-

rative proper). Finally, Antiphon already combines the techniques of the single, extended narrative in speech 1 with discrete, shorter narratives in speeches 5 and 6, in line with the requirements of each case.



## CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

### ANDOCIDES

*M. Edwards*

Unlike Antiphon, Andocides was not a professional logographer, and his three surviving works<sup>1</sup> were delivered by himself on matters in which he was directly involved. Since antiquity judgment on his literary abilities has been severe,<sup>2</sup> but one area in which he indisputably had talent was that of telling a good story. The best examples of this are found in his lengthy defence speech *On the Mysteries*, delivered in 400 against a charge of impiety.<sup>3</sup> Exiled in the wake of the religious scandals of 415, Andocides eventually returned to Athens after the amnesty of 403, but was prosecuted for attending the Mysteries celebrations of 400 when allegedly debarred by the decree of Isotimides. In his defence Andocides has to show that he neither was guilty of impiety in 415 nor had confessed his guilt, and so was not liable to the decree; and he argues that the decree in any case was now invalid. A secondary charge alleged that he had illegally placed an olive-branch on the altar of the Eleusinium during the time of the Mysteries celebrations. Andocides is therefore faced with a complex set of circumstances spanning fifteen years, and his defence is adapted to the needs of the situation. It is divided into several parts thematically rather than chronologically, with narrative details provided at regular intervals, displaying a flexibility that indicates Andocides' innate talent at narrative. After an indeed conventional proem (§§ 1–10), he first addresses the issue of the profanation of the Mysteries (§§ 11–33), a section which may be sub-divided into narrative (§§ 11–18) followed by proofs, with a second short narrative at §§ 27–28. The second part of the defence, concerning the mutilation of the Herms (§§ 34–70), is constructed on a different pattern, in which the

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<sup>1</sup> The authenticity of *On the Peace* is regularly accepted (see Edwards 1995: 107–108), but was challenged by Harris 2000. The fourth speech in the MSS, *Against Alcibiades*, is almost certainly spurious (see Edwards 1995: 131–136; Gribble 1999: 154–158).

<sup>2</sup> See Usher 1999: 42.

<sup>3</sup> For commentaries on this speech see Makkink 1932; MacDowell 1962; Edwards 1995. On the date see MacDowell 1962: 204–205.



narrative of the story is interwoven with the proofs. The reason for this change of approach may stem from the fact that Andocides had admitted to cognizance of the mutilation, whereas his utter denial of any involvement in the profanations could not be refuted, hence he begins with this stronger aspect of his case.<sup>4</sup> He next turns to the revision of the laws (§§71–91), to demonstrate that he was no longer subject to the decree of Isotimides, and here the narrative elements are very brief, forming part of the discussion of earlier laws and decrees (cf. §§73, 80–82, 85–86, 88–89). There follows an attack on the lawless character of Andocides' opponents (§§92–136), which contains historical narrative, a narrative of the secondary charge concerning the olive-branch, and narratives of the behaviour of Andocides' opponents Callias and Agyrrius. The speech concludes with an argument of divine favour (§§137–139) and an epilogue (§§140–150).

The opening narrative (§§11–18) bears some similarities to the method of Antiphon. Its beginning is marked in §10 by a metanarrative narratorial intervention ('I shall tell you'), and its end is clearly indicated in §19 with another intervention, 'you have heard what happened, gentlemen, and the witnesses have testified to you' (cf. Ant. 5.25, 'this is what happened'). But the use of the particle *gar* at the start of the narrative is to be noted,<sup>5</sup> and Andocides regularly marks the beginning and ending of his narratives with an address to the primary narratees, here in §§10 and 19.<sup>6</sup> The internal narrator is at first covert; and a striking feature, not encountered in Antiphon, is the use of *oratio recta*, as Pythonicus, the man who first discloses the profanations, becomes a secondary narrator with secondary narratees (the assembly). Andocides had already used direct speech in *On his Return* (2.14), and it occurs frequently in the *Mysteries* speech.<sup>7</sup> The second informer, Teucus (§15), was a key figure, since he gave information concerning both the profanations and the mutilation, and twice the verb connected with his activities is in the historic present tense rather than the usual imperfect or aorist: he 'informs' (*epaggelletai*) and 'gives a list' (*apographei*) of names. The historic present is also used in connection with another informer, Lydus (§17),

<sup>4</sup> See Edwards 1995: 17–26; *contra* MacDowell 1962: 167–171, 173–176.

<sup>5</sup> Similarly §§111, 130, 133, but not 27, 34, 48, 60, 117, 124.

<sup>6</sup> Similarly §§27/29, 46, 54, 60/69, 106/109, 117/123, 124/128, 130, 136, but not 34, 48, 111/113, 133.

<sup>7</sup> Already in the poem at §4.

significantly as he lists (*apographeî*) Andocides' father among the culprits, and to highlight the reaction of the councillor Speusippus, who 'has the culprits sent for trial' (*paradidōsin*). The narrator closes his account of the Mysteries affair by telling how rewards were given to Andromachus and Teucus in a continuous narrative (§§ 27–28), whose opening is marked by a metanarrative narratorial intervention addressed to the primary narratees ('And now, gentlemen, what happened after this?'), and ends with a similar intervention in § 29.

The narrator resumes his story in § 34, with Teucus' information concerning the Herms. Again, the narrative is introduced by a meta-narrative narratorial intervention ('I will do as I promised and tell you the whole story from the beginning'), and the importance of Teucus giving the information underlined by the use of historic present: 'he informs' (*mēnueî*) and 'gives a list' (*apographeî*). It now transpires that the information led to panic in Athens, and in the midst of the troubles another informer takes centre stage, Diocleides (§ 37). His importance is indicated by the use of the present tense *eisaggellei* ('brings an impeachment'), and by a narratorial intervention, which emphatically appeals on the internal status of the primary narratees: 'Now I want you to think carefully here, gentlemen; try to remember whether I am telling the truth, and inform your companions; for it was before you that Diocleides stated his case and you are my witnesses of what occurred.' His tale (§§ 38–43), introduced by *gar*, is presented as that of a reported narrator; a device familiar from historiography and well at home in forensic oratory. However, it is frequently interrupted by comments of the primary narrator, for the first time in § 39: 'Now to begin with, gentlemen, Diocleides gave his story this particular form simply to be in a position to say of any citizen, according to his choice, that he was or was not one of the offenders—a monstrous proceeding.' The same phenomenon can be observed in § 40 ('and told him what I have told you'), before Andocides' companion Euphemus is introduced by Diocleides and given direct speech, as is Andocides' father Leogoras in § 41. The primary narrator intervenes once more with the comment that Diocleides 'was in this way trying to destroy' Leogoras; and the final part of the reported narrator's story in §§ 41–42 is again interrupted by the primary narrator's comment 'he was thereby trying similarly to destroy my brother-in-law'. The primary narrator indicates the end of Diocleides' narrative in regular manner by a narratorial intervention (§ 43, 'such was his impeachment, gentlemen'), and this is immediately followed by the historic present *apographeî* ('he gives a list'), and a narrative of the

consequences of the information. He carefully details the arrangements made by the Council for Athens' security and remarks bitterly that the author of the 'troubles' (*kakōn*), hailed as Athens' saviour, 'was dining' (*edeipnei*) free in the Prytaneum—the imperfect tense with which the narrative concludes conjures up the image of Diocleides serenely dining while all around was panic. The end of this section of narrative is marked once more by a narratorial intervention addressed to the primary narratees, in so far as they are internal: 'first, gentlemen, those of you who were present recall these things and describe them to the others' (§46).

The next narrative tells the emotive story of what happened to Andocides after his arrest (§§48–53): 'we were all thrown into the same prison and it was night and the gates were shut—one man's mother came, another's sister, another's wife and children—there were cries and moans of men bewailing and lamenting their present troubles'. He first quotes his cousin Charmides' appeal to him for help in direct speech, and then presents his own thoughts as he wrestled with his conscience whether or not to inform, first in direct, then in indirect speech. These thoughts shrewdly contain the evaluations 'wrongfully' (*adikōs*) and 'rightfully' (*dikaiōs*).

In §§60–66 follows the account of how Andocides finally gave his version of the mutilation of the Herms, with Andocides acting as reported narrator ('I therefore informed the Council that I knew the offenders and showed exactly what occurred. The idea, I said, had been ...'). Noticeable here are the repetition of the emotive adverb *adikōs* (§60), the intervention of the primary narrator Andocides in the narrative of his reported narrator Andocides at §62 ('and that is why the Herm which you can all see, the one by our family home ... was the only one un mutilated'), and the use of direct speech at §63, as Meletus and Euphiletus warn Andocides to keep quiet using a phrase ('you will keep us as friends as before') reminiscent of Diocleides' words to Euphemus at §40. The investigation of Andocides' version of events leads to the denouement of the Diocleides story. Shrewdly exploiting the internal status of his narratees, he ends this section by a passage of second-person narration: 'and when you heard the facts yourselves, you handed Diocleides over to the court and put him to death. You released the prisoners ...' (§66). After a summing up of the main facts of his narratives so far (§§67–68), Andocides ends with a final appeal to his narratees, in so far as they are internal, an appeal which by now has acquired the status of a rhyme or incantation ('Now recollect whether

what I have been saying is true, gentlemen; and if you know the facts, make them clear to those who do not': §69).

The next extended narrative in the speech comes at §§106–109, as Andocides surveys past Athenian history to show how grievances had been put aside in previous times of trouble to the benefit of the city. The use of external analepses in the form of historical parallels is very common in the orators and already appears at Ant. 5.67–71, but has a history of its own stretching back to Homer (→).<sup>8</sup> Features of this narrative such as the introductory metanarrative narratorial intervention 'I wish to say a few words about this too' (cf. Lys. 22.1; Isoc. 18.4) have been met often enough before; but its patriotic feel is new, as the now external primary narrator recalls the actions of his ancestors against the tyrants (§106) and adds a first reference in the orators to the battle of Marathon, alongside an emphasis on the nobility (*aretē*) of earlier Athenians. These themes recur in later speeches (e.g. Lys. 2.21; Isoc. 4.86–87; Dem. 18.208).

Andocides' account of the secondary charge against him (concerning the placing of a suppliant's bough) begins with a short narrative of more recent events (§§111–112). This time there is no preliminary narratorial intervention or address to the narratees, though introductory *gar* is used. The narrator describes the scene in the Council meeting as Callias dramatically declares (*legei*) that a bough had been placed illegally on the altar during the recent celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries. The narrative resumes in §115, with the helpful intervention of Cephalus as a secondary narrator (§116). In order to explain Callias' motive for prosecuting Andocides, the narrator goes back in time and inserts an analepsis (117–123), concerning the daughter of Epilycus, whom Callias tried to secure for his own son against Andocides. It opens with the regular narratorial intervention ('I shall narrate why he tried to trap me'), and the narrator suggests his own decency by a shrewd use of indirect speech ('I told Leagrus that this was the time for decent men to demonstrate their respect for family ties,' §118). His good intentions are reiterated in another speech to Leagrus (§120), before Callias enters a claim (*lagkhaneî*) to the girl, lodges an information (*endeiknusi*) and involves (*kathistēsîn*) Andocides in the trial, and places (*tithēsi*) the branch on the altar—a remarkable sequence of present tenses in which, after the first three, the fourth one seems all the

<sup>8</sup> On the use of history in the orators see in particular Nouhaud 1982.

more credible. Steadfast to the end, the narrator turns to the narratees for their assistance in punishing Callias. A third stage of the Callias narrative takes us still further back in time, to the birth of his son (124–127). Callias marries (*gamei*, the emphatic first word of this narrative, in the historic present), but the narrator describes with an ironic humour how he was soon living with his wife's mother too, when he was a priest of Demeter and Kore, the Mother and the Daughter. The mother 'drove out' the daughter, before Callias 'threw out' the mother, denying that her child was his own; and his subsequent altercation with her relatives is narrated vividly and followed by the narratorial intervention 'if he lied he prayed that he and his house would be destroyed—as they will be'. Callias' later change of heart is emphasized by present tenses: he 'brings' (*komizetai*) the woman back and 'introduces' (*eisagei*) the boy as his son; and the narrator describes how Callias swore on the altar to his son's legitimacy (§127) in words very similar to the ones used earlier to describe his denial of paternity (§126). The final part of the Callias narrative (§130) takes us back to his father, Hipponicus, and the rumour that he had an evil spirit in his house. The section begins and ends with an address to the narratees, both times calling on their memories, with the introductory 'I wish (*boulomai*) to remind you' and an initial *gar*.

A final section of narrative concerns Agyrrhius' motive for prosecuting, over a business contract (§§133–135). It is introduced by the meta-narrative narratorial intervention 'I shall tell you' and has an initial *gar*. The narrator again adopts the *persona* of an upright citizen, in contrast to Agyrrhius, whom he ironically calls a 'gentleman' (*kalos kagathos*), and his partners—he intervenes at §133 with the remark 'you know what they are like'. Their reaction, to get rid of Andocides at all costs, is relayed for added effect in direct speech, ending with the recurrent emotive word of the speech's narratives, *adikōs*.

In sum, Andocides in the *Mysteries* speech employs, like Antiphon in *On the Chorus-Boy*, an overt internal primary narrator. His primary narratees are internal, a fact which is frequently, emphatically and maximally exploited, the narrator calling on them as witnesses and even involving them in the form of second-person narration. He adopts Antiphon's method of breaking up the narrative into smaller sections, though here the events of the two main narratives, the profanation of the Mysteries and mutilation of the Herms, were in fact contemporaneous. But a prominent feature of Andocides' method is the frequent insertion of interventions by the primary narrator into stories being told by a reported narrator; and another major advance on his predecessor

is his use of speeches and secondary narrators, both of which greatly enhance the vividness and effectiveness of the narratives. Andocides may not have been a professional logographer, but the ability to tell a persuasive story was one of the tricks of the trade that he possessed in abundance.



## CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

### LYSIAS

*M. Edwards*

In the opinion of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lysias* 18), Lysias was ‘unquestionably the best’ of the orators at writing narrative. By no means all of the thirty-five speeches surviving under his name contain a narrative, but those that do certainly tend to support Dionysius’ judgment, and the narrative frequently plays a central role in the persuasion of the jurors. A crucial factor is the way in which Lysias characterizes his clients, who act as internal narrators. The narrative of the first speech, *On the Killing of Eratosthenes*, will serve as an example of Lysias’ method, but we shall begin with some general remarks.

Although there are some speeches in which he mixes elements of narrative and proof in the manner of Antiphon and Andocides,<sup>1</sup> Lysias generally adopts the basic fourfold pattern of proem, narrative, proofs, and epilogue. An extensive *diēgēsis* is a dominant feature of many of his works,<sup>2</sup> and over one-third of speeches 1, 3, 13, 16 and 31 is taken up by narrative. Various recurrent features are familiar from Antiphon and Andocides, such as the now familiar metanarrative narratorial intervention that indicates the start of the narrative (e.g. ‘I shall describe’, 1.5, 3.4).<sup>3</sup> His speakers regularly add that they will tell the story or the whole story from the beginning (*ex arkhēs*, 1.5; 7.3; 12.3; 13.4; 32.3; cf. And. 1.10, 34), and sometimes that they will do so briefly (12.3; 16.8; 24.4). Almost all of Lysias’ narratives have *gar* at the beginning, with the exception of speeches 12 and 32. Speech 12, however, is among a number of speeches that have a preliminary narrative (*prodiēgēsis*), and while there is no *gar* at 12.4, there is one at the start of the main narrative in 12.6. The beginning and end of most Lysiac narratives are

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. speeches 7, 16, 31.

<sup>2</sup> The circumstances of the case may, of course, militate against an extended narrative: e.g. speech 24 turns on the value of the speaker’s property.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. ‘I shall inform’ (19.12), ‘I shall try to inform’ (7.3; 12.3; 25.7; 32.3), ‘I shall begin to narrate’ (13.4), ‘I wish to describe’ (13.62), ‘I wish to tell’ (22.1).



marked, as in Andocides, by addresses to the jurors functioning as primary narratees, though the end of several narratives is not otherwise clearly indicated: a significant number have the particle *toinun* (cf. 7.11; 10.6; 16.18; 22.6; 24.7; 30.6; 32.19), while speech 1 has the adverb *houtōs* ('in this way', cf. 21.11).<sup>4</sup>

Speech 1 features an internal narrator, the defendant Euphiletus, who is accused of entrapment and intentional homicide, after catching his wife *in flagrante* with her lover, Eratosthenes, and killing him. Euphiletus claims the killing was not planned and was sanctioned by law, but it seems clear that such extreme action was no longer considered to be appropriate.<sup>5</sup> The narrative (§§ 6–26) occupies twenty-one out of the fifty sections of this speech, roughly the same length as that of speech 12, and only the narrative of speech 13 is longer. It is divisible into three sections, beginning with a preliminary narrative (§§ 6–8) describing a perfectly normal Athenian marriage, in which the husband kept reasonable control of his wife and trusted her the more after the birth of their first child; next comes the first stage of the main narrative (§§ 9–21), in which the narrator tells of events indicating his ignorance of the affair, until it is revealed to him by an old crone who is the servant of another of Eratosthenes' conquests and is confirmed by the confession of his wife's maid; then follows the second stage (§§ 22–26), which recounts what happened on the fateful night. Throughout the narrator is overt. Thus we have in § 7 a prolepsis reminiscent of Homer and Herodotus, which foreshadows the disaster to come, as the wife is seen by her future lover at the funeral of Euphiletus' mother: 'but when my mother died, her death became the cause of all my troubles'; and meta-narrative narratorial remarks, which mark transitions in the story (§ 9: 'for I must narrate these things to you as well'; § 22: 'I wish to narrate').

A noticeable feature of the narrative as a whole is tense variation. A dramatic vividness is added to Euphiletus' account by the use of the historic present at certain key points: the birth of the child (§ 6, *gignetai*), the corruption of his wife (§ 8, *diaphtheiretai*), the deception perpetrated by the wife when she closes the bedroom door and locks it (§ 13, *prostithēsi, ephelketai*), the approach to Euphiletus of the old crone (§ 15, *proserkhetai*); and in particular the description of the last night, as Eratosthenes enters

<sup>4</sup> I take the narrative to end at § 26. In Carey's division (1989: 66) the narrative extends to § 28, and there is an address to the jurors in § 29.

<sup>5</sup> For commentaries on this speech see Edwards and Usher 1985; Carey 1989; Edwards 1999.

the house (§ 23, *eiserkhetai*), the maid tells Euphiletus (§ 23, *phrazei*), who goes out and calls on his friends (§ 23, *exerkhomai*, *aphiknoumai*), they enter the house together (§ 24, *eiserkhometha*) and Euphiletus knocks Eratosthenes down (§ 25, *kataballō*).

The narrative plays a key role in the portrayal of Euphiletus' character, as the narrator tells what is, on the surface at least, a simple story of deception and discovery. The simplicity is, of course, the product of shrewd narrative art,<sup>6</sup> and Lysias thereby builds up a picture of a solid Athenian citizen, steadfast in his observance of the law, who is at the same time an unsophisticated man, incapable of the kind of plotting of which he is accused. He is a somewhat naïve, but caring husband (§ 9), firm with his wife when he needs to be and prone to the occasional angry outburst (§ 12). A number of bitter comments on his lack of suspicion and ignorance (§§ 10, 13, 14, 15) cement this picture.<sup>7</sup> But what is perhaps the most remarkable feature of this narrative is the role apportioned to the three women, Euphiletus' wife, her maid, and the old crone. The wife, though never blamed for the affair, is nevertheless a clever manipulator (§§ 10–14), and she is given one of the relatively rare humorous remarks in oratory as she becomes a secondary narrator: 'Yes, so that you can have a go at the slave-girl. You tried to grab her once before when you were drunk. And I laughed.' (§§ 12–13). As well as the wife, the old crone also acts as a secondary narrator, as she alerts Euphiletus to what is happening. Her tale, in particular the remark that Eratosthenes made a profession (*tekhnē*) out of seduction, and Euphiletus' confrontation of the slave-girl enable him to paint a vivid and convincing picture of an extended affair without having to produce either as a witness, which probably was not allowed in law.<sup>8</sup> The slave-girl is, in fact, the only one of the three women who does not take on the role of a secondary narrator, but she does become a reported narrator:

And having at once fallen at my knees and obtained a pledge from me that she would suffer no harm, she accused him firstly that he approached her after the funeral, then told how she finally became his messenger and how my wife was in time persuaded and the ways in which she effected his entrances, and how at the Thesmophoria, while

<sup>6</sup> See Carey 1989: 66; Edwards 1999: 67.

<sup>7</sup> See Edwards 1999: 58.

<sup>8</sup> See Todd 1993: 96. A notable parallel in Lysias is the role of the plaintiff's mother in speech 32, who twice acts as a secondary narrator (§§ 12–13, 15–17).

I was at the farm, she went off to the temple with his mother, and she narrated (*diēgēsato*) precisely everything else that had happened.

This indirect testimony of the women may have made the primary narratees more ready to believe that Euphiletus' version of what happened on the fateful night was not premeditated. These narratees are jurors sitting in the court of the Delphinium, which heard cases of justifiable homicide. In contrast to Antiphon's practice they are addressed regularly (nine times) in the narrative. However, the interaction between narrator and narratees is not on this occasion one of deference, despite the context of a homicide court. Throughout his speech the speaker treats his addressees as fellow Athenians, who would all have reacted in the same way as he did, and his tone of righteous indignation is more that of a prosecutor than a defendant: already in the proem he adopts the forthright stance of a victim of Eratosthenes' outrageous behaviour. This attitude is continued when he acts as narrator. His professed ignorance that was noted above is shrewdly emphasized for the narratees by the common device of presentation through negation: 'I never suspected' (§10), 'thinking nothing of this nor suspecting anything' (§13), 'I said nothing about the matter' (§14); and after the revelation he reflects on things 'which had never happened before' (§17). He also makes asides to the narratees ('I must narrate these details to you', §9, cf. 11), so that they feel fully in the picture, and remarks such as 'I was filled with suspicion' (twice in §17, sandwiching a recapitulation of all the signs he had previously missed and standing in stark contrast to the previous lack of suspicion) add to the persuasiveness of one of Lysias' finest narratives.

Lysias was the foremost logographer of his day, and while modern scholars have commented on his relative lack of argumentative skill, his talent for writing persuasive narrative is undeniable. He employs devices such as metanarrative narratorial intervention that we have seen in Antiphon and Andocides, but his particular brilliance lies in his ability to construct a character for the primary narrator that completely secured the sympathies of the primary narratees.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

### ISOCRATES

*M. Edwards*

The career of Isocrates falls into two distinct phases. Six forensic speeches survive from the period 403–c. 390 BC, which in their method bear both striking similarities to and marked differences from the contemporary works of Lysias. Only the short speech 21, *Against Euthynus*, which may be the earliest of the six, follows the regular Lysiac pattern, especially if its abrupt ending indicates that the epilogue is lost. Two other speeches—16, *On the Team of Horses* and 20, *Against Lochites*—are certainly incomplete, and the latter has no narrative. But speech 16, despite the loss of the proem and narrative proper, contains two narrative sections (§§5–9, 25–38), and the three complete speeches similarly all have a main narrative, followed by one or more later sections of narrative (17, *Trapeziticus* 3–23, 35–37, 42–43; 18, *Against Callimachus* 2–3 [a preliminary narrative], 5–12, 52–54, 59–61; 19, *Aegineticus* 5–12, 18–27).

The beginning of a narrative is, once more, regularly marked in Isocrates by metanarrative narratorial interventions, all involving a form of the verb *diēgeisthai* ('to narrate'), except at 16.4, the first extant narrative of this speech whose beginning is lost, where we have 'I shall begin to inform you'. Narrators twice claim that they will tell the tale from the beginning (17.3; 18.4) and one says he will do so 'as briefly as possible' (21.2). Later narrative sections are less regularly introduced, but noteworthy expressions are 'I desire to describe to you' (16.24; note the verb *dielthein*) and 'I shall mention this to you' (18.58). All the narrative sections have an initial *gar*, with the single exception of the second narrative of speech 19, where the particle is absent at §18, though it does occur in the second and third subsections of this narrative at §§21 and 24. The ends of the first narratives are also regularly and familiarly marked, as by the comments 'this is what happened' (18.12; cf. 16.10; 21.4) and 'I have told you everything that happened' (17.24). As with their opening, the close of later narratives is less clearly defined. Finally, addresses to the narratees at the beginning and ending of narratives is

less common in Isocrates than Andocides and Lysias, with the exception of 17.3/24, 35/38.

As an example of forensic narrative in Isocrates we may take speech 17. This is his finest legal piece, composed for the unnamed son of Sopaeus, a subject of king Satyrus of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, when he prosecuted the banker Pasion for fraud. The internal narrator's main tactic is to portray Pasion as a callous blackmailer, who took advantage of his plight after his father had been arrested by Satyrus and to whom he was forced to entrust his money in order to hide it from Satyrus' agents. This he accomplishes by an extended narrative (§§3–23) which is very reminiscent of Lysias in its length and vivid characterization and has frequent use of the historic present tense. The primary narratees may not have been wholly sympathetic towards a wealthy foreigner who was himself involving Pasion in a fraud (§7), so the narrator highlights Pasion's unreliable, deceitful and erratic behaviour in contrast to his own constancy in times of stress.

The narrative may be sub-divided into two parts, the first (§§3–10) covering the period when the narrator and his father Sopaeus were under suspicion, the second (§§11–23) the events after Sopaeus' release. In the former he paints an intimate picture of the change in his fortunes, from the time he left Pontus with money and ships to his straightened circumstances in Athens and deception by Pasion; he repeatedly inserts his own thoughts (e.g. §8) and those of Pasion, and tells how he tried to safeguard his money in the belief that Pasion was a trustworthy friend. On the news of his father's release, the narrator becomes much more confident, and it is Pasion's turn to be worried and apparently humble (§22), but he is always impudent and full of ruses (§§19–23).

Underpinning the pathos of the story is the use of highly emotive vocabulary, whereby the narrator becomes overt, such as 'slander' (*diabolēs*, §5), 'shamelessness' (*anaiskhuntias*, §8), 'the most outrageous claim of all' (*logon pantōn deinotaton*, §12, cf. And. 1.39) and 'the most shameful accusations' (*aiskhistas aitias*, §13). Additionally, the narrator attempts to interact with the narratees, who strikingly for an Isocratean speech are addressed directly eleven times in this narrative, e.g. 'what do you think was my state of mind?' (§10), 'as you yourselves will learn in the course of my speech' (§19) and 'what more need I say to you, gentlemen of the jury?' (§23). Further, he plays indirectly on the long-standing friendship between Athens and Pontus by indicating that he sailed to Athens with two ships loaded with grain (§4), and on the Athe-

nians' pride at being the centre of the trading world—he has heard about 'this state and the rest of Greece' (§4), and it is to Athens that he comes, opening a bank account with Pasion. If the relations between the two states are used subtly in this narrative, at the end of the speech the speaker openly reminds the jurors of his family's services to Athens (§57). Further sections of narrative are found at §§35–37 (the speaker's dealings with Stratocles) and 42–43 (previous legal problems faced by the speaker in which he had been helped by Pasion; note here how the narrator becomes overt with the use of the emotive verb *sukophantein*, 'to prosecute maliciously'). In this speech, and speech 18, these later narratives are quite brief, but in speech 19 the second is considerably longer than the first, as the speaker avoids a long narrative of his complicated family connections by breaking it up into two sections (§§5–14, 18–29), so foreshadowing the technique of the inheritance specialist, Isaeus.

So far Isocrates the logographer, whose speeches feature internal narrators, but it is for his fifteen discourses that he is mainly studied. These display a variety of content and purpose, ranging from essays on education and epideictic encomia to protreptic treatises and political tracts. They were composed primarily for reading, and the political discourses in particular provided material for study in Isocrates' Athenian school, inculcating political and moral ideas in his wealthy pupils. By the nature of the discourses their narrative sections are broken up, since interpretation of the facts was more important than extended narration of them, as Isocrates himself tells us in a narratorial intervention in *Panegyricus* 97–98.<sup>1</sup> They tend to consist of stories from past history, included as justifications for the policies being propounded, and hence feature external narrators. Here we shall concentrate on two discourses: 9, *Evagoras* and 4, *Panegyricus*.

*Evagoras* was written by Isocrates for king Nicocles of Salamis in Cyprus, to commemorate the life of his father. It is therefore an encomium, but one which differs from earlier sophistic encomia in that its subject is recently deceased and is neither a mythological figure nor one of the fallen heroes of war celebrated in funeral speeches (*epitaphioi*). Evagoras' virtue (*aretē*, a theme of the discourse) and achievements could be emulated by Isocrates' readers, and Isocrates was aware (§8) that he was inaugurating a new literary genre that eventually would become biography.<sup>2</sup> He begins with a conventional element of encomia,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Quintilian 4.2.31–32; Usher 1990: 172.

<sup>2</sup> See further on the *Evagoras* and the origins of biography Bruns 1896; Momigliano

a narrative of the divine and heroic ancestry and the birth of Evagoras (§§ 12–21). The overt external narrator introduces this narrative with the phrase ‘it is fitting for me to describe’ (*dielthein* appeared in 16.24), and a *gar* marks the beginning of the narrative in § 13. It culminates in § 21 with Evagoras’ birth, which is described in one long periodic sentence and which again reveals the presence of its narrator, in a *praeteritio*, ‘I prefer to pass over the portents, the oracles and the visions appearing in dreams ...’ A metanarrative narratorial intervention then immediately heralds the second instalment of the story of Evagoras’ life (with a *gar* at the start of § 22), which again reveals the narrator, this time in a rhetorical question: ‘the confusion, the fears, the exhortations—why need I spend time telling them?’ At § 33, with Evagoras installed as ruler of Salamis, the narrative is interrupted, as happens frequently in Isocrates, and the story of his rule is picked up again in §§ 47–73, introduced in § 46 by ‘it is easy to learn from his deeds themselves’ and with a *gar* marking the start of the narrative. A climax is reached in § 64 with Evagoras’ defeat of the Persian king, the narrator commenting ‘the most amazing thing of all is this’. Narratorial interventions are indeed numerous (§§ 48, 51, 57, 61, 69), culminating in § 73, where the narrative is brought to a close: ‘I am sure I have overlooked many things concerning Evagoras.’ One of these details was his violent death—epideictic biography allowed Isocrates the licence to portray Evagoras’ life as one of unqualified success.

Isocrates is most renowned for his political discourses. The earliest, *Panegyricus*, is perhaps the most famous, in which he sets out his plan for a Panhellenic conquest of the Persians under the joint leadership of Athens and Sparta.<sup>3</sup> Given Sparta’s supremacy in the Greek world at the time of publication (380), Isocrates is forced to argue Athens’ claims on the basis of justice, and he therefore recounts the mythological and historical events that are the material of Athenian epideictic oratory (§§ 21–132). The narrator begins with a preliminary narrative of the antiquity of Athens (§§ 23–25), marked by the intervention ‘for it is admitted that ...’ (*homologeitai men gar*; cf. 9.13). The narrative breaks off at § 26, but resumes in §§ 28–29 with the myth of Demeter and Kore, a story ‘which deserves to be told again now’ and has *gar* at the start. The snippets of narrative continue at §§ 34–36, after a concluding meta-narrative narratorial intervention (‘this is what I have to say about ...’),

1971; Usher 1999: 312–313.

<sup>3</sup> For a commentary on this speech see Usher 1990.

with the story of Athenian leadership of the Ionian migration. This time the narrative begins in the second limb of a long periodic sentence, which encompasses the whole story (similarly the story of the establishment of the laws at §39). After another narratorial summary ('let what I have said suffice ...') at §§51ff. the narrator moves on to Athens' wars, with the remark 'I shall pass over recent or insignificant instances' of Athens' aiding suppliants (§54). He in fact starts by going back into mythological times, with the commonplace story of the help Athens afforded to the sons of Heracles and to Adrastus (§§54–60, interrupted at 57). The narrative, then, is Atheno-centric, which indicates clearly that the primary narratees are envisaged as being Athenians, despite the fact that this tract is ostensibly aimed at a nationwide audience: Isocrates' readers among the various Greek states will have reacted very differently to his version of Athens as the protector of weaker states and even benefactor of Sparta (§§61–63), and as leader of the Greeks against barbarians (§§66–98; note at §66 the intervention 'I shall try to describe [*dielthein*] these things also', which is followed at the start of the narrative by *esti gar*). The Persian Wars are powerfully portrayed, naturally with emphasis on the role of the Athenians, who at Marathon, the narrator comments, were 'a few against many tens of thousands' (§86), while king Xerxes is the arrogant figure familiar from Herodotus (§§89, 90). The part played by the Spartans is diplomatically highlighted, as they rush to Marathon (§§86–87) and fight to the death at Thermopylae, with courage equal to that displayed by the Athenians at Artemisium (§§90–92); but the other Greek allies are hardly mentioned, apart from the Peloponnesians who were only looking out for themselves (§93). The Athenocentric narrative culminates in the battle of Salamis (§§93–96), which is depicted as very much an Athenian victory—the battle of Plataea, won by Peloponnesian infantry, is omitted. As has been pointed out,<sup>4</sup> it is the moral fibre of the Athenians that marks them out more than their physical capabilities, and so detailed narrative gives way to the general character inferences that can be drawn from their actions as a whole. The narrator, himself explicitly Athenian, even defends the atrocities committed later against Melos and Scione (§102, 'we deserve praise for acting harshly in the fewest possible cases') and asserts Athens' selfless moderation in power (§§103–109), in contrast to the oligarchic tyranny

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<sup>4</sup> By Usher 1999: 300.



that followed the fall of the empire (§§ 110–121). Further narrative details pepper the discourse, including Persia's military weakness (§§ 140–143), as Isocrates promotes the policy that was ultimately to be carried out by Alexander the Great.

It is clear that Isocrates' early activities as a logographer, even though he later repudiated them, stood him in good stead for his future career, not least with regard to his narrative technique. A noticeable trait of the narrators and narratees in his discourses is their national pride as Athenians, which colours the way they present, as external narrators, mythological and historical exempla. In this respect Isocrates' speeches are particularly reminiscent of those of the epideictic genre, but Athenian pride also became an increasingly important theme of deliberative and forensic narrators from the mid-fourth century, as Athens faced the threat of Philip of Macedon.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

### DEMOSTHENES

*M. Edwards*

As one would expect of the orator regarded by most critics ancient and modern as the master of his art, Demosthenes displays in his speeches both familiarity with established methods and a readiness to adapt these for his own purposes. The present discussion will be confined to the forensic speeches, taking as examples one of the shorter cases from a private suit (54, *Against Conon*, which has 44 sections in modern editions) and one of the longer speeches from a public suit (19, *On the False Embassy*, 343 sections).<sup>1</sup> We should note, however, that pieces such as the *Embassy* and *On the Crown* speeches, though technically forensic, were essentially concerned with issues of public policy, and clearly they were edited for publication as political documents.<sup>2</sup>

Demosthenes' forensic speeches tend to open in standard fashion with a short proem followed by a narrative. A variety of metanarrative narratorial interventions indicates the transition to the narrative, including expressions such as 'I shall try to show/tell you' (e.g. 27.3; 30.5; 36.3) and 'I must tell/narrate' (23.8; 34.5). The narrators promise to tell the whole story, from the beginning and as briefly as possible (34.5; 36.3; 37.3; 40.5); and they also take pains to interact with the narratees, with expressions such as 'it is necessary to remind you, men of Athens' (18.17), 'you will hear' (32.3), and 'I ask you to listen to me favourably, gentlemen of the jury' (35.5, cf. 55.2). Regularly, the beginning of the narrative is marked by *gar*, with or without an address to the narratees (e.g. 18.18; 27.4; 30.6; 40.6; 55.3), though there are exceptions (e.g. 23.8; 36.4; 37.4). Some Demosthenic speeches may be regarded as having a single, long narrative in the manner of Lysias, whose end is indicated by a concluding narratorial intervention such as 'the dowry, then (*toimun*), he acquired in this way' (27.17, preceded by depositions). But in the great majority of cases Demosthenes follows the practice of

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<sup>1</sup> For commentaries on these speeches see Carey and Reid 1985; MacDowell 2000.

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g. the remarks of MacDowell 2000: 22 n. 66.

his tutor Isaeus, who tended to break up his complex narratives of family history into two or more sections, which provide the crucial details of a case in an apparently straightforward manner.<sup>3</sup> This approach is already evident in Demosthenes' early private speeches, such as 29, *Against Aphobus III*, where a pattern emerges of alternating narrative and proof sections. Further, although sometimes the end of the first narrative is clearly indicated by a concluding remark such as 'these are the facts, gentlemen of the jury' (30.9; cf. 37.17), on other occasions there is no clear distinction between the sections of narrative and proof, and indeed conventional narrative may be abandoned (as in speeches 36 and 38). In the longer speeches in particular, Demosthenes will insert several sections of narrative, so avoiding monotony. For example, in the *Crown* speech he divides the narrative of his own career into three major stages (18.17–52, 53–109, 160–226) and adds a narrative of Aeschines' treachery in connection with the war against Amphissa (139–159). The later sections of narrative are frequently introduced in similar fashion to the first narrative, with metanarrative narratorial interventions and *gar* (e.g. 32.24; 55.23), though there are numerous exceptions in the extensive corpus of this most versatile of orators.

Demosthenes 54, *Against Conon*, was delivered by Ariston in his prosecution of Conon for serious assault. It recalls Lysias 3, *Against Simon*, in its subject matter, but far exceeds the earlier speech in the vividness of the description of the assault and its consequences. The narrator in this speech is internal and overt (§3, 'you will hear', cf. 9, 'I would shrink from saying some of it in your presence', 'I shall tell you this', 11, 'as you hear') and makes interventions (3, 'Conon's sons camped near us, as I could wish they had not done', cf. 4, 7), but admits to gaps in his knowledge (8, 'one of them, I don't know which'). After a brief proem (§§1–2), whose very first word sets the tone for the rest of the speech (*hubristheis*, 'having suffered gross outrage'), an extended narrative is given of the alleged events (3–12), which characterizes Ariston as a shy and reserved man, in stark contrast to the drunken and violent Conon, his sons and their friends. Its start is clearly and familiarly indicated at the end of §2 with the metanarrative narratorial intervention 'I shall narrate (*diēgēsomai*) to you from the beginning (*ex arkhēs*) how each incident occurred in the fewest words (*dia brakhutaton*) I can'. It is then broken up into four stages by witness statements, and its end is marked

<sup>3</sup> See Usher 1999: 128.

by a further set of depositions followed by the summarizing statement ‘that the wounds I received, then (*toinun*), were not slight or trifling ... I think has been made clear to you on many grounds’ (§13). The narrator gives further details later on in the speech to support the characterization of Ariston’s opponents, as a description of their behaviour at the arbitration hearing is inserted into the proofs at §§26–27: ‘I wish to tell you now ...’ The end of this mini-narrative is marked by ‘and now (*nun*) I think most of their defence will concern this point’; and a brief narrative of the behaviour of Conon and his friends in their younger days follows at §39: ‘the contempt this man feels for everything sacred I will tell you about ... for (*gar*) I hear, gentlemen of the jury ... surely (*dē*) Conon, being such a man, is not to be believed on oath’.

In the first stage of the narrative (§§3–6) the internal narrator describes the origins of his enmity towards Conon’s sons, which stemmed from their military service together (note *ex arkhēs* in §3, which immediately picks up the phrase used to introduce the narrative in §2). He is overt in the constant contrasts between ‘we’ and ‘they’, beginning with the reserve of himself and his companions, and their drunken behaviour: ‘they used to spend the whole of every day after lunch drinking ... but we conducted ourselves in the country just as we were accustomed to do here’. The repeated use of the imperfect tense indicates that this was no one-off affair (*epinon* contrasts with *diēgomen*, ‘we conducted ourselves’), and imperfect tenses in §4 continue to bring out the repeated and disgusting abuse of Ariston’s slaves by his enemies, behaviour which was an ‘outrage’ (*hubreōs*, the noun here being linked with ‘brutality’, *aselgeias*). In contrast, the narrator and his entire mess took the single action of reporting these events to the general, but his rebuke of Conon’s sons only served to precipitate actual violence: Ariston was barely saved by the combined intervention of the general, the taxiarchs and some other soldiers, which indicates the severity of the attack. In §6 he reiterates both that this was the origin of the enmity and his own modesty: he had subsequently taken no action, but had resolved ‘to have nothing to do with men like this’.

The second stage of the narrative describes the events that formed the basis of the charge (§§7–9). The narrator begins with another feature of his customary behaviour, an evening stroll in the agora, and how he encountered (note the historic present *parerkhetai*) one of Conon’s sons, drunk and behaving like a drunk. Once more the gathering of the narrator’s opponents begins with *epinon*, and Ariston’s meeting with

them is narrated in the present tense (*peritugkhanomen*, cf. *prospiptei*). The story of the fight, like the earlier description of the abuse of the slaves, is graphically told, with Ariston set upon by three men:

First they stripped me of my cloak, then tripping me up and throwing me into the mud they jumped on me and beat me with such force that my lip was split open and my eyes closed; and they left me in such a state that I could not get up or utter a sound.

The narrator adopts the persona of a retiring young man who will not repeat the foul language of his assailants, but he does describe one action which vividly demonstrates their outrageous behaviour (§9, *hybreōs* again): ‘he began to crow, mimicking victorious fighting cocks, and they bade him flap his elbows against his sides like wings’. The pathos of his own defeat, so total that he is left without his cloak, is brought out by the wailing of his mother and her maidservants, and by his having to be carried, bathed, and shown to the doctors.

In the third stage of the narrative (§10) Ariston describes how it happened (*sunebē*) that one of his relatives, Euxitheus, and his friend Meidias chanced on him (*peritukhein*) as he was being carried home. This is the fifth use of the verb *sumbainō* in the narrative after §§3, 4, 6, 8 (and cf. 2, 12), and in addition Ariston was carried home by chance passers-by (*paratukhontōn*). This time fortune favours him as he can stay at Meidias’ house, which was closer to the baths than his own, and he had more witnesses to his condition. Finally, in the fourth stage of the narrative (§§11–12), he describes the physical effects of the assault, and his life is saved by another ‘happening’ (*sunebē*), a spontaneous haemorrhage. That his condition was life-threatening is confirmed by a reported narrator, the doctor (‘the doctor said that ...’, 11, 12), supported by his deposition. The narrator summarizes his story in §13 by again referring to the ‘outrage and brutality’ of his opponents (inverting the phrase used in §4). By his graphic narrative he has certainly ‘made things clear’ to the narratees.

The circumstances of speech 19, *On the False Embassy*, were very different. Here Demosthenes himself was prosecuting his great rival, Aeschines, in 343 for his alleged conduct on the embassy that had secured the discredited Peace of Philocrates of 346. In this long speech §§10–66 form the main narrative, but two interesting additional narrative sections are inserted at §§192–198 and 229–231. The metanarrative narratorial intervention ‘I wish to remind you of what doubtless most of you remember’ (§9) introduces the main narrative and also, in a

manner reminiscent of Andocides in the *Mysteries* speech, reflects the internal narrator's constant attempts to interact closely with the internal narratees, men of Athens, as he calls on their memories of events in which they took part (e.g. §§19, 27, 33, 45). The interactional particle *toinun*, rather than *gar*, then marks the start of the narrative in §10. The narrator is overt, e.g. 'I wish to tell how' (29; cf. 17, 25, 27, 35, 44, 65), as are his narratees, e.g. 'when one of you hears me describing some event and it seems to him terrible and incredible' (25). A special characteristic of this narrator is his constant use of (rhetorical) questions, often briefly put: §§24, 25, 27, 30 (the simple 'how could he?' in reference to Aeschines), 33, 42–43, 50, 52, 53, 55, 60, 63, 66. His narrative ends, indeed, with four questions, three of which are short and refer to Aeschines (compare the ending of the first narrative of the *Crown* speech at 18.51–52).

At §§192–198 the narrator relates two anecdotes which highlight Aeschines' character in comparison with that of the actor Satyrus and which are introduced as 'a trifling story that has nothing to do with the embassy'. In the first story the narrator relies on hearsay ('as the story goes'), though noticeably Satyrus' moving plea to Philip for the release of his friend's captive daughters is quoted in direct speech. In the second story the narrator is potentially internal, yet absent at the crucial event and hence relying on *ex eventu* knowledge (the Olynthian woman was modest, 'as the event proved': §196) and hearsay ('as Iatrocles told me on the next day': §197). What is more, he relies on the knowledge of the narratees: 'the story was told in Arcadia ... Diophantus related it before you, as I will compel him to testify, and it was common talk in Thessaly and everywhere' (§198). But the immediate juxtaposition of a story whose provenance is unclear with one that was common knowledge has the effect of giving more credence to the former, and so establishes the contrast between the characters of Satyrus (and even Philip) and Aeschines for the narratees all the more strongly.

Finally, in §§229–231 the narrator imagines the outcome of an acquittal of Aeschines with an address to the narratees: 'what in truth will be the story told about you, if you acquit this man?' The story centres on comparisons between the probity of Demosthenes and the wickedness of his fellow ambassadors Philocrates, Phryno, and Aeschines, but added impact is gained from the punctuation of the narrative with brief questions: 'so what?', 'what happened after that?', 'what do you think?', 'what did they think of the prosecutor?' The addition in §232 of two

rhetorical questions addressed directly to the narratees ('Who, men of Athens, seeing this example, will wish to prove himself an honest man? Who will go on an embassy for nothing ...?') forcefully underlines the choice that confronted them.

Demosthenes constantly plays in his speeches on the venality of Aeschines and his own probity, and in turn on their respective treachery and patriotism.<sup>4</sup> One of the key tools he uses in this political battle is narrative—there is, for example, little or no real evidence offered in the *Embassy* speech—and Demosthenes, like Lysias, had an undeniable talent for presenting his story vividly and persuasively. One feature of his narratives, as we have just seen, is his extensive use of rhetorical questions; but a second, even more noticeable, feature that marks him out strongly from earlier orators is the vehemence of the personal attacks his narrators make on their opponents. Some examples have been noted, but he naturally saves his best for Aeschines (18.129):

I am not at a loss for what I should say about you and your family, I'm at a loss where to begin. Shall I tell how your father Tromes was a slave in the house of Elpias, who taught in an elementary school near the Theseum, and how he wore thick shackles and a wooden collar? Or how your mother practised daytime marriages in the hut near Heros the bone-setter's place and how she brought you up, her pretty doll, the consummate third-part actor?

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<sup>4</sup> See further on this, e.g., Edwards 1994: 45ff.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

### AESCHINES

*M. Edwards*

During his defence in the *Embassy* trial, Aeschines laments the fact that his political life was enmeshed with that of a man whom he brands ‘a charlatan and a criminal’ (2.153). Unfortunately for him, it was Demosthenes who ultimately triumphed, both politically and rhetorically, and Aeschines’ speeches are only now beginning to receive the attention that they deserve.<sup>1</sup>

It is in his narratives that Aeschines is at his best, and these form a significant proportion of all three of the long (196, 184, 260 sections respectively), technically forensic speeches that have come down to us. He displays a variety of methods within the three. So, in speeches 1 and 3 the start of the narrative is delayed by extensive discussion of the laws, in a manner reminiscent of Antiphon’s *Herodes* speech. Then, while speech 3 has an extensive narrative of Demosthenes’ political career (3.58–167), speech 1 has two major sections of narrative on Timarchus’ private and public life, interwoven with proofs, and speech 2 has several narratives, of the first embassy to Philip (2.12–56), Athenian military difficulties after the fall of Amphipolis (70–74), the activities of king Cersobleptes of Thrace (81–93) and the second embassy to Philip (97–118). In all three further narrative details are interspersed in the proofs. Most of the main narrative sections are introduced by a metanarrative narratorial intervention, ‘I shall make my accusation,’ 95, ‘I shall try to lay it out more clearly in my account’; 2.11, ‘I shall begin’, 96, ‘I shall give a defence’; 3.57, ‘I shall speak firstly’. In speech 2 Aeschines also uses ‘I wish to remind you’ (70) and ‘it remains for me to speak’ (81). The usual promise of speaking briefly or from the beginning is absent from Aeschines’ introductory remarks, but all the later narratives begin with *gar*.

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<sup>1</sup> Carey 2000; Fisher 2001.



As an example of his narrative practice we shall take speech 1, *Against Timarchus*, which was delivered by Aeschines in his successful prosecution of one of Demosthenes' supporters in 346/5, to forestall an attack on himself for treason. The basis of the charge was that Timarchus had addressed the assembly when debarred from doing so by his immorality, hence Aeschines immediately stresses his own moderation in his opening remarks (§§1–3), and the narrative is delayed by a preliminary discussion of the laws on decency. A transitional section (§§37–39) reiterates his own decent character, before he narrates Timarchus' debauched early adulthood in §§40–70. He adopts a mixture of short and longer narrative sections interspersed with argument,<sup>2</sup> as he tells how Timarchus lived in turn in the houses of Euthydicus (§40), Miggolas (§§41–52), Anticles (§53), Pittalacus (§§54–55) and Hegesander (§§56–70). An immediately striking feature is how overt the narrator is here, for example, 'Timarchus did many ridiculous things in those days, one of them I wish to narrate to you' (§43) and 'the abuses and outrages that I have heard were done to the person of Timarchus by this man were such that, by Olympian Zeus, I could not bring myself to tell them to you' (§55). This is a feature of Aeschines' oratory which is supplemented by narratorial interventions (§§48, 51, 58, 60, 61, 64, 69) and generalizations (§§44, 48, 49, 60). There is regular interaction with the narratees, in form of references to their own knowledge of the man or the places involved (§§44, 53, 56, 65, 69–70), and at §49 the narrator prepares them with the only occurrence of *oratio recta* in this narrative: 'Why do I say this in advance? So that when you suddenly see him you will not be surprised and have some thought such as: "Heracles! This man is not much older than Timarchus."' The interaction serves to mask Aeschines' total lack of solid evidence, and he is at pains to create for himself a trustworthy, modest character by calling on the gods (§§52, 55) and repeatedly avowing that he does not wish to use the words which describe Timarchus' lurid behaviour (§§41, 45, 52, 55, 70)—which does not, of course, prevent him from indicating clearly on numerous occasions what this was (§§40, 42, 52, 53–54, 55, 57, 70). Two further observations may be made on this narrative. First, like other orators Aeschines uses the historic present tense to highlight certain events, here the actions of Timarchus' various partners (§43, 'they find him dining in a lodging house with some foreigners', 53, 'after this

<sup>2</sup> Usher 1999: 281.

Anticles takes him up', 55–56, 'about this time Hegesander sails back ... this Hegesander arrives', 57, 'when he could not persuade Pittalacus he assails the man in person') and the story of Pittalacus (§§ 60–62). The latter immediately follows the description of the attack on Pittalacus and his belongings by Hegesander, Timarchus, and some others 'whose names I prefer not to mention' (the narrator perhaps betrays the fact that he is not omniscient):

First they smashed his equipment and threw it into the street, dice and dice cups and other gaming items, and they killed the quails and cocks which the wretched man adored, and finally they tied Pittalacus himself to a pillar and gave him an inhuman whipping for so long that even the neighbours heard the uproar.

Secondly, in comparison with Demosthenes, Aeschines is relatively sparing in his use of questions; but in speech 2 there is a noticeable concentration of questions in the Cersobleptes narrative, which indeed ends with a question aimed against Demosthenes (2.81, 86, 87, 88, 92, 93); in speech 1 questions are asked of the narratees before the direct speech quoted above (§ 49) and after a call on their knowledge (§ 65), in connection with the testimony of Hegesander, which Aeschines knows he will refuse to swear an oath to (§ 67), and once again at the very end of the narrative in § 70.

Similar features may be detected in the second major narrative of this speech concerning Timarchus' political career (§§ 95–116). Again the narrator is overt (e.g. §§ 95, 101, 102, 106, 109, 116), commenting (§ 104) and calling on the knowledge of the narratees (§ 116), and reiterating Timarchus' lewd lifestyle (§§ 95, especially 105, 107). He is still sparing in the use of questions, two of them being asked in connection with Timarchus' scandalous activities on Andros (§ 108, cf. 109, 113), and also in the use of direct speech, which is given to Pamphilus when he acts as a secondary narrator in §§ 110–111. The narrator has told how Timarchus squandered his inheritance—he even sold the farm at Alopece, which 'his mother begged and pleaded with him, as I have heard, to spare and not to sell, but if nothing else to leave this at least for her to be buried in' (§ 99).<sup>3</sup> Unsurprisingly, a man who wasted his own property was also profligate with the state's, which prompted the decent Pamphilus to denounce him and his partner Hegesander before the assembly (§ 110: 'Men of Athens, a man and a woman together are

<sup>3</sup> The effectiveness of this unsubstantiated remark is noted by Carey 2000: 57 n. 105.

stealing 1,000 drachmas of yours'). It will have been due in no small measure to his employment of emotive narrative that, despite the flimsiness of his case, Aeschines secured the condemnation of Timarchus.

Aeschines' inferiority as an orator to Demosthenes is universally recognized, but he was in his own right a master of narrative technique. Indeed, he was far more at home in narration than argumentation, and extensive narratives are a key feature of his oratory, even when broken down into separate sections. The fact that he triumphed in two of the three cases whose speeches survive indicates the persuasiveness of his narratives, which, as is the case with Andocides, give the appearance of being products of natural ability. His narrators tell vivid stories, interact regularly with the narratees and, in line with the fashion of the times, do not mince their words in their biting attacks on their opponents.

### *Conclusion*

Some of the main points that have emerged in the course of this preliminary survey of the extensive corpus of Attic oratory may now be summarized. The term 'narrative' has a particular connotation in the oratorical context, being one of the major divisions of a speech. It is particularly employed in forensic speeches, though mythological and historical narratives are important elements of epideictic. In all the orators surveyed the start of the narrative is clearly defined by meta-narrative narratorial interventions, and various types of concluding remark indicate its close. The narrative may, in line with the theoretical discussion of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*, be a single passage within the speech, and there is no doubt that Lysias was the master of this form of composition, using it to characterize the main players in the case. But it emerges already from the works of the earliest exponents of the genre that in practice a narrative might well be divided into two or more sections, which deal with different temporal stages or thematic aspects of the story. Narrators in oratory are regularly internal, even in speeches where the speaker is acting as an advocate (*sunēgoros*) for the actual litigant, as is technically the case in Demosthenes' *Crown* speech. These narrators may represent the actual author of the speech, as in Andocides 1 and Demosthenes 19 (this is especially the case with deliberative rhetoric), though the great majority of forensic speeches were composed by a logographer for a client. Since they are trying to persuade their audience, usually of the mendacious character of their

opponent, narrators in oratory are overt, lavishly commenting on the events they recount. Similarly, the narratees are addressed on a regular basis, and may be asked to use their own recollections of events in reaching their decisions; but they are more often external narratees in the forensic context. A particular type of narratee is the speaker's opponent, who will be addressed in apostrophe and, in the later orators, with increasing vehemence. For Aristotle (*Rh.* 3.13) the necessary parts of a speech are the statement of the case (*prothesis*) and proof (*pistis*): however the gap between theory and practice was often wide, and Andocides, Lysias, and Aeschines in particular will have disagreed, instead favouring narrative.



PART SIX

PHILOSOPHY



## CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

### PLATO

*K.A. Morgan*

#### *Introduction*

To what extent does an analysis of the Platonic dialogue belong in a history of ancient Greek narrative? A strict conception of narrative might result in the inclusion only of embedded narratives such as the Myth of Er in the *Republic*.<sup>1</sup> More broadly, one might wish to include those dialogues that self-identify as narratives. Thus the *Republic* begins with Socrates' narrative of his trip to the Piraeus, and the *Symposium* with the complex framing narrative of Apollodorus. But what are we to make of cases like the *Meno* or the *Sophist*, where we plunge into direct dialogue? Are these 'narratives'?

We learn from Diogenes Laertius (3.50) that ancient classifications of the dialogues sometimes distinguished between 'narrative' and 'dramatic' dialogues, although Diogenes himself disapproves of this classification.<sup>2</sup> One might, following this lead, exclude the dramatic dialogues from consideration (with the exception of secondary narratives contained therein). Narratologists are fond of quoting the *Republic* (392d2–394c5) for the distinction between pure narrative and *mimesis*.<sup>3</sup> The same passage envisages the possibility that work might be 'mixed,' that

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<sup>1</sup> Genette 1980: 29 notes that Spinoza's *Ethics* are not narrative, since they do not tell a story. Yet Plato's dialogues ground themselves in specific narrative situations; they tell the story of a particular argument made in a particular context. Cf. Gill 2002: 153–155.

<sup>2</sup> Plato was probably not the first to write either narrative or dramatic *Sokratikoi logoi* (cf. Clay 1994: 27–28, 42–43; Kahn 1994: 89, 95, 100–101). For modern views that dramatic dialogue was Plato's invention and emerged in the Academy, see Thesleff 1982: 61; Tarrant 1996: 136. Plato's originality as a writer of dramatic dialogues was a matter of controversy in antiquity also. Aristotle may have believed that Alexamenus of Teos was the first to write them (but see Haslam 1972 for the ancient system of classification that may have caused confusion here).

<sup>3</sup> Genette 1980: 162–163.



is, combine *mimesis* and narrative (*diegesis*). This schema would allow us to classify Platonic dialogues either as drama (*mimesis*) or as ‘mixed’ pieces.<sup>4</sup> This seems attractive, yet it is important to note that in this account of diction, Socrates states that everything written by poets is narrative. Sometimes narrative is pure, sometimes it is effected through *mimesis*, and sometimes through both (392d5–6). When a poet represents the voice of someone other than himself, he ‘composes his narrative through *mimesis*’. On this account, all poetic production is narrative; distinctions arise only when we ask about the means of effecting the narrative. We might draw a similar conclusion from examining the opening of the *Theaetetus*. There, the framing dialogue presents us with a putative text of a Socratic dialogue whose authority is said to be Socrates himself. This text will be read aloud, but its author, Euclides, notes that he has written the text not as a record of the conversation he had with Socrates (with the ‘he said’s and ‘I replied’s). He has taken out these ‘narratives’ because they ‘create bother’ and has instead attempted to recreate the original conversation between the interlocutors. The *Theaetetus* thus insists both that the body of the dialogue is a narrative, and presents that narrative as a dramatic conversation. It thematizes the question of whether or not the main dialogue is narrative, and, by implication, extends that questioning to the frame dialogue.<sup>5</sup> If that frame dialogue did not exist, nothing would distinguish the narrative practice of the *Theaetetus* from that of the *Meno*. Genette labelled the suppression of one or more narrative levels *pseudo-diegetic*.<sup>6</sup> This absence of a framing narrative has a precedent in Hesiod (→), but it is also clear that Platonic practice in this respect influenced Dio (→) and Lucian (→).

The only safe conclusion to draw from the passages discussed above is that all Platonic dialogues are conceived as narratives.<sup>7</sup> I propose to adopt the same approach: even dramatic dialogues are by implication narratives. The theoretical distinction between mimetic and narrative forms may have been formulated by Plato, and this formulation did

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<sup>4</sup> Although Socrates in the *Republic* declares that the narrative of a good man will contain only small amounts of *mimesis*, Plato’s own practice is far from conforming to this ideal. Cf. Velardi 2000: 126–127; Laird 1999: 51–53.

<sup>5</sup> For a more extensive treatment of these issues, see Morgan 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Or ‘*reduced metadiegetic*’ (Genette 1980: 236–237).

<sup>7</sup> Clay 1994: 47 blurs the boundaries further (rightly), by pointing out that a narrative such as the *Republic* becomes dramatic when it is read aloud, since the reader takes the part of Socrates.

indeed influence the narrative practice of subsequent writers, but the merging of mimetic and narrative forms and the narrative experimentation that Hunter sees at work in Theocritus (→) and other Hellenistic poets find a significant precedent in Plato. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of Platonic writing is the focus on problems of narrative definition and authority, a preoccupation that Lycophron (→), Plutarch (→), and Philostratus (→) (among others) share. Plato's corpus explores the effects of competing narratives and different narrative voices. This competition, moreover, has philosophical implications: what account are we to give of the world, and how are we to communicate our account's content? A full study of Platonic narrative would account for its richness and variety while also exploring the philosophical implications of Plato's narrative choices.<sup>8</sup> The task of this present chapter is more restricted.

### *The narrator and the forms of Platonic dialogue*

Any discussion of Platonic narrative must begin by noting that Plato himself, the author of the dialogues, never appears in his own works. The work of narration is performed by characters who, although many have regarded them as Platonic mouthpieces, are not explicitly endowed with authority to speak on behalf of 'Plato'. In the entire corpus we hear of Plato only to be told that he was not present at the death of Socrates. There are few places where we feel the looming presence of the ultimate author. These may be described mostly as instances of 'Platonic' irony,<sup>9</sup> as when Critias remarks on how opportune a coincidence it is that his account of Athens and Atlantis agrees to such an extraordinary extent with Socrates' ideal city (*Tim.* 25e), or when Socrates in the *Protagoras* (315e) describes a good-looking young boy named Agathon—the Agathon who was to grow up to be a famous tragedian and who would have been well known to Plato's readers. Such interventions, however, are insignificant compared to the overall absence of any Platonic voice. The Platonic narrator is never Plato.

The example of the *Theaetetus*, discussed above, may provide a clue for interpreting Platonic narrative situations. We might conceive the

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<sup>8</sup> The narrative structure of the Platonic dialogue is increasingly the focus of scholarly attention, as Blondell 2002 and the essays in Casertano 2000 show.

<sup>9</sup> Rowe 1987.

texts of the dialogues as Platonic constructions representing a version of a written text preserved by various disciples and subsequently read out loud.<sup>10</sup> In the *Theaetetus* the frame presents the traces of this preservation. On other occasions (as in the *Phaedo*) we are not given the occasion of a reading but are made to move back to a verbal narration that precedes textual codification. Sometimes the narrative takes us even further back to Socrates as narrator (e.g. *Republic* or *Protagoras*). The final ‘unmediated’ level is that of an unframed dramatic dialogue (such as *Gorgias*). If we do not allow the *Theaetetus* to organize interpretation in this way, a more diffuse picture of continual experimentation emerges. My conceptual hierarchy of narratorial mediation or non-mediation should not, however, be understood to reflect a chronological progression in Plato’s narrative technique. As Thesleff has pointed out, it is natural to assume an increase in stylistic complexity over time, but in Plato’s case this would be a dangerous move.<sup>11</sup> The dialogues usually regarded as Plato’s latest are entirely dramatic, and it is not unreasonable to see the *Theaetetus* as a turning point after which dramatic dialogue was Plato’s preferred format.<sup>12</sup>

In my discussion of narrators I shall distinguish between framed and non-framed (dramatic) dialogues. In framed dialogues an introductory section precedes the philosophical discussion and motivates the main narrative, sketching the setting and sometimes dealing with the history of the reception of the discussion. The frame may be narrative (that is, addressed to a silent narratee) or dialogical. In the case of dialogical frames, one of the interlocutors (like *Phaedo*) becomes a secondary narrator. In the case of narrative frames, the narrator may function as an internal primary narrator (as when Socrates reports past conversations), or as an external narrator (as when disciples narrate Socratic conversations that they have heard from others and at which they were not in attendance). The philosophical discussions in framed dialogues are thus analeptic. In dialogues without frames, the main conversa-

<sup>10</sup> I do not, of course, mean to imply that these texts were actually preserved by disciples. The history of such ‘texts’ is a Platonic construction.

<sup>11</sup> Thesleff 1982: 53.

<sup>12</sup> For an attempt to perform a kind of textual archaeology on dialogue frames, see Thesleff 1982. He argues that the dramatic dialogue was at first confined to circulation within the Academy (63) with information about the setting being supplied orally (162), whereas dialogues with narrative frames were intended for wider publication (63). The direct dialogue intended for publication would then have been a secondary development (162). Cf Tarrant (1996: 136, 145) for a similar distinction between early narrative dialogues and later dramatic dialogues.

tion of the dialogue is presented directly. In these cases (the majority) I shall examine embedded narratives and their narrators. Although, as we have seen, it is possible to view these dialogues conceptually as the core of more complex narrative situations, they should nevertheless be conceived primarily in their own terms, as the unmediated presentation of philosophical exchange where the drama impinges directly upon the hearer. Events are presented almost simultaneously (whereas in framed dialogues the narration is subsequent to the events described).<sup>13</sup>

### *The Socratic narrator*

Socrates acts as narrator in a dialogue frame five times. Twice, the frame is dialogical: Socrates acts as internal secondary narrator and reports the action of a past philosophical discussion to a friend (*Euthydemus* and *Protagoras*). In the three instances of narrative frames, Socrates acts as internal primary narrator, reporting a past discussion to a silent narratee (*Charmides*, *Lysis*, and *Republic*). The distinguishing feature of this group of dialogues is that they allow the reader the impression of unmediated interaction with Socrates, whose narratorial presence is overt. When the frame narratee is silent, the reader is given the illusion that (s)he is the narratee, an illusion that would be especially effective if the dialogue were being read aloud. An obtrusive framing conversation gives the audience a window onto a world of lively intellectual exchange. In both cases, we see how philosophical conversation and analysis are greedily sought out and consumed. These Socratic narratives do not have formal endings, although they do end at a natural point of closure: the termination of the discussion. In *Euthydemus* the frame conversation between Socrates and Crito reasserts itself, with Socrates urging Crito to the practice of philosophy. *Protagoras*, *Lysis*, and *Charmides* end with Socrates' narration of his closing comment (and in *Protagoras* and *Lysis* he narrates his departure). Only the *Republic* ends, vividly, with no reminder of the narrative format, as Socrates continues to address directly his internal narratee Glaucon and exhort him to virtue.

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<sup>13</sup> Rutherford 1995: 71 notes that when Socrates is the narrator, the narrative frame follows the events closely, whereas others' narration looks back over a more extended period, thus giving an opportunity for pathos and foreshadowing (Cf. Clay 1994: 44–

Irony is an important feature of the Socratic narrator. We should, therefore, be on our guard against taking Socratic self-characterization at face value. Thus in the frame conversation of the *Euthydemus*, Socrates tells his friend Crito that he was so impressed by the display of the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, that he wants to become their pupil (272b). Although the intellectually plodding Crito appears to take him seriously, there is small danger of any reader doing so. Again, in the *Republic*, Socrates represents himself as terrified by the onslaught of Thrasymachus: 'I was panic-struck and was afraid when I looked at him ... I said trembling a little ...' (336d). Or in the *Charmides* Socrates says he was overcome with lust at the sight of Charmides' body (155d–e). Only slowly does he regain confidence and find himself able to speak (156d). Yet neither in the *Republic* nor in the *Charmides* should we conclude that Socrates was overcome either by fear or by lust, any more than that he wants to be the pupil of the sophists. Socrates does not mean what he says. He presents himself the way he does in order to draw out an interlocutor and sometimes to disarm (not always successfully) suspicions that he is manipulating the conversation. Irony is a generic feature of the Socratic narrator.

Socrates uses his narrative to characterize explicitly both himself and others. Closely related to Socratic irony is the self-deprecating humorous exaggeration of *Lysis* 218c, where Socrates reports that he was rejoicing 'like a hunter' at capturing his intellectual prey, when a strange suspicion entered his head that he was wrong. This causes him to cry out in distress, in mock tragic fashion. Analeptic narrative thus enables self-deprecation, a means of generating sympathy for the narrator because of the difficulty of his intellectual quest. To this episode we may compare *Republic* 357a, where Socrates (at the beginning of Book 2) reports that he supposed he was done with the argument, only to be told that his task was not nearly complete. A similar technique is employed at *Charmides* 154b–c, although the deprecation there is not intellectual. Socrates confesses to his silent narratee, 'My friend ... with regard to those who are beautiful, I am a white measuring line [i.e. one without measuring marks]'. The narratee is drawn into a world, as indeed we all are, where we know 'what Socrates is like'. The genre presumes and constructs our familiarity. Plato also has Socrates employ more indirect self-characterization. Thus his allusion to Homer

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45). As Velardi 2000: 128 points out, the narrated dialogues represent the transmission of Socratic conversation through time.

at *Protagoras* 315b marks him as a man of culture. Finally, we may note Socrates' report of Charmides' blush (*Charm.* 158c), which made him, 'look even more beautiful, for his modesty suited his age. Then he replied nobly ...' Socrates clearly adheres to broad cultural conventions (youths should be modest), but his remarks on the heightening of the boy's beauty and his 'noble' reply, characterize him as much as they do Charmides.

When it comes to his characterization of his interlocutors, Socrates displays a degree of knowledge that borders on omniscience. Characterization is achieved by describing the tone of an interlocutor's speech, or his reaction to speech. Glaucon in the *Republic* can speak 'with a laugh' (451b), or can react with surprise to Socrates' announcement of the immortality of the soul, 'looking at me full in the face in amazement' (608d). In the same dialogue, Thrasymachus, when he realizes he is being bested by Socrates, begins to answer 'reluctantly' (342c, e). At the close of a long sequence of argumentation that reduces Thrasymachus to self-contradiction, Socrates comments, 'Thrasymachus agreed with all my suggestions not as I now easily narrate it, but with difficulty and being dragged along, with an amazing amount of sweat, since it was summer, and then I saw it, although I had never seen it before—Thrasymachus blushing' (350c–d). Socrates' control over his narrative here is obtrusive. In order to render the progress of the argument clearly, he did not reveal to his narratee the faltering and reluctant answers of the sophist. But once the argument reaches its conclusion he characterizes Thrasymachus retrospectively. His portrayal of the sophist's reaction is more devastating for being presented concisely.

But Socrates goes farther than this. He reveals to his narratees even the thoughts and motives of others. Sometimes he turns his interpretative lens on the dynamics of homoerotic courtship (as we know, love is the only area where Socrates claims to be an expert: *Symp.* 177d). Thus in the *Charmides* we note the remarkably thick description of the motivations of Critias, who

had plainly been in distress for a while, and *felt jealous* of his honour with respect to Charmides and the rest of those present. Although *he had previously and with difficulty restrained himself, then he could not*, for it seems to me that what I had suspected was absolutely true, that Charmides had heard this reply about moderation from Critias. Now Charmides, *since he did not wish to maintain the argument himself but wanted him [Critias] to reply*, was stirring him up. He kept on pointing out that he [Critias] has been

refuted, and he [Critias] could not bear it, but he seemed to me to get angry with him, like a playwright gets angry with an actor who recites his lines badly. (162c–d)<sup>14</sup>

Socrates' current narrative confirms his past suspicions (which he communicates to his narratee), and the effect here is to underline his status as authoritative narrator. This seeming omniscience extends to the dynamics of non-erotic exchange with more mature intellectuals. In the case of Thrasymachus, 'he clearly wanted to speak so that he could improve his reputation, since he thought he had an excellent answer, but he pretended that he was anxious that I should answer' (338a). The case of Protagoras is similar: Socrates suspects that he wants to give a formal display (*Prt.* 318c). Later on he senses Protagoras' disappointment with his own performance and that he did not want to continue to answer (335a; cf. 348c). Socrates' conclusions are not unreasonable; they are based upon his interpretation of the conversational dynamics. Yet, as I have noted, the effect is remarkable. Despite Socrates' attempts to undermine himself through humour and irony, his narrative technique is powerful and authoritative. He presents and interprets a wide array of conversational features, reflecting at a narrative level his more general claim that although he has no knowledge himself, he is (preternaturally) gifted at exposing the mystifications and hypocrisies of others. Socrates' intrusions into the narrative, however, make his own bias overt. The reader becomes aware that Socrates selects and interprets in line with his own interests and goals. One might ask how fair Socrates' interpretations are (given that they mostly show his opponents in a bad light), and even question the precision of his edited versions of the conversations.

### *Disciple narrators*

*Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Theaetetus*, and *Parmenides* present Socratic conversation as reported by his disciples. Two (*Parmenides* and *Symposium*) open with narrative frames, while two (*Phaedo*, and *Theaetetus*) open with dialogical frames. At the beginning of the *Parmenides* the narrator, Cephalus, tells an unnamed interlocutor about the search he and others ('we') engaged in to find someone who could narrate to them Socrates' con-

<sup>14</sup> Cf. *Charmides* 169c; *Lysis* 207b.

versation with Parmenides. The search leads to a certain Antiphon, who has heard the narration from Pythodorus and who is persuaded to report it. The vertiginous effect of multiple nested narratives is repeated in the complex opening conversation of the *Symposium* (Apollodorus repeats to an unnamed friend the contents of a conversation he had with Glaucon, who had been told the story of the symposium by someone who had talked to Phoenix. Apollodorus has heard the narrative from Aristodemus, who was the source for Phoenix and who was present).<sup>15</sup> Here again, Plato's experiments with narrative were influential for authors to come, and the complexity of the *Symposium* was seminal. This dialogue presents, as well as the nested frame narratives mentioned above, multiple embedded narratives by the symposiasts, among which is Socrates' famous report of what the seer Diotima told him concerning the mysteries of love. Lycophron (→), Philostratus (→), and Lucian (→) all seem to have been influenced by the dialogue and by the role of Diotima.

*Theaetetus* and *Phaedo*, by contrast, begin with actual (as opposed to implied) conversation,<sup>16</sup> where one interlocutor extracts the story of Socrates' discourse from another who was there (*Phaedo*) or who heard it from Socrates (*Theaetetus*). In all these dialogues, there is considerable stress on the accuracy of the narrative. *Phaedo* was there. Apollodorus (*Symposium*) has recently reviewed the story and checked details with Socrates. Antiphon (*Parmenides*) is said to have heard the story so often he knows it by heart. Euclides, too, confirmed details with Socrates, and as we have seen, even wrote his narrative down.

These 'disciple narratives' share an important feature with the Socratic narratives described in the previous section: they create a world in which the narration of Socratic conversation is a matter of passion.<sup>17</sup> The reader of the dialogues is presumed to share that passion. Just as we see Socrates waylaid so that people may talk with him (*Republic*, *Lysis*), so the framing conversations discussed here present people begging to be told what happened at discussions they did not attend.

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<sup>15</sup> On the complex narrative structure of the *Symposium* and its significance, see further Halperin 1992 and Velardi 2000: 112–120.

<sup>16</sup> Even the narrative frames have a strong element of conversation, most obviously the *Symposium*, which opens with the words, 'I am not unpracticed in [relating] the matters you ask about.'

<sup>17</sup> Tarrant 1996 stresses how Plato wants the reader to be immersed in the world of oral tradition in these dialogues (137), and to 'enter the world of the narration as well as the world of the narrated story' (132).



This is explicit when the frame narrator engages in conversation, but is implied even when the narratee is silent. Indeed, non-presentation of the narratee makes the point very subtly: the first words of the dialogue respond to a question (what did Socrates say?) that was asked before the beginning of the text. The genre assumes we know the question has been asked and that we ask it ourselves. We enter a world of reception in which these stories are told again and again, and where narrators care about getting them right and indicating where memory may not be exact. Thus at *Symposium* 199c, the embedded narrator Aristodemus says that Socrates began to speak ‘more or less like this’. At *Protagoras* 336e even Socrates draws attention to the difficult project of narration, ‘After Alcibiades, so far as I remember, it was Critias who spoke.’<sup>18</sup> At *Euthydemus* 275d, Socrates is so concerned about the ability of his narration to do justice to the original conversation that he invokes the Muses. We see here both an allusion to the *topos* of poetic inspiration, and the standard diffidence of the orator or poet when faced by the greatness of his subject matter. Yet these *topoi* are deflated because Socrates’ admiration for the sophistic performance is only assumed.

The frames of all these dialogues, then, explore the authority supposed to stand behind the narrative.<sup>19</sup> In some the frame serves only to identify a more authoritative narrator (sometimes at several removes) whose memory is then reported in a mix of direct and indirect discourse (we might call these figures secondary frame narrators). This stress on narrative authority has philosophical implications: we are called upon to examine our criteria for ascribing credibility to any narrative, and also to consider that although the dialogues are presented as accurate models of philosophical interaction, our main task is to conduct such discussion ourselves rather than become obsessed with reportage.

In contrast with the Socratic narrator, disciple narrators are usually colourless, transparent, and covert. Once we leave the introductory frame, the influence of the frame narrator ceases to be felt. One result of this is that the reader has inferential knowledge only of the emotions of the participants; we have no Socrates to tell us what Protagoras is thinking. Moreover, in the *Theaetetus*, and *Parmenides*, the reader is never returned to the frame, and the dialogue ends with remarks by

<sup>18</sup> Cf. *Euth* 275b, ‘When I had spoken pretty much these very words’.

<sup>19</sup> For further discussion of narrative authority in the Platonic dialogue, see Clay 1992: 117.

the interlocutors in the embedded narrative.<sup>20</sup> The distancing qualities of the frame fade, and the final impression is the immediacy of the discussion. In *Symposium* and *Phaedo*, more obtrusive closure is provided. The end of the *Symposium* rapidly reviews Socrates' actions the next day after the close of the party and then sends him home to bed. The *Phaedo* ends with the moving summary statement by the frame narrator, Phaedo ('This was the end of our companion ...'). Only in the case of the *Phaedo* is the frame narrator present at the events described. This also explains the greater emotional investment by the narrator in the narrative here.<sup>21</sup> Unlike the other colourless disciple narrators, Phaedo (himself historically an author of Socratic dialogues) can describe how he and others were feeling during Socrates' final day (58e, 88c, 102a, 116a, 117c–e). He is familiar enough with Socrates to be teased by him ('he was accustomed to joke about my hair' 89b), and to be able to comment on Socrates' mannerisms ('he looked straight ahead, as he often used to', 86d). These iterative elements add to the impression, discussed above, of a world of frequent and passionate discussion, which the reader is invited to join.

On two occasions in the *Phaedo* the frame dialogue resumes as Echecrates, the frame narratee, comments and asks questions (88c–89b, 102a–b). It is hard not to think that his reactions are a guide to reader reception and response. Echecrates models the narratee's despondency when Socrates' argument for immortality runs into problems, and his or her curiosity as to Socrates' reaction to challenge. Later, he interjects approval at a Socratic proof ('It seems to me Socrates spoke with amazing clarity,' 102a).<sup>22</sup> Indeed, a function of some framed Platonic dialogues seems to be the emphatic presentation of and comment on the effect of philosophic conversation on its audience.<sup>23</sup> We have seen above how Socrates unmask the thoughts and motives behind the reactions of his interlocutors in his narrations. The *Phaedo* shows us

<sup>20</sup> Cf. the ending of the *Republic*, discussed above. The *Parmenides*, as Rutherford 1995: 274 remarks, is something of an oddity. Description and comment end at 137c, and by the close of the dialogue even the compliant interlocutor has faded away.

<sup>21</sup> Ebert 2000: 53 draws attention to the unusual prominence of Phaedo as narrator among the narrators of the other framed dialogues.

<sup>22</sup> Phaedo confirms 'that was what everyone present thought'.

<sup>23</sup> For the significance of the emotional effect of Socratic dialectic on interlocutors, see Blank 1993: 435–437, who draws attention both to the description of the strong reactions of Socratic respondents and to the important point that Socratic conversation can have this effect even on someone not present at the original exchange (as is the case with Echecrates in the *Phaedo*).

how the passions aroused in the embedded narrations are resumed in the frame. Other examples of this occur in the *Euthydemus*, where we again return to the frame conversation in the course of the narration, as a device to focus the attention of Crito, the frame narratee (and us) ('I said these things, Crito, and I paid particular attention to what would follow and I watched how they would fasten onto the argument,' 283a). Later, a lengthier return to the frame (290e–293a) results in the conversation of the frame and the narrative running in parallel as the frame narrator and narratee rehearse obtrusively the same argument with similarly unsuccessful results. Again, it is clear that the frame conversation models the conversation Plato expects his dialogues to stimulate.

The reactions of narratees are paradigmatic, therefore, as we have already seen with Homer (→) and will see with Dio (→) and Lucian (→). The distress, anger, and evasion that Socrates notes in his sophistic interlocutors have their counterpart in the dedication and involvement of like-minded conversation partners. True philosophers seek the truth rather than merely to win arguments. They are gentle, receptive, and encouraging.<sup>24</sup> Whereas contentious sophists are easily annoyed, a Platonic narrator will often state that a friendly interlocutor answered with a smile or a laugh.<sup>25</sup> The lightness of tone in philosophical discussion reminds us of the eagerness with which Socrates' friends and disciples seek to engage him in conversation or hear a narrative of a past encounter. Socratic dialogue is presented as something it is pleasurable to listen to and to engage in. One function of the narrative apparatus is, therefore, to be protreptic.

### *Secondary narrators and narratives*

Embedded narratives may be arranged into several groups. The chief categories are: Socrates' accounts of his own past (rare), reports of past events, reports of past conversations, reports of speeches, mythological narratives, and hypothetical conversations. These narratives occur both in framed and non-framed dialogues.

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<sup>24</sup> For *paramuthia* and playfulness as the constitutive tone of philosophical discourse, see Morgan 2000: 164–175.

<sup>25</sup> E.g. *Phd.* 101b, 102d; *Resp.* 451b.

Socrates' accounts of his past occur in the *Apology* and the *Phaedo*. In the *Apology*, Socrates narrates, with commentary, the story of the Delphic oracle's declaration that he was the wisest of men and its (iterative) aftermath (20d–23b). This is a forensic *narratio*, but we encounter the same sort of self-justification in the *Phaedo* (95e–100a), where Socrates reports his investigations on causation. It is worth noting, given Socrates' explicit statements elsewhere in the dialogues on his dislike for long speeches (*Prt.* 336b–c), that even these narrations retain elements of conversation. In the *Apology*, Socrates reports the conversations he repeatedly had with his fellow Athenians, and in the *Phaedo* he punctuates the narrative with orientating questions to his narratee. The most significant aspect of these embedded narratives, however, and one that will recur, is the formality with which they are introduced. This feature is especially striking when we consider that similar formality is mostly lacking when it comes to the dialogues considered as wholes (a point to which I shall return). The *Phaedo* narrative begins with an offer to tell the story, and then the opening words, 'Listen, since I am about to speak' (96a). In the *Apology* Socrates states, 'Listen, then ... I shall tell you the whole truth' (20d). In both instances, the conclusion of the narrative is less marked, as Socrates goes on immediately to draw the inferences of the narrative for the current conversation.

Reports of past events are usually brief. Among the more detailed is Alcibiades' account of his attempt to seduce Socrates, and Socrates' courage in battle (*Symp.* 217b–221b), both part of his eulogy of Socrates. Yet anecdotes about the past are also used to deflate. Thus Laches tells the story of how Stesilaus made a fool of himself in battle (*Lach.* 183c–184a) in order to express his doubts about the value of fighting in armour for display purposes, and Socrates relates briefly the prosecution of Pericles by the Athenian people (*Grg.* 515e–516a) to devalue Pericles' claims to statesmanship. A final function of such accounts is to present problem cases for analysis, such as the narrative of the successful villainy of Archelaus (*Grg.* 471a–c) or Euthyphro's account of the death of his labourer (*Euthyphr.* 172b–d). Narratives of past events occur, then, mostly for purposes of example and illustration.

Reports of past conversations are an important part of the philosophical world. In order to approach the truth one must treat the same subject again and again (*Phd.* 107a–b), and it may be that recalling what has been said on previous occasions can help in present efforts or help

focus attention on important points.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the entire corpus of Platonic dialogues is an example of this narrative function, and the framed dialogues examined in this chapter make the point even more forcefully. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that narrative of conversations is sometimes a feature within the dialogues. The most famous example is perhaps Socrates' report of his conversation with Diotima in the *Symposium* (201c–212b), but one might also cite Crito's report to Socrates of his conversation with an unnamed interlocutor at the end of the *Euthydemus* (304d–305b). This guides our reception of the conversation between Socrates and the sophists, as the interlocutor's disapproval of that conversation is a possible reaction for all narratees. Nevertheless, Socrates' reaction to Crito's narrative demonstrates how this disapproval has in Socrates' opinion no intellectual standing. Instances of reported past conversation remain fairly limited, however. The reason seems to be the philosophical premium placed on giving one's true opinion in any given philosophical context. One must not merely report the thoughts of others, but think for oneself. Thus at the beginning of the *Meno*, Socrates heads off Meno's attempt to cite Gorgias as an authority for a definition of virtue. He pretends to be forgetful of what he himself has heard Gorgias say, and asks Meno to 'let him go, since he is absent. But you yourself Meno, by the gods, what do *you* say virtue is?' (71d). It seems, then, that narrative can be a threat to the philosophic project, since it encourages mere reportage rather than the active generation of truth. The status of the Platonic dialogue itself is thus called into question: the reader must not be too reliant on what Socrates, or even Plato, said.

Nevertheless, the questionable philosophical status of narrative does not prevent lengthy stretches of it within the dialogues. These embedded narratives occur when a narrator reproduces an important set speech he has heard elsewhere. Examples are Protagoras' 'Great Speech' reported by Socrates in the *Protagoras*, Aspasia's Funeral Oration reported by Socrates in the *Menexenus*, the speech of Lysias reported by Phaedrus in the *Phaedrus*, and the speeches of love delivered by the symposiasts and reported by Apollodorus (on the authority of Aristodemus) in the *Symposium*. All these narratives are presented in direct discourse and are clearly marked at introduction and conclusion. Nothing mediates the immediacy of the speeches; we are meant to experi-

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<sup>26</sup> The *Timaeus* opens with Socrates' recapitulation of a *Republic*-like discussion and his plea for a narrative account that will bring the perfect city to life.

ence them directly as pieces of affective oratory. Moreover, there is (theoretically) no question of any contribution to the speech by the narrator who reports it.

Things are different when we come to embedded mythological narratives. Extended philosophical myths, whether narrated by Socrates or by another philosophical leader (Timaeus or the Eleatic Stranger), support the narrator's personal reflection and are marked as the product of philosophical inference.<sup>27</sup> The major myths told by Socrates (in *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*) share several characteristics. They all have formal introductions (as, for example, in the *Gorgias*: 'Listen then, as they say, to a very fine story' 523a). Socrates usually pretends that the narrative is not his, but that he has heard it from someone else. Thus the myth of the *Gorgias* is something that Socrates has heard from others (524a). The myth of the *Phaedo* 'is told in the following way' (107d); while the myth in Book 10 of the *Republic* is attributed to Er the Pamphylian (614b). Even Socrates' great second speech in the *Phaedrus* is ironically attributed to Stesichorus. These attributions seem to be an attempt to play, once again, with the notion of validation and also to maintain a prudent reserve with regard to the content of the narrative.<sup>28</sup> Even when Socrates cites a source, he still is careful to hedge his bets (*Grg.* 527a–b; *Phd.* 114d). Acceptance of the narrative is conditional; it can always be replaced by one with a better philosophical basis. Formal introductions are matched by formal conclusions, and these conclusions, aside from rounding off the narrative are ethically protreptic: the narratees of the *Phaedo*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic* are presented with the moral necessity of pursuing justice and philosophy, while the immediate and less immediate narratees of Socrates' speech in the *Phaedrus* are to pursue love and philosophy. Indeed, all of these Socratic myths are marked by the obtrusive psychological (and textual) presence of the narratee. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates addresses his narratee, Callicles, five times. In the myth of the *Phaedo*, the presence of Simmias, the narratee, makes itself felt particularly in the opening sections (108–110), although he is also addressed in the conclusion. Glaucon, the narratee of the Myth of Er, is twice addressed during the body of the narrative (615a,

<sup>27</sup> Morgan 2000: 240–244.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Phdr.* 275b for confirmation that Socrates' attributions of his mythological fantasies to an external source are relatively transparent, even within the world of the dialogue. The *Euthydemus* (290c–291a) parades the likelihood that Socrates is attributing to others arguments that he himself has made.

618b), as well as at the start and finish. Finally, the beautiful boy who is the imaginary narratee of Socrates' second speech in the *Phaedrus* is addressed explicitly only at the start, finish, and once during the body of the narrative (252b), but Socrates continually makes his presence felt by use of the first-person plural (e.g. 'Let not the argument throw us into confusion,' 245b).

These narratives are meant to persuade. Concomitant with this intent is the confusion of clean narrative boundaries and levels. Our experience of the narrative is always mediated. Socrates injects himself into the text with obtrusive statements of belief or logical inference. We are always made aware that the most seemingly obvious distinctions, such as that between *muthos* and *logos*, are contestable and defined by context.<sup>29</sup> We often experience the narrative making a fresh start and swinging wildly back and forth between different temporal and spatial realms in vertiginous changes of perspective. Thus in the *Gorgias* we begin with the citation of Homer as a source for the basis of the story and the division of the world into three kingdoms by Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades. The story becomes more immediate with the insertion of direct speech for Zeus, but more remote as Socrates' heavy narrative presence resumes. The second part of the myth is presented as Socrates' inference on the first part, strongly marked by language like 'as it seems to me', 'I declare', and marked also, as was the beginning of the myth, by appeal to the authority of Homer (525d–e). Similar changes of perspective occur in the *Phaedo*, where Socrates uses the myth to open up a different temporal viewpoint on the significance of the discussion. Since the soul is immortal, death is no escape from wickedness; only education and virtue can help us in the eternal perspective. An introductory paragraph summarizes the content of the story (as usual, *post mortem* reward and punishment, 107d–e). Socrates then disagrees with Aeschylus on the nature of the path to the underworld, making his inferences from orphic/Pythagorean ceremonies (107e–108a). He then makes a fresh start at the beginning of the story, as the soul descends to the underworld (108a–b). Judgment, reward, and punishment are related in slightly more detail, but the meat of the myth starts when Socrates comments that he has heard that

<sup>29</sup> Cf., most famously, *Gorgias* 523a: 'Listen then, as they say, to a very fine *logos*, which you, I think, will consider a *muthos*, but I consider a *logos*, since I speak the things I am about to tell you in the belief that they are true.' For further discussion on the implications of this passage see Morgan 2000: 158–159.

the earth is not really what the geographers suppose. He is encouraged to expand, and then launches into a detailed rhetorical description of the earth, now presented as the product of inferential reasoning (108c–110b). Socrates then asks Simmias whether he would like to hear a fine *muthos* about what the earth is really like, and then gives more rhetorical description, ending with the rivers of the underworld and thus to the judgment of the newly dead, now told for the third time (110b–114c).

There does not seem to be a consistent narrative format for these myths. In the *Gorgias*, the myth is told in direct discourse, with the speech of Zeus also quoted in direct discourse. In the *Republic*, the Myth of Er is told in indirect discourse, using the accusative and infinitive construction, apart from the use of direct quotation for the conversation between two souls that tells the fate of incurable sinners (615c–616a), and for the information given by a ‘prophet’ who superintends the choice of lives as the souls of the dead prepare for reincarnation (617d–e, 619b). In the *Phaedo* the narrative of the myth oscillates back and forth between finite and infinitive constructions, while the myth of the *Phaedrus* (as we might expect from a product of ‘inspiration’) stays with finite constructions. It is tempting to associate the predominant use of infinite construction on the Myth of Er with the strictures of the *Republic* on the use of mimetic discourse, although, as I have already remarked, Plato does not elsewhere seem keen to live up to such requirements for his narrative.

The myths of the *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, and *Critias* are not narrated by Socrates, neither are their functions primarily ethical protreptic. The myth of the *Politicus* aims to clarify the function of the ruler by exploring the history of the world, whereas the cosmology and story of Athens and Atlantis contained in the *Timaeus* and *Critias* are a result of Socrates’ request to set the perfect but static model of the perfect state (as in the *Republic*) into narrative motion. Like the ethical myths described above, however, their status as narrative is strongly marked by formal beginnings and ends (except in the case of the *Critias*, where the narrative of the downfall of Atlantis breaks off curiously just at the point where we are about to hear direct speech in a council of the gods). Moreover, these myths share the disorderly narrative motion of the ethical myths: the tendency to backtrack and make fresh starts and to forswear attempts at completeness or total accuracy. Leaving to one side the problematic and incomplete *Critias*, we may note as examples *Timaeus*’ insistence that his story is merely a ‘likely account’ (*Ti.* 29c–d), and his anxious explanation that although he has spoken of the



creation of the body prior to the creation of soul, this was not the order in which they were created by the Demiurge. The reason for this temporal narrative incoherence is that ‘somehow, because we have a great share of what is random and happens by chance, we in fact speak in this sort of way’ (34b–c). Similarly in the *Politicus* the narrator (the Eleatic Stranger) struggles with the mass of his material, trying to focus on what is most germane for the philosophical point he wants to make (271e, 274b). In the end, however, he is forced to conclude ‘we raised up a marvellous mass of *mythos* and were forced to use a greater portion of it than we had to. And so we have made our demonstration rather long and we totally failed to perfect the *muthos*’ (277b).

Despite the insistence of Timaeus and the Eleatic Stranger on the imperfections of their narratives, we may still ascribe to them a qualified omniscience. Timaeus and the Eleatic Stranger let their narrative choices be guided by what they regard as propriety. Even though Timaeus stresses that his is only a likely account, he does not hesitate to put himself inside the mind of the creative Demiurge. Since the narrators in these dialogues believe that a supreme deity is good, and since goodness is at least partially accessible to the human mind through philosophical enquiry, the process of creation should conform to the truths achieved by philosophical enquiry. So the Demiurge must be good and perfect (because it would be blasphemy to believe otherwise) and will make the world as perfect as possible (*Ti.* 28–30). Thus Timaeus’ conclusions about creation are put forward as both likely and necessary (e.g. ‘progressing in accordance with the likely and necessary account’ 53d5), and the Eleatic Stranger declares ‘it is not right for him [the creator] to move the world now in one direction, now in another. As a result of these arguments, we must not say that the world always moves itself ...’ (*Plt.* 269e). Philosophical enquiry puts limits on the narrative possibilities open to the philosophical narrator, but in so far as he can discern eternal truths, he has a god’s eye view. This is so even in Socrates’ ethical myths. For all that he disclaims responsibility for his narratives by displacing responsibility onto his sources or by claiming inspiration, Socrates views the world of the soul in these narratives from an omniscient perspective that can sometimes (in the *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*) be outside the world as we know it.

The clear demarcation of the embedded mythological narratives considered here reminds us of Socrates’ narratives of his past and the reports of formal set speeches and brings us to a final point. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates famously remarks that a discourse ought to be like

a living creature, with head, feet, and middle fitting together harmoniously (264c). The embedded narratives I have been examining in this section conform to this canon. Yet one is struck by the contrast between the studied formality of secondary or embedded narratives with the informality of the beginnings and endings of the dialogues that contain them. The dialogues often begin with an intellectual event or discussion already in progress (*Gorgias*, *Cratylus*, *Philebus*), or with the meeting of the frame narrator with a friend (*Theaetetus*), or with a narration that is the answer to a question asked outside the text (*Republic*). Although the dialogues usually have more defined endings, even here we may stop in mid-discussion (*Philebus*), and we are always made aware that, even if an argument has been concluded, it is part of a larger project (*Phaedo*, *Theaetetus*). I have mentioned above that the openings of the dialogues presume familiarity with the genre: we are meant to know who is speaking and to be familiar with the world of the dialogue. The secondary narratives thus conform to developing canons of rhetorical artifice, while the dialogue as a whole aggressively rejects formal canons. Why? The answer, in part, must be that the dialogues model a philosophical process that is meant to be ongoing. However polished and subtle they are, they must not risk closing off discussion by being mistaken for treatises that express a defined and already discovered truth. Whereas Socrates' polished ethical myths are meant (among other things) to persuade, the dialogues are inspirations and reminders: models for life, not art.

The last type of embedded narration to be considered here is perhaps the most characteristically philosophical. It is the imaginative projection of a line of argument, what one might call a hypothetical narrative. These occur when Socrates, or whoever is leading the discussion, asks what the answer would be if he were to say something, or alternatively, what would be replied if an imaginary interlocutor were to ask something. This is an extensive category, although I have space only to glance at it here. A lengthy example is Socrates' imagined conversation with the laws of the city in the *Crito* (50a–54c) in which they persuade him not to try and escape from prison ('if the laws and commonwealth of the city should approach and stand over me and ask, "Tell me, Socrates, what do you intend to do?" ... what shall we say?'). Less elaborate examples abound, such as *Gorgias* 451a: 'For example, if someone should ask me ... "Socrates, what is the art of arithmetic?" ... I would say ...', or *Phaedrus* 268a–269c, where Socrates imagines what would happen if someone who knew the rules of medicine and poetry

but not their application were to pretend expertise in the presence of a doctor or poet.<sup>30</sup> The most fascinating of these exchanges occurs in the *Theaetetus* (166ff.), where Socrates reanimates the dead Protagoras in order to make a defence of his man-measure doctrine. Not only does Socrates try to imagine what Protagoras would say, but he talks as though Protagoras has actually spoken (168c–d) and addresses him directly in response (170a). Such narratives of potential conversations are important because they show that the Platonic dialogue seeks to avoid treating arguments as abstract entities, but always tries to connect them with a speaker, even if that speaker must be imagined. There is, as has often been noted, a tendency for the argument in Platonic dialogue to become personified and find a voice. Thus the laws, tragedy, Protagoras, and a host of anonymous interlocutors enter the narrative when there is need to expand its intellectual scope. Philosophical conversation consists of a series of thought experiments (what would the results be if we were to say ‘x’?). These experiments can be myths, actual and hypothetical lines of argument, or a combination of the two (such as the complex of sun, line, and cave in the *Republic*). Yet they all become effective only when deployed in conversation in the mouths of narrators.

What is true for embedded narrations in the dialogues in this instance applies to the dialogues as a whole. Socrates himself, the Eleatic Stranger, and Timaeus are personified lines of argument engaging in hypothetical conversations. The elaborate narrative apparatus of the dialogues brings this point home, but also constructs a world of reception whereby the reader is guided into the philosophical life.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> A selection of further examples: *Meno* 74b, *Philebus* 13d, *Sophist* 243d–245e, 260d–e, *Theaetetus* 158e, 163d.

<sup>31</sup> This treatment of Platonic narrative had already reached final form when I became aware of Blondell 2002. Rather than signal laboriously multiple points of contact between Blondell’s approach and conclusions and my own, I shall state only that any serious student of the topic will need to consult her book.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

### XENOPHON

*V. Gray*

Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, *Oeconomicus*, *Apologia*, and *Symposium*, which all contain conversations of Socrates, share some important narratological features. The primary narrators are anonymous, but reveal themselves in introductory frames, which also state the topic of the conversation. The narrator claims to be remembering conversations he has heard himself (*Oeconomicus* and *Symposium*), or reports of them from others (*Apologia*), or a combination of these two types of memory (*Memorabilia*). This makes the works remembered narratives and authorizes them as the product of eye-witnessing, whether in the first or in the second degree. The narrator also displays through them the power of memory that was required of a Socratic pupil and the process that ensures that the lessons of the conversations remained with him (*Mem.* 1.2.19–21; 4.8.11; on this theme → Plato). They could provide private re-education, as *Memorabilia* 4.8.11 suggests, or be read aloud and thus shared with others (→ Plato).

Theoretically Xenophon might have chosen to call his narrator 'Xenophon'. Instead, as in *Anabasis*, he introduces the character Xenophon as a dramatized 'other', in order to secure an impression of objectivity and hence persuasive force. Indeed, he even allows Socrates to criticize this character for being 'foolish' (*Mem.* 1.3.8–13). Since Xenophon was probably too young to remember the party described in *Symposium* (for which the dramatic date is 422 BC), he cannot be identified as the narrator of this work either. The narrators of *Memorabilia* and *Oeconomicus* might be among those silent bystanders who are mentioned as witnesses to the conversations (*Mem.* 1.2.30; 1.6.1; 4.2.1; *Oec.* 3.1). In *Symposium*, he could be one of the named guests, referring to himself in the third person, or an anonymous guest. The memories are fictional if they are credited to the author,<sup>1</sup> but could still be the genuine memories of this 'other'.

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<sup>1</sup> E.g. Kahn 1996: 29–35.

One common feature of the frames, which can be entirely narrative or involve dialogue, is their use of formulae. A very full range of these introduces the sequence of smaller conversations that form the bulk of *Memorabilia* 1.4–4.8. A typical instance is: ‘I will first state what I once heard him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus ...’ (1.4.2). The actual conversation is then started off by Socrates’ perception of a problem that he tries to solve: ‘Learning that he did not sacrifice to the gods ... “Tell me”, he said, “Aristodemus ...”.’<sup>2</sup> There are also other forms of introductory remarks, such as exhortations to the narratees to join the narrator in his search for the truth (‘Let us enquire ...’: 1.5.1, 7.1), and assertions of the narrator’s discrimination (‘it seems worthy of report’: 1.6.1). The narrator does not intervene in the course of the conversations, but he often summarizes what Socrates achieved (1.4.19, 5.6; 4.2.40, 5.12), thereby rounding off one conversation before proceeding to the next one.

These formulae are found in later manuals of rhetorical instruction, which use them to introduce the sayings of the wise as proofs, and show how to elaborate them into short stories. The longest type of saying is the *apomnēmoneuma*, which is the Greek title of *Memorabilia*.<sup>3</sup> *Memorabilia* indeed elaborates the introductory formulae, as, for example, when we hear how Socrates came to view the famous courtesan Theodote (3.11.1), or how Socrates made Euthydemus receptive to his instruction over a period of time (4.2.1–8). The first makes a philosophic issue of the beauty of Theodote (it is beyond words, who benefits from it?), while the second characterizes the world of the reception for Socrates’ teaching method, as in Plato (→). Euthydemus is introduced as an example of how Socrates adapted his approach to those who were unready to accept instruction (4.1). In a series of short scenes, Socrates breaks down his pride, speaking to his companions on topics meant to gain his silent attention, and using irony (4.2.1–8). The main conversations that follow these elaborations are then introduced in the formulaic ways: ‘Tell me, Theodote ...’ (3.11.4); ‘Tell me, Euthydemus ...’ (4.2.8). Sometimes the remark is developed to prove that Socrates practised what he preached, e.g. in 4.4.1–4, 5.1–2, 7.1, in accordance with the programme of the work, which sees imitation of his practice as an essential part of his education (1.3.1).

<sup>2</sup> Other examples: 1.2.29–30, 3.8; 2.1.1, 2.1, 3.1.

<sup>3</sup> Gray 1998: 107–122 has discussed these introductions to the so-called *chreiai*. See Hock and O’Neil 1986 for the relevant texts.

The other works also begin with variations of these formulae, and there is an impression that they form a continuous sequence. *Oeconomicus* begins: 'I once heard him [Socrates] speak about household management *as well* ... "Tell me," he said ...'. *Symposium* begins: 'But to me it seems that not only are the serious pursuits of gentlemen worth remembering (as is the common opinion) but the playful ones *as well*.' He next introduces his actual narrative with the well-known formulaic frame: 'On account of what experiences I came to this conviction I wish to reveal'. *Apologia*, like *Oeconomicus*, starts like another one of the conversations embedded in *Memorabilia*: 'It seems to me worth remembering *also* ...'; cf. *Memorabilia* 1.6.1. The sense of continuity and the similarity to the frames of the sequence of conversations in *Memorabilia* suggest that these other works constitute further conversations in the sequence and come from the same narrator. Perhaps this expresses the continuity of the process of remembering and the collected force of the wisdom that they contain.

The authority of this anonymous internal narrator is expressed in his claims to have been present at Socrates' conversations and to have heard them himself, or at least to have heard about them. He appeals to his own memory (e.g. *Mem.* 1.3.1), or simply claims to 'know' (*Mem.* 2.7.1, 2.10.1; 3.3.1; 4.4.5, 4.5.2). Occasionally he introduces anonymous spokesmen ('others'), who were witnesses themselves and as such can confirm what the narrator says (e.g. *Mem.* 4.3.2). He turns to a named secondary internal narrator at the end of *Memorabilia*, where Hermogenes tells him about a conversation he had with Socrates, which revealed his remarkable attitude to death (4.8.4–11). The named witness gives special authentication to something that the narratees might find particularly unbelievable. We are in fact told that Socrates' critics fail to understand his attitude to death (4.8.1) and that this applied at first even to Hermogenes. Hermogenes therefore carries authority not only because of his personal experience of Socrates, but also because he initially shared the ignorance of the critics, but learned the truth from Socrates himself. Hermogenes appears in this same role in *Apologia*, where the narrator refers to the inadequacy of other accounts and introduces him to tell the true story. The concern for authority can be found in the frame of a conversation within *Memorabilia* too, where Socrates, as narrator of the story of Prodicus, refers to the possible failure of his memory (2.1.21) but then asserts authority in saying that he is not using the exact words of Prodicus—which he must know (2.1.34).

Introductory frames can model a world of reception for Socratic teaching for the primary narratees, as in Plato (→), characterizing not only Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4.2 but also Callias in *Symposium*, who is presented as one who is passionate to spend time with Socrates, who prefers the company of the wise to that of military men and office-seekers, and whose passion is confirmed in his distress at Socrates' initial refusal of his invitation to his party. He seems keener to display his wisdom to Socrates than receive it, but Socrates ironically reveals that his wisdom is inferior since it has been purchased from the sophists. In *Oeconomicus*, Critobulus as secondary narratee shows the same passion for Socrates' advice (2.14, 3.1).

Primary narrators often express as their motive for narration the correction of an erroneous view: that Socrates' condemnation was wrong (*Memorabilia*), that play is unworthy of memory (*Symposium*), or that Socrates' attitude to death was unworthy (*Apologia*). This makes the narrators educators in their own right.

The works also have their own distinct features, to which I turn next.

### *Memorabilia*

*Memorabilia*'s anonymous internal primary narrator embarks on his tale because he wonders what arguments persuaded the jurors to condemn a man like Socrates. The first part of the work (1.1–2) refutes the charges with arguments in defensive courtroom mode, confronting the opposition (from 1.2.9 onwards) and illustrating some points with dialogues (1.2.29–46); while the rest (1.3.1–4.8) offers a sequence of dialogues, framed and sometimes interspersed with narrative, as well as some plainer reports, such as the account of the limit of Socrates' instruction (4.7), which serve as more positive proofs of Socrates' virtuous instruction of others.<sup>4</sup> The conversations present a comprehensive account of Socrates' teaching to a very wide variety of people, mainly on their relationships—to the gods and to each other. This range of topics makes the work a compendium of wisdom, unlike any single dialogue of Plato. The conversations are often in order of the importance of their topics (beginning with religion: 1.4, and then self-control: 1.5), but they are also grouped according to topic (conversations about family rela-

<sup>4</sup> Gray 1998, especially 123–158, describes the structure of the contents and establishes that there is a programme in it, which previous scholars have questioned.

tions: 2.2–3, friendships: 2.4–10, relations between political officials and their constituencies: 3.1–7). The conversations with Euthydemus (4.2–3, 5–6) offer an almost complete process of education in the one interlocutor, raising the original teaching on religion and self-control to a higher level and culminating in the teaching of dialectic. The last conversation (4.8) takes place on the eve of Socrates' death, bringing us back to the beginning of the work and hence creating closure.

The narrator's organization of his work (refutation of the charges, followed by positive proof of Socrates' virtue in a sequence of conversations) rather interestingly shows him to be one who has learned the Socratic teaching technique that he portrays in the work.<sup>5</sup> The combination of refutation followed by more positive instruction is the shape of the character Socrates' instructional dialogue, e.g. his education of Euthydemus, which begins with negative refutation (4.2 *passim*) but proceeds to positive instruction, which begins at 4.2.40. This characterizes the narrator as a true disciple of the educational process of his venerated master in his instruction of his narratees and is a unique narratological feature of *Memorabilia*. In accordance with the clear rhetorical purpose of the work, the narrator, though anonymous, is overt; he is throughout present with his emotions and evaluations, e.g. 'I wonder then how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker ...' (1.1.20), and numerous first-person comments ('I believe', 'I see', etc.).

The narratees are anonymous like the narrator. Their presence is implicitly felt, however, when the narrator inserts numerous rhetorical questions in the first part of his defence, e.g. 'So, in pronouncing on opinions of his that were unknown to them, it is not surprising that the jury erred: but is it not astonishing that they should have ignored matters of common knowledge?' (1.1.17).<sup>6</sup> They are also the focus of persuasion when the narrator constructs and refutes the various arguments of anonymous opponents, structuring his work as a virtual dialogue with these (from 1.2.9 onwards): 'The accuser says ... but I say against this ...' (1.2.19); 'A man might say against this ... I do not oppose that, but ...' (1.2.17); a sustained use of the 'anonymous interlocutor' device. Perhaps the opposition represents the views of some narratees, but for others, the victory of the narrator over his opposition persuades them that he has argued the stronger case. The narrator

<sup>5</sup> Gray 1998: 91.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. 1.5.1, 2.2, 2.8, 2.11, 2.15, etc.



indeed overwhelms his opposition in the course of the work, first refuting their view that Socrates was harmful (1.2.9–64), then beginning to prove him helpful (1.3), reintroducing the opposition to argue that he was only partly helpful (1.4.1), dismissing this with a series of conversations that prove Socrates' entire helpfulness, letting them put a final thesis regarding Socrates' death (4.8.1), and crushing this as well. His first-person conclusion finally dismisses them, when it invites 'a man' who is not pleased with his evaluation to compare Socrates against others (4.8.11). This conclusion also uses the 'continuance' motif to indicate to them how influential Socrates has been: 'All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others.'

There are a few embedded stories credited to secondary narrators. The longest of these is Prodicus' 'story' of Heracles (2.1.21–33), which the secondary narrator Socrates introduces with a formula similar to those with which the primary narrator introduces his own conversations. The purpose of this embedding is to reinforce the teaching on toil by offering a range of instructional styles on the same topic: poetic didacticism (Hesiod and Epicharmus) and sophistic epideictic (Prodicus) are embedded within Socrates' own dialectical conversation. The question of translation arises when Socrates pretends not to have been able to capture Prodicus' own grand language, but this is more likely to illustrate his knowledge of the original (2.1.34).

### *Oeconomicus*

*Oeconomicus* presents a multiplicity of narrators,<sup>7</sup> in a manner comparable to that found in Plato (→). The primary narrator, anonymous and internal, without motivation, but in his role of eyewitness, recounts in dramatized form a discussion between Socrates and Critobulus about successful estate management. After one sentence ('I once heard him discussing the subject of estate management in the following manner') he disappears never to surface again, except to provide speech-introductions. This topic (of estate management) is the realm of the *kaloskagathos*, who can 'use his household and his house-holders and relatives, and friends and polis and fellow-citizens for benefit', like the

<sup>7</sup> Pomeroy 1994: 17–18 briefly describes the structure of the work. The embedding once gave some the impression that the work is not a unity.

*kaloikagathoi* who associate with Socrates at *Memorabilia* 1.2.48 and 64. Socrates teaches in his customary way, defining ‘estate’ in terms of its function, which is to benefit the possessor (1.1–15). For further instruction, he introduces reported narrators, recounting what ‘people say’ about the practices of the Persian king (4.4), what Cyrus ‘is said’ to have told those who received his gifts (4.15–16), what Lysander ‘is said’ to have told a Megarian stranger about Cyrus (4.20–25), and, becoming a secondary narrator himself, reports a long conversation he had with the supreme estate manager Ischomachus, in which he learned management (6.12 to the end). This Ischomachus, becoming a tertiary narrator, embeds his own ‘memories’ (7.43; 8.23) of the conversations in which he instructed his wife (7.5–10.13) and spoke with the mate of a ship he once inspected (8.11–16). The secondary narrator Socrates intervenes only occasionally into the conversations he reports (‘I said’: 10.1, 11.1), while, as was noted earlier, the primary narrator has disappeared altogether. Thus, the work ends with Ischomachus addressing Socrates.

Introductions to the embedded conversations mention the leisure that is the setting for philosophical discourse, but show that men with property shun such idleness. (Socrates:) ‘Seeing Ischomachus once ... since he seemed at leisure, I approached him and sat down and said. “You’re not accustomed to sitting down doing nothing ...”’ (7.1); (Ischomachus:) ‘I saw this man in his leisure making a full inspection ... I asked him what he was doing and he said ...’ (8.15). These introductions, then, are part of the ‘economic’ lessons imparted.

There is considerable characterization of the secondary and tertiary narrators and narratees. Socrates as secondary narrator seeks his customary definitions, employs irony, describes models for his narratee Critobulus to imitate and sends him to higher authorities for experience he does not possess (a habit of his noted in *Memorabilia* 4.7). In estate management he is a success himself, since he succeeds in making a small profit from his small estate (2.10). The secondary narratee Critobulus is a young man of much greater property, under the greater obligations that this carries (2.1–9; also 7.3), married, but spending money on idleness such as boyfriends and dramatic performances (2.3–8; 3.12), and becoming aware that he is exhausting his means and eager for instruction in how to become a *kaloskagathos* (6.12). The tertiary narrator Ischomachus is the ultimate model for Critobulus, and therefore a fully characterized narrator. He has a great property and is married like Critobulus, but unlike Critobulus, is not given to idleness,

but to farming. He has a reputation as a *kaloskagathos* (6.17) and he supplies the instruction that Socrates has foreshadowed—training his wife to rule the servants and increase his estate (7–10; cf. 3.11–16), developing his physique and training for war while himself increasing his estate (11; cf. 4), teaching his workers to increase his estate (12–14), teaching Socrates how to farm (15–19) and telling him what ruins estates (20–21; cf. 1.16–23). He is an excellent teacher, instructing his workers in the art of ruling (13.3–5)—which he considers the peak of achievement (21–22)—and bringing knowledge to birth in Socrates (19.14–15). Socrates as his tertiary narratee is eager to learn, which he says is characteristic of a philosopher (16.9), thus providing a model for his own secondary narratee, Critobulus.

The possibility that Socrates is ironic arises when he says that he sought Ischomachus out because he had a reputation as a *kaloskagathos* (6.12–17, since reputations can be misleading). Yet there is no irony in his own praise of farming as secondary narrator (5.1–13; 6.4–10). Successful farming indeed requires and develops philosophic virtues, such as self-control (1.16–23), and permits the cultivation of friends and polis (6.4–11). Ischomachus is ironic about his own reputation (7.3) and he knows when Socrates is being ironic (11.3–7; 20.22–29), but he is also serious about his own instruction, and Socrates elicits even from his remark about profiteering (20.22–29) the serious principle that ‘all men naturally love whatever they think will bring them a profit’. *Oeconomicus* can therefore be read as a straightforward lesson in how Socrates taught his associates to manage their households and other organizations by extension, such as the polis. Ischomachus says the principles are applicable to any organization (21.2), and Socrates does not oppose this; elsewhere, he even endorses it (*Mem.* 3.4.12).

Other narratees are characterized to a lesser extent. Ischomachus characterizes his wife through her reactions to his training (7.8, 14, 37 etc.), just as he is seen as beautiful through her eyes (10.6). She has been identified as the Chrysilla whom Andocides criticized for subsequent immorality, but to import this into the work and make her portrayal ironic is narratologically indefensible.<sup>8</sup>

Secondary and tertiary narratees such as Critobulus and Socrates steer the reception of the primary narratees in their eagerness to learn. The truth of the embedded stories is not seriously challenged. Crito-

<sup>8</sup> Pomeroy 1994: 261–264 believes that an ironic reading would destroy the point of the work, but ironists could read it as a parody of the impossibility of such perfection.

bulus asks whether Socrates really believes what ‘they say’ about the Persian king (4.4), but accepts it as true (4.12) after Socrates proves it through an ‘enquiry’ into it (4.5–11). He gives the same acceptance (4.17) to further reported narratives about the king.

The function of the embedded narratives in *Oeconomicus* is educational: they are paradigms, which bring the narratees into the presence of successful managers of great estates (the Persian king, Ischomachus) and reinforce Socrates’ teaching about the excellence of farming, or the excellence of his paradigms. They use a range of educational methods: Socrates teaches through questions, definitions, paradigms and protreptic; Ischomachus’ instructional styles include protreptic (15.10–16.7), and the Socratic method of questioning and bringing knowledge to birth (16.10 to 19.14–15). Ischomachus also offers instructional models for all narratees to adopt in managing their own households: the lectures he delivers to his wife (7–10), and the praise and blame, rewards and punishments that he uses on his workers (12–14). His instruction of Socrates also illustrates Socrates’ customary search for wisdom and his expressed concern to find expertise he does not have: he has theoretical knowledge, but lacks the experience of running a large estate (this disqualification is mentioned at 2.3.11–13). This is why Socrates promises to send Critobulus to other teachers for various areas of instruction (2.13–18; 3.14–16; 4.4), but in fact he supplies Ischomachus as a person who combines all these.<sup>9</sup> This embedded narrative also allows Socrates to cast himself as pupil and reveal the delight of the philosopher in learning, which models the reception that is appropriate for Critobulus.

### *Apologia*

The anonymous external primary narrator in *Apologia* motivates his own narrative by saying that other writers agree about the ‘high-mindedness’ of Socrates over the period of his trial, thus authorizing this feature, but make it look ‘witless’ by failing to explain his conviction that death was preferable to life. He wants to correct this situation by intro-

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<sup>9</sup> For example, Socrates does not fulfil his promise to have Aspasia give advice on wives (3.14), but this advice is incorporated into Ischomachus’ account. In his own instruction he remembers more than what has been agreed at 6.6–7 but his expansion is a natural extrapolation from 4.3, where craftsmen are said to be bad defenders of their country.

ducing a named internal secondary narrator, Hermogenes, who alone made Socrates' high-mindedness appear 'appropriate' by explaining its rationale. This secondary narrator is authoritative, because he was an eyewitness of the trial, indeed a companion and interlocutor of Socrates (cf., e.g. 2–3).

The primary narrator offers minimal framing. In 2 he introduces a report of a conversation that Hermogenes had with Socrates before the trial ('He stated that, on seeing Socrates discussing any and every subject rather than the trial, he had said ...'); this conversation runs from 3 to 9 (cf. the similar report in *Memorabilia* 4.8.4–10). In 10 ('Hermogenes stated that with this resolve Socrates came before his jurors ...') he introduces a report of the trial itself (11–21), including the embedded responses of Socrates' accusers (20–21). In 22 he curtails Hermogenes' account of the trial, stating that he knows that much more was said by Socrates and his counsellors, but that he limits himself to the proof of his conviction about death. This intervention from the primary narrator into the account of his secondary narrator demonstrates his wider knowledge, anticipates any hypothetical objection from the primary narratees that his account is incomplete, and at the same time characterizes his desire to discriminate and focus on his theme. From this point the voices of the primary and secondary narrator merge, endorsing the same image of Socrates in persuasive harmony. In 23–31 the primary narrator recounts mainly in his own voice, occasionally recalling his source Hermogenes (e.g. 27: 'Hermogenes reports him as asking ...'), how subsequent events proved Socrates' disregard of death, recording conversations with his pupils (27–28) and comments on his prosecutor Anytus (29–30). The narrator even seems to step into the shoes of Hermogenes when he describes how Socrates' physical appearance was 'in agreement with' his resolve (27), something only Hermogenes, who alone was present, could have seen.

There is some direct engagement with the narratees, but not very much: two instances of the 'presentation through negation' device represent the ignorant narratees' expectation (31: 'he was not cheated of this expectation, but ...'; 33: 'he did not shrink in the face of death, but he met and saw it through in high spirits') and an extended instance of the 'anonymous interlocutor' motif at the very end of the work, which challenges those narratees who do not accept his final conclusion ('I am unable not to remember him and, in remembering, not to praise him. If any of those who desire virtue have been with a man more helpful than Socrates, I think him a real man worthy of the name most blessed': 34).

*Symposium*

*Symposium* tells the story of a party, from the invitations to the break-up, and takes as its theme the seriousness that can be found in the playful activities of *kaloikagathoi*. *Memorabilia* 4.1.1 finds the same seriousness in Socrates' playful claim to be in love with his young men. The narrator is anonymous and undramatized and though internal (cf. 1: *hois ... paragenomenos*: 'an experience of mine') after the first framing chapter invisible in his own story. His initial scene models the world of philosophy, when it recounts how the company gathered to celebrate the victory of Autolycus (1.2–6), characterizing Callias, his host and lover, as an enthusiastic fan of philosophy, and Socrates and his friends as men who are indeed, as Callias describes them, purified in soul. Thus they 'as was natural' (i.e. for educated men), praised Callias for the invitation, but at first declined to attend (1.7). The narrator also frames the speeches that form the bulk of the work with narratives that contrast different types of play, some worthy of philosophers, some not. At the beginning Autolycus' beauty produces the civilizing effects of love on the company, but this is disturbed by the entry of the clown Philip with his buffoonish play. Socrates will eventually reject passive entertainment like this in favour of the more engaged play of philosophers (3.2). Love is indeed the subject of Socrates' long speech, and the kind of play that Socrates will eventually harness to most serious educational purpose, in order to make Callias a political leader and lover of the polis (8.36–43). At the end of the work, young actors 'play' a dramatic mime of the love of Dionysus and Ariadne, balancing the homosexual love in the introduction with heterosexual love (9.2–6). Yet the actors playing the lovers are seriously in love once more, and under that god's civilizing influence. The performance ends the work with the company inspired by thoughts of wedded bliss, while Socrates, Callias, and others join Autolycus and his father on their walk (9.1, 9.7).

Though invisible as a character, the narrator is overt, in that he comments on the events of his story. He introduces the various speeches of the guests that form the inner core of the work with simple tags ('he said, they said'), occasionally turning to indirect speech (e.g. 3.14; 4.50). He marks stages of the conversation (e.g., 4.5, 9, 28, 45, 64; 9.1, 7), guiding the narratees to an interpretation (6.10), involving them as virtual eyewitnesses through the use of the 'anonymous witness' device ('A person who took note of the course of events would have come at once to the conclusion that beauty is in essence something

regal ...': 1.8), or reminding them of the theme of the work (4.28). He introduces *hōs eikos*-comments (1.7, 8), which recall the narrator of Xenophon *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* (→). He also intervenes to give brief descriptions of the entertainment, sometimes in order to have Socrates evaluate it (e.g. 2.8, 11–12, 22; 5.9–10; the final entertainment is the mime). In particular he marks the relation between outer appearance and inner realities, to make the inner reality clearer. He thus indicates, as the Socratic narrator in Plato (→), Socrates' outer seriousness and inner irony (e.g. 2.17; 3.10; 8.4; cf. 4.19), the outer blush that betrays Autolycus' inner modesty, (3.12), and the inner malice that provokes the Syracusan's jokes (6.6–10). This has been a theme also of the introduction, where Autolycus has an inner and outer beauty and produces the same harmony in the company (their silence, their poses, their tender looks reflect their inner feelings); the clown uses mock mournful poses and gestures and voice to convey his inner pain at not causing laughter in the company; and in the mime too, the 'players' resolve their inner and outer appearance, because they truly feel the serious emotions that they express as stage lovers.<sup>10</sup>

There is only one secondary narrator, Charmides, when he contrasts his previous life as a rich man with his current life as a poor one, adopting a view of democracy in the process that is patently ironic (4.29–32). Otherwise there are only analytic discussions, but here the reactions of the rest of the company to the speakers guide the reactions of the primary narratees, just as the internal audience's reaction to the visual spectacles guides their reaction to those spectacles in narrated form. This is illustrated by the general disapproval of the malice of the Syracusan entrepreneur, and his polite but firm treatment by Socrates (6.6–10).

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<sup>10</sup> Description of physical appearance is relatively rare in classical literature, but *Anabasis* 2.6.9 also characterizes the looks and voice of Clearchus as an outer reflection of his inner character; *Apologia* 27 marks the conformity of Socrates' appearance with his words.

PART SEVEN

BIOGRAPHY





## CHAPTER THIRTY

### XENOPHON

*V. Gray*

*Cyropaedia* praises the achievements of Cyrus the Great as creator of the Persian empire. In an introduction (1.1) the narrator describes the process that led him to admire his leadership, then gives an account of Cyrus' lineage, natural qualities, and education (1.2–6), his creation of his empire (3.1–8.1.48), his arrangements for securing it (8.2–6) and his death (8.7). An epilogue follows, which laments the abandonment of Cyrus' practices by Persians in the narrator's own time (8.8).<sup>1</sup> The intended status of the work is an interesting question. The narrator could be seen as a historian because he re-writes Herodotus' *Histories* 1.107–216, adding an account of the education of Cyrus, giving different versions of his birth, upbringing, and death, changing his relations with other main characters, and giving more detail on his battles and his arrangements for the maintenance of empire.<sup>2</sup> However, he spends so much of his energy on the praise of Cyrus (who is 'worthy to be admired': 1.6) that he looks to be writing an encomium rather than a history. Praise and blame of different characters is an integral part of historical works such as *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*, but they do not entirely focus on praise, let alone the praise of one central character. The narrator's enquiry into Cyrus' lineage, natural qualities, and education (1.5) is the kind of biography we associate with Plutarch, for instance, in *Agesilaus* 1–2. Xenophon's own *Agesilaus*, which declares that it aims to praise the central character, also begins with his lineage, and discusses his natural qualities (3–11) after an account of his military career (1–2). *Cyropaedia* uses the same devices as historical texts (e.g. the 'anonymous spokesmen' device), but more exclusively to make the narratees believe the praise of Cyrus.

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<sup>1</sup> Due 1989: 31–53 and 108–114 gives the most useful comment on the work for narratological purposes. Marincola 1997 does not treat *Cyropaedia*.

<sup>2</sup> See for further views about its intended status: Cook 1983: 11–24; Hirsch 1985: 61–

*An external primary narrator*

The primary narrator is not dramatized: we hear no name, or any other personal information. What we can deduce, however, is that he is an external narrator, who is removed in time from the event he recounts. This becomes clear from a quite prominent feature of his narrative: his frequent use of the ‘reference to the narrators’ own time’ and ‘continuance’ motifs. The instances of the latter motif are marked by *eti kai nun* (‘even to this day’) or by mixing the present tense into descriptions of the past, e.g. in the passage on the best way to camp and decamp (8.5.2–5). In the epilogue the references are not to continuance, but to abandonment of the customs that Cyrus established, and contrasts are drawn between ‘previously’ and ‘now’. The narrator is indeed quite unusually aware of the relations between past and present. The time that has passed between the time of Cyrus and the time of narration is not specified, but can be deduced as about two centuries, since the epilogue refers to events that occurred as late as 361 BC (8.8.4).

The ‘reference to the narrator’s own time’ and ‘continuance’ motifs go back to Herodotus (→) and also occur in Xenophon *Anabasis* and *Hellenica* (→), but the narrator of the *Cyropaedia* uses them in a distinctive and interesting way. Due argues that by reminding the narratees of the contemporary situation they assimilate the work to historical writing, add liveliness and coherence, and praise the central character, Cyrus. It could also be argued that the narrator’s distance from the events makes the praise more objective.<sup>3</sup> But more obviously, the device gives another sort of authority to the narration and the praise. The continuance of customs into the narrator’s own time prove that they (1) really happened, since there is contemporary evidence of them, and/or (2) that they really were excellent, since what lasts and stands the test of time is good and right. *Cyropaedia* 1.2.16 makes the first point explicit, when it indicates that contemporary practice indeed is ‘evidence’ of the ancient Persian diet and exercise: ‘and even to this day there remain proofs of their moderate diet and of their exercising off what they consume; for it is even now a source of shame ...’ *Cyropaedia* 1.2.1 has both effects,

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97; Due 1989: 117–135; Tatum 1989: 35; Gera 1993: 13–22. On Xenophon’s contribution to the development of biography in general, see Momigliano 1971.

<sup>3</sup> Marincola 1997: 76, 94, 158–174, 222 examines ‘fear and favour’ among contemporaries.

where 'Cyrus is said and sung by the barbarians even to this day to have been most beautiful, most kindly, fond of learning and honour-loving' (1.2.1). This confirms that not only are there witnesses to his reputation, but it has not been eclipsed and has stood the test of time (8.5.28).<sup>4</sup>

In the case of the epilogue (8.8 *passim*), the narrator's position outside the narrative allows him to prove the excellence of the customs by showing that abandonment of them meant decline. The epilogue has been seen as a later addition to the text, but also as an integral part of the praise of Cyrus, a conscious narratorial device designed to reinforce the praise of his practices by demonstrating that the people who once used them have declined as a result of abandoning them.<sup>5</sup> Xenophon's *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* uses the same device when it states in the introduction that it seeks to praise the practices instituted by Lycurgus (1.1–2), and then inserts an 'epilogue' (14), which proves the excellence of the practices by showing that contemporary Spartans have declined as a result of abandoning them.<sup>6</sup> It would be too much of a coincidence to have a narrator who in both cases inserts after-thoughts that contradict his original thesis (or an interpolator who takes issue with that thesis).

Sometimes the narrator wants to have his cake and eat it too, since practices that are said to continue in the main narrative appear to have been abandoned in the epilogue, but there are usually some subtle changes. Thus, 1.2.16 says that contemporary Persians continue to avoid publicly voiding their water and wind, and this is used as evidence that they once had a meagre intake of food and worked it off in exercise; 8.8.8 agrees that the avoidance continues, but says that they no longer work it off.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. 1.4.27; 3.2.24; 4.2.1; 6.1.27–30; 7.1.3, 45, 46, 47; 7.3.15, 5.70; 8.1.23–24, 4.5, 4.16, 4.28, 5.28, 6.5, 14.

<sup>5</sup> Due 1989: 16–22 gives a critical summary of the debate and comes down on the side of the narrative device. Since then Tatum 1989: 220–239 and Gera 1993: 299–300 have given their versions of its significance. Nadon 2001: 139–146 most recently tries to prove that the seeds of the collapse are already sown in the practices that Cyrus instituted.

<sup>6</sup> As Momigliano 1936 argued; he is followed by Bordes 1982: 198–203 and Carlier 1984: 252–254. Cf. Tigerstedt 1965: 169.

<sup>7</sup> Another example is 1.3.2, where it says that the Persians in their homeland continue to have plainer clothing and food than the Medes, while 8.8.15 says that they adopted Median dress and food, but continued to practice Persian restraint. What the Persians did at home in the first passage seems to be different from what they did

It could be argued that the instances of the ‘continuance’ motif in the main narrative give the narratees the impression that the empire still remains as it was created by its founder, which would make the epilogue a shocking surprise, but this underestimates the narratees. The narrator of Xenophon’s *Respublica Lacedaemoniorum* could give the same impression of continuity, but he shows that his narratees have clearly not closed their minds to the possibility that his practices have lapsed; for he introduces his account of the decline: ‘If anyone should ask me whether the practices of Lycurgus seem to remain unshaken *even to this day ...*’ (14.1). The narratees of *Cyropaedia* might experience the same doubt.

*The primary narrator and his sources*

The narrator describes in his introduction how he reflected on the general truth that successful leadership was a virtual impossibility, but was reminded of the exception, Cyrus, and decided to find out more about him. The resulting narrative therefore is ‘what we have found out and think we know’ (1.1.6), and his informers turn out to be the Persians themselves, as appears, e.g. from 1.2.1: ‘what is said and sung by the barbarians’.<sup>8</sup> This gives authority to his account. It departs from Herodotus’ earlier version of Cyrus’ career, but perhaps exploits the opportunity left by this author’s mention of other traditions that he rejected, instead preferring ‘what the Persians say, those who do not wish to make a legend of the achievements of Cyrus, but speak the truth’ (*Hist.* 1.95.1). The remarkable reference to what is sung establishes the greatness of Cyrus, since poetry is often presented as a form specially reserved for greatness; cf. Lysias 2.3 or Arrian 1.11.2.

The narrator does not say how he has come by these Persian traditions, nor does he describe them more precisely, but we do know that the author, Xenophon, had access to them, since he came to know Cyrus the Younger, the namesake descendant of his Great ancestor, by participating in the expedition described in *Anabasis* and mentioned

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abroad. The Persians ‘at home’ retained their original mores (8.5.21–27). Due 1989: 36–37 finds that there is no tension in these instances; Gera 1993: 299–300 and Nadon 2001: 142–144 are more sceptical.

<sup>8</sup> Due 1989: 30–31 thinks that these declarations ‘assimilate’ the work to historical writing.

also in *Cyropaedia* (8.8.3). Indeed, the narrator of *Anabasis* describes Cyrus the Younger's leadership and achievements in similar terms to those of his Great ancestor (*Anabasis* 1 *passim*).

As an illustration of his use of these sources, the narrator validates his account by repeated references to '(anonymous) spokesmen' ('what was said'), and these most frequently authenticate material that might otherwise strain the belief of the narratees because of its greatness or other superlative qualities. The most obvious category of such material is the superlative qualities of Cyrus, as at 1.2.1 ('it is said and sung by the barbarians even to this day that he was most beautiful, most kindly, fond of learning and honour-loving').<sup>9</sup> Other categories of material for which anonymous spokesmen are adduced include: the incredible activities of the gods, such as the omen that favours Cyrus on his first expedition (1.6.1, cf. 4.2.15), the great physical size of a monument (7.3.16), Cyrus' huge armies and subjugation of all the nations as far as Egypt (8.6.20), so that 'they say' that he was, hyperbolically, able to enjoy perpetual springtime (8.6.22).<sup>10</sup>

Anonymous spokesmen cluster to validate the extraordinary and tearful emotion that marked Cyrus' departure from Media (1.4.25, 26, 27) and culminated in the 'kiss-story' (1.4.27–28), for which the narrator offers not only spokesmen, but also an 'apology' ('if it is necessary to tell it'). The combination might suggest that he wants to distance himself from the story for some reason (perhaps as too sentimental), but Herodotus uses the same phrase to introduce things incredible, such as, e.g. the amazing construction of the moat and walls of Babylon (*Hist.* 1.178–179).<sup>11</sup> The 'apology' seems to be yet another way of validating the remarkable love that Cyrus inspired in his relatives, which is an important part of his attraction as a ruler.

The narrator uses even dissonant spokesmen to confirm his account of the superlative speed of the messengers of Cyrus (8.6.18). In this instance 'they say' that the night relays are succeeded by the day relays without cease, and 'some say' that they cover the ground faster than cranes, but the narrator adds in his own voice that even if they lie about the birds, the relays are the speediest on earth.

<sup>9</sup> Other examples: 3.2.7 (Cyrus 'said to be the most warlike'), 4.6.11 (a woman selected for Cyrus, who was 'said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia'), 8.5.28 (Cyrus' wife said to be the most beautiful), and 8.2.13–14 (Cyrus' generosity).

<sup>10</sup> Spokesmen also mark Cyrus' own more astonishing sentiments: 1.3.4, 15; 4.2.13.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. *Hist.* 2.24; *Hell.* 2.4.10 and 6.3.11.

Sometimes the narrator does not insert references to ‘what is said’ but to ‘what seems to be’ (*dokein einaĩ*). Some have claimed that in these cases the narrator is distancing himself and expressing scepticism,<sup>12</sup> but they seem rather to function in the same way as the references to anonymous spokesmen; they stress the impact on those to whom the events appeared and confirm that impact rather than denying it. They particularly validate reputations (which of course are a form of seeming to be to others), as in 1.5.1 (‘he seemed to be the best’) and cf. Cyrus himself (‘I am and seem to be the best of those of my years in throwing the spear ...’: 1.3.15).

There are a few places where the narrator seems to have no complete knowledge of the matter at hand and gives two possible reasons for an action or a custom, in the way of Herodotus (→) and the narrators of *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* (→). *Cyropaedia* 7.2.29 gives two reasons why Cyrus kept Croesus at his side: for security reasons or because he recognized that he could be a source of benefit to him.<sup>13</sup> However, the rarity of this lack of resolution, and its restriction to motivation rather than action, makes it difficult to accept that it just reflects the narrator’s inability to decide between his sources. The device seems rather to give greater significance to exceptional actions by amplifying their causes.

### *An overt narrator*

Although the primary narrator does not tell us anything about his personality, he is an overt narrator, who often indulges in first-person comments, which are all aimed at pointing out Cyrus’ excellence to the narratees. Clusters of such devices mark his most important achievements, such as the great battle against the Assyrians (7.1), and the techniques he developed to secure his imperial position (8.2). These first-person interventions vary between the use of the singular and plural. The narrator uses the first-person plural in the introduction, when setting out the process of reflection that led him to his conclusion that Cyrus was an exceptional ruler; the first-person singular in the epi-

<sup>12</sup> Nadon 2001: 168 reads ‘seeming’ in *Cyr.* 1.6.20–21 as ‘mere appearance’, as opposed to the sinister reality.

<sup>13</sup> Other examples: 8.3.14 (two reasons why his people prostrated themselves at the sight of Cyrus in procession); 4.3.2 (two motives for why the Medes bring their women on campaign even to this day).

logue, when claiming knowledge (8.8.2), and challenging to those who disbelieve his picture of decline (8.8.27). Perhaps the plural makes the narrator appear more dignified, in keeping with the grandeur and dignity of his subject.<sup>14</sup> It may also express the natural concord of narrator and narratees, as in Plutarch (→), though this raises the question why it is not used all the time. Tatum's observation, that '(the epilogue) is filled with anger and exasperation' and Gera's reference to its 'sharp sarcastic tone', seem to arise from the use of the first-person singular, which can convey this kind of impression.<sup>15</sup> The first-person singular certainly marks superlatives that reinforce the praise of Cyrus, as in 3.3.59 ('So Cyrus' army was filled with enthusiasm, ambition, strength, courage, exhortation, self-control, obedience; and this, I think, is the most formidable thing an enemy has to face').<sup>16</sup> Frequently, the narrator qualifies first-person comments as what he 'seems to know' (1.1.6 'we have found out and seem to/think that we know'; 8.1.40 'we seem to/think that we have observed'); these could express uncertainty, but are regularly used in philosophical works to accentuate the process of reflection and thus confirm its findings.

Another use of the first person is to mark the disposition of the content and introduce new topics: in the epilogue (8.8.8, 16) and in the account of Cyrus' education (1.2.9, 15, 16; a mix of singular and plural).<sup>17</sup> The narrator does not use this kind of first-person reference much in his main account of the creation of the empire, perhaps because it would distract from the sense of active expansion and conquest. The marking of new sections is more important when the narrator proceeds from topic to topic rather than through a connected narrative of military action. First-person references come back therefore to mark the more descriptive arrangements for empire (8.1.17, 48; 2.7; 3.1; 5.2—mainly plural except 8.2.7). Here they also validate the material, by stressing that it is the product of his enquiry (8.1.40: 'we think furthermore that we have learned'; 2.2; 2.10: 'moreover we have discovered'; 4.5; 6.16, 17).

*Cyropaedia* also uses categories of narratorial interventions, which are found in Xenophon's *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* (→), most often to praise

<sup>14</sup> *Hell.* in contrast uses the singular in its first-person evaluations and disposition of material, e.g. 4.8.1; 5.1.4.

<sup>15</sup> Tatum 1989: 216 and Gera 1993: 299.

<sup>16</sup> Other examples: 8.2.6, 12.

<sup>17</sup> Due 1989: 33 concludes that they make the work resemble historical writing and 'stress points of special interest and importance'.



Cyrus. He comments that it was ‘no wonder’ that Cyrus gave great gifts because he had such resources, but ‘more wondrous’ that he showed concern for his friends (8.2.13), for which cf. *Anabasis* 1.9.24 and *Hellenica* 7.5.19. He also appeals to ‘many other occasions’ in order to support the case in question (7.1.30), for which cf. *Hellenica* 5.4.1. The comment ‘as was natural’ (*hōs eikos*) and its equivalents mark a natural reaction in order to contrast it with a subsequent unnatural but admirable reaction, as in 4.2.32 (the Medes and Hyrcanians let themselves go in victory ‘as was natural’, but Cyrus did not let himself go and took action to preserve the victory).<sup>18</sup> The phrase is also used of natural occurrences and family feeling, e.g. the death of the parents of Cyrus in old age (8.7.1).<sup>19</sup>

As can be expected in a narrative about non-Greeks, the narrator sometimes intervenes to explain foreign customs, like the narrator in Xenophon’s *Anabasis* (→). These are usually quite short interventions, and they are not designed just to inform the narratees for whom these customs are unfamiliar,<sup>20</sup> but to enhance the praise of Cyrus or the broader understanding of the narrative. Thus, the explanation of how the Assyrians fortify their camps in order to be able to choose the moment of attack and rely on horses which they have to hobble at night, which makes them difficult to prepare for action in a hurry (3.3.26–27),<sup>21</sup> is essential to the understanding of the subsequent action, in which Cyrus is faced with the problem of attacking an impregnable fortification. The comment on earlier techniques of chariot warfare proves the uniqueness of the changes that Cyrus made in chariot-fighting (6.1.27–30).<sup>22</sup>

Sometimes the narrator reports Cyrus’ thought about best practices in the past tense and then confirms this in the present tense in his own voice, for example in 2.1.29 on the effects of hard work on men. Due says that these interventions have the same function as first-person comments and the ‘continuance’ motif,<sup>23</sup> but they also show how closely the narrator endorses the practices of Cyrus.

<sup>18</sup> Other examples: 3.1.7; 4.2.9 (where it is unnatural that the Medes joined Cyrus—since they belonged to Cyaxares); 6.2.12. (3.1.41).

<sup>19</sup> Other examples: 3.1.41 (bedding of a recently married couple); 4.1.7 (pleasure at a victory); 4.2.27 (place of cavalry on flanks); 5.4.29 (a rich ally brings Cyrus money).

<sup>20</sup> Due 1989: 109–114.

<sup>21</sup> *An.* 3.4.35 explains this custom without reference to fortifications.

<sup>22</sup> Other examples: 1.2.6, 3.10; 8.2.4–6.

<sup>23</sup> Due 1989: 109–114.

*The primary narratees*

The primary narratees are occasionally visible. The narrator does not address them in the second person, but indirectly addresses them in the form of the ‘anonymous interlocutor’ device, who might raise objections to the praise of Cyrus. Of course, he makes such references in order to overcome the narratees’ imagined objections, but they also suggest a world in which the narratees are actively engaged in the narrator’s investigation, as in Plutarch (→). An example is 8.2.11 (‘if anyone thinks that the king selected only one man to be his “eye”, he is wrong’), where the narrator contradicts the assumed opinion of his narratees (this might be based on Herod. *Hist.* 1.114, which mentions only a single ‘eye’), in order to illustrate the generosity that is such a feature of Cyrus’ rule (cf. 8.2.7–12). Elsewhere the narrator asks his narratees to remember the pleasure of basic foods to the hungry man if he objects to the plain diet of the Persian boys (1.2.11 ‘if anyone thinks that they do not enjoy their food ... let him remember’).

The narratees are also invited to visualize or imagine particularly sensational events, in the form of the—since Homer (→) well-known—‘indefinite second-person’ device: e.g., ‘then one might have seen that the equals were trained as they should be; for they obeyed at once and at once sent orders to the others’ (3.3.70).<sup>24</sup> A highly effective appeal to the imagination of the narratees occurs in 4.2.28. The narrator has briefly summarized a total of fourteen frenetic reactions by the enemy to the sudden appearance of the forces of Cyrus, then he ends: ‘One must also think that they did many other things of many kinds, except for anyone fighting back; because they died without a fight’. The narrator involves the narratees in the effect of his *priamel*: they did everything but fight back.

*Secondary narrators and narratees*

From time to time characters in their speeches tell stories to other characters, particularly Cyrus. These include stories about new recruits that are told in the course of the banquet in the tent of Cyrus (2.2), Araspas’ story of his first meeting with the beautiful Panthea (5.1), and

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<sup>24</sup> Another example: 7.1.38.

the personal histories by Gobryas (4.6) and Croesus (7.2). There are good reasons why these are put in the mouths of secondary narrators, such as the sympathy Gobryas and Croesus secure by telling their own stories, which are sad illustrations of the human condition. Most of all, though, secondary narrations characterize the fine qualities of Cyrus through his response and add to his praise. His response is immediately sympathetic toward Gobryas, even though the main narrator notes that he is aware that Gobryas' story could be false (it turns out to be true of course), and toward Croesus, even though he is an erstwhile enemy. Araspas' account of his meeting with Panthea could have been part of the main narrative, which has already described how she was specially selected as a prize for Cyrus (4.6.11), but the secondary narrative allows us to see Panthea through the eyes of Araspas, who will eventually fall in love with her, and allows Cyrus to make him a paradigm of the dangerous distractions of eros, which he is determined to avoid.

The stories about the new recruits whom Cyrus had drafted into his army could also have been part of the main narrative, since the narrator has already described their training, but they are told instead by secondary narrators, who raise a great deal of laughter among their dining companions regarding the inexperience and incompetence of the new men. The primary narrator has indicated that during such dinners Cyrus 'took pains to make the conversation as entertaining as possible while still inciting to good' (2.1.1). His reaction to their stories again illustrates this character. The first story is about a recruit who never was able to secure a good portion of food at dinner, the second about the inability of another recruit to comprehend even the most basic military instructions. The stories show the secondary narrators to be not entirely unkind to the recruits, but having a quiet laugh at their expense. However, Cyrus reinterprets their significance in a far more kindly fashion (2.2.10), admiring in the first case how easily you can make a friend of new men by giving them even a small portion, and in the second admiring the obedience of the new recruits, even if they did misunderstand the orders. This fulfils his characterization as one who turned the conversation toward the good. When another man then complains that the stories were just lies, made up to amuse, which he does not consider worth much, Cyrus fulfils the second function by letting them pass for the sake of amusement (2.2.12).

*Conclusion*

Cyrus' apparent perfection has provoked sinister interpretations of *Cyropaedia*, which find sub-texts of blame under the surface of praise. This is contradicted by the author's other works, which all display the same positivity about paradigms of leadership.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, our survey of the primary narrator and his activities has shown his continuous and persistent inclination to praise the subject of his narrative, without any reservation or a trace of irony.

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<sup>25</sup> See the very brief survey in Due 1989: 185–206.



## CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

### PLUTARCH

*C.B.R. Pelling*

Narrative is a slippery thing, and Plutarch ensured that his readers knew it. Let us begin with a few passages of embedded narrative, and see how he portrays storytelling in action. Such passages are rare: Plutarch normally prefers to tell stories on his own authority. But where they come they often point out the uncertain relation of narrative to the events described.

Take Proculus Iulius' narration of Romulus' apotheosis at *Romulus* 28.1–3, especially interesting because it is an embedded narrative (Proculus') of a further narrative, Romulus' account of his apotheosis: so Proculus is a secondary narrator, Romulus a tertiary. The primary narrative had given several possible explanations of the disappearance in the previous chapter. Had the senators torn him apart and concealed the fragments in their clothing? Or had he genuinely been snatched up to the gods? Now Proculus comes before the assembled Romans, and tells how Romulus appeared to him and explained that this had been the gods' will, to allow him to return to Heaven: now he will protect Rome as the god Quirinus. The story was believed 'because of the character of the man who told it and the oath which he swore' (so narratorial authority does make a difference, *Rom.* 28.3); but an important element of uncertainty remains. Plutarch as primary narrator is decisive enough to conclude that there was indeed 'something supernatural' at play—but in the way that everyone accepted Proculus' story, 28.3, which is not the same as saying that this divine version was true. He goes on to make his own scepticism clear, first relating the parallel 'mythical tales' (28.4, 7) of Aristaeas and Cleomedes, then arguing that it is 'stupid' (28.7) to think that bodies, unlike souls, can be taken to Heaven. Something of Romulus' apotheosis may remain, a matter of spirit rather than corporeality;<sup>1</sup> but that is not the way Proculus and

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<sup>1</sup> Pelling 1999: 441–442 = 2002: 185.

Romulus described it, or at least not the way that people at the time apparently took their story.

Plutarch's version of the meeting of Solon and Croesus is a further, very elaborate case (*Sol.* 27–28).<sup>2</sup> Misreading is in the air. It is set up by Solon's own initial misreading of the court, where he cannot tell which of the sumptuously dressed figures is Croesus himself (27.3). When questioned, Solon gives embedded narratives of Tellus, then of Cleobis and Biton: the stories are reported in indirect speech and given briefly and enigmatically, presumably because Herodotus' original is taken as familiar. As in Herodotus, Croesus does not get the point, 'and so Solon left: he had given Croesus pain, but left him no wiser' (27.9). But Herodotus' Croesus does become wiser later, and can pass on Solon's lesson (or at least an interpretation which only mildly trivializes, *Hist.* 1.86.5) to the conquering Cyrus. Plutarch's Croesus tries to do the same, and there is embedded narrative here too as Croesus tells of Solon's advice (28.4–5). Croesus concludes that 'it was a greater evil to lose this wealth than a good to gain it' (28.4): *that*, for him, was what Solon must have 'foreseen' when he urged him to 'look to the end' (28.5). The primary narratees would be unlikely to have read Solon's wisdom quite like that. They would recall Solon's exchanges with Thales (*Sol.* 6–7), a case where an embedded narrative was straightforwardly false, in that case Thales' carefully wrought story of the death of Solon's son. The text had there pointed the folly of concluding that it is a mistake to have anything good at all, 'wealth, or glory, or wisdom' (7.1), simply because one might one day lose it—very much the opposite of the moral that Croesus now draws. In this case, Cyrus is 'wiser than Croesus' (28.6), and takes Solon's lesson to heart: but it is not clear that Cyrus, this great man of insight and achievement, reads that lesson as simply or subjectively as Croesus has done.

So the wise adviser Solon knows that telling stories is a good way of conveying wisdom; but it also emerges that stories are not easy to read, and their point can be missed—as it is missed by Croesus, certainly at the beginning and possibly even at the end.

There are implications here for Plutarch's narrative too, but they are subtle ones. It would be wrong to suggest that his own master-narrative is infected by similar uncertainties, at least most of the time:

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<sup>2</sup> For a close comparison of the scene with Herodotus see Frazier 1992: 4499–4506: she particularly stresses Plutarch's psychological focus on Croesus' reactions and the contrast with Solon.

there are many devices for establishing Plutarch's narrative authority. But there remains a *potential* uncertainty about narrative: uncertainty about fact, about interpretation, about moral implication. That is one reason for the frequent nests of scholarly citation. Not merely do they establish the narrator's learning, they also point to the number of variants attested by other reputable authorities. If the narrator wins the narratees' confidence, it is against a background of potential slippage, the knowledge that other narratives might be possible and that the narrator himself may not always be confident that this is the right story to tell.

That suggests a rather sophisticated brand of complicity between narrator and narratees, and in this chapter I shall explore the ways in which this complicity is established and developed. That is a vast topic, for Plutarch's narratorial interventions can take many forms; he can convey a response and make it infectious—approval or disapproval, or simply engagement and excitement—in many ways, and we cannot look at them all here. Here I will examine only his uses of an explicit 'me' or 'you' in the *Lives*. I begin with his first-person statements.

These are often there to explain the origin of a story.<sup>3</sup> While 'I' was travelling over the battlefield of Bedriacum the consular Mestrius Florus told me of the piles of corpses (*Oth.* 14.2); 'I' discover that Nicias' shield is still on display in Syracuse (*Nic.* 28.6, cf. *Ages.* 19.10–11); Sextus Sulla of Carthage has given 'us' a particular explanation of the Roman wedding-cry 'Thalassio' (*Rom.* 15.3); Philotas of Amphissa told Plutarch's grandfather Lamprias an anecdote of the feasting of Antony and Cleopatra, then Lamprias passed it on to 'us' (*Ant.* 28, cf. 68). There are times when such 'we's clearly extend to his narratees as well, or at least some of them. 'Our' fathers still tell a story of Lucullus at Chaeronea (*Cim.* 1.8); inscriptions of 'Lucius Cornelius Sulla Epaphroditus' are still found 'among us' (*Sull.* 34.4); honours are paid to Themistocles' descendants to 'our own day', including one who himself bore the name of Themistocles and was 'our' friend in the school of Ammonius (*Them.* 32.6)—this last an instance of how a first-person plural can blur between the inclusive 'we', embracing the narratees,

<sup>3</sup> For this sort of 'I' cf. Russell 1993: 428. It is of course very common in the historians, from Herodotus (→: cf. also Dewald 1987 and forthcoming) through Thucydides (→), Xenophon (→), Arrian (→), Appian (→), Cassius Dio (→); also in biography from Xenophon (→) to Philostratus (→) and beyond. Cf. Marincola 1997: 80–83.



and the authorial ‘we’ which equals ‘I the narrator’. Similar instances of the ‘continuance’ motif are found elsewhere too.<sup>4</sup>

Such passages add to the narrator’s ‘authority’ by citing evidence; they also convey a world where the past has vitality, where ‘we’ still care, where stories are still told and memorials are on display. The same goes for those passages, whether or not they include ‘we’s or ‘I’s, which stress continuing controversy, with arguments still being made: was Aristides really poor (*Arist.* 1, including a ‘to our day’)? Should we follow the traditional version of the Megarian decree or what ‘the Megarians say’, using Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* to turn the blame on to Aspasia and Pericles (*Per.* 30.4)?<sup>5</sup> The past is still alive in other ways too: the Athenians’ magnanimity towards Aristides’ family was followed by later cases, and ‘even in our own day the city still produces many examples (*deigmata*) of generosity and kindness, and is justly admired and emulated (*zēloutai*) for it’ (*Arist.* 27.6–7). Part of the narrator’s own purpose in the *Lives* is to provide such ‘examples’ himself; that of Aristides has been followed by many, and the present city, true to its past, still gives examples for the future and is ‘emulated’ for it. There is a continuing process of inspiration and imitation here, one in which Plutarch’s own writings play a part. The ‘we’s and ‘our’s invite narratees as well as narrator to join in this milieu of moral and intellectual immersion in the past.

Proems and epilogues are particularly important in the narrator’s characterization of self, of narratees, and of the dynamic between the two. In proems we often find a strong self-characterization, or characterization of the reading or writing process:<sup>6</sup> a display of critical learning (*Arist.-Cat. Ma.*; *Lyc.-Num.*), or moral debate (*Demetr.-Ant.*; *Per.-Fab.*; *Agis-Cleom.*; *CG-TG*), or a setting of a hero’s life in a wider ethical or historical perspective (*Cim.-Luc.*; *Phoc.-Cat. Mi.*). These herald the

<sup>4</sup> E.g. *Sol.* 21.7 and 25.1; *Lyc.* 31.4; *Rom.* 13.6 and about a dozen other instances in that *Life*; *Popl.* 10.7, 11.6, 15.3, 24(1).3; *Arist.* 1.3; *Them.* 22.3; *Cim.* 19.5; *Alc.* 21.3; *Alex.* 69.8; *Phoc.* 18.8, 22.2; *Fab.* 1.8; *Flam.* 16.5–7; *Sull.* 21.8. Cf. Frazier 1996: 38. It is also found in e.g. Herodotus (→), Polybius (→), and Xenophon—interestingly, more suggestively in *Cyropaedia* (→) than in *Hellenica* and *Anabasis* (→).

<sup>5</sup> Frazier 1988: 301–302, like Dover 1966, assumes that these ‘Megarians’ are written sources; in Pelling 2000b: 272 n. 60 I give reasons for assuming that Plutarch is here conveying, and very likely constructing, what Megarians would *still* be saying.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. on beginnings Stadter 1988: 292; on ends Pelling 1997a: 231–236 = 2002: 367–370. See also Russell 1993: 431 on similar projections of a learned *persona* in the *Moralia*, sometimes extending to making a little fun of himself (e.g. *Table Talk* 675a or 731a–b): not the case, I think, in these cases in the *Lives*.

sorts of reflection which are expected of the narratee during the rest of the narrative too, once the narrator's personality has receded into the background (not that it ever disappears); then similar points recur with particular frequency in the comparative epilogues. Naturally, then, first-person statements are common in proems and epilogues.<sup>7</sup> Many of those are undeveloped—'it seems to me', 'I praise', 'I blame', 'I infer'<sup>8</sup>—though even these have their point in setting the tone for the *sorts* of response which the narrative invites.

There are a few second-person statements too: let us start with the formal dedicatees. These can be important in setting a work's tone. Outside the *Parallels*, *Aratus* is dedicated to Aratus' descendant Polycrates of Sicyon, giving 'examples drawn from their own household' to his sons to encourage them to emulation (*Arat.* 1). The theme of 'sons' and Aratus' descendants 'to our own day' recurs symmetrically at the end (54.7–8). That does not mean that Polycrates' family are the only, or even the target, narratees: the very reading of the work tells every new reader that it extends to a larger audience. But the moralism of *Aratus* is more explicit than that of the *Parallels*, with a particular stress on education;<sup>9</sup> and that fits a more straightforward protreptic work aimed at the young. Polycrates and his sons give a signal of the type of narratee expected, even if an extreme example of that type; they indicate narratees to which real readers may assimilate themselves, flattered and intrigued to think of themselves as moral classmates of the man's real-life descendants.

The *Parallel Lives* give a more refined version of this. Their dedicatee is Q. Sosius Senecio, twice consul, perhaps himself of Greek origin, and also the dedicatee of *Table Talk* and *Progress in Virtue*.<sup>10</sup> The series may have been initially dedicated to him during his first consulship in AD 99.<sup>11</sup> If so, the proem to the lost opening pair *Epaminondas and Scipio* would probably have made the appropriateness explicit: this is a lover

<sup>7</sup> Just as they are in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (→).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. *Dem.* 1.1, *Demetr.* 1.1, *Luc.* 44(1).8; *Cat. Ma.* 32(5).3; *Num.* 24(2).10; *Ages.-Pomp.* 83(3).1–2 ('it seems to me', 'I think'); *Marc.* 33(3).1–2; *Crass.* 36(3).2; *Sulla* 41(3).7 ('I praise' or 'do not praise'); *Sull.* 39(1).5; *Cat. Ma.* 32(5).3 ('I blame' or 'do not blame'); *Sull.* 41(3).7 ('I infer'). Outside proems, e.g. *Luc.* 36.6; *Phoc.* 4.1; *Alex.* 8.1; *CG.* 2.1; *Per.* 39.2; *Sol.* 27.1, *Marc.* 21.3, 28.6: notice how many of these are close to the beginnings or ends of *Lives*, as the narratorial persona gradually recedes or re-emerges.

<sup>9</sup> Pelling 1988: 266–267 = 2002: 291.

<sup>10</sup> Jones 1970: 103 and 1971: 55; but the eastern origin is doubted by Halfmann 1979: 211 and Swain 1996: 426–427.

<sup>11</sup> Thus Jones 1966: 70 = Scardigli 1995: 114.

of the Greeks and yet a great Roman, a military man with a taste for the past and for culture, a symbol of the interplay of different worlds and pursuits which the *Lives* will explore.<sup>12</sup>

Sosius' name recurs in various 're-addresses' at *Theseus* 1.1, *Demosthenes* 1.1, and *Dio* 1.1. Those placings are not random. *Theseus* 1 marks out *Theseus-Romulus* as the point where the series reaches its extreme boundary in the past. The mind-set of the critical but sympathetic narratee is also in focus, as we shall see, and a narratee of 'ideal' sophistication is here constructed with special care. *Demosthenes-Cicero* will present two figures who combine culture and a life of action, and investigate the tensions which that can bring. Sosius, as a contemporary example of the cultured man of affairs, adds a valuable further perspective. *Dio-Brutus* will investigate the Platonic picture of the 'philosopher in politics', especially the Academic philosopher: and '... it is right for *neither Romans nor Greeks* to complain about the Academy, for they both gain equally from this book which contains the Lives of Brutus and of Dion' (*Dio* 1.1). That suggests a world of cultural fusion, where both Romans and Greeks learn from philosophy and are interested in its effect on political action. Sosius sums up that world too.

Sosius, however, is hardly the typical narratee. The *Lives* often explain basic Roman terms and institutions—the meaning of *hoc age*, for instance, or *deliciae*, or even *magnus* (*Cor.* 25.3–4; *Ant.* 59.8; *Crass.* 7.1); or how the tribunate worked (*Ant.* 8.5; *Cam.* 5.1; *Fab.* 9.2).<sup>13</sup> At other times too they seem to imply Greek narratees, for instance in their comments on the lack of Roman aesthetic taste (*Popl.* 15.4), uncharacteristically abrasive if aimed only at a Roman narratee but wistfully nostalgic if aimed at a Greek.<sup>14</sup> Still, we need not narrow the real-life audience down, even there: Roman readers might feel flattered to be expected to share Greek tastes. Real-life readers doubtless extended over a wide

<sup>12</sup> Wardman 1974: 39: 'Sosius is ... the reader who already exemplifies by his life and achievement the kind of activity to which the *Lives* exhort us'.

<sup>13</sup> Ziegler-Gärtner 1980: 200–203 give a list of Latin terms which Plutarch explains. For other instances where the audience seems Greek, cf. Wardman 1974: 39–40; Duff 1999, index s.v. 'audience, constructed as Greek', esp. 302 on the *Parallel Lives*. Stadter 2000: 494 n. 4 objects that 'Plutarch frequently explains Greek terms and institutions' too, 'especially those of Sparta and Athens. His practice is more a feature of his literary technique than an indication of a restricted audience'. I agree that the practice does not give a firm guide to the *real* audience, but it does give a guide to the *constructed* audience, the narratees: where Greek institutions or terms are explained they tend to be distinctly more arcane, the sorts of thing where even a Greek might flounder.

<sup>14</sup> For similar cases of a Greek viewpoint on Roman issues, cf. Swain 1996: 139–145.

range, from the most distinguished of Plutarch's Roman friends to impressionable young pupils at Chaeronea. Sosius may be valuable as intimating one end of that range, rather as in Philostratus' (→) dedication of his *Lives of the Sophists* to Gordian (*VS* proem), or in his claim that he re-edited his *Life of Apollonius* at the behest of Julia Domna (1.3).<sup>15</sup> Readers can reflect on the implications of being included along with Sosius in that range: the work is suitable for him as well, and that has its own implications on the value and applicability of what they will read.<sup>16</sup>

The proem to *Demosthenes* tells a tale about Plutarch as well as about Sosius. One can be virtuous anywhere: it would be odd if small towns, Ioulis or Aegina, had produced great actors or poets but could not generate people of goodness and justice (1.2–3). Plutarch himself has made his home in the small town of Chaeronea (2.2). Still, there is value for a writer too in living in a great city, where one has not merely a lavish supply of books but also hears the stories which people still tell about the past (2.1). When he was in Rome and Italy, he had not had time to refine his Latin because he was too busy with political affairs and with those who came to hear him speak on philosophy. Then, when he did read Latin sources, he had found it a great advantage that he was already familiar with the substance (2.2–3). He is not equipped to give a stylistic contrast of Demosthenes and Cicero as orators—people 'who have more leisure and whose age is more suited to ambitions of that sort' (2.4) might do that—but he can at least compare them as politicians and men of action (3.1).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> For similar dedications of narrative works cf. Marincola 1997: 52–57, pointing out that they are less frequent in what he calls 'Great historiography' than in related, smaller-scale genres—autobiographies, memoirs, monographs, works with a strong panegyric element. Those genres are also more 'personal' than historiography in that the narrator too often emerges as more of a character, either as more 'self-conscious' about the writing process (as in Plutarch, or, say, in Sallust) or as a figure in the narrative itself. The two points go together, with both narrator and narratees being in sharper focus.

<sup>16</sup> Swain 1996: 144–145 argues 'that Plutarch probably looked on ... Senecio ... as a man who needed encouragement towards attaining the peace of mind that comes from Greek philosophy'. Swain bases this particularly on the dedication to Sosius of *Progress in Virtue*. I should put this less in terms of Plutarch's view of the man and more in terms of the rhetoric of the dedication, the suggestion that even a Sosius might be improved: but the basic point is similar.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Cat. Ma.* 7.3, on the comparison of Cato's style with Lysias: 'This is a matter for those with a greater feeling for Latin style to decide, but we will include a few of his *bons mots*, for we think that human character appears more clearly from what people say

Scholars frequently quote this passage for what it tells us of Plutarch's Latin;<sup>18</sup> they less often ask what its function is in this pair,<sup>19</sup> or how it characterizes narrator or narratee. Once again we have the intimation of milieu: in big cities people are still exchanging anecdotes about the past, in little ones too people are examining their moral health. As for the narrator's own self-characterization, (a) small towns can produce great artists, and (b) Chaeronea is a small town. His distaste for self-praise—a subject on which we have his moral essay, and on which he dwells in this pair (*Cic.* 24, 51[2])<sup>20</sup>—prevents him from drawing the conclusion from the two premises, but the self-applicability is not far to seek. Yet he is more than just a writer, and his aspirations have not been only to be the good man in private life which the first chapter of the *Life* has sketched. He has also been a man of affairs: those 'times in Rome and Italy' make a point, together with those distractions which prevented him from perfecting his feeling for Latin style. The distractions consisted in 'political affairs'—presumably diplomatic missions,<sup>21</sup> though again he is diffidently vague—as well as 'those who came to listen to me on philosophy'. This is a doer *as well as* a man of letters and ideas, a narrator who is well equipped to understand the interplay of culture and politics which he will explore in Demosthenes and Cicero. And what of his narratees? As we saw, this is an appropriate place to introduce Sosius Senecio; but the wider audience is hinted at as well. The 'we's of this proem are sometimes clearly 'Plutarch', 'we the narrator': 'we' began to read Latin late in life and visited Italy (2.2–3), 'we' are writing this fifth pair of *Parallel Lives* (3.1). But some 'we's are vaguer: 'if we fall short of thinking or living as we should, we shall ascribe this not to the smallness of our country but to ourselves' (1.4). There is an intimation here of a value-scheme which narrator and nar-

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than (as some think) from how they look.' That intimates the narrator's distance from the physiognomists as well as from the stylistic critics.

<sup>18</sup> As I did myself in Pelling 1979: 75 = 2002: 2 = Scardigli 1995: 267.

<sup>19</sup> An exception now is Mossman 1999, who dwells particularly on the contrast of substance and style and its resonance in the later narratives. Rosenmeyer 1992: 221 does address the question, but reaches the opposite conclusion: 'The arguments of the first two chapters ... are largely unrelated to what follows'. Russell 1993: 428 has some good remarks on the self-characterization here: 'this is both apology and self-recommendation ...'

<sup>20</sup> On the problems of narratorial self-praise cf. Marincola 1997: 175–182, and, for Plutarch in particular, Russell 1993; Pelling 2002: 249. The issue is also addressed by Polybius (→).

<sup>21</sup> Jones 1971: 20–21.

ratee share, just as there will be in the epilogue to the pair—there, for instance, the valuing of wide culture (*Cic.* 50[1]), the sympathy for Platonic views on philosopher-kings (52[3].4), the strong views on political venality (52[3].5–6). All have the tone of dispensing approval and disapproval among a community of morally serious people who think and feel in similar ways.

Then there is the parade of eschewing stylistic comparison (2.4). That theme too returns in the epilogue (*Cic.* 50[1].1), though he goes on there to do something very close to it anyway—perhaps itself self-characterization, suggesting that even though he rates substance above style he can make stylistic points as well. In each case, though, the tone suggests that the narratees are likely to feel the same way. That reference to those different types of reader ‘who have more leisure and whose age is more suited to ambitions of that sort’ (2.4) is not especially warm, nor does it imply that such a project would be triggered by their own reading of Plutarch. Then in *Demosthenes* 3 Plutarch is dismissive of the stylistic criticism of Caecilius, and that too is not likely to produce any identification of most narratees with this potential stylistic critic. Or rather, perhaps, we should distinguish between two different sorts of constructed narratee. There are those whom the narrator welcomes and accepts, those whom he is writing *for*: his ‘target’ narratee, perhaps. Such a narratee is expected to share his assumptions, in this case a privileging of substance above style. But there is a second sort of constructed narratee as well, those who he knows will read his work but may not be so sympathetic, those who may put quite different questions to the material. They are not neglected, but not welcomed with such inclusiveness or warmth.

The inclusive techniques, though, are the more usual ones, and they can be more far-reaching. Those first-person plurals are here important. It is indeed often unclear exactly how that category of ‘us’ is envisaged: ‘we Greeks’, ‘we cultured beings’, ‘we people of humane sensibility’, ‘we who are interested in the past’?<sup>22</sup> Does it include real

<sup>22</sup> Cf. e.g. *Dem.* 22.5, the actors playing kings and tyrants ‘whom we see in the theatres crying and laughing not as they themselves wish, but as the plot demands’; *Per.* 8.9 (quoting Stesimbrotus), ‘we do not see the gods either, but we infer that they exist from the honours they receive and the goods which they give us’. *Per.* 39.2, ‘... just as we think it right that the gods, as responsible for good things but not for bad, should rule over and control all reality, not in the way that the poets terrify us ...’; *Cor.* 32.6, Homer attributes everyday responses ‘to us’ but more irregular ones to the gods; *Arist.* 6.5, ‘our’ nature does not allow immortality. In the proems, e.g. *Per.* 1.4–5, ‘we often

readers in subsequent generations as well as those ‘in our day’, i.e. Plutarch’s own.<sup>23</sup> But in any case it is evidently a category that includes narratee as well as narrator. Elsewhere too, as in the *Demosthenes* proem, a ‘we’ may begin by seeming to be Plutarch himself, but drifts into being a genuine plural ‘we’ which equals ‘you and I’, narratee and narrator: ‘now that we have delivered our first narrative, we have to go on to contemplate experiences and sufferings of a similar size in the Roman pair, comparing the life of Tiberius and of Gaius ...’ (*Gracch.* 1.1). As in that *Gracchi* passage, it easily reaches the stage where the whole project of the Lives is envisaged as a joint investigation of narrator and narratee: when ‘we compare’ two people (e.g. *Phoc.* 3.6, *Pomp.* 81[1].1; *Popl.* 1.1; *Ag-Cleom.* 2.7), or ‘bring on first’ one of them (*Dio* 2.7), or ‘contemplate’ the pair’s qualities (*Pomp.* 84[4].11; *Ant.* 88[1].1), that ‘we’ is not restricted to Plutarch himself. There are also blurred intermediate cases, sometimes very uncharged, where it is unclear whether narratee is included or not: ‘if we were to say that those writers were lying (though there are a fair number of them ...),’ *Cic.* 52(3).6; ‘we do not have anything parallel in Pompey’s career’, *Pomp.* 82(2).2. These are not very different from some cases without an explicit ‘we’, such as ‘but this, I suppose, will seem to support Lycurgus’ case’ (*Num.* 26[4].14), or Nicias’ moneymaking ‘will seem more respectable’ than that of Crassus (*Crass.* 34[1].1). ‘Seem’ to whom? ‘To me’, or ‘to us’? The blurring is important in insinuating that *of course* narrator and narratee are people who think along similar lines.

Such ‘we’s create an impression of happy unanimity between narrator and narratee. There are fewer cases where instead of an inclusive ‘we’ there is a disjunction of ‘I’ and ‘you’, though there too the text usually suggests basic concord, or at least the likelihood of concord. One of those ‘you’s comes in the proem to *Aemilius-Timoleon*, which gives an interesting twist to the relation of narrator and narratee. Normally Plutarch presents himself as the model for his narratees, almost an ‘ideal’ narratee and moral respondent to the stories he tells. This time the movement goes the other way. He began his biographical project for others, he tells us, but continued it for his own sake, using history

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despise the craftsman but admire the work,’ etc., and 2.3; epilogues, cf. e.g. *Ant.* 90(3).4, ‘as we see in paintings’. Russell 1993: 427 observes that even an ‘I’ can often amount to ‘I, as a typical rational being ...’ The same issue of a blurred ‘we’ arises in Polybius (→).

<sup>23</sup> For this complication cf. de Jong 1987: 36.

as a mirror for making up his own life on the model of those of the past (*Aem.* 1.1): so, instead of the narrator's response cueing that of the narratee, the process here works the other way round. Soon there are 'we's that seem inclusive: 'it is as if we were entertaining each of them in turn, welcoming them in the history and examining "how great he was and what sort of man", and taking the most important and finest things we might see in their actions ...' (1.2). Then the 'we' becomes less certain: 'we use our historical reading and our familiarity with its writing to mould our own life, welcoming always the recollection of the best and most glorious figures into our souls ...' (*Aem.* 1.5): is that 'we' narrator alone, or narratees too (as the plural 'souls' particularly suggests)? They too by now have 'familiarity' with his writings. Then the first person becomes more clearly the narrator, but that goes with a blurring of the narratee: 'From such examples we have now taken for you the life of Timoleon of Corinth and of Aemilius Paullus ...' (1.6). Is that 'you' just 'Sosius Senecio'? Or any reader? In any case, the two lives will generate a 'debate, whether it was good fortune or good judgment which brought them their greatest successes' (1.8), and it is a debate in which both narratee and narrator will participate.

So the debates are shared ones: there are times, too, when the text gestures towards the possibility that narrator and narratees might disagree. In the proem to *Agis-Cleomenes*, the text gives a summary interpretation of the Gracchi (2.7–8), and goes on 'you will judge this for yourself from the narrative' (2.9).<sup>24</sup> It is up to 'you' to 'judge for yourself', and there is again an intimation that other narratives might be possible. It is at least conceivable that narratees might construct an alternative interpretation for themselves. But it is also not very probable: that summary interpretation had been given in confident indicatives, 'they ... did not realize that they were entering on a course where it was not possible to withdraw'. That *mild* encouragement to an independent verdict is then echoed in the pair's conclusion: 'you

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. *Solon* 19.4–5, discussing whether there was an Areopagus before Solon. The text weighs various learned arguments and inclines towards the view that there was, though allowing that the crucial evidence could be taken another way: 'well, then, consider this for yourself'. The addressee is taken as engaged and discriminating, one who might conceivably disagree with 'Plutarch' but one who will accept that this is the way to approach the problem. The atmosphere of debate there continues into the next few chapters, with vigorous discussion of the rights and wrongs of several laws: notice the 'someone might say ...' at 20.8; and the continuation of the principles into 'our own laws' at 21.7 and the preservation of the cylinders to 'our own time' at 25.1.



see for yourself the difference on the basis of the narrative. If it is necessary to set it out in detail, I say that Tiberius came first of them all in virtue, that young Agis made fewest mistakes, and that in action and daring Gaius was not far behind Cleomenes' (*Gracch.* 45[5].7). It would not be in keeping with Plutarch's narratorial *persona* to assume that so elaborate a judgment would be taken over in each particular by every narratee: hence the affectation of diffidence. Other verdicts show similar tentativeness: 'perhaps it is time to consider whether we shall not be far off the truth, if we declare that Sulla got more things right but Lysander fewer things wrong, and give the one man the prize for self-control and restraint, the other for generalship and courage' (*Sull.* 43[5].6); 'consider whether, if we give the crown to the Greek for military skill and leadership and to the Roman for justice and generosity, we shall not seem to be doing too badly' (*Flam.* 24[3].5).<sup>25</sup> Yet, despite the diffidence, more important is the underlying assumption that this is the *sort* of judgment that narratees might eventually make, that they are at least playing the same comparative game. It is still that joint project of comparison which we saw earlier.

And in all those cases—*Agis-Cleomenes-Gracchi*, *Lysander-Sulla*, *Philopoemen-Flaminius*—there is a further twist, for all make particular use of the idea of competition:<sup>26</sup> the 'crown' for Philopoemen or Flaminius, the 'first place' for Lysander or Sulla, Tiberius 'coming first' and Gaius 'not far behind' Cleomenes. All those pairs have also made use of the idea of competition in their narratives. It was competitiveness which led to the rifts between Lysander and Agesilaus, then between Sulla and Marius; it was contention for glory which led Agis, Cleomenes, and the Gracchi astray; it was ambition for glory which drove Philopoemen and Flaminius too, and they eventually recognized it as a competition between themselves.<sup>27</sup> In all these pairs the men are contestants, and the agonistic contests of the narrative prepare for the final synkritic competition. That is only resolved in the final words, and the judges are narrator and narratees.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Duff 1999: 203–204 (*Lys.-Sull.*), 268–269 (*Ag.-Cl.-Gracchi*), and more generally 286 (though these are not all necessarily 'courtroom metaphors', as he says at 286 n. 45). For some related points about the complicity of narrator and narratees in the epilogues see also Pelling 2002: 361.

<sup>26</sup> Pelling 1997b: 329–331.

<sup>27</sup> Esp. *Lys.* 2.3–4, 23.3 and 7; *Sull.* 4.6, 5.10, 13.1, 39(1).7; cf. Stadter 1992; Duff 1999: 179–180; *Ag.-Cl.* 2.5 ('contesting', *hamillōmenoi*); *Phil.* 15.1–3; *Flam.* 13.1–4; and Pelling 1997b: 91, 220 n. 93.

The same lack of real discord is seen in those passages when an epilogue imagines an objection: 'here someone might say that ...' (the 'anonymous interlocutor' motif).<sup>28</sup> Those objections are sometimes rebutted, sometimes accepted, or at least accepted in a modified form. The implication is certainly that the narratee has been pondering the line of argument critically, and is capable of making independent steps in the argument; he or she is not wholly a follower. But the implication is still that both are conducting the investigation according to similar rules—perhaps, indeed, that the narratee has been led by Plutarch's own example, in this and in earlier epilogues, to understand how this comparative exercise ought to be conducted. Sometimes it is the imagined interlocutor who makes the telling point: 'yet here someone will draw a distinction between them' (*Alc.* 41(2).8, cf. e.g. *Gracch.* 42(2).4). The effect is not very different from the rhetorical questions which often punctuate epilogues (often in close conjunction with an imaginary 'someone-might-say' objection): 'or is this the first point which tells the other way?' (*Brut.* 56[3].6, cf. e.g. *Num.* 25[3].4–5, 26[4].7; *Crass.* 37[4].3). Are these soliloquizing reflections of the narrator, or are they questions put to the narratees? By now the distinction does not matter: the assumption is that both are engaged, weighing issues and putting the same sorts of question. The dialogue can become more elaborate still: a reflective question about attitudes to wealth, 'or is this the first point which could tell either way?' (*Cat. Ma.* 31[4].1), leads on to 'I should like to put the point to Cato himself ...' (31[4].5). By now it is a three-way moral debate, with narrator, narratee, and subject all engaged.

Those engaged and sympathetic narratees—following the narrator most of the way, sharing his tastes and assumption, with an independence which remains within limits—may also be sensed when Plutarch apologizes for a digression: they are independent enough to need an apology, but are expected to be indulgent. 'We think that this material is not unsuited to our biography, nor that it will seem unhelpful

<sup>28</sup> E.g. *Sol.* 20.8; *Marc.* 32(2).2; *Rom.* 32(3).1, 2, 3; *Numa* 23(1).10, 26(4).1; *Brut.* 57(4).5; *Ant.* 90(3).2 (an imagined objection which 'one could not make'); *Tim.* 40(1).3; *Popl.* 27(4).4. Such a *tis*-intrusion may not always be an objection, of course: 'if one examined their battles', *Flam.* 22(1).3; 'one might particularly think Lucullus fortunate in the time of his death', *Luc.* 44(1).1; 'one should not wholly excuse Lucullus for this', 45(2).5; also e.g. *Brut.* 56(3).5; *Mar.* 1.4; *Ant.* 91(4).5; *Cic.* 54(5).1; *Crass.* 34(1).1, 38(5).1; *Fab.* 30(3). 6; *Alc.* 44(5).2; *Cat. Ma.* 29(2).5; *Ages.* 15.3; *Pomp.* 84(4).4; *Gracch.* 42(2).4.

to readers who are not in a hurry and not too busy' (*Tim.* 15.11).<sup>29</sup> Such narratees may also be felt in Plutarch's moralism: there is rarely a sense of telling them anything they might be reluctant to accept; he rather gives the impression of providing thought-provoking test-cases within an acknowledged framework of moral values.<sup>30</sup> Learning as well as ethical taste is taken for granted, and such narratees will not be bewildered by comparisons with other historical events and characters.<sup>31</sup> Sometimes those are great—'Agesilaus, Lysander, Nicias, and Alcibiades ... Salamis, Plataea, Thermopylae, and Cimon's successes at the Eurymedon and Cyprus' (*Flam.* 11.5–6); sometimes more mixed, as with the 'Fabii and Scipios and Metelli, ... or Sulla, Marius, and both Luculli' (*Caes.* 15.2), where the lesser Lucullus brother might not be in the front of everyone's mind. Literary culture is also assumed, enough to welcome the quotations and allusions which lace his narrative;<sup>32</sup> enough, even, to catch allusions which the narrator does not label, confident that the narratee will be able to fill in the gap—'in that city of Sophocles' (*Ant.* 24.3, referring to *OT* 4–5), or 'Greece that had "endured so very much"' (*Ant.* 62.1, quoting Euripides' *HF* 1250, and the Herculean suggestions are important); and many others.<sup>33</sup> The same goes for allusions to myths.<sup>34</sup> At *Theseus* 28.3 the text has just mentioned Theseus' marriage to Phaedra: 'as for the misfortunes which concerned her and his son, there is no disagreement between the historians and the tragic poets, and so we must assume that it was as they have all made out'. The narrator clearly relies on the narratees

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<sup>29</sup> Cf. also e.g. *Per.* 39, building to the Life's elevated ending with an excursus on the moral goodness of the gods, suggesting that Pericles is indeed 'Olympian': 'but these things will perhaps seem appropriate to a different type of enquiry'. The narratee has a feeling of appropriateness to context, but will also not mind too much (otherwise the emotional rhythm of the closure would be wrecked), and may not mind at all ('perhaps'). *Rom.* 12.6 is similar but more elaborate. The text has just mentioned an attempt to fix Rome's foundation date by reverse astrology, reading back from its future greatness: 'these things, perhaps, will attract by their strange and far-fetched character rather than alienating those who come across them because of their air of myth'. But there the possibility of a more cross-grained reaction ('alienating') is more explicit: the formulation 'those who come across them' may fit this possibility of a grumpier response.

<sup>30</sup> Or so I argued in Pelling 1995 = 2002 ch. 10. On the moral texture of the *Lives* see esp. Duff 1999.

<sup>31</sup> On these cf. Duff 1999: 251–252.

<sup>32</sup> They are usefully collected by Helmbold and O'Neil 1959.

<sup>33</sup> E.g. the Homeric cases now collected by Alexiou 2000.

<sup>34</sup> And also for an appreciation of some finer points of philosophy and mathematics: Wardman 1974: 41–42.

to know what is meant: an important point is built on the Hippolytus story, again rather allusively, in the epilogue (*Rom.* 32[3].1–2).

There are moments, however, when less concordant narratees are envisaged, people whose approach was so at odds that they would be looking for, or even assuming they had found, one of those alternative and very different narratives. In *Demosthenes-Cicero* we noticed that a different sort of person is acknowledged, someone who might conduct the stylistic discrimination that Plutarch and his regular narratees would avoid. We also noted that these were not treated with the same inclusiveness: we may have to class them as ‘cross-grained narratees’, in that the text acknowledges their potential existence, but they are not *proper* narratees, not people entering into the spirit of the project, not the readers whom the writing is *for*. Dorrit Cohn has drawn a distinction between ‘consonant’ and ‘dissonant’ *narrators*,<sup>35</sup> we may have to make a similar distinction among *narratees*. For elsewhere too such dissonant, cross-grained narratees are treated in a similarly unwelcoming way; they constitute a foil for the more appropriate response which more sympathetic narratees will develop.<sup>36</sup>

It is interesting to see how they are described. At the beginning of *Nicias*, ‘it is time to request and call upon those who come across (*tous entugkhanontas*) these writings not to assume that I have suffered the same affliction as Timaeus’ (that is, the ambition to outdo Thucydides: *Nic.* 1.1). These are ‘those who come across these writings’, a phrase which in post-classical Greek is often hard to distinguish from ‘my readers’<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Cohn 1978: 26–33, discussing the degree of ‘consonance’ a third-person narrator shows with the psychology of a central character. In this case the ‘consonance’ or ‘dissonance’ will be not with the psychology of any agent within the narrative, but with the self-presentation of the narrator himself.

<sup>36</sup> Xenophon too, both in his more historical works (→) and in *Cyropaedia* (→), acknowledges narratees who may be reluctant to follow his lead; so perhaps does Polybius (→). Plutarch develops the notion more elaborately.

<sup>37</sup> Schmid (1887) I.41–42, 300, and IV.651 collects post-classical instances of such uses of *entugkhanēin* and assumes that throughout they mean simply ‘sich befassen mit etwas’, ‘studieren’: cf. LSJ s.v. iii. That is clearly sometimes the case, e.g. at Dio Prus. 18.9, where it is used of careful reading of historians. But such a rendering elides nuances in some cases: in a careful discussion, Chantraine 1950: 122–126 finds several cases where, for instance, a more private *entugkhanēin* is contrasted with a more public reading aloud (*anagignōskein*). Our nuance is a rather different one, but a certain casualness of such chance reading ‘encounters’ (as classically at Pl. *Smp.* 177b) might also be detected at e.g. D.H. *Dem.* 43 (‘I shall take examples, not ones that were carefully chosen but ones I came across in the *Philippics*’); Lucian *VH* 1.4; Strabo 1.16.12; or Philostr. *VA* 6.27 (and probably 1.3).

but seems to have a different nuance in Plutarch: as in *Demosthenes*, they are not ‘proper’ narratees. The same phrase is used in the proem to *Demetrius-Antony*. The narrator there gives his reasons for including characters whose lives were less creditable, ‘not (for Heaven’s sake!) to give variation to my writing so as to give pleasure or diversion to those who come across (*tous entugkhanontas* again, *Demetr.* 1.5) it’. The better approach is to realize that ‘*we* will become more enthusiastic in our contemplation and in our living of better lives, if *we* pay attention too to those who are bad and are censured’ (1.6). That is what ‘*we*’ do—and that ‘*we*’ gives a more regular embrace of the narratee as someone who reacts as the narrator himself does.

Or consider the famous passage which begins *Alexander*. ‘We shall ask our readers *mē sukophantein* if we do not include everything or go into every detail of famous events, but abbreviate most of them. For it is not histories we are writing, but lives ...’ (*Alex.* 1.1–2). There *mē sukophantein* is usually translated as ‘not to complain’ (Perrin, Waterfield, Hamilton, Duff) or ‘not to regard this as a fault’ (Scott-Kilvert). There is more to it than that. The word always carries a notion of something disingenuous or disreputable: ‘criticize in a pettifogging way’, ‘quibble’ (LSJ I.2) is better, or ‘de ne pas nous chercher chicane’ (Chambry). Whether or not the complex suggestions of classical Athenian ‘sycophancy’ are felt, there is always a hint that the objector is not being sufficiently generous, or that he is not saying what is really in the mind.<sup>38</sup> Such complaints are some way from the engaged and sympathetic ‘someone might say ...’ objections in the epilogues.

*Theseus-Romulus* provides a more elaborate example where the narrator toys with a degree of narratee independence. The proem indeed

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<sup>38</sup> Perhaps non-coincidentally, the word recurs twice at the end of the narrative at *Alex.* 74.4–5, where the issue is whether those accusing Antipater are doing so falsely. At *Num.* 9.3 the lawgiver does not *sukophantein* in the case of a genuine impediment in conducting sacrifices, that is ‘does not make *unreasonable* objections’. At *Cat. Mi.* 11.4 some critics *esukophantoun* at the expense of the funeral of Cato’s brother, failing uncharitably to realise the depth of his capacity for emotion. At *Pomp.* 2.10 Pompey *esukophanteito* as neglecting public affairs because of his wives. The narrative will show there is some truth in this, but for the moment the critics are stigmatized as ungenerous: Pompey is ‘careful and guarded’ about his love life, but ‘nonetheless was blamed by his enemies’. Naturally, Plutarch also uses the word in contexts of classical democracy: *Sol.* 24.2; *Arist.* 26.2; *Per.* 37.4; *Alc.* 13.6, 19.7, 34.7; *Tim.* 37.1; *Phoc.* 12.3 etc. It is never friendly or neutral. See more generally on the word’s range Harvey 1990, singling out the suggestions of monetary motivation, false charges, sophistical quibbling, slanderous attack, taking people to court, and raking up old scores; ‘sophistical quibbling’ is the nearest to the present use.

asks 'our listeners to be indulgent and to accept ancient tales in an acquiescent mood' (*Thes.* 1.5): that assumes the same sort of readerly independence as before, as if the indulgence cannot be taken for granted. The narratee would normally be critical of such unreliable material, and in ways which are not merely triggered by passages of explicit discussion in the text: thus Plutarch cannot simply avoid such criticism by refusing to question veracity himself. To ask for such discrimination among different types of material is to demand, and to assume, considerable sophistication in a narratee: in that sense there is flattery here. But it is also a sophistication which is close to Plutarch's own, or at least to the sophistication which he temporarily affects for this pair. As in the epilogues, even the independent narratee is assumed to be conducting games which are not too distant from those played by Plutarch himself: for even if that narratee *does* decide that the mythical has not been made to look like history, he or she will be doing so by applying criteria similar to those which Plutarch has acknowledged he would apply elsewhere.

The same goes for the epilogue, where the narratees may still not be sure how serious, and how convincing, the whole exercise of 'making myth look like history' has been.<sup>39</sup> Are these then narratees who are constructed as thinking differently from the narrator, who have been so perplexed by the clever moves and ironies that they are finally at a loss to work out what sort of text they have been reading? Not at all: for the proem itself approached this singular project with some diffidence, affecting uncertainty whether it would come off. Now, at the end, we again have the effect of rumination, with narrator as uncertain about narrative status as narratee. Narrative is still slippery, especially in this pair, and both parties are assumed to know it. Even in uncertainty, even when the narrator has highlighted the possibility that the narratee may not be able to go with him the whole way, narrator and narratees are not so very different, and share the same sort of patience with the material and subtlety in the way they toy with it.

The same is true in those cases when the narrator reveals a moral response to his material which goes beyond those views that the narratee would naturally share. 'For myself, I would not even sell a working ox because it was too old, never mind an elderly man' (*Cat. Ma.* 5.6). 'I would not myself agree with Demaratus of Corinth, who said that a

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<sup>39</sup> Or so I argued in Pelling 1999 = 2002 ch. 7.

great pleasure had been denied those Greeks who had not seen Alexander sitting on Darius' throne' (*Ages.* 15.4). 'The wisest judges put particular weight on Tigellinus' impious and unspeakable cavortings with prostitutes ... This, those wise persons thought, was the worst punishment of all, outweighing a multitude of deaths' (*Otho* 2).<sup>40</sup> The narratees might not go that far; some would not gibe at turning an honest drachma from an aged ox; some might even prefer the odd whorish cavorting to even a single death.<sup>41</sup> But at least we are expected to find the narratorial persona attractive rather than repellent, someone with whom we can engage and even identify, at least most of the way.

'We are expected ...', 'we can engage ...': those are phrases which the modern scholar uses unselfconsciously, and which have many parallels with the sort of inclusiveness for which I argued above.<sup>42</sup> The same goes for the rhetorical questions: 'are these then narratees who ...?': am I asking my own readers, or myself? The implications are similar too, of a barely conscious attempt to insinuate the notion that reader and author are at one in a joint investigation. It is not that scholarly discourse has stayed the same: the manner is different from that, say, of nineteenth-century scholarship. It is rather that the 'Plutarch' which

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<sup>40</sup> This essay has been confined to the *Lives*, but I cannot resist one example here from the *Moralia*. At *Epicurus makes a pleasant life impossible* 1093c the text has been discussing the absorbing power of imaginative literature, and concludes 'who would take pleasure in sleeping with the most beautiful of women rather than staying awake with what Xenophon wrote about Panthea, or Aristobulus about Timocleia, or Theopompus about Thebe?' The answer was never going to be 'no one'.

<sup>41</sup> Pelling 1995: 206 = 2002: 238. Contrast Booth 1983: 157: 'From the author's viewpoint, a successful reading of his book must eliminate all distance between the essential norms of his implied author and the norms of the postulated reader'. Not 'all distance', if the argument here is correct: the remaining distance should not be large, but it may exist. The important point is that any disjunction of views should not be genuinely alienating, and those of the narrator, or in Booth's terms 'implied author', should be found attractive even if not irresistible.

<sup>42</sup> Compare the response of a modern philosopher to friends who had questioned his use of the 'ubiquitous "we"' (e.g. in phrases like 'our ethical ideas' or 'what we think'). 'It refers to people in a certain cultural situation, but who is in that situation? Obviously, it cannot mean everybody in the world, or everybody in the West. I hope it does not mean only people who already think as I do. The best I can say is that "we" operates not through a previously fixed designation, but through invitation. (The same is true, I believe, of "we" in much philosophy, and particularly in ethics.) It is not a matter of "I" telling "you" what I and others think, but of my asking you to consider to what extent you and I think some things and perhaps need to think others' (Williams 1993: 171 n. 7). It is hard to better this description of the 'invitational "we"', and it fits closely on to what I have been suggesting here for Plutarch's *Lives*.

the *Lives* construct, with that combination of learned disquisition with vitality, engagement, and genial characterization of self and narratee,<sup>43</sup> has much in common with the more informal style of much current scholarship, or at least with the scholarly *persona* which many of ‘us’ try to project.

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<sup>43</sup> And a heavy degree of self-referentiality too: this paragraph is sufficient testimony to that.





## CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

### PHILOSTRATUS

*T.J.G. Whitmarsh*

The Philostratean corpus<sup>1</sup> is large and diverse (incorporating *Love letters*, two collections of *Descriptions* of paintings, dialogues and essays). His two longest and most sophisticated narrative texts are *In honour of Apollonius of Tyana* (henceforth *VA*) and the *Lives of the sophists* (*VS*), both of which are—in the broadest sense—biographical works.

#### *In honour of Apollonius of Tyana*

I begin with the earlier text, a magisterial and voluminous hagiography of the first-century sage and holy man. ‘Hagiography’ is not a neatly compartmentalized form, though, and critics have emphasized the text’s generic affinity to the Greek novels.<sup>2</sup> What it shares in particular with the ‘sophistic’ novels (those of Achilles, Longus, and Heliodorus) is attentiveness to the authorization of the primary narrative, layered narratives, and ‘overt’ narration at every level. For some, this is evidence of its playfully ‘sophistic’ approach to its subject matter,<sup>3</sup> but formal sophistication does not necessarily imply a lack of commitment to content. As we shall see, the narrative strategy is largely consonant with the text’s express purpose (1.3) of magnifying its hero, although at the same time its many delicious ambiguities do indeed play self-consciously to the learnedness of the primary narratees.

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<sup>1</sup> On problems of attribution, see esp. Lannoy 1997. *In honour of Apollonius of Tyana* and the *Lives of the sophists* are by the same author, as guaranteed by the cross-reference at *VS* 570.

<sup>2</sup> For the *VA* as quasi-novel, see Bowie 1978: 1663–1667; Swain 1991: 150; Bowie 1994; Anderson 1996; see also Reardon 1971: 189–190; Hägg 1983: 115–117; Reardon 1991: 147–148; Billault 1991. Other scholars, however, consider it to be, at least partially, historically accurate, e.g. Jackson 1984; Dzielska 1986; Puskás 1991. For crucial objections to the use of Eastern literary traditions to support the *VA*, see Anderson 1986: 173 n. 106; Koskenniemi 1991: 10 n. 34.

<sup>3</sup> Anderson 1986.

The primary narrator does not name himself, but nor does he gain-say any assumed identification with the rhetorical superstar Philostratus (he is a rhetorician and a member of the ‘circle’ of Julia Domna: 1.3). Even so, narrator cannot be conflated simply with author. The marked style of the writing (simple but authoritative) is a device chosen to construct a *persona* for the occasion. Literary style is an issue throughout: Apollonius uses laconic brevity (7.35), and ‘cultivated a literary style’ that was ‘not dithyrambic or tumid or swollen with poetical words, nor again was it tongue-tied and hyperatticized’ (1.17; for his style, see also 3.36, 41; 8.6). These descriptions of the subject of the narrative also function as a stylistic programme for the primary narrator. The narratorial *persona* is thus assimilated to the subject, a phenomenon that we shall encounter again.

The primary narrator narrates overtly and (as one would expect at 150 years’ distance) wholly externally.<sup>4</sup> Limitations in the narrator’s knowledge are acknowledged, with ‘I think’ (*oimai*) a common parenthetical interjection;<sup>5</sup> elsewhere, he affirms that he ‘knows’ (2.2; 7.1). Such markers of focalization (particularly ‘I know’ [*oida*] and ‘it is my opinion’ [*moi dokei*]) are, as it happens, said to be features of Apollonius’ ‘oracular’ style (1.17); this further underscores the Apollonian aspect of the narrator’s style. In addition, these markers focus the primary narratees’ attention upon the problems of constructing a factual account of a historical figure, particularly a religious leader around whom so many layers of myth have accrued. In the Herodotean manner (→), the narrator claims personally to have seen artefactual evidence (3.41, where he has seen one out of the two books attributed by tradition to Apollonius; contrast 8.20, where he has *not* seen the book himself, relying on others’ testimony instead); he has travelled to Spain to confirm Apollonius’ theory of Atlantic tides (5.2); he has personally seen a satyr (6.27).

### *The narrator and his sources*

But these ‘autoptic’ elements, overall, represent either vestigial traces or circumstantial evidence: the primary *testimonia* to Apollonius’ life come in literary sources, and it is to these that we now turn. The narrator

<sup>4</sup> See further Billault 1993 on the self-presentation of Philostratus in this text.

<sup>5</sup> 1.21, 1.37, 2.9, 3.14, 5.43, 6.24, 7.3, 8.1, 8.9.

is highly self-conscious in his use of sources. The guise of the source-critical historian is assumed from the outset, in a passage that it is worth citing in full:

It seems to me that I should not condone or acquiesce in the general ignorance, but write a true account of (*exakribōsai*) the man, detailing the exact times at which he said or did this or that, as also the habits and temper of wisdom by which he succeeded in being considered a supernatural and divine being. And I have compiled my information partly from the many cities where he was loved, and partly from the temples whose long-neglected and decayed rites he restored, and partly from the accounts left of him by others and partly from his own letters ... But the more precise details (*akribestera*) are as follows. There was a man, Damis, by no means stupid, who formerly dwelt in the ancient city of Nineveh. He resorted to Apollonius in order to study wisdom, and having shared, by his own account, his wanderings abroad, wrote a study of them. And he records his opinions and discourses and all his prophecies. And a certain kinsman of Damis drew the attention of the empress Julia to the documents containing these memoirs hitherto unknown. Now I belonged to the circle of the empress, for she was a devoted admirer of all rhetorical exercises; and she commanded me to rewrite (*metagraψai*) these essays, paying attention to their style and diction; for the man of Nineveh had told his story clearly enough, yet somewhat awkwardly. I also read the book of Maximus of Aegae, which comprised the life of Apollonius in Aegae; and furthermore a will was composed by Apollonius, from which one can learn how rapturous and inspired a sage he really was. For we must not pay attention to Moeragenes, who composed four books about Apollonius, and yet was ignorant of many of the circumstances of his life. That then I have combined these scattered sources together and taken trouble over my composition, I have said; but let my work redound to the honour of the man who is the subject of my composition, and also be of use to those who love learning. For assuredly they will here learn things of which as yet they are ignorant. (1.2–3)

The pose here is partly Herodotean / Thucydidean: the narrator has travelled and ‘compiled’ sources from authoritative witnesses and documents, bringing together assiduously the ‘scattered sources’ to produce a text that is *akribēs* (‘accurate’, a key word for Thucydides, from the latter’s famous claim at 1.22.1 onwards). In four cases, he alludes to information he has ‘discovered’ (1.25; 6.40; 8.5, 8), presumably during his travels. Information (whether generally ethnographic or specifically dealing with the Apollonius narrative) gathered from tradition is frequently marked, with an unspecified ‘they say that’ or ‘it is said that’

(the ‘anonymous spokesmen’ device).<sup>6</sup> The Herodotean voice resonates throughout the text, particularly in the description of events as ‘worthy of record’ or ‘worthy of remembering’.<sup>7</sup> From another perspective, however, the narrator is defiantly un-Herodotean: in addition to the role of autoptic traveller, he also plays that of learned archivist, consulting the books already written on the subject. The narratorial claim to *akribeia* is substantiated by reference not only to experience but also to learning. This latter very much bespeaks a post-classical context dominated by didactic institutions (schools, seminars, libraries).<sup>8</sup>

Maximus and Moeragenes have attracted a certain amount of attention from scholars wishing to reconstruct their beliefs, but in narrative terms their importance is limited (each is mentioned only once more).<sup>9</sup> They serve primarily as foils to the narrator’s own project, examples (supposedly) of distortion whether through want of *akribeia* or malice.<sup>10</sup> By far the most significant source is Damis. The Damis memoirs serve as a *Beglaubigungsapparat*,<sup>11</sup> a technique designed to enhance the authority and plausibility of the narrative. This is most prominently exemplified at 4.25, where the narrator presents ‘the best-known story of Apollonius’, but supplants the common version, handed down ‘in a vague and general manner’, with his own truer version which he anchors explicitly in Damis’ memoirs. But the *Beglaubigungsapparat* is

<sup>6</sup> 2.20, 2.21, 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.8, 4.23, 5.1, 5.3, 5.4, 5.39.

<sup>7</sup> 1.9; 2.4, 16, 28; 5.1, 7, 9; 6.13; 7.3, 28, 35.

<sup>8</sup> See further Elsner 1994.

<sup>9</sup> See Raynor 1984 on Moeragenes; Graf 1984–1985 on Maximus; and more generally on the sources for the *VA*, Flinterman 1995: 67–88. The title of Moeragenes’ work, ‘*Memorabilia* of Apollonius of Tyana’, is recorded at Origen, *Against Celsus* 6.41. The second mentions are: ‘These and many similar incidents are given by Maximus of Aegae in his treatise, a writer whose reputation for oratory gained him the position of imperial secretary’ (1.12); ‘... four books concerning divination by the stars, a work that Moeragenes has mentioned’ (3.41).

<sup>10</sup> The narrator also prominently disputes with other writers on ethnographic issues: 2.9 (the Alexander historians; cf. also 2.18), 2.13 (Juba on elephants), 3.6–8 (various poets on dragons), 7.35 (unspecified malicious accounts). Similarly, he disagrees with received opinion (unspecified) at 3.2, 4.25, 5.39. Secondary narrators also use sources: Apollonius reports Juba on elephants (2.16); the account of the shadow-footed men (attributed by the primary narrator to Scylax) is refuted by Iarchas (3.47). Other writers are alluded to without disagreement at 2.12 (unspecified), 2.17 (Nearchus and Pythagoras), 3.53 (Nearchus and Orthagoras), 4.28 (unnamed local historians). *Quellenforschung* confirms the importance of literary antecedents in the narration of Apollonius’ travels: Rommel 1923: 1–59 argues that the ethnographic digressions can be traced to the author’s reading in conventional sources or his own invention.

<sup>11</sup> Bowie 1978: 1663–1667. For more on the ‘Damis question’, see Edwards 1991.

also an established device in the tradition of literary fiction, which fact inevitably raises unsettling questions about the truth-status of the text.<sup>12</sup> The uncertainty over the text's generic status—history or novel?—feeds the (playful) uncertainty over the degree of authority possessed by its primary narrator.

The use of Damis as a source is proclaimed on numerous occasions,<sup>13</sup> as is that of Apollonius' writings.<sup>14</sup> The problems raised by the limitations of the sources are confronted overtly and ingeniously. At 3.27, a conversation to which Damis was not party, is nevertheless derived from him, on the grounds that 'he heard [it] from Apollonius and wrote it down in his book'—this technique of narrative authorization (supplying a plausible explanation for the narrator's later grasp of events that would have been unknown at this stage) is already found in the *Odyssey*.<sup>15</sup> Again, Damis does not record how Apollonius died (8.29), and so the narrator is constrained to offer contrary and conflicting narratives ('some say ... others say', 8.30). This is the only time in the text where the narrative presents an unresolved *amphibolē*,<sup>16</sup> but the source limitations are turned to an advantage. The haziness surrounding the sage's death raises doubts about whether he died at all, thus allowing the insinuation that he was in fact immortal (8.31).<sup>17</sup>

In many other instances, Apollonius and Damis are conflated as reported narrators, the primary narrator simply stating that 'they say' (*phasi*).<sup>18</sup> All these instances come in the midst of the travel-narratives, which employ in these cases the 'experiencing' focalization of the reported narrators. In several cases, however, there is a lack of clear

<sup>12</sup> For the literary *Beglaubigungsapparat*, see Speyer 1971: 78–79; for the Damis memoirs as self-conscious advertisements of novelistic genre, see Bowie 1994: 194.

<sup>13</sup> 1.24, 1.32, 1.34, 2.10, 2.28, 3.15, 3.27, 3.36, 3.41, 5.9, 6.22, 7.15, 7.21, 7.34, 7.42.

<sup>14</sup> 1.32, 2.20, 3.14, 3.15, 5.39.

<sup>15</sup> Hom. *Od.* 12.389–390; cf. e.g. Ach. Tat. 8.15.

<sup>16</sup> Except 2.3 on the Prometheus narrative, which is however subsequently dismissed as a myth.

<sup>17</sup> A further case of source limitation turned to profit: at 3.13, neither Apollonius nor Damis is said to know how many approaches there were to the Brahmins' hill, 'for the cloud around it did not allow them to be seen'. Apollonius, who possesses the advantages of second sight and prophecy, is usually an entirely authoritative source; the narratees conclude that only among the Brahmins, where he plays the role of acolyte rather than teacher, does his omniscience fail him.

<sup>18</sup> 2.1, 2.4, 2.12, 2.19 (a tertiary narrative: 'they also say that they learned from the Indians ...'), 2.20, 2.24, 2.25, 2.42, 2.43, 3.5, 3.6, 3.9, 3.13, 3.53, 3.54, 3.56, 3.58, 5.5, 5.6, 5.14, 6.26. Reported narrators also occur in Herodotus (→), Thucydides (→) and Xenophon (→).

distinction between *phasi* = ‘Apollonius and Damis say’ and *phasi* = ‘tradition reports that’. Thus at 3.5, there are two uses of *phasi* that clearly refer to the reported narrators (‘they say that they saw ...’, ‘they say that they came across ...’), but sandwiched between them is a use that seems to refer to a tradition: ‘they say that this soil is the best in India, and constitutes the greatest of the territorial divisions ...’ How would Apollonius and Damis know this, and what would be their interest in reporting it? Similarly ambiguous is 3.9, where a *phasi* referring to Apollonius and Damis follows directly on the statement that the Indians ‘are said’ (*legontai*) to understand animals by eating the heart and liver of dragons. There is no reason why Apollonius and Damis should not be narrating this interesting extension of dragon-lore, but the use of the passive distances it from any attribution to a specific source.

The primary narrator’s aim of ‘rewriting’ (*metagraphein*) the memoirs of Damis raises interesting narratological issues. Many of these are questions of focalization: how much of the text is Damis, the naïve faithful, star-struck, provincial who experienced these miracles with his own eyes? And how much is Philostratus, the metropolitan sophisticate and expert on rhetorical style, who, however, has no personal experience of the sage? These matters are largely beyond the scope of this volume, but there are also questions to do with narratorial self-presentation, and these must be addressed here.

The principal issue is how to refashion source-material—particularly the memoirs of Damis, which constitute the *fabula* for large parts of the text—into a meaningful narrative.<sup>19</sup> The narrator expresses concerns for the ‘length’ (*mēkos*) of the text, seeking to control the proliferation of material by judicious selectivity (‘Let us give up this prolixity [*mēkos*] and proceed ...’, 4.34; ‘my account does not permit prolixity [*mēkos*]’, 7.2). He omits material that narratees can consult in other sources (Apollonius’ *Epistles*, 5.39; the sayings of Musonius, 5.19), ‘mythical’ accounts (*muthōdē*, 5.1: an allusion to Thucydides’ pointed statement of omission at 1.22.4), digressive material (‘no more on this subject’, 6.1; cf. 7.39), and the obvious (‘I need not describe the exaltation of Egypt, nor how the people ... applauded him for this action’, 5.24). He includes things ‘worthy of memory’ and ‘the more serious’ (*ta spoudaiotera* / *spoudaiotata*) events (4.22; 6.35); there are indeed occasions

<sup>19</sup> Narratorial selectivity is also an issue for Herodotus (→).

when a part of the *fabula* is so significant that ‘my account does not allow me to pass over’ it (2.18), or it is ‘unworthy of omission’ (2.28). Yet selection can never be a neutral narratorial act. The operative principles of selectivity throw light upon the self-positioning of the narrator, and also upon the way he constructs his sources.

The most important consideration relates to the question of how the primary narrator excerpts Damis. In book seven, he declines to include all of the events that occurred in prison, contrasting his own selectivity with Damis’ supposed practice of recording everything that happened:

There followed other episodes in prison, some of them insidiously contrived, others of mere chance and not of sufficient importance to merit my notice (Damis, I believe, has recorded them in his anxiety to omit nothing). The following, however, are relevant to my account. (7.28)

Damis is constructed by the primary narrator as an uncritical recorder of everything. This construction is a rhetorical one (no narrative can present *everything*, and Damis’ own selectivity is averred elsewhere),<sup>20</sup> and of course serves the narrator’s agenda: a naïve source is by implication an honest one, and the latter is implicitly constructed as using truthful sources while adopting a more knowing and sophisticated position himself (a strategy that has many parallels in modern scholarly discourse). The tendentiousness of this pose can be pointed up by looking to those passages where the primary narrator’s practice varies. In a passage in book one, he once again confronts the issue of omission, but takes a different tack:

For the sake of accuracy (*akribologia*), and in order to leave out nothing of the things Damis wrote, I should have liked to have related all of the incidents that occurred on their journey through these barbarous regions; but my subject hurries me on to greater and more remarkable episodes. (1.20)

At first sight, this contradicts the rhetoric of the previously quoted passage: omission is now held to compromise ‘accuracy’. *Akribologia*, however, is not quite the same as *akribeia*, having a negative connotation of nit-picking pedantry.<sup>21</sup> To narrate all of Damis’ *fabula* would (it is

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<sup>20</sup> ‘Many were the discussions that, according to Damis, the sage held in Athens; but he did not write down all of them, only the more indispensable ones that handled [*spoudastheias*] great subjects’ (4.19). The use of the *spoud-* root implicitly associates Damis’ own selectivity with the primary narrator’s emphasis upon recording the *spoudaiotera/spoudaiotata*.

<sup>21</sup> LSJ s.v. 2.



implied) betray an unsophisticated inability to control material critically. From this perspective, this passage intermeshes with the other, constructing Damis' memoirs as naïve but ontologically unproblematic, a foil for the flamboyant but veridical primary narrator. The two passages can be seen as strategic attempts to deproblematize the process of *metagraphhein*, of 'rewriting' source material.

Yet it is not all one-way traffic: the narrator is also at the mercy of his sources. At 3.45, he asserts that he must not omit a discussion that took place 'since it has been recorded by Damis', a claim that contradicts the principle of selectivity advanced elsewhere. (Similarly at 3.6, an anecdote 'must' be presented, the narrator tells us, because Apollonius records it.) Issues of accuracy also arise when different sources report different versions.<sup>22</sup> At 3.15 Apollonius' elliptical account in an unspecified medium of Brahmanic dwelling (they live 'on the earth but not on it, fortified yet without fortification, possessing nothing yet having the riches of all men') is said to have been presented 'too cleverly' (*sophōteron*): Damis' more descriptive version is used by the primary narrator to decode Apollonius' allusions. This presentation of two different focalizations within the text allows the narrator simultaneously to mystify Apollonius and the Brahmins, and to preserve his self-arrogated narratorial stance of lucid *akribeia*. At the same time, however, it points up his dependence upon his sources, with all their limitations and opacities. Although Apollonius' version is stigmatized as 'too clever', Damis' is implicitly too mundane, failing to communicate the theurgic power of the sages. Indeed, we have argued above that the narrator artfully makes use of the gaps in Damis: over the text as a whole, the episodes not witnessed by Damis himself (the interview with Iarchas and the Indian king at 3.27–33, and particularly the 'death' of Apollonius, 8.30–31) are arguably marked as wondrous, 'mystic' moments.

### *Narratees*

Although the narrator claims to be writing for the empress Julia Domna (1.4), the predominant role he assumes in relation to his narratees is pedagogical. At a number of points, he guides interpretation with sub-

<sup>22</sup> Sources do not have to contradict each other: Damis is said to have recorded the conversations of Apollonius and Vardanes, while 'Apollonius himself composed a letter

junctives in the first-person plural ('let us ...'),<sup>23</sup> thus imagining a community of readers steered by the narrator. Elsewhere, he adopts a more imperative tone: 'one must think that ...' (*khērē gignōskein* ... 3.1); 'it is clear from what I have said that ...' (5.12). The narration targets 'those with no experience (*apeirois*) of Apollonius' (6.35), a statement that is at one level self-evident (anyone of Philostratus' time with direct experience of Apollonius would have to be at least 120 years old), but serves primarily to cast the narrator in the role of informed empiricist, a man with *peira* (experience) he wishes to impart to students. At 7.39, he explains his digression on the question of sorcery as motivated by a desire to protect 'young men' from its lures. The narrator here assumes the guise of the responsible citizen *in loco parentis*. Although there are occasions where he proclaims the risk of a negative response from his primary narratees (because he goes beyond what the Alexander historians say, 2.7; when he implies Plato's foolishness, 7.3; because he includes a speech of Apollonius that does not conform to contemporary oratorical fashion, 8.6), but these cases are best interpreted as devices that procure consent (by stigmatizing negative reaction) and simultaneously dramatize the narrator's fearless resistance to received opinion. Overall, the narrator presents himself as an enlightened, if unconventional, educator of young acolytes; and this is clearly another point of convergence between the narrator's representation of himself and of Apollonius.

### *Embedded narration*

Because of the primary narrator's insistent focus upon sources, it is perhaps best to conclude that the entire text is the product simultaneously of primary (by 'Philostratus') and reported narration (by the sources). There are, in addition, tertiary narratives. On several occasions, Apollonius uses narrative *exempla* (cf. *paradeigmata*, 1.34) as philosophical parables; that is, as moralizing reflections upon the situation in which the characters find themselves.<sup>24</sup> Parables, however, cannot guarantee their

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containing them, and has sketched out in his epistles much else of what he said in conversation' (1.32).

<sup>23</sup> 'Let us consider ...' (2.2); 'Let us proceed ...' (4.34); 'Let us consider ...' (5.12); 'Let us not disbelieve ...' (6.27); cf. 'We might deduce this from the following evidence ...' (8.2).

<sup>24</sup> 1.34, 2.14, 2.37, 5.14. The primary narrator also makes interesting use of this

own correct reading: the process of mapping the tertiary narrative parable onto the primary/secondary narrative situation is not secure, since the ‘meaning’ of a narrative is infinitely (re)interpretable. Thus at 7.30, Apollonius and Damis trade stories and interpretations of stories about lions, as each attempts to establish the best position to take relative to Domitian. Apollonius begins by narrating how Phraotes advised lion-tamers to approach the beasts without striking them or fawning upon them (so he will approach the emperor with cautious authority). Damis responds with a narrative from Aesop about the lion who pretended to be sick, so that he could eat animals that visited him, until a fox realized what happened (so he counsels avoiding the emperor, though he may look docile from a distance). Apollonius responds that the fox would have proven himself wiser if he had entered the cave but not been caught. This is the end of the exchange, but the primary narratee may well imagine a counter-narrative to re-establish the fact that tyrants are best treated with caution.

Elsewhere, embedded narrative is treated with great sophistication. There are four levels of narration in the account of Achilles (4.16: primary narrator reports that Damis reports that Apollonius reports the narrative presented by Achilles’ spirit), and in Iarchas’ account of the Hellanodicae (3.30: primary narrator reports that Damis reports that Apollonius reports that Iarchas reports).<sup>25</sup> At the tertiary level, narrators are often those in positions of particular symbolic importance, especially esteemed philosophers. The only major tertiary narrator who is not a philosopher (i.e. Apollonius, the Indian sage Iarchas, or the Egyptian sage Thespesion)<sup>26</sup> is the Indian king Phraotes (2.29–33). In the latter case, however, philosophy is precisely the matter at issue. Apollonius asks how he was educated, given the presumption that there are no philosophical teachers in India (2.29); Phraotes responds with an autobiography that shows how some few, including himself, have been selected for philosophical training (2.30). When this tertiary narrative

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device at 7.21: the event recorded by Damis is ‘both like and unlike’ the story of Aristides the Athenian.

<sup>25</sup> This narrative originally derives (so Iarchas says) from the Egyptians: in a sense, then, there are *five* levels here.

<sup>26</sup> In addition to Apollonius’ parables, discussed above, see 4.16 (on his visit to Achilles’ tomb). For Iarchas’ narratives, see 3.16 (narrates Apollonius’ life), 3.20 (how the Ethiopians were expelled), 3.23–24 (Apollonius’ promethepsychotic life), 3.25 (story of Tantalus), 3.30 (his grandfather, and the customs of the Hellanodicae). For Thespesion, see 6.22 (Palamedes, Socrates, Aristides).

wanders from the subject of philosophy, Apollonius ‘interrupts’ and steers it back to the subject of the Brahmins (2.33).<sup>27</sup> This tertiary narrative is a site of negotiation (with a slight, bristling, intercultural tension) for philosophical authority. The close interrelation between narration and authority in the *VA* is enriched by the thematic emphasis upon the role of interrogatives. In a programmatic passage in book 1, Apollonius states that ‘I asked questions when I was a lad; it is not now my business to ask questions, but to teach others what I have discovered’ (1.17). Asking questions is the converse of narration: it jeopardizes rather than reinforces philosophical status.

### *Issues of credibility*

The events of the *VA* are frequently presented as occasions for *thauma* (‘wonder’) and *ekplēxis* (‘awe’).<sup>28</sup> At one level, this merely reflects Philostratus’ Herodotean (→) legacy, but there is more at work here than just intertextual homage. Throughout the narrative, wonder and awe mark an abrogation of power in the face of a superior being: to manifest amazement reveals the beholder as philosophically inferior. In a key passage, the primary narrator states that ‘wisdom renders awe-struck that which meets with it, but itself is awestruck by nothing’ (7.22). Thus the various wondrous beasts on the journey to the East occasion *thauma* only from Apollonius’ companions, and specifically not from him (1.38; 2.11). If the primary narratee wants to learn how to read this text, s/he will have to learn not to be amazed at its contents.

But *thauma* suggests, as well as wide-eyed wonder, a sceptical disbelief in the face of the incredible. To what extent does the primary narrative probe its own plausibility? This issue is particularly explored during the trips to the East, which is after all the traditional location of implausible narratives.<sup>29</sup> The East is constructed in the *VA* as a place beyond the limits of Greco-Roman experience. As he travels East, Apollonius crosses a succession of boundaries symbolically marking the journey into the unknown.<sup>30</sup> Book 3 sharpens the focus on the question of

<sup>27</sup> The model for this interruption mid-narrative may be Hieroson at D. Chr. 36.24.

<sup>28</sup> On the central role of wonder in biographies of holy men, see Cox 1983: 60–61. On the theme of *thaumata* in the *VA*, see also Reitzenstein 1906: 39–54; Padilla n.d.; Elsner 1997: 23–24, 28–29.

<sup>29</sup> Romm 1992: 82–120.

<sup>30</sup> Even when he contemplates the travel, Apollonius speaks of it as ‘travelling over

plausibility, beginning with a description of the wondrousness (*thauma*, 3.1) of the river Hyphasis: extraordinary trees, fish, worms and wild asses, pepper trees and dragons (3.1–9). Two of these marvels come from the pages of the notoriously untrustworthy Ctesias (*Indika* 27; 25): informed narratees may be predisposed to distrust the story of the oleaginous worm (3.1) and the unicorn with its magic horn (3.2).<sup>31</sup> But the narrator does not mention any literary authorities, relating instead that ‘they’ (unspecified) ‘say’ that these phenomena exist (3.1, 3.2). We have already discussed above the ambiguity of the primary narrator’s use of ‘they say’ (‘they’ can refer either to tradition or to Apollonius and Damis), and it is arguable that he exploits this ambiguity strategically to mislead his narratees here. At first reading, we might take ‘they’ to be the reported narrators, Apollonius and Damis, relating their experiences. But in 3.2, Damis is said to ask if Apollonius believes the story told by the Indians about the unicorn’s horn (anyone who drinks from it gains immortality), to which Apollonius replies with a sceptical evasiveness (he will believe it if he finds that the king is immortal). By subverting the plausibility of the magic properties of the unicorn’s horn, and hence attacking the credulousness on the part of any narratees who have assumed the ‘truth’ of these phenomena (which they might have supposed to be guaranteed by the autopsy of the reported narrators), the primary narrator conducts an object lesson in critical reading.

Yet the line between the plausible and the implausible is not so easily drawn. Towards the end of the Indian sojourn (3.45–49), Iarchas discusses a series of wonders, arguing that while some are untrue (shadow-feet and long-heads: 3.47), some exist (magnets, pygmies, gold-digging griffins, the phoenix), and so (as he instructs his narratees, the tertiary narratees, in the case of the magnet) ‘you must not disbelieve ... but you may wonder (*thaumazein*)’ (3.46). This sequence is introduced by a comment on the part of the primary narrator that ‘there would be some

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borders’ (1.18). The ‘borders’ of Babylon are marked by a frontier control (1.21). Border crossing is also a central tool of textual organization: the beginning of a book repeatedly marks the crossing of a boundary. At the end of the first book, Apollonius resolves to leave Babylon; while at the beginning of the second book, Philostratus refers to the Caucasus as the ‘beginning’ of the Taurus (2.1–2). At the end of the second book, Apollonius reaches a column inscribed ‘Alexander got this far’, which Philostratus supposes to have been erected either by Alexander to mark the ‘limit’ of his empire, or by the Indians out of pride that he ‘got no further’ (2.43). The words ‘got no further’ close book 2, so that Alexander’s column also marks the end of a book.

<sup>31</sup> Romm 1992: 117. For Ctesias’ unreliability, see Luc. *VH* 1.3.

profit in neither believing nor disbelieving all of this' (3.45). Whereas the passage that opens book 3 teaches primary narratees to be sceptical of *thaumata*, this passage teaches them to use that scepticism judiciously. The model for this type of reading, whereby scepticism must be temporarily (but knowingly) suspended, is found in Herodotus (→),<sup>32</sup> but in the context of the *VA*, it serves a new role. The exploration in the Indian episode of the credibility of *thaumata* serves as a programmatic education in reading the miracle-working figure of Apollonius. If his actions strain credibility, we must nonetheless tread a line between critical acuity and acquiescence, because a divine man necessarily does, by definition, exceed the usual limits of human ability.

The *VA* is an opulent text, in narratological terms: clever, knowing, self-conscious, manipulative. Yet this richness is not simply the work of a sophistic *amator ingenii sui*. As we have seen throughout, Philostratus' narrative sophistication serves a larger point, the exploration of the divine character of Apollonius. It is precisely because the narrative sites itself in the midst of the complex battle to interpret the phenomenon of holy men that it deploys such an array of narrative techniques.

### *The Lives of the sophists*

Set against the richness and depth of the *VA*, the *VS* comes across as plainer fare: there are no instances of extravagantly layered narration, there is nothing corresponding to the *VA*'s elegant treatment of sources, and less 'play' with the truth-status of the text. Yet this relative lack of complexity is itself a stylized literary pose: in general, the primary narrator of the *VS* presents himself as a magisterial, didactic figure, whose project is largely uncomplicated by doubts.<sup>33</sup>

The preface is addressed to the dedicatee, a 'consul' named Gordian (*VS* 479), probably the future emperor Gordian I.<sup>34</sup> This figure is described as a man of culture (a descendant of Herodes Atticus, and a 'leader of the Muses', 480), and the narrator promises to 'lighten the weight of cares on your mind, like Helen's cup with its Egyptian drugs'

<sup>32</sup> Our narrator's phrase may even echo Hdt. 4.96.1 ('I do not disbelieve or overly believe in this'), where the Herodotean narrator presents himself as a model for detached, sceptical interpretation.

<sup>33</sup> I am grateful to Thomas Schmitz for allowing me to see unpublished work on the narrator of the *VS*.

<sup>34</sup> Flinterman 1995: 26–27.

(480). Yet the narratee of the main text, although (unlike the community addressed by the *V4*) a single figure,<sup>35</sup> is not this specific political high-flier, but a more generally conceived student, whose reception of the biographical narratives is firmly steered by the primary narrator.<sup>36</sup> In the course of the text, narration is conceived of as ‘revelation’;<sup>37</sup> the primary narratee is ‘one who wants to know a lot’ about his subjects (480). To this extent, the *VS* dramatizes its role as straightforward transmission of knowledge from the knowing to the ignorant. The frame, however, highlights the theatrical quality of this drama: the narratee of the preface (not just ‘Gordian’, of course, but also general student) is jolted into a different role in the main text. The effect of this is to create a double consciousness: the narratee can simultaneously acquiesce to his role as student, guided by the masterful direction of the primary narrator, and look on, observing the master–student relationship from the outside. The apparently ‘simple’ pedagogic stance of the narrator, then, emerges as an artful narrative device.

The biographical narratives are ordered in simple fashion, life by life in chronological sequence,<sup>38</sup> with most simply introduced by the name of the sophist. The pedagogical narrator marks his presence in the text overtly,<sup>39</sup> selecting paradigms on the basis of their instructional value, whether moral or stylistic. Exemplary instances from the lives or texts of the sophists are repeatedly introduced to substantiate general rules or pointed lessons. The primary narrator draws his narratee’s attention to noteworthy and memorable cases. ‘I wish to reveal how this came about, for it is good and worth remembering’ (*VS* 536); ‘This is another amazing thing about this man Lucius ...’ (*VS* 557). ‘Philostratus’ does not simply report what his sources tell him, but recasts his *fabulae*

<sup>35</sup> At least, the one passage in the text where the narratees are directly addressed employs the singular *soi* (515). See also below on injunctions to the narratees.

<sup>36</sup> ‘Let us not consider ...’ (487, 547); ‘one must consider ...’ (480); ‘let us proceed to ...’ (510); ‘one must not marvel about this ...’ (517); ‘this is what one must know about ...’ (545); ‘let us not fail to remember ...’ (544); ‘let Varus be considered worthy of narrative ...’ (576).

<sup>37</sup> The root *del-* (‘reveal’/‘revelation’) appears at 498, 515, 520, 523, 535, 536, 567, 574–575. This is a rather different, but no less authoritarian, usage to that of Aristides in the *Sacred Tales* (→).

<sup>38</sup> The text begins with an enclosed, parenthetical section dealing with philosophical sophists in chronological order (484–492); it then loops back in time to deal chronologically with the sophists *stricto sensu*.

<sup>39</sup> ‘I do not consider it right to call this exile ...’ (488); ‘I see that the man ...’ (503); ‘I shall discuss Scopelian ...’ (514); ‘Let me not omit this ...’ (524); ‘I shall not omit ...’ (527); ‘my narrative summons me to ...’ (566); ‘My narrative leads me to ...’ (605).

into a story with pedagogical purpose. In selecting and editing in this way, the narrator casts himself in the empowered role of gatekeeper of sophistic culture. The narratee is thoroughly dependent upon his editorial qualities.

Indeed, the narrator not only carefully polices the examples chosen, but even seeks to control his narratee's interpretations, guiding her or him through the inferential processes that will allow them to deduce the point of the example. 'The quality of his arguments can be surmised from the following. For (*gar*) ...' 'The good fortune that attended his embassies we may also surmise from the following. For (*gar*) ...' (*VS* 521). *Gar* ('for') is the most important particle in this text, investing the narrator with the power of explication. 'Let us regard this process as chewing over his matter, not eating it, for (*gar*) ...' (*VS* 583). Yet the interpretation that is taught is not always straightforward or unequivocal. One of the narrator's favourite devices is to confound the narratees with an aporetic or contradictory utterance, before explaining (with a *gar* clause) why a simple explanation will not suffice. 'As for Antiphon of Rhamnus, I do not know whether one should call him a good or a bad man. For (*gar*) on the one hand (*men*) he may be called a good man, for the following reasons ... but on the other hand (*de*) there are evidently good reasons for regarding him as a bad man, and they are the following ...' (498). Such cases of moral or stylistic complexity, expressed through the *prima facie* uncertainty of the narrator, recur throughout the *VS*;<sup>40</sup> their effect is to underscore (through the subsequent solution of the puzzle) the narrator's status as a pedagogical expert, one who understands the problems involved in evaluating the richness and diversity of human life.

If the narrator is styled as an expert, however, he also presents narrative 'truth' as a complex quality that must be striven for amidst multifarious competing, and often conflicting, biographical variants. 'Some (*hoi men*) say that ... but others (*hoi de*) that ...' and 'There are those (*enioi*) who think ...' are formulae that recur repeatedly. Sometimes they are unresolved, and the narratee is left unguided,<sup>41</sup> but commonly the narrator intervenes with a flourished 'but I consider ...'.<sup>42</sup> The narrator's opinion concerning individual sophists is constructed as particu-

<sup>40</sup> 486, 536, 592, 597, 604. Comparable is the device of posing a question, then immediately answering it (523).

<sup>41</sup> 498, 521, 524, 570.

<sup>42</sup> 502, 530, 543, 554–555, 604.



larly insightful, in contradistinction to those of others. The best instance of this is the case of Scopelian, as whose saviour from slander the narrator represents himself. The account begins as follows:

I shall now speak of the sophist Scopelian, but first I shall deal with those who try to calumniate him. For they say that he is unworthy of the sophistic circle and call him dithyrambic, intemperate in his style and thick-witted. Those who say this about him are sluggish quibblers, not inspired with extempore eloquence. For man is by nature a creature prone to envy. For instance, the short disparage the tall, the ugly the good-looking, the slow and lame the light-footed swift runner, cowards the brave, the unmusical the musical, those who are unathletic the athletic. So one must not be surprised if certain persons who are themselves tongue-tied, who have set on their tongues 'the ox of silence', who could not of themselves conceive any great thought or sympathise with another who conceived it, should sneer at and revile one whose eloquence was the readiest, the boldest, and the most elevated of any Greek of his time. But since they have failed to understand the man, I shall reveal what he was and how illustrious was his family. (514)

Here, the narrator sets himself at odds with the received tradition on Scopelian, here presented as a form of 'malicious' history,<sup>43</sup> and does so in a manner that states his own right to pronounce authoritatively. Using a technique we have already observed, he passes from the specific instance (the slanderers of Scopelian) to a general conclusion about the 'nature' of man (the explanatory section introduced by 'for'). In this case, he then returns to specifics, exemplifying this natural law with a series of instances (the transition to exemplification now marked by 'for instance'). This pedagogical self-representation seeks to legitimize the narrator as a revisionist, the proponent of a true ('I shall reveal'), authoritative ('one must not be surprised ...') account of Scopelian not vitiated by jealous carping. As in the *VA*, the narrator casts himself as the defender of true wisdom against its assailants.

The agonistic temper runs throughout the *Lives of the sophists*. Those who ascribe the *Araspes* to Dionysius of Miletus, are 'uncultured' (524); those who accused Herodes Atticus of hitting Antoninus Pius were 'ignorant' (554); those who called him the 'stuffed orator' were 'petty and trivial' (565; cf. also 547; 602). Of particular interest is the courtroom episode in the account of Herodes, where the sophist is accused of murdering his wife, Regilla (*VS* 555–556). The narrator tells us that

<sup>43</sup> For 'malicious' history, see Plutarch *On the malice of Herodotus*, and further Gray 1990. Cf. 531, where the narrator's interpretation is opposed to that of the masses.

this is a charge trumped up by her brother, Braduas, and proceeds to present (in indirect speech) Herodes' grounds for defence, one of which is his extraordinary grief at the death of his wife. Next, he adds further reasons of his own to believe that Herodes' grief was genuine; imperceptibly we have shifted from a covertly narrated account of events in court to the primary narrator's overt assessment. The agonistics of the courtroom have subtly metamorphosed into the agonistics of biography, with the narrator as lawyer for the defence.<sup>44</sup>

In general, however, relative to the *V4*, the *VS* downplays the attribution of narratives to sources.<sup>45</sup> In addition to the instances discussed, there are references to the works of Aeschines (483), Herodes Atticus (537, 538), and Polemo (539); also to the will of Antoninus Pius (534) and to unspecified traditions ('x is said to have ...', 494, 527). Outside of these exiguous examples, the text avoids reported narration entirely. Unless, that is, we count sophistic epideixis as narrative, for there are of course numerous descriptions of sophistic performance and its reception.<sup>46</sup> Even though the narrator usually assesses a sophist's literary ability by passing his own judgments on his extant written works, the value of an individual figure is frequently articulated in terms of the audience's response to his work. The most common form of response is 'enchantment' (*thelgein* and cognates) or 'amazement'.<sup>47</sup> Occasionally, negative responses are recorded (laughter at the tubby figure of Leon, 485; the tense exchanges between Philagrus at the students of Herodes at 579–580).

The general lack of reported narration, however, need not be viewed as a deficiency: we can treat the emphasis upon primary narration, instead, as a rhetorical device. The narrator of the *VS* is understated, 'simple', but pedagogically authoritative. To this extent, he bears comparison with the *V4*; and, as in that text, he is artfully revealed to be a role assumed strategically to bolster the generic self-presentations and the literary ambitions of the text.

<sup>44</sup> For the narrator as legal apologist, cf. also 532 (Polemo 'is charged with ...'), 595–596 ('they accuse him of ... let me put the case for the defence ...'), 600 ('let him be acquitted of this ...').

<sup>45</sup> On the question of Philostratus' sources in compiling the *VS*, see most recently Swain 1991.

<sup>46</sup> See further Korenjak 2000 on the role of the audience in sophistic performance.

<sup>47</sup> *Thelgein*: 491, 496, 520, 593; *agamai*: 589, 611. See also *thaumazein* at 529.



## CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

### AELIUS ARISTIDES

*T.J.G. Whitmarsh*

The *Sacred Tales* (orations 47–52) are an idiosyncratic and intriguing collection of ‘autobiographical’ narrations.<sup>1</sup> Although they envisage a public performance (the primary narratees are a plural ‘you’), they present an intensely personal narrative, focusing upon a communion with the god Asclepius. They thus occupy a junctural position between rhetorical exposition and private introspection. The primary, ‘public’ narration (‘Aristides’ to his audience) embeds a second, ‘private’ order of narration (Asclepius to ‘Aristides’), presented through the opaque and fragmentary medium of dreams. These secondary narratives operate simultaneously at two levels, the apparent and the protreptic. At the first level (marked by the recurrent use of the verb *dokein*, ‘seem’/‘think’) stand the various oneiric phenomena that manifest themselves cryptically to ‘Aristides’; at the second stands the god’s deciphered meaning, what he is in reality commanding. On some occasions, ‘Aristides’ mediates between the two levels (or an interpreter has to be sought: e.g. 50.16–17); on others (e.g. 50.1, where an apparition speaks to him directly), the two converge.

Given this delicate equipoise between inner devotion and rhetorical address, the use of the verb *dēloun* in the only explicit acknowledgment of any primary narratees is significant: ‘But now I wish to reveal (*dēlōsai*) to you the matter of my belly’ (48.2; cf. 51.67). The narration is (constructed as) a ‘revelation’, a bringing of private matters into the public glare. This word also has theurgic, epiphanic connotations (it is also used of the god’s revelations to ‘Aristides’ of what he should do, 48.75): the primary narrator appropriates some of the power of the secondary narrator. A further function of the term is to insist that the principal function of the primary narratees is merely to witness: the narration is (to be) an act of devotion to the god (cf. 48.1, where the narrator

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<sup>1</sup> Behr 1968; Percy 1988, with many interesting reflections upon narrative in the *Sacred Tales*; Bompaire 1989; 1993. Translations are modified from Behr 1981.

proclaims his desire to commemorate the god's acts), rather than a rhetorical performance designed to engage the primary narratees. This narrative technique is sustained throughout the *Sacred Tales*: although there are periodic markers of overt narration,<sup>2</sup> primary narratees are only very rarely (and obliquely) alluded to.<sup>3</sup> This disengagement from narratees is of course precisely a narrative *effect*, which serves to construct them as detached observers of a miracle. The narrative represents itself in general as simply 'showing', or (as we might say, using the language of evangelism) *testifying to* the god's power, irrespective of and unconcerned with primary narratees. But a full account of the *Sacred Tales* must seek to get underneath this self-representation, to expose the covert strategies whereby Aristides engages his narratees.

The autobiographical narrator's 'revelations' are not, therefore, to be taken at face value as straightforward confessionals.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, so far from being an innocent naïf, 'Aristides' is extremely self-conscious about the act of narration.<sup>5</sup> In a crucial passage at the beginning of the first *Sacred Tale*, he compares himself to Helen in book 4 of the *Odyssey*, who states that she could not narrate 'all the sufferings of enduring Odysseus' (Hom. *Od.* 4.241 = Aristides 47.1); instead, she selects and 'narrates' (*diēgētai*) a single deed to emblemize the total. He proceeds as follows:

Likewise I myself would not tell all the achievements of the Savior, which I have enjoyed to this day. Nor at this point shall I add that Homeric phrase, 'not even if I had ten tongues, ten mouths' [*Il.* 2.489]. For that is a small number. Not even if I should surpass all human strength, speech, and wisdom could I ever do justice to them. I have never been persuaded by any of my friends, whoever have asked or encouraged me to speak or write about these things, and so I avoided the impossible. For it seemed to me the same as if after swimming through the whole sea under water,

<sup>2</sup> 'I want to reveal ...', 47.4; 'let us recall ...', 48.1; 'it would perhaps now be appropriate to discuss ...', 48.45; 'It has been told how ...', 49.44; 'I shall return to the place where a little earlier ...', 50.71.

<sup>3</sup> 'Perhaps someone might ask to hear of ...', 48.60; 'As for what happened next, anyone who wants to believe, let him believe; but anyone who does not, be off with him!', 49.40 (discussed below). The second and fourth orations make use of the first-person plural subjunctive ('Let us record ...', 48.1; 'let us turn ...', 48.71), but it becomes clear that the 'we' in question refers solely to the narrator: 'let us give the *logos* mentioned at the start ...' (48.37); 'let us say ...' (50.38). The imperative 'Come now' (*phere dē*) that percolates the texts (see below) is arguably a command to a primary narratee, perhaps best interpreted as an assumption of Socratic authority on the part of the narrator (cf. e.g. *Pl. Rep.* 348c; *Grig.* 455a; *Cra.* 385b etc.).

<sup>4</sup> For the general point, see Sturrock 1993: 9.

<sup>5</sup> See on this particularly Pearcy 1988.

I should be compelled to produce records of the total number of waves that I encountered, and how I found the sea at each of them, and what it was that saved me. For each of our days, as well as our nights, has a story (*sungraphē*), if there were someone willing to record (*apographēin*) the events or narrate (*diēgeisthai*) the providence of the god, wherein he revealed some things openly in his presence and others by the sending of dreams, as far as it was possible to obtain sleep (but this was rare, due to the tempests of my body). In view of this, I decided to submit to the god, truly as to a doctor, and to do in silence whatever he wishes. (47.1–4)

The narrator self-consciously tries out the voice of the epic poet who appeals to the Muses for help in the face of the vast hordes of Achaeans he must catalogue (Hom. *Il.* 2.489). His own narrative task, however, is constructed as the greater: Homer might need more than ten tongues and ten mouths, but from Aristides' perspective ten 'is a small number'. The definitive expansiveness of the epic voice is usurped, incorporated and roundly trounced. Aristides' quasi-epicism is also inflected with the 'aporia' motif ('not even if I should surpass all human strength, speech, and wisdom could I ever do justice to them'). This *topos* is, of course, already found in Homer (→), but by Aristides' time it is closely associated with rhetorical encomium.<sup>6</sup> The quasi-epic temper announced here permeates the *Sacred Tales* at two levels: not only are they spotted with citations of and allusions to early epic,<sup>7</sup> but also the almost complete excision of any reference to narratees (discussed above) recaptures the magnificent grandeur of Homeric narration. Again as in epic and encomium, the statement of narrative *aporia* is ironic and subsequently undercut. After this overwrought display of self-deprecation, the narrator recants his stated decision to submit 'in silence' and proceeds to a lengthy description of the god's works. The statement of inability to narrate exposes itself as a rhetorical *topos*, designed both to magnify the subject and to indicate the scale of the orator's task (and hence to laud his narrative powers).

For all that this device is deeply established in the encomiastic and hymnic tradition, it does have a specific role to play in this narrative programme. Every moment of our life, he tells us in the passage cited above, whether waking or dreamed, has a 'story'; but it is immensely difficult to turn this into a text. The problem lies with finding a nar-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Menander Rhetor 368.10–11 Russell-Wilson; X. *Ages.* 1.1; Isoc. *Evag.* 48; for its status as cliché, see Lib. *Or.* 59.5.

<sup>7</sup> Direct quotations at 48.39, 48.72, 51.44; allusions at 48.42, 48.72 (Hesiod), 50.34, 51.12, 51.27.

rator with the will to record the events or ‘narrate’ the providence of the god. Aristides’ reference to the ‘story’ (*sungraphē*) of his dreams is comparable to the narratological concept of a *fabula*.<sup>8</sup> There is, therefore, a notionally infinite number of possible autobiographical ‘stories’ that could be written out of the *fabula* of experience; although in practice not all the stories could be written, since that would presuppose a superhuman will on the part of the narrator. The problem that the narrator confronts self-consciously concerns the principles of ordering and selection necessitated by narrative composition.

This problem, however, is not limited to sorting through a vast number of events facing him: he must also *represent* that vastness, or testify to the magnitude of the god’s power. The distinction here between the ‘recording’ (*apographē*) of events and the ‘narration’ (*diēgēsis*) of the god’s works has been linked with the two stages in the composition of the text, the first a rudimentary diary of his dreams (cf. 48.3–4; 49.30 for these *apographai*) and the second the worked-up narrative we are presently experiencing.<sup>9</sup> There is, however, an alternative (and, I think, preferable) explanation. Rather than distinguishing between two chronologically and materially distinct phases of the compositional process, the narrator is differentiating between two representational registers within the same composition: firstly, a banausic effort, editing the infinite *fabula* into a finite (hence selective) narrative; and secondly, perhaps more importantly, producing an artful narration worthy of Asclepius. It may be that these two registers do in practice correspond to two stages of composition, but the contrast specifically effected here is not between compositional forms but between objects of narration: *apographēin* represents ‘the events’, *diēgēsis* ‘the providence of the god’.

It is this second element that constitutes the abiding concern of these texts. The ineffability of his subject matter is a recurrent theme in the *Sacred Tales*. In the second, he asks himself ‘Where should I start?’ (48.11), again a use of ‘*aporia*’ motif. The narration proper is also circumscribed by doubts. ‘What happened next it is beyond the powers of a mortal to narrate (*diēgēsasthai*); nevertheless, I must try’ (48.8). ‘Who could display what happened as a consequence of this?’ (48.22). ‘You could not tell in language (*eipōis legōn*)’ what happened in the Achaean straits (48.67; cf. 47.59; 50.80). Sometimes narratorial doubt stems from a supposed abundance of divine works to record (50.70). Elsewhere,

<sup>8</sup> Bal 1997: 5, 175–219.

<sup>9</sup> Percy 1988: 381–383.

the narrator self-consciously addresses the need for selectivity, the need, that is, to compress the *fabula* so as to convert it into narrative: 'it is beyond or like the address to Alcinous, but I shall try somehow to speak briefly' (48.60); '... to speak briefly and vaguely ...' (48.70; cf. e.g. 50.85; 89; 104). Like the *aporia* motif, this *topos* is rooted in both rhetorical convention and pre-rhetorical tradition.<sup>10</sup> Narrative compression is not merely a question of pragmatics, of how to shoehorn an immense number of events into a finite literary space. Or, rather, when narrators claim to be compressing, they are making claims about the unspeakable amplitude of the subject matter. In this context, it is the god's works that strain the very limits of mortal narrative. In the second tale, for example, the narrator reports that the god explicitly ordered him to compile only 'summaries' (*kephalaia*) of his works (48.4; cf. 49.5, 13). At a later point, he writes that 'it would be more chilling and vivid (*enargesteron*) for me to narrate (*diēgeisthai*) unadorned the very visions I beheld', but 'necessity' (i.e. the god's will) constrains him to report only 'in summary' (*kephalaia*: 48.29). 'Vividness' (*enargeia*) is the quality of rhetorical description that permits narratees to perceive events as though with their own senses, the closest that language can come to effacing its own status as second-order representation.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, however, the overt reference to the act of narration reinstates precisely that second order of narration. The *Sacred Tales* offer (or construct themselves as offering) glimpses of a terrifyingly powerful, numinous world only dimly represented by 'mere' language; but they are *only* glimpses.

The *Sacred Tales* are certainly constructed as 'astounding'. The narrator refers to events as *thaumata* ('marvels', 47.64; 48.55) or describes them as *thaumastos* ('marvellous': 50.7, 63, 80; 51.38), following in the footsteps of Herodotus (→). The 'anonymous witness' device is used to introduce spectators of the miracles that the god performs (48.82; 51.41). Occasionally, even stronger language is used: his narrative on one occasion encompasses something 'more chilling' (*phrikōdesteron*, 49.48–49; cf. 48.29). As has been emphasized, this numinous quality is represented through the violence done to (what is constructed as) 'ordinary' narrative. The repeatedly stated inability of mere language to represent the power of the god becomes a means of representing the power of the god.

<sup>10</sup> See e.g. Dem. 60.6; Hyper. 4.2 Blass; Philostr. *VA* 4.34; 7.2.

<sup>11</sup> See Zanker 1981 on this term.



The language of *thauma*, however, has further connotations in a literary context. *Thaumata* also strain the *belief* of the listener or observer, and the term is often used to hint at the existence of an uncertain barrier between truth and fiction (→ Philostratus). There are indices in the *Sacred Tales* of a certain self-conscious play with these categories. In particular, the association between ‘Aristides’ and Odysseus (*qua* internal narrators) invites an ironical reading on the part of sophisticated, informed readers. Odysseus was not only the canonical traveller and sufferer, but also the paradigmatic liar. At one point, the narrator states that his own experiences are similar to, or even beyond, Odysseus’ ‘address to Alcinous’ (*Or.* 48.60); and the phrase used here (*Alkinou apologon*) had since Plato become proverbial for unsubstantiated self-vaunting (*Pl. Rep.* 614b).<sup>12</sup> Later, he refers to an episode in the same tale as a ‘kind of *Odyssey*’ (48.65). He is alluding primarily to the element of shipwreck in the narrative, but it is impossible to exclude a more self-conscious, and self-subversive, reading. At another point in the same tale, he receives a visitation from Athena, who tells him that the *Odyssey* is not a collection of ‘myths’, but that she would help him as she helped Odysseus and Telemachus (42). This assertion is finely balanced: is the *Odyssey*, like the *Sacred Tales*, in fact true despite its *prima facie* implausibility? Or does the equation of the two texts sow the seeds of doubts in the mind of discerning narratees?

The *Sacred Tales* pose a self-conscious challenge to sceptical narratees, reading against the grain. ‘As for what happened next, anyone who wants to believe, let him believe; but anyone who does not, be off with him!’ (49.40). This is a playfully coercive narrative contract between narrator and narratees: the precondition for an appreciation of these marvellous tales is the willingness to suspend disbelief; but the very foregrounding of the requirement to credit the incredible also draws knowing attention to the strenuous demands made of the narratees. It is, in fact, impossible for the latter to attain the degree of familiarity, intimacy, and credulity that Aristides requires, precisely because he cleaves so closely to his role as narrative gatekeeper. His readers are constantly aware that the dream-world he constructs as anterior to the *Sacred Tales* is inaccessible in all its plenitude and richness, precisely because he underlines the mediatory effort involved in his translation of the dream-text into legible narrative.

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<sup>12</sup> Aristides himself uses the phrase with this meaning at *Or.* 36.88.

Aristides' *Sacred Tales*, then, mark a new stage in this history of biographical narrative, not because of the personal voice *tout court*, but because of the profoundly self-conscious dialogue between inner communion and narrative expression. Despite the extremely limited engagement with narratees, despite the repeated statements of *aporia*, despite the apparent rejection of formal markers of narrative (notably sequence), they do narrate; but what they narrate is constructed as non-narratable, beyond the limits of narrative form. In this respect, Aristides manifests a generic kinship not so much with other biographers, Xenophon, Plutarch, and Philostratus, as with such late philosophers as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, whose difficult, crabbed writing is presented as part of the very process of authorial self-scrutiny and self-correction.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> For the interiorizing turn of self-representation in the high empire, see esp. Foucault [1984] 1990: 39–68; Perkins 1995.



PART EIGHT

BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC



## CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

### DIO CHRYSOSTOM

*T.J.G. Whitmarsh*

Most of the orations of Dio Chrysostom pursue what has been called (broadly) a ‘moralizing’ agenda, in line with the author’s self-projection as a hardy, practical philosopher. His use of narrative to serve this end (finding an obvious precedent in Plato→) has been the focus of a certain amount of recent work; but, as commentators have stressed, there is also a strong current of irony, and indeed indulgent pleasure, running through his works, sometimes running contrary to the narrowly moralizing trajectory.<sup>1</sup> Dio pays sustained, and self-conscious, attention to the role of narration within his works, which emerges as a complex, devious and even morally ambiguous phenomenon.

Dio’s orations are designed for public performance, and the primary narratorial voice almost always reflects upon the speaker:<sup>2</sup> either ‘Dio’ himself presents autobiographical experiences as an internal narrator,<sup>3</sup> or we are dealing with a narratorial *alter ego*.<sup>4</sup> Most importantly, the narratives almost always at some level reflect analogically upon the pedagogical relationship between ‘Dio’ and his primary narratees: it is, as I shall call it, ‘metapedagogic’.

There are two principal literary contexts for Dionic metapedagogy. Firstly, a significant number of his texts are dialogues. Dialogic utterances are not necessarily ‘narrative’ in the conventional understand-

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<sup>1</sup> ‘... one typical trait ... [is] a degree of reticence, and the sense of narrative resourcefulness is held in check by an overriding moral responsibility’ (Anderson 2000: 143); see also Saïd 2000, who sees a less hierarchical relationship between the two elements.

<sup>2</sup> The exceptions are arguably *Orations* 28 and 29 on Melancomas, at least if they are to be read side by side: the primary narrator of 28, who states that he has never seen Melancomas (28.5), cannot be the narrator of 29, who claims to have been a close friend of his (29.1).

<sup>3</sup> Especially *Orations* 1, 7, 13, 36.

<sup>4</sup> Principally in orations 6 and 8–10, the ‘Diogenes orations’; but also in orations 53–55, on Homer and Socrates respectively, and in 56–57, which focus upon the role of Nestor.

ing of the term, but it is helpful to consider them in this context, partly because there are important overlaps with Dio's practice in more straightforwardly narrative contexts, and partly because (at the level of literary form) dialogue is so often interwoven with narrative: although some texts are 'straight' dialogue,<sup>5</sup> some frame the dialogue with an indication on the part of the primary narrator of where he heard it,<sup>6</sup> after the fashion of Plato's *Republic* (→).<sup>7</sup> Still others use dialogue to frame a central speech: the intriguing piece *Charidemus* (oration 30) uses a dialogic frame to report a deathbed oration by its subject (a structure derived from Plato's *Phaedo*);<sup>8</sup> while oration 74 begins as a dialogue (74.1), but the next 28 chapters adopt the form of an oration (with the frame unclosed at the conclusion).

In several of these dialogues, the dramatic scene is metapedagogical: the interlocutor plays the role of acquiescent narratee (55, 56, 67, 70), his function being to represent conventional opinion (*doxa*), offsetting the brilliant but deviant pedagogical narrator. In the sixtieth oration, the narrator early on secures the narratee's assent that they must speak 'contrary to the *doxa* of the many' (60.2). The responses of narratees may express shock at the narrator's challenges to received opinion ('What! Do you consider it the mark of insanity in a man to wish to be very highly prized and to amass great wealth?' 77/78.9), or 'amazement' (*thauma*) at his outlandish utterances (55.9; cf. in a non-dialogic context 80.1, where the narratees are said to express *thauma* at the solitary wandering of 'Dio'). The course of the dialogue can trace the 'conversion' of the narratee, most notably in oration 56, where the narratee's conclusion contains the observation that 'I am at last beginning to understand the drift of your argument'.<sup>9</sup> Of course, the assent of a 'metapedagogic' narratee does not guarantee that of a 'pedagogic' reader: one function of such all-too-acquiescent interlocutors may be, paradoxically, to inspire disagreement (and hence to develop the reader's critical autonomy). Elsewhere the narratee may be more feisty (especially in oration 60), though none aggressively challenges the

<sup>5</sup> *Orations* 14, 21, 23, 25, 26, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 67, 70, 77/78.

<sup>6</sup> *Orations* 15, 28, 36.9–15, 58.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. 'After coming up from the harbour ...' (28.1) / 'I went down yesterday to the Piraeus ...' (Pl. *Rep.* 327a).

<sup>8</sup> See Trapp 2000: 223–224; and esp. Moles 2000: 200–202 on the intertwined narrative voices.

<sup>9</sup> For 'conversion dialogues', or *logoi protreptikoi*, see Schäublin 1985.

pedagogical authority of 'Dio', as Thrasymachus does to Socrates in Plato's *Republic*, or Callicles and Polus in the *Gorgias*.

The principal vehicles for Dionic metapedagogy, however, are the exemplary stories, or 'parables' (as I shall call them), that percolate his oeuvre.<sup>10</sup> I shall begin by focusing upon the first four orations, which contain some of the most extravagant and intriguing examples. These so-called *Kingship orations* are assumed by most scholars to have been addressed to the emperor Trajan,<sup>11</sup> although it should be noted that the narratees of the second and fourth orations are covert (whereas the first and third are explicitly addressed to the emperor). Dio artfully varies his parabolic practice in these texts: the first oration is framed by two narratives, one an apparently traditional encounter between Timotheus and Alexander (marked as such by *phasi*, 'they say': cf. 'it is said that', 2.1; 'they say that', 4.1), the other a quasi-autobiographical presentation of a supposed event in Dio's life; the second and fourth orations consist of dialogues reported by a narrator, who asserts his presence in an opening frame; the third opens with a narrative about Socrates and the Persian, which is then revealed as a negative paradigm (3.2). All these narratives constitute attempts to use analogy to steer the primary narratee's ('Trajan's') reception of the primary narrator's ('Dio's') speech by providing paradigms of kingship, evaluated in accordance with the receptivity of the king in question towards philosophical learning.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, each (apart from the negative paradigm of the third oration) dramatizes the response, be it good or bad, of a secondary or tertiary 'narratee' to a 'narrator': the parabolic narratives construct an interpretative frame for the response of primary narrator to narratee. I use apostrophes for the secondary 'narrator' and 'narratee' because the situations alluded to are not always straightforwardly narrative. Not every presentation in the dialogues is narrative, on a strict definition.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup> I concentrate upon the richest examples, although Dio uses this device with great frequency: 1.1–3; 1.50–84; 2; 3.1–2; 4; 5; 7.1–80; 16.10; 17.13–18; 20.19–23; 21.4, 6; 43.4–6; 57; 58; 60.9–10; 62; 66.6. See also Saïd 2000: 171–174; → Lucian's parables. I shall not discuss here the various orations to the cities (orations 31–35) or those on civic matters (orations 38–51): although these are frequently in one sense narrative (defending one's conduct, for example, necessarily involves telling a story), they are more amenable to the techniques of rhetorical analysis than narratology.

<sup>11</sup> For bibliography and discussion of the problem of audiences, see Whitmarsh 2001a: 325–327.

<sup>12</sup> Moles 1990.

<sup>13</sup> → Introduction and → Plato for the argument that dialogue can be considered a form of narrative.



In the parable that opens the first oration, can we count the flautist, Timotheus, as a narrator, and his audience, Alexander, as a narratee? In the narrated dialogues of the second and fourth orations, do the moral points exchanged count as narrative?

In what follows, I have adopted generous definitions, because the metapedagogic strategy does depend fundamentally upon the distribution of narrator/narratee roles between the figures in the dialogue. In the fourth oration, for example, Alexander (serving on this occasion as a secondary narratee) responds passionately: 'He flushed and grew angry' (4.18); 'in fear' (4.26); 'he became upset and aggrieved' (4.49). Clearly, this can be taken as a negative paradigm for an imperial response to moral improvement (and indeed the description of Alexander's arrogant character that opens the oration has already prepared the way for this). This chimes with what we might suppose to be the primary frame for the delivery of this oration, i.e. Dio to the emperor. In the second oration, however, the responses of Alexander are not described, whereas those of Philip are: Philip 'laughs at' (2.13, 17) and 'teases' (2.19) Alexander; he also 'betrays awe' (2.7), 'something close to anger' (2.16), and 'delight' (2.79) at him. The ambivalent responses of Alexander's 'narratee' suggest perhaps that the target audience of the second *Kingship oration* is not Trajan but a Greek audience, who are being encouraged to consider their responses to Roman imperial power.<sup>14</sup>

In the complex parable that concludes the first oration, however, it is certainly a *narrative* (in the strict sense) that we are dealing with. 'Dio', functioning as internal narrator, promises a 'sacred and salutary story (*logos*) in the guise of a myth (*muthos*)' (1.49): in a sequence modelled on Socrates' encounter with Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*, he claims to have met with an Elean or Arcadian prophetess (1.50–84), who presented to him a narrative. The larger part of this secondary narrative consists of a version of the famous story of Heracles' choice, familiar from Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (2.1.21–34): Hermes guided Heracles to two mountains, one representing kingship and the other tyranny, and asked him to choose between the two (1.69–77). Hermes' advice makes him a tertiary narrator and Heracles a tertiary narratee. In this narrative, Hermes 'figures' the pedagogic role of the primary narrator, and Heracles that of the primary narratee, who is thus steered towards true

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<sup>14</sup> Whitmarsh 2001a: 204.

kingship (and simultaneously to a favourable reception of the present oration).<sup>15</sup> In this particularly ingenious text, then, the metapedagogic fiction analogizing the primary narrator–narratee relationship resides at the third level of narration, the secondary narration serving as a flamboyant, platonizing intermediary between the two.

Prior to this narrative, however, comes another, particularly sophisticated and knowing, engagement with the primary narratee. The prophetic prognosticates a future occasion when her (secondary) narratee ‘Dio’ will report the tale to ‘the ruler of many lands and peoples ... even if there will be those who will ridicule you as a rambling (*planēs*) wind-bag’ (1.56). This future-time narration maps onto the supposed narrative scenario in the present (‘Dio’ addresses the emperor). Even in this context, where there is no figuration, i.e. where the secondary narrator/narratee maps exactly onto the primary narrator/narratee, there is a protreptic directive: the negative response of deriding ‘Dio’ as a windbag is stigmatized and (ideally) defused. (The passage is also a joke, however: Dio the *planēs*, the ‘wandering philosopher’, often ironizes his own ‘wandering’ narrative style.)<sup>16</sup>

This playfully involved imbrication of primary and embedded narrative situations exemplifies nicely Dio’s manipulative narrative skill. It is arguable, however, that matters are even more complex than this. The fifty-seventh oration, *Nestor*, appears to be a preamble for a performance of one of the *Kingship orations* before a Greek audience: at any rate, it presents the narrative of Nestor’s speeches to Agamemnon as a parable for the ‘words I spoke before the emperor’ (57.11).<sup>17</sup> Whether all or any of the *Kingship orations* themselves were originally performed before Trajan we cannot tell for sure; the *Nestor*, however, means that we may have to refine our account of the narrative scenario of at least one of them. If prefaced by this text, the *Kingship oration* in question—that is, the sum of words addressed to the emperor—would itself become a secondary narrative, the imperial addressee (if we are dealing with the first or the third orations, which explicitly address the emperor) would become a secondary narratee, the parabolic narratives tertiary narratives, and what we have called the tertiary narratives of the first oration (assuming that is the oration in question) quartary narratives.

<sup>15</sup> Moles 1990.

<sup>16</sup> Whitmarsh 2001a: 160 n. 108.

<sup>17</sup> Whitmarsh 2001a: 327.

That this narratological complexity in Dio's parabolic narratives is artfully thought out should be clear enough from the examples above, but there are also passages where his practice is explicitly discussed. The sixtieth oration is a dialogue between (apparently) Dio and an unnamed interlocutor, interpreting the narrative of Nessus and Deianeira. The dialogue form was discussed above; for now I want to concentrate upon the closing speech of the interlocutor, who is permitted, almost exceptionally among Dio's dialogues, a remarkably vigorous challenge to Dio's interpretation:

By heaven, it seems to me not a bad or unconvincing [interpretation], either. And somehow or other I have the feeling that the method of some philosophers in dealing with their arguments resembles in a way that of the makers of figurines. For these craftsmen produce a mould, and whatever clay they put into this they form into the shape of the mould; and some of the philosophers before now have proved like that, with the result that whatever myth or story they take in hand, by tearing it to pieces and moulding it to suit their fancy they render it beneficial and suited to philosophy. (60.9)

The interlocutor's final speech, from which this passage is drawn, closes the dialogue without reply: the reader is left with an unresolved, and provocatively critical, assessment of Dio's parabolic practice. This is interesting in terms of the dynamics of the dialogue form: the combative rejoinder of the narratee (already pre-empted by his earlier expression of caution that 'We may destroy the myth', 60.30) ironizes the speaker's ('Dio's') moral authority, and steers primary narratees towards a more active engagement with his parabolic practice. It is notable also that this interlocutor is granted a certain narratorial authority by his magisterial use of simile himself: the comparison to a maker of figurines constructs him as a pedagogically competent figure.

A more explicit commentary on the function of parabolic narratives comes in the fifth, *Libyan*, oration. The larger part of this (5.5–27) is taken up with the narration of a supposedly traditional myth ('it is said that ...', 5.5), but the opening frame (5.1–5) explains the role of this narration. The primary narrator 'Dio' begins by observing that a 'myth' (*muthos*) at first sight does not provide promising material, but that 'subjects that are guided in the proper direction and act as parables for (*paraballomena*) true reality' provide no small amount of usefulness (*khreia*). The implicit connection here between *muthos* and pleasure, on the one hand, and *logos* ('rational account') and utility, on the other, is deeply embedded in Greco-Roman thought, going back via Stoic

theory at least to Thucydides (1.22.4). In the following passage (5.2–3), he compares his practice to agricultural grafting: he is attaching a ‘useful, edifying *logos*’ onto ‘useless myths’ (5.3). Framed by this explicit moralizing preamble, the myth of the sexy, siren-like serpent women of Libya who tempt men to their death, a brood later wiped out by Heracles, is easily decoded as an allegory of the conquest of sexual lust by philosophical hardiness (an explanation that is in any case made explicit at 5.23–24).

This programme is at first blush straightforward: the primary narratees are being directed towards moral improvement. The exposition of the myth, however, is more complex. The narrator’s promise to ‘gratify’ (*epikharizesthai*) the younger members of his audience with a little bit more mythologizing (5.24–27) ties up worryingly with the general emphasis upon the dangers of male lust within the narrative proper: the last story tells of two Greek ‘young men’ travelling in Libya, led onto a gruesome death by the sight of what they take as a sexy local harlot.<sup>18</sup> On this interpretation, the promise of exotic sexual pleasure to the young men within the narrative encodes an allegory for the promise of exotic narrative pleasure to the primary narratees, both false promises: pleasure is substituted in the first case by painful death, in the second by painful but salutary moral lesson. This interpretation cannot be a complete one, however, because it insists that narrative pleasure must necessarily be overmastered by moral vigour; whereas nothing can guarantee that primary narratees will not take pleasure in this pornographic snuff-movie of a parable. Unless the reader is truly Heracleian—and for Stoics, no man is truly wise—the beast within will survive the heroic moralizing.

The question of the pleasure of narratees is one of abiding interest to Dio, especially given his self-consciousness about the potentially uncongenial nature of his material. In several places, secondary narratees are used as a device to stigmatize negative responses to his moralizing. In the dialogue *Agamemnon or on kingship* (*Oration* 56), the Dionic figure begins by asking whether hearing about as ancient a figure as Agamemnon is likely to ‘annoy’ his interlocutor; the latter responds that he would not be aggrieved even if he were to hear of still older

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the two cases of an uncontrollable lust among male onlookers: 5.14, 26. The serpent women are presented in notably erotic terms (‘bosom and breasts’: 5.12, 14, 25); the myth has been justifiably compared (cf. now Anderson 2000: 155–156) to that of the alluring but deadly Vine-women and Ass-legs in Lucian’s *True stories* (1.8; 2.46).

figures, ‘providing I am likely to be improved’ (56.1). This commendable narratee rightfully puts instruction first. Analogously, the contumacious interlocutor of the sixtieth dialogue (*On Chryseis*), discussed above, is advised by the Dionic figure: ‘Do not be grouchy (*duskolos*) when you follow the argument’, advice to which his interlocutor explicitly accedes (60.2).

One important passage in connection with narrative pleasure comes in the eighth oration, *Diogenes or on virtue*. Orations 6 and 8–10 form a group of narratives presented by an external narrator focusing upon Diogenes the Cynic, each reporting a substantial speech uttered by Diogenes to unnamed individuals or masses in the cities. As so often in Dio, the relationship between secondary narrator and narratee reflects metapedagogically upon that between their primary counterparts. The external primary narrator’s voice is almost entirely covert, the occasional parenthetical *oimai* (‘I imagine’) constituting an isolated and hardly obtrusive exception (8.36; 9.1): in general, the *persona* of Diogenes is allowed to shade imperceptibly into that of the narrator, his near-homonym. The secondary narratees of the Diogenes orations (i.e. those addressed by Diogenes) stand for *doxa* (common opinion), the secondary narrator Diogenes (and implicitly the primary narrator ‘Dio’) for the radical voice of philosophical enlightenment. In general, the responses of secondary narratees are predictable enough, dramatizing the eccentric but powerful role of the philosopher: ‘some admired him ... to others he seemed crazy’ (9.8). But the eighth oration concludes in an interesting and unusual manner:

While Diogenes thus spoke, many stood around and listened to his words with great pleasure. Then, possibly being put in mind of the act of Heracles, he stopped speaking, squatted on the ground and performed an indecency. Immediately, the masses scorned him, and the sophists started up their din again, like frogs in a pond when they do not see the water-snake. (8.36)

In this case, the secondary narratees respond with pleasure ... and the secondary ‘narrator’—though it is hardly a narrative act he performs here—reacts by defaecating on the ground. Or, rather, by performing an *adoxon*, translated ‘indecency’ but also suggesting an affront to *doxa* or common opinion. The Augean stable that Diogenes attempts to clear out is the mistaken assumption, fostered by the sophists, that pleasure is the proper aim of language. As with the conclusion of the *Libyan oration*, this represents a coded threat to the primary narratees, warning them not to miss the water-snake concealed in his genial

narrative. At the same time, this closing narrative itself operates at a pleasurable, or perhaps seriocomic, level: it is an amusing twist to find defaecation used to establish a philosophical position after the sermon has been misinterpreted by the secondary narratees. This is a cunning joke on all who would wish to make sense of this oration: what sort of meaning does this shit have? Is it just a joke? Is there any metapedagogical value in it? What would be gained from treating the observers of this shit as secondary narratees? An ingenious double bind, then: pleasurable responses to narrative are stigmatized in a passage itself saturated with ludic narrative pleasures.

Some of Dio's parables are more complex. In the thirty-sixth (*Olbian*) oration, 'Dio' functioning as an internal primary narrator recounts to (according to the manuscripts) a Prusan audience about a journey of his to Olbia; embedded therein is a narrative that he claims to have presented as a secondary narrator to the Olbians. This consists largely of a tertiary narrative, a (Stoicizing) cosmic myth supposedly told by the Persian Magi (39–61), which completes the oration. The secondary narratees (the Olbians) are characterized as culturally ambiguous (they practise pederasty, 8; they like Homer, 9; they have beards and Homeric long hair, 17; but they wear trousers and Scythian garb, 7; and 'no longer speak Greek clearly', 9).<sup>19</sup> The metapedagogical role of the secondary narratees is not self-evident: do they preserve a true, vital Hellenism, unlike that artificially ossified by Roman conquest (cf. 17 for anti-Roman sentiment among the Olbians)? Or are they debased, barbarized Greeks, childlike in their lack of sophistication (cf. 10–11, where the secondary narrator 'Dio' recommends to them the simple, gnomic poet Phocylides)? The challenge, for the primary narratees, is to establish what is the relevance of the secondary narrative to them, and how to respond to the cues of the secondary narratees (since this will implicate their own cultural definition); that is, how the 'argument' function of the narrative relates to the 'key' function. This sense of uncertainty is characteristic of Dio's pedagogical style,

The famous eleventh (*Trojan*) oration is also in a sense a metapedagogic parable: the primary narrator 'Dio' claims to instruct his primary narratees (11.1), and to remove the *doxa* ('common opinion') from them (11.3). In line with his complaint elsewhere that only the intelligent few understand philosophy (cf. 5.1; 11.145; 60.2), he predicts a frosty

<sup>19</sup> See further Moles 1995; Trapp 1995.

response: 'I know you will all think that this is false, except the wise' (11.124). Yet for all that its narratorial voice is parasitic upon that of the moral parables, this oration is a *jeu d'esprit*. It purports to address narratees in contemporary Troy,<sup>20</sup> offering them the supposedly comforting suggestion that Troy was never captured, the Homeric texts being implausible fictions. The *Beglaubigungsapparat* that underpins this claim is a narrative, presented by 'Dio' functioning as internal narrator, about a trip of his to Egypt (11.37–124): a 'very old priest in Onuphis' (11.37), he reports, told him the true story about Troy (a device that looks knowingly to Hdt. *Hist.* 2.118–119). Homeric correction is, of course, rife in the literature of the empire, and Dio's contribution should be viewed in the context of the journals of Dictys and Dares, as well as Philostratus' *Heroic tale*.<sup>21</sup> A further consideration is the possible congeniality of Dio's revisionist account to Roman readers, the supposed descendants of Trojan Aeneas.<sup>22</sup> But ultimately, the oration acts not as a simple vehicle for Romanizing ideology, but as a ludic challenge to its primary narratees. The text begins with the observation that 'I am almost certain that while all people are hard to teach, they are easy to deceive' (11.1): a brilliantly playful ambiguity (will the following words teach or deceive?), which is only partially resolved by the narrator's subsequent insistence that he has the true account. This oration exploits the metapedagogic paradigm principally to pleasurable, ironical effect.

His most brilliant and celebrated moral parable comes in the seventh, *Euboean*, oration.<sup>23</sup> This is another autobiographical tale: 'I shall now relate events I saw myself, not things I heard from another' (7.1). The action is set on the island of Euboea, in 'practically the middle of Greece' (7.1): this marked location indicates to the readers that the narrative is to be paradigmatic of Hellenic values, while the surprising choice of Euboea (rather than, say, Athens or Delphi) as the near-centre figures the reversal of perspectives that 'Dio' will enforce upon his primary narratees. After a shipwreck, 'Dio' narrates, he was cast ashore in the Euboean wilderness, where he was given hospitality by a hunts-

<sup>20</sup> Seeck 1990; Anderson 2000: 152–153; Saïd 2000: 176–186.

<sup>21</sup> Esp. Merkle 1994: 194.

<sup>22</sup> That different versions of the myth will appeal to narratees of different cultures is a theme of this oration: 'You [Trojans] should be grateful and hear me gladly, for I have been zealous in defence of your ancestors' (5); 'there was some advantage in [believing the Homeric account] for the Greeks of those days [the time of the Persian Wars]' (147). For the 'Roman' theory, see Saïd 2000: 178–179, with references.

<sup>23</sup> Highest 1973; Russell 1992; Swain 1994; Moles 1995; Trapp 1995.

man. As they walk to his home, he becomes a (secondary) narratee: the huntsman tells him of his farming practices, and reports a visit to the town when he was charged with tax evasion. Within this secondary narrative, tertiary narration takes place: the huntsman and his prosecutor deliver speeches to the assembly (24–53); the huntsman is saved from the assembly's wrath by a certain Sotades, who narrates how he once benefited from the huntsman's hospitality (54–59). When the secondary narrative closes, 'Dio' reports that they reached the homestead, where he was well if simply entertained; presently, it transpired that the huntsman's daughter was to marry her boyfriend, the son of another cohabiting huntsman and the first huntsman's sister. The metapedagogical value of this narrative is then decoded, as it segues into a long, moralizing section about the superiority of rural over urban dwelling (7.81–152). The different parts of the oration are artfully interlinked. In the main autobiographical narrative, 'Dio' links his observations to aspects described in the secondary narrative;<sup>24</sup> while the narrative in places artfully foreshadows the moralizing section.<sup>25</sup>

As we have seen, Dio recurrently presents his narratives in terms of pleasure and utility. This particular example is framed by references to these principles. At the start, the narrator states that as an old man he recalls such events in his life 'not without pleasure' (*ouk ahēdōs*, 7.1); but at the conclusion of the narrative section, he states:

Now I have not narrated this entire story idly, or—as some might think—because I am a chatterbox, but to present a paradigm (*paradeigma*) of the manner of life I originally adopted, and of the lifestyle of the poor ...  
(7.81)

A parable that promised its primary narratees pleasure is revealed simultaneously to be paradigmatic of a larger moral argument about the superiority of rustic simplicity over urban decadence. Interestingly, in the present context, both the pleasure and the moral instruction (which are inextricably interlinked) are engendered by clashes of perspective between narrators and narratees. Dio's primary narratees are implicitly constructed as sophisticated urbanites, who are to be both

<sup>24</sup> See 64, where he jokes that the huntsman concealed 'the fairest of your possessions' (i.e. his vegetable patch) when he was being prosecuted; 68, where he asks whether this is the daughter who gave Sotades the cloak (cf. 58).

<sup>25</sup> Cf. 9: '[I found that] poverty is in reality a sacred and inviolable thing'; 65: 'I could not help deeming these people fortunate and thinking that of all men that I knew, they lived the happiest lives'. See also Swain 1994: 169.



amused by the extent of the rustics' naïveté and educated by their simple virtue. The narrator shuttles between the two perspectives, mediating between (and simultaneously embodying) the knowing intellect of the urbanites and the moral probity of the rustics.

On occasion, the pleasant humour is explicitly marked in the amused reaction of narratees at moments of miscomprehension between rustics and urbanites. In the huntsman's secondary narrative, his speech in the city (a tertiary narrative) is greeted with intermittent laughter (7.23, 24, 29, 30).<sup>26</sup> These occasions are not straightforward cues to the primary narratees, however: the aggressive and unsympathetic reaction of the city folk (tertiary narratees)<sup>27</sup> is offset against the more compassionate response of 'Dio' (the secondary narratee). Yet the events *are* amusing, and all the more so for that they are presented by a narrator (the huntsman) who remains apparently as ignorant as he was when the events took place (an issue to which we shall return). This is particularly evident when he narrates how he saw, 'square buildings on the walls' and 'ships peacefully moored as though in a lake' (7.22):<sup>28</sup> his naïve perspective upon two familiar phenomena of urban life, towers and harbours, is enclosed within and framed by the knowing perspective of the primary narrator/secondary narratee ('Dio') and primary narratees.

In the course of the narrative, the role of the internal narrator 'Dio' shifts from that of translator of an unfamiliar world—that is, a townsman interpreting the country for townsmen—to that of apologist for rustic values (and thus the concluding part of the narrative serves as a transition to the fiery moralism of the second part of the oration). At the beginning of the narrative, the character 'Dio' is cast as a powerless figure abandoned on the shore of an unfamiliar world (ever since the *Odyssey*, the shipwreck on the beach has been a familiar narrative topos). This powerlessness is cognitive as well as physical: 'Dio' the narrator recalls how he needed to make inferences from his surroundings. The presence of a deer lying on the beach and dogs barking on the cliff indicated to him that the deer had been forced over the cliff; the clothing of the man he subsequently met told him that he was a huntsman (7.4). As at the beginning of Heliodorus'

<sup>26</sup> The laughter at 64 and 68, on the other hand, is benign and non-aggressive.

<sup>27</sup> Characterized as a fickle 'mob' (*okhlos*, 7.23, 24, 29; *plēthos*, 30), whose reactions are easily manipulated by disreputable orators.

<sup>28</sup> The manuscripts transmit the glosses 'towers' and 'in the harbour' in these two phrases, but editors rightly delete them as marginal notes that have been incorporated into the text. See Russell 1992: 117.

*Aethiopica*, the primary narratees' knowledge of the scenario is built up inferentially: the internal narrator 'Dio' narrates according to his experiencing focalization, suppressing any *ex eventu* knowledge, and the narratees are dependent upon his interpretative powers.

By the conclusion of the narrative, 'Dio' is still apparently dependent upon the huntsman for an interpretation of the world: he wrongly suggests (with a misplaced laugh) that the rustics concealed their garden from the city folk (7.64). He assumes that the rustics will need the help of the rich in the village, when in fact the situation is more the converse (7.69); and he needs to ask a number of details about the arrangements for the wedding (7.70–72). There is, however, an important distinction to be drawn here between 'Dio' the agent in the story and 'Dio' the narrator: while the former may have been rooted in the town, the latter is (constructed as) an experienced traveller with a diverse range of cultural and phenomenal experience. One of the processes staged in this text is Dio's own transition from the blinkered city-man he was before his exile to the enlightened moralist and exponent of simple values he is at the time of narration. 'Dio' the agent is a naïf, needing instruction; 'Dio' the narrator, however, is a knowing figure, an instructor himself, closer to the huntsman. It is possible even that the huntsman (the secondary narrator) might be considered as an *alter ego* of 'Dio' (the primary narrator), a technique that looks back to Diotima in Plato's *Symposium*, or indeed the prophetess in Dio's first oration. It is also worth noting that none of the rustics is named: this too compounds the sense that they are fictitious paradigms of rusticity contrived to serve Dio's narrative purposes (and so the claim to autoptic experience that opens the oration would have to be read as an ironical play with a well-worn narrative formula, rather than a simple statement of fact). The *Euboean oration* relies upon the elegantly constructed distance between the perspective of the rustics and that of the townsfolk, but Dio himself shuttles artfully between the two, both engendering narrative irony and arrogating to himself moral authority.

Storytelling appears throughout Dio's corpus. Usually, as we have seen, it serves a metapedagogical function, analogizing the pedagogical relationship between primary narrator ('Dio') and his narratees. This metapedagogy, however, is not straightforward or self-evident; in fact, its instructive value may even be said to lie in its inculcation of critical skills that might allow primary narratees to negotiate the gulf between their situation and that of their second-, third- or fourth-order counterparts. Moreover, the role of metapedagogical presentations is compli-

cated by the narrator's stated awareness of the pleasurable seductions of narrative. The 'useful' effects of narrative never fully prevail over the 'pleasurable'. Rather than consider this philodiegetic impulse as a 'sophistic' dilution of 'philosophical' ideals (the dominant view since Philostratus, who includes Dio among the 'philosophers in the guise of sophists': *Lives of the sophists* 479, 492), it is preferable to conclude that Dio's narratives engage in a self-conscious, sophisticated, and (for sure) playful manner with the received theories of narration. His primary narratees, that is to say, are not simply to be instructed; or, perhaps better, they are not to be instructed *simply*. Narratees should think hard about narrative, and the role it plays in pedagogic communication.

## CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

### LUCIAN

*T.J.G. Whitmarsh*

Lucian's corpus is huge, heterogeneous, and complex: his narratives are invariably overlaid by fiction and role-play. One unifying strand, however, is the author's consistent *involvement* with his narrators and narratees.<sup>1</sup> In the major narrative texts, as conventionally defined, the primary narrator is always internal;<sup>2</sup> in the dialogues, a figure often appears at some point representing the *persona* of the primary narrator, 'Lucian' (there are some exceptions, which will be discussed below).<sup>3</sup> Lucian's narrators repeatedly foreground and problematize their own identities. Narration, for Lucian, is a self-disclosing, but also a self-concealing, act.

Let us begin by surveying the narrative forms we shall be considering in this chapter. Lucian's most celebrated narrative text is the *True stories*, a quasi-Herodotean account of the narrator's fantastic travels.<sup>4</sup> The narrator is identified as 'Lucian' (elsewhere the author's name only rarely intrudes into his works)<sup>5</sup> in an inscription towards the end (2.28), but this identification is subverted by the acknowledgment in the prologue that he made it all up: 'I had no true story to narrate, since

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this section, Lucian's corpus is taken to exclude the works of doubtful authorship transmitted under his name: *On the dancers* (as opposed to *On the dance*), *Philopatris*, *Charidemus*, *Nero*, *Timarion*, *Halcyon*, *Swift-footed*, *Lucius or the Ass*, and the epigrams.

<sup>2</sup> If we are excluding *Lucius or the Ass* (on grounds of inauthenticity). The *Demonax* (a quasi-biography of the philosopher) is at one level the presentation by an external narrator of a series of deeds and sayings of the philosopher, but at times the narrator becomes internal, when telling about his long experience as a student under him (cf. 1).

<sup>3</sup> The exceptions are the sophistic declamations, where the narrative situation is fictitious: *Phalaris* I (ambassador of the tyrant to the Delphians), *Phalaris* II (Delphian to his fellow-citizens), *The tyrannicide*, and *Disowned* (imaginary defendant to jurors).

<sup>4</sup> See Rütten 1997; Georgiadou and Larmour 1998; Fusillo 1999 and von Möllendorff 2000.

<sup>5</sup> Except in titles and paratextual apparatus, the name 'Lucian' appears only here and at *Alex.* 55; *Peregr.* 1; [ps.-Luc.] *Epigr.* 1 Macleod. See further Dubel 1994; Whitmarsh 2001a: 253; Goldhill 2002: 60–82.

nothing worth mentioning had ever happened to me; and consequently I myself turned to lying; but I am more honest about it than others are, for I will say one thing that is true, and that is that I am a liar' (1.4). This is a celebrated appropriation of Socratic nihilism, the ironic assertion that wisdom consists in knowing that one knows nothing.<sup>6</sup> In narratological terms, however, it also constructs a delicious paradox. The story is presented by an internal narrator, but one who deliberately rejects any claim to autopsy or personal experience (although autopsy is claimed in the text: e.g. 1.22—a Herodotean touch→). The internal narrator, then, discloses himself as (in a sense) external to the events described. The entirety will be 'meta-literary pastiche',<sup>7</sup> narration of 'things that I have neither seen nor experience nor heard tell of from anybody else: things, what is more, that do not in fact exist and could not ever exist at all' (1.4). The narrator claims to be motivated not, like Herodotus, by the desire to record true events, but by 'vanity', being 'eager to transmit something to posterity' (1.4). The primary narratees of the *True stories* are identified as 'those who take literature seriously' (1.1), an ironic vaunting of *spoudē* ('earnestness') in a self-professedly comic text (but also an index of the sophistication of the pastiche).

The text also employs embedded narratives, with 'Lucian' and his crew invariably as secondary narratees: Endymion's account of the battle between the sun and moon, presented in a mixture of direct and indirect speech (1.11–12); the autobiographies of the old man Scintharus in the whale (1.34) and Homer (2.20); the prophecy of Rhadamanthus (2.27); and the autobiographical letter of Odysseus to Calypso, the intended recipient, which is also discretely read by 'Lucian' (2.35–36). As one would expect from a text that has already jettisoned any pretence to realism, these narratives are also visibly angled towards primary narratees for comic effect: most notably in Odysseus' letter, where the received tradition, sanctioned by 'serious' literature, of like-minded mutuality between Odysseus and Penelope is subverted by Odysseus' expressed desire to run away to Calypso.

Next, there are three narrative texts on religion, which are also presented by internal narrators: *On the Syrian goddess*, *Alexander or the false prophet* and *Peregrinus*.<sup>8</sup> The first is another quasi-Herodotean narrative

<sup>6</sup> Pl. *Apol.* 21d; see Rütten 1997: 30–31; Georgiadou and Larmour 1998: 57–58.

<sup>7</sup> Fusillo 1999: 351–356.

<sup>8</sup> I exclude the 'diatribes', *On sacrifices*, *Astrology*, and *On funerals*, which are not in any strong sense narrative.

(the Herodoteanism this time signalled by the adoption of the Ionic dialect), an account of the cult of Atargatis at Syrian Hierapolis.<sup>9</sup> The narrator, who does not self-identify as ‘Lucian’—but does style himself ‘an Assyrian’ (*Syrian goddess* 1), i.e. a Syrian, like Lucian—claims to have derived his narrative partly from autopsy and partly (in the case of past events) from priests. In addition, there are (in the Herodotean style →) numerous non-specific reported narrators (‘they say’) substantiating his narrative throughout the text. The other two texts are satires on would-be religious leaders, and they share certain formal features. In both, the narrator self-identifies as Lucian (*Alex.* 55; *Peregr.* 1), both are addressed to a named narratee (Celsus in the *Alexander*, Cronius in the *Peregrinus*), but in both (as in the *True stories*) the narrator’s stance is playfully undercut. In the *Peregrinus*, additionally, secondary narration is employed. The narrator reports to his primary narratee (Cronius) his journey to the Olympic games, where he heard a certain Theagenes (a secondary narrator) rant in support of Peregrinus. The internal primary narrator here becomes a secondary narratee, and records his contemptuous response (5–6). Then a lengthy narrative is presented by an unidentified speaker (7–30). The secondary narratees include as well as the primary narrator the undifferentiated ‘bystanders’, who cheer for all the Cynics to be burned (31). Finally, a third secondary narrator—Proteus himself—gives a speech, but the primary narrator’s ability to report this is hindered by his inability to hear, i.e. by his ineffectiveness as a secondary narratee (32–33).

A third category are the *prolaliai* (or ‘introductory speeches’, which would probably have prefaced a longer performance): *Dionysus*, *Heraclēs*, *Electrum*, *Dipsads*, *Herodotus*, *Zeuxis*, *Harmonides*, and *The Scythian*.<sup>10</sup> In each of these, we may assume a suppressed primary narrator, ‘Lucian’, although there is no disclosure of the name. All of these texts include narratives, and the motivation for the narration is made explicit: the primary narratees—that is, the narratees of the primary narrator ‘Lucian’—are directed to view certain points of comparison between the situation in the narrative and the primary narrator’s own situation (*Dion.* 8; *Heracl.* 7; *Electr.* 6; *Dips.* 9; *Zeux.* 2–3; 12; *Harm.* 3; *Scyth.* 9). These narratives serving as ‘parables’ to reinforce the *captatio benevolen-*

<sup>9</sup> See Elsner 2001; Lightfoot 2003: 184–208.

<sup>10</sup> On these, see Branham 1985, recapped at Branham 1989: 38–46; also Nesselrath 1990.

*tiae* for the performances to follow.<sup>11</sup> Although this device is characteristically Lucianic (albeit paralleled in the works of Dio Chrysostom →), the manner in which the parable is introduced, i.e. whether at the start or the end, whether at length or briefly, whether constructed around an exegetical description of an artwork or not, varies widely.<sup>12</sup> Usually the primary narrator is external to these parabolic narratives, but *Heracles* and *Electrum* are ‘autobiographical’ and hence the narrator is internal.

The final and largest class of Lucianic narratives are the dialogues. It is questionable at the outset whether a simple distinction between narrators and narratees is helpful in the case of dialogues. It is arguable, and this is the assumption upon which I shall work, that dialogues *are* narratives, in that they constitute reports, the primary narrator of which is ‘Lucian’ (who is however entirely reticent), of conversations between interlocutors; these interlocutors become secondary narrators and narratees when narrative (rather than argument) is at stake.<sup>13</sup> Each interlocutor potentially plays the role of both narrator and narratee, even simultaneously (a narration by one character can represent a response to that of another).

In the case of Lucian’s dialogues, however, all interlocutors are not in every case equally valorized: the focal point of the text is often one individual, privileged interlocutor. This figure is frequently given a name that evokes, without replicating, the primary narrator’s (i.e. ‘Lucian’s’) identity: ‘Lycinus’ (in Greek ‘Lukinos’, while ‘Lucian’ is ‘Loukianos’), ‘The Syrian’, ‘Momus’ (the personification of ‘blame’, i.e. literary invective), ‘Parrhesiades’ (‘son of free-speaker’), ‘Cyniscus’ (‘Cynical’), ‘Menippus’ (see e.g. *Twice accused* 33 for Menippus as Lucian’s literary model), ‘Tychiades’ (‘son of fortune’, a traditional way of describing bastards and hybrids: see e.g. Soph. *OT* 1080). In these texts, which I shall call the *alter-ego* dialogues, the role of narrator is most often—though not exclusively—given to the *alter-ego* figure.

<sup>11</sup> A similar ‘parabolic’ function of narratives can be identified in *On the hall* 1 and *You are a Prometheus in words* 5, where however the externally narrated parable apologizes on behalf of the work in which it is included (rather than an impending speech). *The dream* also contains a parable (the relevance of which is decoded at 17–18), an internally narrated symbolic dream (modelled on Prodicus’ *Choice of Heracles* at Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–34), in which Sculpture (the usual translation, though ‘Artisanship’ might be better for *tekhnē*) and Education vie for the youthful narrator’s attention.

<sup>12</sup> Nesselrath 1990: 114–115.

<sup>13</sup> → Introduction, → Plato, and → Dio Chrysostom.

Among the *alter-ego* dialogues we may distinguish further between ‘mimetic’ and ‘narrative’ dialogues. In the first category, a dramatic situation is enacted (as in *Twice accused*, where ‘the Syrian’ is tried in the course of the dialogue; or *Hermotimus*, where Lycinus refutes the would-be philosopher), and in the second the *alter-ego* figure presents a narrative, which is responded to by a narratee. The first category includes the *Solecist*, *Zeus refuted*, the *Fisherman*, *Twice accused*, the *Parasite*, *Portraits*, *Defence of ‘Portraits’*, *Lexiphanes*, *Hesiod*, *Hermotimus*, the *Ship*, the *Cynic*. On the terms presented above, these dialogues are narratives, presented by a suppressed primary narrator, reporting conversations that are represented as having taken place. Given that there are no markers of primary narrative in the ‘mimetic’ dialogues (the primary narrator has no voice, and *a priori* the primary narratees cannot be acknowledged), however, it is the second category (consisting of *Nigrinus*, the *Symposium*, *Icaromenippus*, the *Lover of lies*, *Menippus*, and the *Eunuch*) that is of principal interest in this context. These ‘narrative’ dialogues are often fiendishly complex: behind the dialogue between the *alter ego* (functioning as secondary narrator) and his narratee lies another narrative level, presented by the silent primary narrator, ‘Lucian’. It is no coincidence that the *Symposium* belongs to this category, for the dominant literary model is of course Plato’s *Symposium* (→).<sup>14</sup> The complex, recessive structure of that text is arguably matched in one Lucianic text, the *Nigrinus*: a framing letter from the primary narrator (identified in the MSS as we have them as ‘Lucian’) to a primary narratee (Nigrinus) presents an embedded dialogue between two characters, one of whom tells about the effects of Nigrinus’ teaching.<sup>15</sup>

The distinction between mimetic and narrative is not entirely clear-cut, though. A number of ‘mimetic’ dialogues contain embedded narratives (*Fisherman* 29–37; *Twice accused* 26–29, 33, 34; at *In defence of ‘Portraits’* 1–12, the interlocutor Polystratus narrates the speech of Pantheia, i.e. his experience as a narratee). Conversely, in the ‘narrative’ dialogue the *Lover of lies*, Tychiades narrates an event that is itself in effect a dialogue (a debate on credulity between Tychiades and other interlocutors), except that the secondary narrator introduces speeches (e.g. 36:

<sup>14</sup> The *Euthydemus* and *Theaetetus*, which are also narrative dialogues, apparently interest Lucian less.

<sup>15</sup> Whitmarsh 2001a: 267; 269 on Plato *Symposium* and Lucian *Nigrinus*.



‘At this juncture, Arignotus the Pythagorean came in ...’). Even this feature, however, is in a sense ‘authentically’ dialogic: at any rate, it has a precedent in Plato’s *Republic*.

Not all of Lucian’s dialogues incorporate an *alter-ego* figure. Those that do not are uniformly mimetic: the *Consonants at law*, for example, which represents squabbles between various phonemes that have been ousted thanks to the drive towards linguistic Atticism.<sup>16</sup> As we have already seen, however, narrative elements can be found embedded in mimetic dialogues; most notably, for this group, in the *Dream or Cock*, where Micyllus narrates his dream (9–11) and the cock his prome-tempsychoic life (24–25).<sup>17</sup>

Two particularly interesting cases of ‘mimetic’ dialogue that do not feature *alter-ego* figures are the dialogues on cultural relativism, *Toxaris* and *Anacharsis*. Here, the theme of the dialogue is played out in the equal weighting given to the two participants, one Greek and one non-Greek.<sup>18</sup> *Toxaris* is of especial interest, because the dialogue revolves around the presentation of stories motivated by the desire to proclaim the superiority of friendship in one culture or the other. The roles of narrator and narratee are thus exchanged in accordance with a formal sequence. At the same time, the culturally determined position of the external primary narratee (with whom the Greek reader will identify) is brought into play, since only the Scythian Toxaris includes ethnographic information upon his culture’s practices (‘It is not the Scythian habit ...’, 35; ‘I wish to tell you how we make our friends’, 37; ‘our custom is ...’, 48).

Ultimately, however, too firm a distinction should not be drawn between the dialogic and non-dialogic works of Lucian: there is a substantial degree of crossover between the roles of narrators and narratees in both. We have already mentioned the extreme example of the *Lover of lies*, where the (secondary) narrator presents a narrative that constitutes a ‘virtual dialogue’. In two other ‘narrative’ dialogues, a

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the *Downward journey* (although the figures Micyllus and Cyniscus, who appear briefly, have *alter-ego* characteristics), *Zeus rants*, the *Dream or Cock*, *Prometheus*, *Timon*, *Charon*, the *Sale of lives*, the *Judgement of the goddesses*, *Anacharsis*, the *Runaways*, *Toxaris*, *Saturnalia*, the *Dialogues of the dead*, the *Dialogues of the sea-gods*, the *Dialogues of the gods*, the *Dialogues of the courtesans*, *Gout*—if this last, a paratragic drama, is to be counted as a dialogue.

<sup>17</sup> Other narratives can be found at *Zeus rants* 15–18 (featuring an internal narrator), *Prometheus* 7–19 (internal narrator), and *Runaways* 12–21 (external narrator).

<sup>18</sup> Branham 1989: 104.

figure appears who might arguably represent the *alter-ego persona* of a dialogue: Nigrinus, in the presentation of his speech in the eponymous text (already, as we have noted above, doubly embedded, by a letter and a dialogue) and the unidentified secondary narrator of the *Peregrinus*.<sup>19</sup>

How do the secondary narrator–narratee relationships steer the reception of the text by primary narratees? To answer this question we must look first to the ‘narrative’ dialogues, to see how the secondary narratees respond to the *alter-ego* secondary narrator. The simplest use of secondary narratees is to prompt for information (e.g. *Menippus* 8: ‘What was his object in that?’) or to draw attention to specific points of importance (e.g. *Symposium* 38, where, cued by the narrator, the narratee agrees to ‘remember’ a detail). A more complex function is to express awe or pleasure, serving to construe the narrative as an object of desire.<sup>20</sup> The secondary narratee in *Icaromenippus* asks for the ‘end’ (*telos*) of the story, complaining of his suspense (3; cf. 11; 16; *Men.* 2). The most extravagant example comes in the *Nigrinus*, where a speech by the philosopher Nigrinus is presented in a two-way dialogue, which is itself presented in a letter from ‘Lucian’ to ‘Nigrinus’. The unnamed secondary narrator within the dialogue states his own response (as in effect a tertiary narratee) to Nigrinus’ speech: spellbound, speechless giddiness (35). This response is then transmitted back down the narratorial chain to the secondary narratee in the dialogue like rabies (in the text’s arresting simile, 38; cf. *Lover of lies* 40).<sup>21</sup> In these cases, the proposed value of the narrative is marked by the pleasurable responses of the (tertiary and secondary) narratees. The *Symposium* playfully inverts this *topos*. The (secondary) narrator Lycinus piously refuses to tell the shameful story; but his interlocutor, instead of begging him to do so (as at *Menippus* 2), accuses him of putting on an act, claiming that ‘I know that you are much more keen to talk than I to listen’ (4)!

Turning now to the ‘mimetic’ dialogues, here narratees can steer the primary narratee’s responses, too. In *Twice accused* (32) and the *Fisherman* (38), the legal acquittal by the narratees of the Syrian / Parrhesiades vaunts the proper social function of literary satire. *Hermotimus*

<sup>19</sup> For this point in relation to *Nigrinus*, see Whitmarsh 2001a: 270–271; in relation to *Peregrinus*, Harmon 1936: 8–9 n. 2.

<sup>20</sup> See also *Jup. trag.* 3–4; *Downward journey* 16–17.

<sup>21</sup> See Whitmarsh 2001a: 277–278.

concludes with the tearful enlightenment of the narratee (and erstwhile philosopher, 83), again marking the victory of satirical scepticism (this time over dogmatism).

An important aspect of this steering is the role of laughter. When narratees laugh, they join with ‘Lucian’ or his *alter ego*, united against a common target: the text thus effects a reincorporation of community through satirical mockery. This community-defining function of satire is made explicit in the ‘mimetic’ dialogue the *Fisherman*, where the philosophers begin by joining ranks against Parrhesiades (the *alter-ego* figure), but conclude by joining with him in condemning the false philosophers. In *On sacrifices*, the narrator opens by predicting that his readers will ‘laugh at the stupidity’ of sacrifices (1), and concludes that such practices ‘need a Heraclitus or a Democritus, one to laugh at people’s ignorance, the other to lament their folly’ (15). In *Peregrinus*, likewise, the primary narrator (‘Lucian’) states that ‘I imagine that you’—that is, his primary narratee, Cronius—‘are having a hearty laugh ...’ (2; cf. 37, 45).<sup>22</sup> The laughter of his narratee is matched by that of the unnamed figure within the narrative ‘Lucian’ tells, who laughs both *qua* secondary narratee (i.e. in response to the overblown secondary narrative of the Cynic Theagenes, reported by ‘Lucian’: 7) and *qua* secondary narrator (at the conclusion of his own narrative: 31). ‘Lucian’ also reports his own laughter (*qua* secondary narratee) in response to the overblown devotion of the Cynics (33). The laughing narratees also figure in the dialogues, both as an interlocutor in a ‘narrative’ dialogue (*Eunuch* 6) and as an embedded narratee in a ‘mimetic’ dialogue (*Downward journey* 16–17). By interlinking all such figures through the motif of laughter, the boundaries of a satirical community are reinforced. Friendship, for Lucian, is dependent upon the identification of a common enemy.

One of the fundamental constituents of the satirical society is *philia*, ‘friendship’. The narrator frequently addresses his narratee(s) as ‘my friend(s)’ (e.g. *Alex.* 1; *Zeux.* 1; *Dips.* 9; cf. *Fisherman* 38–39, the acquitted Parrhesiades is now counted as a friend by the formerly hostile philosophers); this form of address manifests the subtle bond of complicity shared by all subscribers to satirical laughter. In other contexts, the narratee can be an enemy: *An apology for a slip in greeting* and *Against an une-*

<sup>22</sup> Arguably, matters are even more complex: ‘Lucian’ and ‘Cronius’ are in fact secondary narrator and narratee, the *Peregrinus* as a whole being the implicit report (by ‘Lucian’ to his readers) of that narrative situation.

*educated book-buyer* are addressed to a hostile figure, whether (in the case of the first) one who has initiated the aggression or (with the second) one who has merited the narrator's mockery. The satirical dynamics, however, are not fundamentally different in these cases: the entire work is implicitly a narrative by (the primary narrator) 'Lucian' to primary narratees (with whom the real readers may identify) of his (*qua* secondary narrator) clever put-downs to his explicit addressee (secondary narratee). The primary narrator is inviting his unaddressed primary narratees to join him in friendship against an inimical target (secondary narratee). The existence of such primary narratees is in fact acknowledged in *An apology for a slip in greeting*, which concludes with a fear that 'some' may think that he deliberately made the slip in order to have a pretext to write the apology (19). He proceeds to express to his narratee—now ironically styled 'my best friend' (*philtate*) Asclepius—his hope that 'all' may receive this work as the beginning of an *epideixis* ('showpiece'), not as a defence-speech. In this indirect appeal to other narratees, it is revealed that the explicit narratee is not (of course) the only destined recipient of the text.<sup>23</sup>

In other contexts, a difference in perspective can emerge between narrator and narratee, despite their friendship. In the 'parabolic' narratives, the narrator characteristically distances his own views of his work from those attributed to his narratees. When he has presented the story of his allegorical dream, the narrator of *On the dream* reports that one of his narratees has interrupted his speech with the comment, 'Heracles! What a long and legal-sounding speech!'; another has compared it to a winter dream, calling it 'an idle tale' full of 'pointless yarns' (17).<sup>24</sup> The principle function of these responses is to attempt to steer the reception of the text, by defusing criticism. Although these interjections are subsequently corrected by the narrator ('No, my friend', 17), they are nevertheless allowed to resonate, providing an ironic, playful alternative reading of the narrative. In *Zeuxis*, likewise, a 'wrong' reading is simulta-

<sup>23</sup> Also evident from e.g. *Alex.* 61; and the *Apology*, which is addressed to a different narratee (Sabinus) than the text for which it apologizes (*On salaried posts*). *Apology* 15 is of interest, though, because there the narrator states that Sabinus is the only narratee whose opinion he values ('As for the rest, even if they all condemn me unanimously, I shall be content to quote "Hippocides doesn't care"'). This passage should not, however, be read 'straight', but as a 'performance' of a close friendship between narrator and narratee, and thus as a paradigm of satiric incorporation.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. the narratee implied by the narrator's rhetorical question at *Hippias* 1: 'Why have I said all this? It was not out of an ill-timed desire to air my knowledge of history ...'

neously acknowledged and defused. The narrator begins by telling how after a performance to ‘you’, he was waylaid by ‘many’ of the audience, who praised his speech for its innovative qualities: ‘Heracles, what novelty! What marvellous paradoxes! How inventive he is! The freshness of his thought is beyond compare!’ (1). This response, however, displeased the narrator, who is (he states) proud of his fidelity to tradition as well as his innovation (2), and the subsequent, parabolic narratives are explicitly pointed to exemplify this point. At the conclusion, we return from the narrative to the frame, with the narratorial comment that he is confident of their responses because ‘you are real artists and examine each detail with craftsmen’s eyes’ (12). This is the same audience he was earlier chiding for their limited grasp of his ambitions: the narrator is simultaneously allowing for the possibility of ‘misreading’ and protreptically directing his primary narratees towards the ‘proper’ interpretation.

These ‘wrong’ responses also serve a wider purpose in siting the narrator as a marginal, deviant figure, as against the ‘normal’ expectations of society. In a number of texts, narratees play the ‘straight’ role to offset the ostentatiously eccentric satirical narratorial *persona*. This can be a reasonably simple prompt on the part of the narratee for explanation (common in the narrative dialogues).<sup>25</sup> In the dialogue *Menippus*, the narratee’s question as to whether those who were powerful when alive have more honour among the dead is answered by a curt ‘Nonsense!’ (17): the narratee’s conventional assumption is displaced by the privileged, Cynic view. In the *Symposium*, the device is used in a slightly different way: the narratee interrupts, presuming that the address delivered by Hetoemocles was a praise of the bride or wedding-song, to which Lycinus replies: ‘Of course, we ourselves expected something of the sort, but it was far from that ...’ (21). Here it is not that the narrator has a truer perspective (because he previously shared the traditional expectation), but that narrator (at the time of the narrative) and narratee are alike educated in the vanity of philosophical pretension.

In such cases, the narrator is the winner, and the narratee constructed as foolishly naïve. But in other contexts, the narrator is himself ironized. This is most obviously the case in the *True stories*, where (as we saw above) the advertisement at the start of narratorial lying undercuts any credibility that the subsequent narrative might have had.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. also the ‘virtual’ narratees of *Hipp.* 2; *Dion.* 5; *Alex.* 21; *You are a Prometheus* 1.

It is also conspicuous in the case of the *Teacher of rhetoric*, where the narratorial *persona* adopted is that of a rhetorician advising his youthful charge to take short-cuts, and not to bother with the technicalities of learning. Other cases are subtler, however. The narratee of *Icaromenippus* expresses, as we noted above, pleasure in listening; but he also complains at the implausibility of the narrator's trip to the heavens (12). Responses of 'wonder' (*Men.* 1; *Ship* 9) are necessarily ambiguous: a sign that the narratee is impressed, for sure—but perhaps also incredulous?<sup>26</sup>

Subtler still is the *Alexander*, where the close relationship between narrator (identified as 'Lucian') and narratee (identified as 'Celsus') threatens to expose itself as a self-serving bond of complicity.<sup>27</sup> The two are presented as sharing fundamental values: they both are to feel 'shame' at the story of Alexander (2); they both are to look down upon 'those accursed Paphlagonians' (11), 'thick and uneducated people' (17). Shared values are further hinted at by statements such as 'You see what sort of school the man that I am describing comes from!' (5). 'Lucian' and his narratee would, of course, never display the gullibility of Alexander's provincial victims: 'As a matter of fact, this trick, to a man like you, and if it is not out of place to say so, like myself also, was obvious and easy to see through, but to those drivelling idiots ...' (20). The complicity of narrator and narratee, however, is arguably satirised. Not only is Epicureanism (to which both are said to devote themselves: 61) elsewhere mocked by Lucian, but also the progress of Alexander's cult from the margins to the imperial court in the centre sends up the anti-provincial snobbery appealed to by the narrator.

It is instructive to observe, in conclusion, that two of the texts in which the narrator's voice is most ingeniously ironized, namely the *True stories* and *Alexander*, are the two texts in which the narrator self-identifies as 'Lucian'. Narrators are never to be taken at face value in Lucian's writing, especially when they lay claim to transparency. Lying narrators feature heavily in his corpus, whether traditional poets (*Men.* 2; *Jup. trag.* 39–40; *Sat.* 5–6; *Hesiod passim*) or contemporary frauds (cf. esp. *Lover of lies passim*), but the echo chamber of satirical voices proffered in response is no more veridical. Lucian the self-confessed cultural outsider, the self-constructed literary scandal, refuses the terms (plausibility, realism, autopsy) of traditional narrative—while happily mobilizing critiques against other traditional or contemporary nar-

<sup>26</sup> → Herodotus and Philostratus.

<sup>27</sup> My views on the *Alexander* have been influenced by Julie Lewis.

ratives on precisely these terms.<sup>28</sup> At one level, this is an aspect of Lucian's satirical, Socratic, negative epistemology: true knowledge lies in destroying the illusion of knowledge.<sup>29</sup> At another level, however, the debunking of narratorial authority is an act of cultural self-positioning, a self-conscious projection of the author's knowingly oblique perspective on Greek culture. Identity (whether cultural or narratorial) is for this author always an issue, and also a problem, a resource, and a game.

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<sup>28</sup> Esp. *True stories* 1.3–4; also *How to write history* 29 on autopsy.

<sup>29</sup> Rütten 1997: 30–31.

PART NINE

THE NOVEL





## CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX

### CHARITON

*J. Morgan*

*Callirhoe*, probably the earliest fully extant Greek novel, is narrated by an omniscient external primary narrator, who is the most obtrusive of his kind in the extant genre. His frequent appearances in the text enable us to characterize him, and his covert narratee, with some precision. He addresses his narratee directly, in the second person, on only two occasions: at 5.8.2 he says, of a particularly dramatic scene, ‘you would have thought you were in a theatre’,<sup>1</sup> and at 8.6.11 he implicates his narratee in the appreciation of the heroine’s beauty: ‘you truly would have thought you were looking at Aphrodite herself as she rose from the sea’. Nevertheless, the features noted in this chapter imply a more or less continual interaction.

The narrator introduces himself in a short prologue:

My name is Chariton, of Aphrodisias,<sup>2</sup> and I am clerk to the attorney Athenagoras. I am going to tell the story (*diēgēsomai*) of a love affair that took place in Syracuse. (1.1.1)

However, on several occasions he uses the present tense of institutions of the Persian Empire, as in the following example:

Persia can mobilize its forces very easily. The system has been in force since the time of Cyrus, the first king of Persia. It is established which nations have to supply cavalry for a war, and how many; which are to supply infantry, and how many; who is to supply archers; how many chariots each people is to supply (both ordinary and scythed); where elephants are to come from, and how many; and from whom money is to come, in what currency, and how much. Everybody participates in these preparations, and they take no more time than one man takes to get ready. (6.8.6 –7)

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<sup>1</sup> Quotations are taken from the translation by B.P. Reardon, in Reardon 1989, with a few minor alterations.

<sup>2</sup> It has been suggested that ‘Chariton of Aphrodisias’ is a pseudonym (which would cleanly separate the narrator ‘Chariton’ from the author ‘x’), but although it is almost

This locates his voice in the period before the conquests of Alexander, about four hundred years before the novel was actually written, and about two hundred years before the city he claims as his home was founded. The narrator is thus fictitiously configured as more or less contemporary with the events he relates, in the manner of the Athenian Xenophon (→).<sup>3</sup> His *persona* as a contemporary historian also perhaps accounts for his eschewal of cheap literary effects of surprise and suspense: he tends to keep his narratee fully informed of what is happening. So, to take an example which will enable comparison with the other novelists, when the heroine is presumed dead and buried in her family's tomb, the narrator has already told us that she is only unconscious (1.4.12–15.1). Similarly, events leading to the reappearance of the hero and the final recognition and reunion of the protagonists are also fully conveyed to the narratee. The one major exception to this 'historiographical' manner is the heroine's pregnancy, which is not revealed until she herself becomes aware of it.

The fullness of the information he provides extends beyond what a normal 'historian' could have offered. The narrator has access to events on the divine plane, and can tell us of the agency and motives of Eros in getting the story started, and of Aphrodite in bringing it to its conclusion:

Eros intended to make a match of his own devising ... Eros likes to win and enjoys succeeding against the odds. He looked for his opportunity and found it as follows. (1.1.3)

Aphrodite thought this too harsh; she was growing less angry with him. At first she had been incensed by his misplaced jealousy: she had given him the fairest of gifts ... and he had repaid her kindness with arrogance. But now ... Aphrodite took pity on him; having harassed by land and sea the handsome couple she had originally brought together, she decided now to reunite them. (8.1.2–3)<sup>4</sup>

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too appropriate for a romantic novelist to be true, both the proper names in this opening sentence are epigraphically attested at Aphrodisias.

<sup>3</sup> Also 5.1.3, 5.2.2, 5.4.5, 5.9.1, and possibly 4.6.1 if the MS reading *dokei* is retained. The last example talks of one of the minor characters in the story as still alive, fixing the narrator close to the dramatic date in the fourth century BC. In addition he makes some generalizing comments on the nature of barbarian despotism which are more appropriate to the narrator's than to the author's date (5.2.6, 6.5.10).

<sup>4</sup> Similarly 2.2.8, 2.4.5, 2.8.3, 3.3.8, 4.5.3, 6.8.1 (Fortune), 3.2.17 (the evil spirit), 3.3.10, 3.4.7 (Providence), 3.4.10 (some avenging spirit), 3.9.4, 4.7.5, 6.4.5, 6.7.1 (Eros), 8.3.6 (the god). In isolation some of these could read as metaphor, but others are so

He can also take us inside the minds and hearts of his characters and tell us, as objective fact, what they thought or felt. For example, at 1.12 we are told that the pirate Theron acted out of rapacity not humanity; that he did not judge it prudent to look openly for a buyer for Callirhoe; that he was afraid to approach someone eminent; then that he could stand the delay no longer; there follow an interior monologue and a dream. Quite often the narrator will draw attention to the truth behind appearances:

The majority advised the opposite course, partly on the grounds that Callirhoe's father had done the royal household no little service, and also because this was not a separate case that he was bringing to his court, but virtually part of the case already before him. They did not want to admit the real reason—that they could not tear themselves from the sight of Callirhoe's beauty. (5.8.7)<sup>5</sup>

An important by-product of this omniscience is a recurrent and explicit emphasis on dramatic irony: the narrator and the narratee always know more than the characters, as when Callirhoe builds a cenotaph for her husband which

was like her own tomb in Syracuse in all respects—shape, size, costliness—and like hers it was built for someone who was still alive! (4.1.6)<sup>6</sup>

One major function of the highly visible narrator is to articulate the structure of the story. Following his introductory appearance, he makes major re-entries to sign a switch between narrative threads, when he leaves the heroine at her second wedding in Miletus and backtracks in time to pick up events in Syracuse following her abduction from the tomb (3.2.17, 'how he did so I shall tell shortly; first I want to relate what happened in Syracuse during the same time'); at the exact half-way point of the text, when he makes a lengthy summary of the story so far, and moves forward into the second half of the novel (5.1.2, 'This has all been set out in the story so far. Now I shall describe what happened next'); importantly at the beginning of the last book, where he makes another recapitulation and looks forward to the resolution of the plot (8.1.1ff., discussed below); and at the very end to round the

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precise and personal (even when the reference is to a personified abstraction) that they can only be taken as a literal report of the activities of an anthropomorphic divinity.

<sup>5</sup> Similarly 2.5.12, 5.9.7, 6.9.4 (expanded with a pseudo-interpretive deduction, 'In fact I rather think ...').

<sup>6</sup> Compare, for example, 3.4.18, 4.1.1, 4.2.1, 8.1.2.

whole thing off (8.8.16). Less prominent narratorial interventions mark the operation of Chariton's interlace technique.<sup>7</sup>

He is also active in guiding the narratee's response. Sometimes this is done quite overtly, as in the section at the beginning of the last book, which gives us important pointers as to his, and his narratee's, system of values. After saying that 'Fortune was minded to do something as cruel as it was paradoxical', he points up the irony inherent in events: 'Chaereas was to have Callirhoe in his possession and fail to recognize her; while taking others' wives on board his ships he was to leave his own behind.' Finally he comments on the pleasure that will be derived from the story's happy ending:

And I think that this last chapter will prove very agreeable to its readers: it cleanses away the grim events of the earlier ones. There will be no more piracy or slavery or lawsuits or fighting or suicide or wars or conquests; now there will be lawful love and sanctioned marriage. So I shall tell how the goddess brought the truth to light and revealed the unrecognized pair to each other. (8.1.4–5)<sup>8</sup>

The ultimate point of telling and reading this story then is for pleasure; and its most pleasurable part is concerned with happy love, though there is at least an implicit recognition that the happy ending owes its effect to the preceding tensions.

This is not the only place where the narrator comments on the nature of his own story. The paradoxicality highlighted in this passage is similarly drawn to the narratee's attention when Fortune throws Callirhoe's pregnancy into the equation (2.8.3–4, 'an unexpected, indeed incredible state of affairs. How she did it is worth hearing'), when Theron's ship is discovered with Callirhoe's grave goods (3.4.1), and when the protagonists are reunited (8.1.9). The novelty of the situation is emphasized when Chaereas prosecutes himself in court (1.5.4), or when Persian spoils arrive at Syracuse in peacetime (8.6.12). At climaxes the narrator is not content to let the drama of the situation speak for itself; rather he makes sure that the narratee appreciates the full effect. A prime example of such self-advertisement, featuring the '*aporia*' motif, is when Chaereas makes his unexpected appearance at the law court in Babylon:

Who could fitly describe that scene in court? What dramatist ever staged such an astonishing story? You would have thought you were in a the-

<sup>7</sup> As at 3.7.1, 7.4.11, 7.6.1, 8.6.1; see Hägg 1971: 139–154.

<sup>8</sup> The idea of cleansing is a faint echo of Aristotle on tragedy; cf. Rijksbaron 1984.

atre full of emotions beyond number: all were there at once—weeping and rejoicing, astonishment and pity, disbelief and prayers. How happy all were for Chaereas! How glad for Mithridates! For Dionysius, how sorrowful! ... I think the King himself, at that moment, would have liked to be Chaereas. (5.8.2–3)

Another such example is when the protagonists, safely returned home, are theatrically displayed to the populace of Syracuse:

Thunder never so stunned the ears nor lightning the eyes of those who beheld them, nor did anyone who had found a treasure of gold ever cry out as did that crowd then, when beyond all expectation they saw an indescribable sight. (8.6.8)

A recurrent trope in such passages is a rhetorical question, addressed to the narratee, usually making the point that it is impossible for any writer to do justice to the material. This protocol is established very early when a Syracusan assembly raises the question of the protagonists' marriage: 'Who could describe that assembly? It was dominated by Eros' (1.1.12).<sup>9</sup>

These rhetorical questions have no expressed addressee, but must be read as part of the narrator's communication with his narratee. We turn now to other aspects of this communication. If the narrator occasionally aims a question at his narratee, there are many places where the questioning goes in the other direction, as it were. Although the primary narratee is perforce without a voice, the narrator's habit of inserting explanatory parentheses can only be for the narratee's benefit, a pre-emptive response to an implicit request for clarification. So, for example, Theron is surprised at the size and luxury of Dionysius' country residence; whereupon the narrator inserts a syntactically independent aside ('it was in fact [*gar*] equipped to receive the king of Persia', 1.13.1) before continuing with the narrative and the structure of the sentence he has just interrupted, almost as if he had seen his narratee raise a questioning eyebrow.<sup>10</sup>

The passage from the beginning of Book 8 has already demonstrated the narrator and narratee's shared taste for romantic and exciting stories. Similar shared values are also apparent in the many generalizing and normative *sententiae* with which the narrator litters his text. The function of these is twofold. First, they naturalize the story by grounding it in a description of the real world acceptable to both nar-

<sup>9</sup> Similar rhetorical questions at 1.6.2, 4.1.11, 8.1.14, 8.4.1.

<sup>10</sup> Other examples are at 1.14.1, 2.1.5, 3.1.2, 5.3.5, 5.8.1, 7.1.3.

rator and narratee; second, they invoke that shared perception of reality as explanation or motivation, as indicated by an appropriate connective participle. To take two examples: after Chaereas accuses his wife of enjoying a riotous party in his absence, the narrator continues:

But lovers are easily reconciled; they gladly accept any justification from each other; and so (*oun*) Chaereas changed his tone and began to talk winningly to her, and his wife welcomed his change of heart. (1.3.7)

Or when Dionysius renounces the use of force against Callirhoe, the narrator adds:

But for all that he did not give up hope of winning Callirhoe over, for (*gar*) Love is naturally optimistic. (2.6.4)<sup>11</sup>

A similar effect is achieved when Eros is described as ‘a cruel tyrant’ (4.2.3); when the narrator comments on typical Greek curiosity (4.5.4), contrasts Greek spirit with barbarian servility (6.4.10) or talks of the ‘innate superstition that barbarians feel towards the royal title’ (7.6.6). In every case the effect depends on an appeal to a community of experience that secures the reader’s consent to the fiction (turns a real-life reader, in other words, into the narratee which the text constructs). A similar effect is achieved at a rather more prosaic level (dependent on general knowledge rather than shared moral values or literary taste) when the narrator digresses at some length and in the present tense on the national character and geographical location of Tyre (7.2.7–8).

The shared value system is operative also in the many evaluative judgments that the narrator makes as his story proceeds. He is not an objective reporter, but his judgments define the narratee to whom they are acceptable as much as the narrator who passes them. So the heroine is introduced as a ‘wonderful girl’ (1.1.1), and the villain Theron as a ‘scoundrel’. As the trial at Babylon begins to decide which of Callirhoe’s two husbands will get to keep her, the narrator comments:

But the prize was not a wreath of wild olive or fruit or pine, but supreme beauty, for which the gods themselves might fitly have contended. (6.2.2)

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<sup>11</sup> Similar *sententiae* occur at 1.4.2, 3.3.16 (connected by *oun*); at 3.2.6, 3.4.13, 3.9.3, 6.4.3, 6.5.1, 6.5.5, 7.1.4, 8.6.5 (connected by *gar*); at 5.2.6, 5.8.4 (connected by *hōste*); at 8.5.14 (connected by *houtō*).

And the acquittal of Theron would have been ‘the worst outrage possible’ (3.4.10). The constantly judgmental tone of the narrative is a feature that distinguishes Chariton from the other Greek novelists.<sup>12</sup>

Another way in which the narrator appeals to shared experience is through comparisons, whose ostensible purpose is to help the narratee grasp something unfamiliar by assimilating it to something he knows. Many of these are neutral enough: two of them denote a specifically Hellenocentric view of the world: when the interest of the court case is likened, in a rhetorical question, to the Olympic Games and the Eleusinian Mysteries (5.4.4), and again when the arrival of the contestants in the courtroom is compared to ‘the competitors at Olympia arriving in the stadium escorted by a procession’ (6.2.1). An interesting subset of comparisons is specifically literary or artistic. At the very beginning of the story, Callirhoe’s beauty is adjudged superior to that of a Nereid or mountain-nymph, and Chaereas is compared to ‘Achilles and Nireus and Hippolytus and Alcibiades as sculptors and painters portray them’ (1.1.2–3). Polycharmus is introduced by being compared to Homer’s Patroclus (1.5.2). Dionysius’ awareness of the inconstancy of Love is glossed with a comment from the narrator about the depiction of Love by poets and sculptors (4.7.6). The set-up in the Persian courtroom is compared to a Homeric divine council, with a quotation from *Iliad* 4.1 (5.4.6). Callirhoe’s appearance in the courtroom is compared to Helen’s appearance among the Trojan elders in *Iliad* 3 (5.5.8). This assumption of a shared level of literary cultivation also underlies one of the most eccentric features of Chariton’s narration: on many occasions he quotes Homer, not, as it were, in illustrative parentheses, but to carry the main narrative forward; for a brief moment the narrator’s microphone passes to the poet.<sup>13</sup> Every one of these quotations is in effect a familiarizing comparison for the benefit of an ostentatiously bookish narratee.

<sup>12</sup> Further examples at 2.5.2, 3.4.12, 3.6.5, 5.3.9, 5.5.1, 5.9.8, 6.5.8, 7.2.5.

<sup>13</sup> 1.1.14, 1.4.6, 2.9.6, 3.4.4, 3.6.3, 4.7.5, 5.2.4, 6.1.8, 6.2.4, 7.4.3, 7.4.6, 8.1.17, 8.5.2; at 4.7.7 a similar effect occurs with a quotation from Menander’s *Misoumenus*. On the quotations from Homer, see Müller 1976.



*Embedded narratives*

There are numerous embedded narratives in *Callirhoe*, few of them of any great length or technical interest. Without exception they are internal analepses, and only one of them introduces information that is not already known to the external primary narratee, when a messenger brings news of the death of the Egyptian king and the approach of the Persians (8.2.3). Their main function is to convey information between the characters, and to make it clear who knows what; this is necessary because the narrator makes sure that the primary narratee knows everything. Occasionally the primary narrator will draw attention to a detail deliberately omitted from the embedded narrative, again in order to clarify the actors' areas of ignorance, as when Callirhoe tells her story to Dionysius but omits any reference to Chaereas (2.5.10) or when Theron confesses but conceals the name of the person to whom he has sold Callirhoe. A secondary, narratorial, function is to recapitulate events for the benefit of the primary narratee, in a way analogous to the narrator's own retrospectives at the beginning of Book 5 and Book 8.<sup>14</sup> Most of the embedded narratives are in the form of direct speech, but occasionally indirect speech is used or the narrator indicates that a narrative took place without going into details, presumably in order to avoid tedium for the primary narratee.<sup>15</sup> Occasionally narrative is included in a speech whose actorial motivation is something other than the transmission of information, such as a lamentation or a persuasive or forensic oration.<sup>16</sup> And sometimes the primary narratee knows that the embedded narrative is false or partial. Thus the villain Theron is characterized by being allotted two lying narratives, clearly signed as such, at 3.3.17 (echoing Odysseus' Cretan tales), and 3.4.7; at 3.10.2 some country people tell Callirhoe of the destruction of Chaereas' ship in a way that leads her to believe him dead, although the narrator has already told how he escaped; and at 6.1.2–3 two factions in Babylon each present a slanted narrative of events, according to whether their sympathies lie with Chaereas or Dionysius.

<sup>14</sup> On this aspect see Hägg 1971: 253–263.

<sup>15</sup> Indirect speech at 3.9.9–11 (which starts in direct speech), 8.1.14; abbreviated reports at 7.2.4, 8.1.17, 8.5.9.

<sup>16</sup> 1.14.7–8, 5.1.4 narrative within a lamentation; 3.2.8–9, 5.6.5–8, 6.7.8 narrative within forensic or deliberative speech; 4.4.7 narrative within a letter.

In most cases the response of the secondary narratee is indicated. This reflects the character and position of the actor within the fiction: so at 2.1.5 Dionysius is excited to hear of Callirhoe's beauty, but disappointed that she is a slave, and at 2.5.11 he reacts to Callirhoe's narrative with tears of thwarted desire. However, these narrated responses are also signs to the primary narratee, at least in the sense that the story invites from him an unashamedly emotional response (even if the emotions do not coincide with those of the secondary narratee).

The final embedded narrative of the novel requires separate commentary. The story has reached its resolution, but before the text can attain closure the Syracusan populace has to hear the whole story. At this stage their reaction has no function within the story. However, the narrator presents his narratee with the longest and most elaborate embedded narrative of the entire work (8.7.9–11). At first Chaereas wants to start at the end to avoid the traumatic episodes of the beginning, but the audience insists on hearing the whole thing in order. As he is still reluctant, his father-in-law Hermocrates narrates the first part of the story (an interesting case of second-person narration), and Chaereas takes over at the point where he sailed to Miletus. He is in constant interaction with his audience, telling them at one point not to be afraid, because Callirhoe did not really become a slave. At the point where his ship is destroyed, the audience breaks out into lamentations, and then again prevents him omitting a painful part of the story. At the very end there are 'cries of well-wishing from everyone'. This complex embedded narrative is in effect a résumé of the novel in its entirety, and in a sense the fictitious provenance of the story that the primary narrator tells. The response of the in-frame audience, therefore, can be read as endorsement of the primary narratee's response to the novel, and of the narrator's strategy of giving full information in its proper order.



## CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN

### XENOPHON OF EPHEBUS

*J. Morgan*

The *Ephesian Story* is narrated by an anonymous external narrator who is far less perceptible than Chariton's.<sup>1</sup> On no occasion does the narrator speak of himself in the first person or to his narratee in the second, and there is virtually no overt self-referential commentary on the quality of the narration, with just two scenes being described, in the same phrase, as 'a pitiful spectacle' (1.14.2; 2.6.3). Since he refers at the very end of the novel to the protagonists' lives after the end of the story (5.15.3), the narrator is not configured as a contemporary of the events he narrates; but there is no indication by how much the story antedates the act of narration, nor in what circumstances the latter should be imagined as occurring.

Like Chariton's, this narrator knows the story in its entirety, and communicates it fully to his narratee. The heroine Anthia, like Callirhoe, falls into a death-like sleep and is entombed alive: but the narrator has already explained that the poison with which she believed herself to be committing suicide was in fact a sleeping-potion given her under false pretences by a kindly physician (3.5.11). He also disposes of full information about events on the divine plane, telling us that the jealousy of Eros begins the plot (1.2.1), that Eros is enraged by Habrocomes' resistance (1.4.4), that Fate had not forgotten (1.10.2), and that the god of the Nile took pity on Habrocomes' prayer (4.2.6).

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<sup>1</sup> We must immediately enter the *caveat* that the exact status of the extant text is disputed. It has been argued that we have only an epitome of a once more extensive text (Bürger 1892). Although this thesis is untenable in the form in which it was originally argued (see the assaults on it by Hägg 1966 and O'Sullivan 1995), almost every modern reader has the sense that the narrative is cripplingly bare and undeveloped. O'Sullivan's hypothesis of residual oral technique suggests that our text may be just one realization of a fluid *texte vivant*, or a skeletal summary on which oral performance could be improvised. Either way, a text whose function is to record the story in the simplest way possible is precisely the kind of text that is likely to minimize the visibility of a potentially more interesting narrator.

Oddly the gods' role in the dénouement is merely implicit. The narrator has access to the thoughts and emotions of his characters,<sup>2</sup> though he does not always explain why they do what they do. In contrast to Chariton's, however, this narrator is often content to let the characters speak for themselves: roughly two-thirds of the text can be classified as showing rather than telling.<sup>3</sup> Similarly the narrator can offer opinions about events and characters: for instance, Manto is beautiful, but 'not nearly as beautiful as Anthia' (2.3.1), Cyno is 'hideous to look at and much worse to listen to' (3.12.3), and Anchialus 'pays the price for his wicked passion' (4.5.6).<sup>4</sup> But, to a surprising extent, the narrator as often maintains a laconic objectivity, offloading the judgments on to his characters. To take a single example, it is the character Habrocomes, not the narrator, who describes Cyno as a murderess (3.12.5).

Communication between the primary narrator and his primary narratee coheres with this pattern. There is, for instance, a short digression about the temple of Apis at Memphis, which serves to locate the story in relation to the narratee's knowledge of the real world. The narrator offers a couple of *sententiae* stressing the difference between Greeks and barbarians (2.2.4; 3.11.4), and a number of explanatory parentheses, particularly when a new character is introduced (2.9.1, 2.14.1, 3.5.9, 5.2.2, 5.4.5, 5.5.2, 5.9.7, 5.12.1). These occur particularly at points of transition between the narrative lines and are a by-product of Xenophon's extravagantly primitive interlace technique: the pretence is maintained that a strand is resumed not at the point where it was left, but at a time exactly coinciding with that reached by the strand to be dropped. There are thus many fictitious gaps in each strand, which the explanatory asides appear to fill. One might say, in fact, that the most visible function of this barely visible narrator is precisely to control the rapid transitions between the novel's two storylines.

In one respect, however, Xenophon marks a clear difference and arguably an advance over Chariton. This is in the matter of embedded narratives. Sometimes these, like Chariton's, concern events within

<sup>2</sup> E.g. at 1.9.6, 1.14.7, 1.15.4, 2.4.1.

<sup>3</sup> The figure is from Scarcella [1979] 1993: 175–177.

<sup>4</sup> Quotations come from the translation by G. Anderson in Reardon 1989. A complete list of the narrator's observations can be found in Scarcella [1979] 1993: 172–174.

the novel and clarify who knows what and when. So, at 3.3.4 the bandit Hippothous (a structurally important figure who acts as girder between the two story-lines) tells his new friend Habrocomes about his earlier encounter with Anthia. There is no new information for the primary narratee here, but it is a vital part of the story that Habrocomes should now learn what the primary narratee has known for some time; the news motivates his journey to Cilicia. Similarly at 3.9.4 an old woman called ChrySION (whose only reason for existence is to transmit this information) tells Hippothous' men the tragic story of the death of a woman whom Hippothous recognizes as Anthia, and the theft of her body from its tomb by pirates. The narrator has already made it clear that Anthia is still alive, but the partial information provides motivation for Habrocomes' voyage to Alexandria. It is also worth noting that this embedded character-narrative avoids the kind of omniscience that the primary narrator takes for granted. Thus ChrySION shows uncertainty over the motive for Anthia's suicide by giving alternative explanations ('either because she was mad or because she was in love with someone else'). ChrySION's narrative precipitates an extreme emotional reaction and lament from Habrocomes, which the primary narrator and narratee are able to read, from their positions of superior knowledge, as dramatic irony.

Three embedded narratives cover events outside the story and are of no organic relevance to it. One of these is Anthia's tale of a childhood encounter with a ghost, which she uses to account for the epilepsy she has feigned to frighten off the clients of the brothel into which she has been sold (5.7.7–9); this is clearly marked as a fiction, but nonetheless stands in analogic relation to the main narrative, the horrific assault of the ghost corresponding to the sexual assaults intended by the customers of the brothel. The other two embedded narratives, both external analepses, function more clearly as didactic analogies. The first is Hippothous' account of his love for and loss of the beautiful boy Hyperanthes (3.2.1–15). This is set up as being equivalent to the story of the hero Habrocomes, for which it is exchanged (3.1.5). Like the main story it concerns passionate love disrupted by the aggression of a rival, resulting in separation and travel; as in the main story, the first meeting occurs at a festival, and the lovers are more or less equal in age. However, the homosexuality of the embedded narrative forms a clear contrast to the love of Habrocomes and Anthia; and Hippothous' story embodies a quite different paradigm of sexual relations, substituting for the equality of the main story a division of roles into active and submis-

sive partners on the classic pederastic model.<sup>5</sup> Its argument function is very limited; it elicits Habrocomes' narrative of his adventures (given in extreme summary at 3.3.1), which in turn prompts Hippothous to recall his encounter with Anthia; Habrocomes shows no signs of understanding its importance as a counter-paradigm to his own experiences, but for the primary narratee it shapes the understanding of the main story in as profound a way as this novel ever achieves. Again we can note that the secondary narrator avoids the omniscience of the primary one: at 3.2.4 Hippothous talks of the envy of 'some evil spirit', rather than attributing events to the agency of a specific deity in the manner of the primary narrator.<sup>6</sup>

The second external analepsis is the narration by the old fisherman Aegialeus of his love for and elopement with the young girl who became his wife, and whose embalmed corpse he keeps in his bedroom (5.1.4–11). Aegialeus has no function in the novel other than to tell this story. Again the motifs of the embedded narrative reflect those of the main story: inamorations, rivalry, separation, and reunion. By casting the theme of separation and reunion in its most extreme form (the separation of death redeemed by the continued presence of the mummy), this narrative succeeds in producing a profound learning experience in the protagonist, who realizes 'that true love knows no age limits' (5.1.12).<sup>7</sup>

Although they differ widely in the visibility and the characteristics of their primary narrator and in the uses to which they put embedded narratives, the novels of Chariton and Xenophon stand together, in this as in other respects, as relatively straightforward examples of their genre. As we move to the three sophistic novels of Achilles Tatius, Longus and Heliodorus, we shall encounter far more complex narrators and narrative situations.

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<sup>5</sup> On this see Konstan 1994: 26ff.

<sup>6</sup> Virtually the same phrase recurs in Aegialeus' narrative at 5.1.6.

<sup>7</sup> On this see Morgan 1996: 174–175.

## CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT

### ACHILLES TATIUS

*J. Morgan*

*Leucippe and Clitophon* opens with a narrative by an unidentified internal primary narrator,<sup>1</sup> describing a painting of Europa at Sidon and reporting the narrator's meeting with Clitophon, whose narrative of his own adventures forms the bulk of the novel. The only information forthcoming about the primary narrator is that he had just experienced a severe storm at sea; he is, of course, a Greek speaker, and his *ekphrasis* displays a pretty taste in rhetoric. No clues are given as to the occasion or setting of the framing narration, except that, by obvious implication, it must be imagined as occurring within the same lifetime as the event narrated. The primary narratee is more or less invisible: an explicative aside about the identity of the Phoenician goddess 'whom the Sidonians call Astarte' (1.1.2)<sup>2</sup> implies a Hellenocentric ignorance of such things; a single indefinite second-person verb within the *ekphrasis* (1.1.13, 'you might have said that the picture was even moving') draws the narratee into the rhetoric and implies a community of interest and taste with the narrator, implicit also in the mere assumption that the primary narratee will be interested in Clitophon's story. The primary narrator becomes the external secondary narratee of the novel's romantic substance. He characterizes himself as 'under the influence of Eros' (1.2.1 *erōtikos*), and actively elicits Clitophon's narration by taking him to a suitable setting, evocative of Plato's *Phaedrus*:

I took him by the hand and led him to a neighbouring grove, where the plane trees grew thick and plentiful, and the water flowed by cool and clear, just as it comes from melted snow. I sat him down there on a low bench, and sat myself next to him. 'Well, it is time to hear your story,' I said. 'A setting such as this is delightful, and just right for erotic fiction' (*muthōn axios erōtikōn*). (1.2.3)

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<sup>1</sup> 1.1.1–1.3.1; there is no first-person form before 1.1.2.

<sup>2</sup> Quotations are taken from the translation by T. Whitmarsh 2001b, with minor adaptations.



It is clear that what he anticipates from Clitophon's narration is pleasure, even though Clitophon has already hinted that his experiences were at least partially negative; his engagement is at the level of entertainment, not profound human sympathy. In this respect he corresponds closely to the primary narratee of his own narration.

After the opening scene the primary narrator disappears. There is no suggestion that he has doctored Clitophon's narrative in any way, and at no stage during Clitophon's narrative does he make his presence felt, either by interrupting the speaker or by inserting an aside to describe, for example, Clitophon's body-language or his own reaction to the narrative.<sup>3</sup> The text ends with the conclusion of Clitophon's narration; the frame narrative is not resumed. This lack of closure appears to be deliberate.<sup>4</sup> In formal terms Clitophon's narrative corresponds to the embedded narrations by secondary internal narrators found in other Greek novels, and the primary narrator's frame to the central story into which they are set. It is this formal arrangement that both allows and requires Clitophon's narration to be in a first-person form.<sup>5</sup> In Achilles' novel the embedded internal narrative has expanded to occupy almost the entire text, but the failure to close the frame leaves the novel in a pseudo-fragmentary form and allows one to imagine the primary narrator's story continuing after his audience with Clitophon.

The greater part of this chapter will be concerned with Clitophon's narration, which is imagined as taking place not long after the events, as Clitophon is still a young man when he meets the primary narrator (1.2.1). He is an internal narrator, and his narrative is to a large extent shaped by his role in the story and his character. Although the circumstances of his narration are very specific, he makes no reference to them.<sup>6</sup> And though a distinction between Clitophon-as-character (the

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<sup>3</sup> Here one may contrast Clitophon's own procedures: at 7.11.5 he inserts an editorial parenthesis into a courtroom speech, and at 7.15.1 describes his own reactions at a crucial juncture in the legal proceedings.

<sup>4</sup> On this issue see Nakatani 2003.

<sup>5</sup> *Leucippe and Clitophon* is the only surviving novel written predominantly as an internal narrative. However, in the *Wonders beyond Thule* by Antonius Diogenes the protagonist's narration of his experiences was also introduced by an authenticating frame-narrative. There are also some fragmentary fictional narratives with (apparently) internal primary narrators: the *Phoenicia* of Lollianus (*P. Colon.* 3328 + *P. Oxy.* 1368); and the so-called *Herpyllis Romance* (*P. Dublin.* C3), though we cannot be sure that we are not dealing with embedded narrative within a more conventional text.

<sup>6</sup> At 1.4.3 he compares Leucippe's beauty to a painting of Selene he had once seen; a variant reading making this a picture of Europa rather than Selene is sometimes

experiencing-I) and Clitophon-as-narrator (the narrating-I) is implicit in the whole structure of his narrative, Clitophon himself does not often draw attention to it. An occasional present tense reminds us of the act and moment of narration, as when Clitophon exclaims ‘I cannot not express in words how I felt’ (8.14.2), or introduces an episode by saying ‘I remember Melite making a joke during the festivities’ (5.14.4), or looks back on his former self from a distance in time:

We separated, I unwilling and suffering, she—well, I do not know what her emotions were ... I know not of any time before when my heart had been so joyous: then it was that I first learned that nothing can rival for pleasure the kiss of desire. (2.8.2–3)<sup>7</sup>

Similarly he makes one or two passing references to the part of his life not covered by his narrative:

[The water of the Nile] was sweet to drink, no more cold than was pleasant (some of the rivers I know in Greece can cause pain; I noted the contrast with this river). (4.18.4)<sup>8</sup>

On three occasions Clitophon makes internal cross-references to earlier phases of his narrative. So at 8.17.2 he summarizes the first part of an embedded narrative thus: ‘He began by telling everything that I have already narrated.’ Curiously the other two cross-references are faulty: at 2.14.2 he introduces Sostratus ‘who was commander of the war, as I mentioned’, when in fact this is a new piece of information; and at 7.14.1 he refers to Sostratus’ visit to Tyre ‘as I stated at the beginning of my story’, though in fact the embassy referred to had merely been sent on Sostratus’ suggestion. These contradictions may be due to textual corruption or to authorial incompetence, but may be an attempt to reproduce the slippages characteristic of an unpremeditated oral performance.

In the course of his narrative, Clitophon never addresses his specific narratee, though he makes relatively frequent use of the indefinite second-person singular in descriptive or ekphrastic contexts, as a

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taken as a reference to the painting before which he met the primary narrator; however *toi autēn eidon egō pote* more naturally suggests an unspecified occasion in the past than the specific circumstances of a few minutes previously.

<sup>7</sup> Note that the first part of this extract is also an explicit example of the limitation of knowledge of other people’s thoughts discussed below, but unusually (for Achilles) applied to the present of narration rather than the past of experience.

<sup>8</sup> Compare 5.2.2: ‘There was a torchlit procession, that largest I have ever seen.’

retorical trope of vivid description, promoting the illusion of presence or visual perception for his narratee:

As a wave rose high, touching the very clouds, it looked high as a mountain facing the vessel in the distance; as you watched it approach, you felt sure the ship would be gulped down. (3.2.7)<sup>9</sup>

As any narrator might, he also inserts explanatory aside for the benefit of his narratee: to give a very simple example: ‘Charicles (that was his boyfriend’s name) came running up in distress’ (1.7.3).<sup>10</sup> On a couple of occasions communication with the narratee is possibly signalled by exclamations within Clitophon’s narrative: ‘With the gods as my witnesses, I had no idea what I ate’ (1.5.3).<sup>11</sup>

A final aspect of Clitophon’s communication with his narratee is the extreme sententiousness of his narrative.<sup>12</sup> Although he is not the only character in this novel prone to generalizing statements, he is far more so inclined than any of the external narrators of the other novels. The large majority of Clitophon’s *sententiae* concern love, its physiology and its psychology. The primary narrator/secondary narratee (‘Achilles’) has already characterized himself as *erōtikōs*, and these digressive and often quite lengthy disquisitions on love can be read as playing to his interests—and through him to those of the primary narratee.

The use of an internal narrator activates a number of protocols. First there is the question of restriction of knowledge: what the narrator may be allowed to know and how and when he may plausibly be imagined to have acquired knowledge of events in which he himself played no part.<sup>13</sup> In the case of Clitophon we find both paralipsis and parepsis: sometimes, that is to say, the narrating Clitophon suppresses his own knowledge of how things turned out and limits himself to what he knew at the time of the action, but sometimes he appears to know things for which no plausible channel of information is provided, notably the thoughts and emotions of characters with whom he had no later con-

<sup>9</sup> Note that the narratee is defined as male by the participle *blepōn*; similar uses of the second person at 3.7.2, 3.8.4, 4.12.1, 4.19.6 (again with a masculine participle), 5.13.1.

<sup>10</sup> Similar naming formulae at 2.17.2, 4.2.1, 6.2.5; explanatory parentheses at 2.16.1, 2.19.1 (a fairly elaborate explanation of the layout of Clitophon’s house), 4.2.1, 7.12.1.

<sup>11</sup> Also at 3.17.7.

<sup>12</sup> On Achilles’ *sententiae* and their functions, see Scarcella [1987] 1993, Morales 2000.

<sup>13</sup> This issue is discussed at greater length by Hägg 1970: 124–136 and Reardon 1994, to whose accounts the next few paragraphs are much indebted; also Lowe 2000: 246–248.

tact or details of scenes and conversations in which neither he nor Leucippe had any part. However, one use to which Achilles puts embedded narratives is precisely to show how such information came to the secondary internal narrator. Secondly, the narrator's intimate involvement with the story allows (or even, for the sake of plausibility, requires) him to be partial (in the sense of taking sides): thus Clitophon constantly makes evaluations of events and persons reflecting his own interests and attachments. Thirdly, the narrator's personality may obtrude on the way in which he narrates his story: if not exactly an unreliable narrator, Clitophon is one whose judgments and perceptions are not always coincident with those of the author.<sup>14</sup>

As an actor in the story, Clitophon lacks the omniscience of the external narrators of Chariton and Xenophon. This shows itself at a basic level in his treatment of the divine. Whereas those earlier narrators know exactly what is happening in the superhuman dimensions of their created world, Clitophon is confined to imprecise deductions:

By chance (some deity had no doubt willed it), there was a festival going on ... I also beheld Zeus Meilichios and the temple of Zeus Ouranios. I addressed a prayer to the great god, asking that our sufferings should one day cease ... It seemed (*eōikei*), however, that the god did not nod his assent to our prayers: Fortune was once again set to put us through our paces. (5.2.1–3)

The tense locates the uncertainty in the past with the character, rather than in the present with the narrator, whose surplus of knowledge is revealed in the prolepsis.<sup>15</sup> Similarly Clitophon generally (though not with complete consistency) is not privy to the inner thoughts and emotions of other people. This applies particularly to his dealings with his beloved Leucippe, who reaches us only through the prism of his perceptions and assumptions. A good example of the effect of this stance occurs when the lovers experience the generically typical double dream. Leucippe's dream can only be known if presented through her own direct speech, addressed to Clitophon, whereas Clitophon himself, as narrator, communicates his dream to his narratee without any such

<sup>14</sup> By this I mean not the real-life Achilles Tatius, but the controlling intelligence of the novel, whose careful triangulation and distancing of Clitophon allows the 'author's narratee' to find a 'truer' story than Clitophon is able to narrate. Compare Conte's idea of the 'hidden author' in Petronius.

<sup>15</sup> For similar lack of precision with the divine see 3.5.1 ('some good spirit') and 3.23.3 ('some deity'). The relative paucity of references to divine agency in Clitophon's narrative is itself due to his position as internal narrator.

mediation (4.1.2–4). Similarly in the wooing scene of the second book, Clitophon narrates his own feelings, but only his reading of the visual indices of Leucippe's:

I found myself dazed and incapable of speech.  
 'Greetings, mistress,' I said.  
 She smiled sweetly, and her smile was a coded signal that she had understood why I had said 'Greetings, mistress'. (2.6.1–2)

There are a number of other occasions where Clitophon acknowledges that his version of events is based on surmise or interpretation:

At this point, an emissary arrived from the satrap of Egypt with a letter for the general. The message, in all probability (*hōs eikos*), urged him to war: at any rate, he ordered all his men to arm themselves to fight the Herdsmen. (4.11.1)<sup>16</sup>

Particularly in the earlier parts of the narrative, Clitophon generally tells his story apparently without the benefit of hindsight. This is well demonstrated by the typical motif of the apparent death of the heroine. Leucippe has just been kidnapped and is being carried off in a pirate ship; Clitophon is in pursuit:

When the bandits saw the ship now closing in to attack, they stood the girl on the deck with her hands tied behind her. One of them shouted out in a loud voice:

'Behold your prize!'

Then he cut her head off and shoved the rest of the body into the sea. When I saw this, I screamed and made to throw myself after her. The bystanders restrained me, but I begged them to halt the ship and have someone dive in, in the hope that I might have the girl's body, even if only for burial. Two of the sailors hurled themselves overboard, seized the body and brought it on board. (5.7.4–6)

Clitophon then mourns at length over the headless torso before fading to a scene six months later. However, Leucippe is not dead; by the time he is narrating this episode Clitophon knows that she survived, and that the mistress of one of the pirates had been dressed in her clothes and beheaded in her stead. The narrator deceptively limits his knowledge to that of the experiencing-I in order to create effects of suspense and, when Leucippe reappears, surprise. The event is not disambiguated

<sup>16</sup> It is tempting to read the similar qualifications *hōs to eikos* (6.2.3) and *kata to eikos* (6.7.7) as equivalent to a narratorial 'probably'.

until close to the end of the novel, when Leucippe explains it in the course of a narrative of her experiences for the benefit of her father.<sup>17</sup> In fact she is prompted to include this episode by Clitophon:

Please tell us that fabulous story (*ton muthon*) about the bandits of Pharos, and the mystery of the decapitation there, so that your father can hear it too. That is the only part of the whole plot (*tou pantos dramatos*) that remains unheard. (8.15.4)

It seems that Clitophon has heard the story before, but in his narrative has deliberately suppressed even Leucippe's first telling of it, for yet greater effect.

The technique of Clitophon-narrator restricting his knowledge to that of Clitophon-character is observed rigorously in the first sections of the novel, and compromised for the first time only at 2.13ff., where he uses knowledge gained later to explain the actions of Callisthenes several months earlier than the moment being narrated.<sup>18</sup> In the complex intrigue of the second half of the novel, however, Clitophon behaves more and more like an omniscient narrator, and repeatedly gives accounts of scenes and conversations that he did not witness. Sometimes he will specify a source of information, as in 4.6–8, where Menelaus reports to him the substance of his discussions with the general Charmides. Sometimes we are left to suppose that Leucippe gave him an account of her experiences at some time before he communicates them to his narratee, as with the account of her scenes with Melite at 5.22ff. At one point Clitophon specifically presents his account as the product of his own deduction: 'She thought, clearly, that she would not be believed if she refused: that, I imagine, is why she promised' (5.22.7). There are clearer *paralepses*, however, when secret thoughts and feelings are attributed to characters who cannot be imagined to have told Clitophon about them, as, for example, in the account of Thersander's emotions at 6.17.5–18.2.

Another aspect of the subjectivity of Clitophon's narrative is that he does not hesitate to be judgmental: his narrative reflects his sympathies and personal responses as much as his knowledge. The perspective of these evaluations can be that of Clitophon as character:

She truly was beautiful: you would have said that her face was daubed with milk, and that roses grew in her cheeks. Her brilliant eyes scintil-

<sup>17</sup> Note that she is deriving 'great pleasure' from her own narration (8.15.3).

<sup>18</sup> Reardon 1994: 82.

lated with erogenous sparkle, and her hair was thick, long, and golden in colour. It was not without a certain feeling of pleasure that I beheld the woman. (5.13.1)

Or it can be a more retrospective one corresponding to that of Clitophon as narrator. Thus before the priest who speaks on behalf of the protagonists in the courtroom scenes of the final book even begins his oration, he is introduced as follows:

He was a speaker of no slight ability, and in particular emulated the style of Aristophanic comedy. He delivered his own speech, opening with an extremely suave exordium in the style of the comic poets. (8.9.1)

Such judgmental passages seek to compel Clitophon's narratee to share his interpretation of the story, and occasionally the narratee is conscripted fairly explicitly into the narrator's attitudes:

Among their slaves was a fellow who was interfering, garrulous, gluttonous, and anything else one might want to call him, by the name of Conops. (2.20.1)<sup>19</sup>

This last example, however, opens up a crucial issue of reading. The primary narratee<sup>20</sup> can easily see that the bad-mouthing meted out to Conops is due to the fact that his job is to block the narrator's access to the heroine's bedroom, and that from any other perspective a different judgment would be drawn. Clitophon is an object of the novel's irony, and the novel as a whole invites a different response from the one Clitophon is represented as trying to elicit from his narratee. The text, that is to say, invites a critical and distanced reading on the basis of the narrator's character.<sup>21</sup>

A number of points need to be made briefly on this head. First, we have already noted the sententiousness of Clitophon's discourse. His *sententiae* are merely his, and are a *leitmotif* of his characterization. Not only do they mark him and his narratee as *erōtikoi*. They are also irritating in the delays they impose on the narrative, running on occasion

<sup>19</sup> The third-person indefinite inscribes the narratee just as much as a second person.

<sup>20</sup> By this I mean the reader of the novel, rather than the person implicitly addressed by the primary narrator.

<sup>21</sup> The two Latin novels by Petronius and Apuleius play more obviously on this effect: Encolpius and Lucius are both unreliable narrators, for whom corrections must be made. Note particularly the reading of Petronius developed by Conte 1996 on the basis that Encolpius is a *skholastikos* distanced from a 'hidden author' critical of all that the narrator represents. A similar approach to Achilles Tatius needs to be developed; see, for the first steps, Morgan 1997: 179–186.

to entire pages of digressive and generalizing statements and generally involving pretentious rhetorical conceits.<sup>22</sup> The narrator does not simply thwart the primary narratee's desire for narrative pleasure: he seems to be working to a different, ostensibly more philosophically and rhetorically elevated agenda. In constructing his secondary narratee, Clitophon (by the author's intention) alienates the primary one.

Secondly, at least some of Clitophon's *sententiae* are undermined by his own narrative. For example, Helen Morales has shown how the *sententia* on the sexual appetites of barbarians at 5.2.2, applied in the first instance to Tereus' rape of Philomela, but hinting at Clitophon's enemy Thersander, who is also a Thracian adulterer, turns out in fact to apply most aptly to Clitophon himself.<sup>23</sup> She also draws attention to the 'tension between the didacticizing form of the sententious declaration and the hackneyed lessons which it conveys' and the 'bathos in the disjunction between the self-authorizing, self-important pronouncing of the pseudo-science and the predictable ordinariness' of the events narrated.<sup>24</sup> At the same time that Clitophon is parading his knowledge of the generalizations of love, few, if any, of which are grounded in narrated incident, he signally fails to learn from the lessons that a careful reader can see the plot is offering him.<sup>25</sup>

Thirdly, the events of the narrative suggest a very different characterization of Clitophon from that of his self-representation. This is a man who emerges as weak, cowardly, pompous, self-serving, gullible, wilfully blind about himself and others. The point is that he is shown as shaping his autobiographical narrative so as to assimilate it to literary norms and generic expectations. His narrative dances over the chasm between the person he is and the person he ought, as the hero of a novel, to be, the person his narratee wants him to be. This tension is palpable even before the beginning of Clitophon's narrative. He tells the primary narrator:

That is a swarm of stories that you are stirring up ... My tale is like a fictional adventure. (1.2.2)<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> 1.6.2–4 on the effects of night on the pain of love; 2.29.1–5 on conflict of emotions; 3.11.1–2 on tears; 5.13.3–4 on the exclusivity of love; 6.7.1–2 on tears; 6.19.1–7 on desire and anger. Morales 2000: 67ff. provides a conspectus of critical views.

<sup>23</sup> Morales 2000: 79–80.

<sup>24</sup> Morales 2000: 83–84.

<sup>25</sup> Morgan 1997: 182–186.

<sup>26</sup> *ta gar ema muthois eoike*, picked up in the primary narrator's choice of a setting *muthōn axios erōtikōn* (1.2.3); *muthos* is used of the plot of the novel at 8.4.2, 8.4.3, 8.5.9,



And soon thereafter he refers to his experiences as a *drama*<sup>27</sup> and reflects on the effects of erotic stories:

Erotic stories fuel the appetite. Even if you school yourself into self-control, an example incites you to imitate it. (1.5.5)<sup>28</sup>

Clitophon is thus set up as a self-conscious narrator, whose story is mediated through literary artifice. A major task of the primary narratee is to disentangle ‘fact’ from the spin put on it by the secondary narrator.

### *Embedded narratives*

As we have already seen, Clitophon’s own narration is strictly speaking an embedded or secondary narrative in the open-ended primary frame story. It has embedded within it further or tertiary narratives. Not unexpectedly these cover a wider range of forms and functions than in the simpler novels of Chariton and Xenophon. Some are external analepses, generally dealing with mythical or aetiological material. A few of these cases are digressions in Clitophon’s own voice, and can be seen as another index of his conceitedly scholastic *persona*. They are prompted by objects or events in the plot, but have no organic connection with it. Thus at 2.2.2–6 he interrupts his narrative of the meal at which he made his first advance on Leucippe to give a narrative on the origin of wine, and a few lines later, when he is on the point of being reluctantly married to his half-sister Calligone, he digresses into an aetiology of Tyrian purple, prompted by the bridal gown; this digression is said to derive from ‘Tyrian mythology’.<sup>29</sup> Two of these narratorial digressions take the form of narrative *ekphraseis* of paintings of Perseus and Andromeda and the rape of Philomela; the thematic and allegorical connection of these stories to the plot that frames them is fairly clear, but seems to elude Clitophon himself.<sup>30</sup> In other cases the narra-

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8.15.4, 8.17.1; at 7.4.1 *muthos* denotes a false story.

<sup>27</sup> 1.3.3; the same word is similarly used by the narrator at 1.9.1, 6.3.1, 8.5.9; and by Clitophon as character at 8.15.4; at 7.2.1 *drama* denotes a fictitious charade.

<sup>28</sup> Similar *sententiae* about the reception of narratives at 5.5.1, 6.2.3, 8.4.2.

<sup>29</sup> 2.11.4–8; similar aetiologies from the narrator at 7.13.2–3 on the sanctuary of Artemis in which Leucippe takes refuge; 8.12.1–8 on the myth of Rhodopis, introducing the rite of trial of ordeal to be undergone by Melite.

<sup>30</sup> On thematic relationships between digression and plot, see Bartsch 1989: 40ff.

tive is put in the mouth of a character, including Clitophon-as-character when (at 5.5.1–9) he offers Leucippe an exegesis of the painting of Philomela he has already described in narratorial *ekphrasis*.<sup>31</sup>

Two of these embedded narratives form a witty and interesting pair that playfully further the plot, as Conops, a slave detailed to guard Leucippe, and Clitophon's slave Satyrus engage in a duel of fables, playing on Conops' name ('Gnat'). Conops' fable (2.21) concerns an elephant consoling a lion afraid of cockerels by telling him that a gnat can kill an elephant by flying into its ear; Satyrus replies with a fable of a gnat who defeated a lion by buzzing around his head, only to be caught in the moment of triumph by a spider's web (2.22). The alternative views of the strength and weakness of the gnat conceal threat and counter-threat.

A final external analepsis occurs when, on his first appearance in the plot, Clitophon's new friend Menelaus narrates the death of his beloved boyfriend (2.34). Although the content of this narrative is not directly connected to the main story, it serves both to characterize Menelaus (not least in respect of his homosexual preferences) and to offer thematic parallels both to the main story (love, loss, exile, and return) and to the experiences of Clitophon's other homosexual friend, Clinias, who also lost his beloved in tragic circumstances.

Other embedded narratives bear directly on the plot. They fall into two main groups: those recapitulating events already narrated and those introducing new material. Many of the recapitulations are very short and serve merely to record the transmission of information between the characters. Only in the most marginal sense are they directed at the primary narratee. Thus, when Clitophon first encounters Menelaus, there is an exchange of stories. Menelaus', which is new, is recorded in full, but those of Clinias and Clitophon, which are already in the primary narratee's possession, are simply mentioned:

With a groan, Clinias recounted the story of Charicles and the horse. I then told mine. (2.34.7)<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Similarly digressive are 4.4.7–8 (Charmides relates an event he witnessed, as part of a disquisition on the sweetness of the breath of the elephant) and 8.6.7–11 (the priest's aetiology of the syrinx, just before it plays an important part in Leucippe's trial by ordeal).

<sup>32</sup> Similar brief transfers of information at 3.14.1, 5.8.3, 5.11.4; cf. Puccini-Delbey 2001: 97–98.

The recapitulations are fuller when information is shared selectively. A particularly interesting case occurs after the court-case towards the end of the novel, when Clitophon has to clear the air with Leucippe's father, Sostratus. First the priest addresses Sostratus, stressing the pleasure to be had from the narration of vicissitudes; Sostratus then passes the baton to Clitophon, again stressing the entertainment-value of a narrative of painful events:

After all, if events have caused me a certain amount of grief, it is certainly not your fault but Fortune's. And, anyway, a narrative of events past provides more entertainment than grief for one whose sufferings are over.  
(8.4.4)

Since the story being elicited is essentially the same as the one being narrated, the emphasis on narrative pleasure here inscribes the concerns of both secondary and primary narratees. Clitophon's response lists the salient episodes of the novel in such a way that the primary narratee can review the whole plot, but also understand that Clitophon as a narrator is liable to manipulate and embellish his material:

I narrated everything: the passage from Tyre, the sea voyage, the shipwreck, Egypt, the Herdsmen, the abduction of Leucippe, the fake belly beside the altar, Menelaus' artifice, the general's infatuation and Chaereas' drug, the bandits' abduction, the wound in my thigh. I showed them the scar. When I came to the part about Melite, I omitted my performance of the act, reshaping the story into one of chaste self-control, although I told no actual lies: I told of how Melite was smitten with desire, and how I controlled myself, of all the time she spent beseeching me, and failing, of all her promises and all her laments. I narrated the part about the ship, the sea voyage to Ephesus, how we had both passed the night together, and how—'with Artemis here as my witness!'—she had risen as if from another woman's bed. Only one of my actions in the course of the drama did I overlook, namely the services I subsequently rendered Melite.  
(8.5.1–3)

He then turns to Leucippe's story, which he claims outdoes his own; again his partiality and embellishment of the truth are openly acknowledged:

When I reached the part about Sosthenes and Thersander, I elevated (*exēiron*) her story even more than I had done mine, in an amorous attempt to gratify her, given that her father was listening. I told of how she had endured having every kind of outrage inflicted upon her body except one, and that it was for the sake of the last-mentioned that she had tolerated all the others.  
(8.5.5)

Finally the reaction of the tertiary narratees is recorded: a mixture of wonder and close emotional involvement, which may be suspected of closely cuing the response both of Clitophon's (secondary) narratee and the primary narratee:

As they listened to this, the priest sat agape with wonder at each of the events in the story, while Sostratus wept whenever the plot included Leucippe. (8.5.9)

The complex process is completed by Leucippe's own narration to her father (discussed above), where pleasure is again identified as a product of the narrative.

On other occasions, selective or distorted recapitulations made by characters in the story are given in direct speech; such, for example are Melite's denial of Thersander's accusations of infidelity, Clitophon's speech of self-accusation in the belief that Leucippe is dead, or Clinias' judicial defence of Clitophon.<sup>33</sup>

Where an embedded narrative is used to introduce new material, the most common structure is that retrospective narrative disambiguating an earlier event is introduced at the point where Clitophon himself was first made aware of it. In other words, the order of the narrative reflects the narrator's processes of cognition, not the story itself (though Leucippe's narration to her father of her apparent decapitation seems to be an important exception). We have already discussed this issue in connection with the narrator's suppression of subsequently acquired knowledge. Examples are Menelaus' explanation about the apparent death of Leucippe as a victim of human sacrifice (3.19.1–22.6); Chaereas' revelation that Leucippe's madness is the result of an aphrodisiac administered to her by the now dead Gorgias, sourced by a confession of Gorgias' servant (4.15.4–6); Clinias' account of his survival of the shipwreck in which he had been presumed to have died and including the news that Clitophon's father has agreed to his betrothal to Leucippe and is searching for him (5.9.1–10.7); Sostratus telling Clitophon the ending of the story of Calligone and Callisthenes (8.17.2–18.4), completing the narration of events given earlier by Clitophon himself ('he began by telling everything that I have already narrated'; in fact Cli-

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<sup>33</sup> 6.9.2–7, 7.7.3–6, 7.9.9–13.

tophon's knowledge of Callisthenes' actions leading up to the abduction of Calligone can only derive from Sostratus' version here).<sup>34</sup>

Two other embedded narratives merit special comment. The first occurs at 5.11.4, where Melite is first mentioned, when Satyrus explains Clitophon's situation to Clinias and Menelaus. This masks an odd paralipsis, since Clitophon has just passed over the whole six-month period following the apparent beheading of Leucippe, in the course of which he must have encountered Melite, in a single clause. Even more blatantly than Leucippe's narrative at the end of the novel, this is a case where the embedded narrative does not represent the channel through which Clitophon became aware of the facts, but channels new material to the primary narratee in a way calculated to maximize effects of surprise and suspense.

The second is a lying narrative at 7.3, arranged by Thersander to convince Clitophon that Leucippe is dead. This, of course, has important functions in the story, motivating Clitophon's behaviour in the courtroom. It is worth mentioning, however, for the extreme complexity of the narrative structure. Thersander has planted someone in the same prison as Clitophon. The stoolpigeon strikes up a conversation with a third prisoner, on which Clitophon eavesdrops, as an unintended narratee; he spins a false story of a chance encounter with a young man whose extorted confession to the murder of Leucippe he overhears. The kernel of the lying narrative is thus doubly embedded in a sort of Russian-doll effect, and this arrangement is specifically chosen in order to lend authenticity to a fiction.

In comparison with the pre-sophistic novels of Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus, Achilles' is formally more complex and requires more sophisticated interpretation by its primary narratee. Of course, narratology insists that a separation between narrator and author should always be made, but Achilles' is the first novel to make of that separation an important component of its signification. In his case, the fact that the bulk of the story is given to a secondary internal narrator makes the situation reasonably clear. Longus explores a similar effect with a *primary* internal narrator.

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<sup>34</sup> On the effect of dividing the sub-plot in this way, see Morgan 1997: 185–186.

## CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE

### LONGUS

*J. Morgan*

Like *Leucippe and Clitophon*, Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* is introduced by a brief framing narrative by an anonymous masculine internal primary narrator; in each case the story that forms the bulk of the novel is formally a secondary narrative. But whereas Achilles' primary narrator quickly becomes the silent and invisible external narratee of a secondary narration by an internal narrator (Clitophon), the first-person voice of Longus' prologue continues as that of the external narrator of the story of Daphnis and Chloe. And whereas Achilles' primary narrator is scarcely characterized, Longus' is carefully triangulated in a way that ironically distances him from the author and invites an unstraightforward response to his telling of the story:<sup>1</sup>

On Lesbos, while hunting, in a grove of the Nymphs, I saw the most beautiful sight I have ever seen, a depiction of an image, a history of love ... I looked and I wondered, and a desire seized me to respond to the painting in writing. I found someone to interpret the picture, and have laboured hard to create four books, an offering to Love, the Nymphs and Pan, a possession to delight all mankind, which will heal the sick and comfort the distressed, stir the memory of those who have been in love, and give preparatory instruction to those who have not. For certainly no one has ever escaped Love, nor ever shall, so long as beauty exists and eyes can see. For ourselves, may the god grant us to remain chaste in writing the story of others. (*proem* 1; 3–4)<sup>2</sup>

Several significant features of the narrator are established in this opening paragraph. First, the fact that he is in the countryside to hunt aligns him with a series of wealthy urban characters within the story who also use the country for pleasure. Like them he has a palpably urban perspective and aesthetic, which affect the way he tells his story; the novel's deconstruction of their 'soft' pastoral fantasy extends to its own narrator and his narratee. Second, while the derivation of the narrative

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<sup>1</sup> This idea is explored at greater length in Morgan 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Translations are taken from Morgan 2004.

from a painting provides it with a fictional provenance and fictionally exonerates the narrator from the charge of having invented the story, at the same time it exposes his limitations. His description of the painting as a series of unconnected scenes enacts his initial failure to construe it as a narrative, until an exegete instructs him. The story, within the fiction, has an existence independent of this particular telling of it: the narrator is not its controlling intelligence, but rather a not particularly good reader (of the painting) or narratee (of the exegete),<sup>3</sup> reliant on a third party's exposition and driven by a potentially irrational desire, whose take on the story need be no more authoritative than any other reader's, on either the factual or the interpretive level. Third, he specifies the kind of people he envisages as his narratees: they share his sentimental preconceptions, and notably his view that love is a disease in need of a cure, a view that the story itself will comprehensively disprove. Finally, the prayer for self-control is double-edged. It voices the narrator's fear of losing artistic distance and ending up with mere pornography, and the very fact that the narrative begins immediately after implies that the narrator believes his prayer has been answered and his text will resist misreading. However, his prayer has drawn attention to the possibility of such misreading; it is a challenge that the reception history of *Daphnis and Chloe* shows has often been accepted.<sup>4</sup>

It is obvious that the narrator of this novel is just as much a fictional creation as its protagonists; he is carefully distinguished and distanced from the author.<sup>5</sup> In the following paragraphs, therefore, it will be necessary to approach him and his narratee(s) at two distinct levels. The first takes him at his face value and examines how he tells his story. The second recognizes the narrator as a literary device of the author; if not exactly unreliable, he is at least a distorting lens, for whom the reader must make corrections in order to realize the text fully. Correspondingly, we must also distinguish two narratees: the narrator's narratee, at whom the fictitious narrator directs his discourse and who is imagined to respond as the narrator intends; and the author's narratee or reader, who reads through the narrator to uncover the author's communication. However, although the narrator is the target of the author's irony,

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<sup>3</sup> The exegete's narration is of course only implicit in the text to which it gave rise; the narrator is not directly represented as the exegete's narratee.

<sup>4</sup> Fascinating material on reception history is presented by Barber 1989.

<sup>5</sup> In speaking of the 'author' here I mean not the real-life Longus, but the voice of the novel as a whole, a figure sometimes termed 'the implied author' or 'abstract author'; see Morgan 2003: 175 n. 9.

it is not possible or methodologically desirable systematically to disentangle these two levels. Indeed, the uncertainty as to where authority is located in this text is both an element of its power and fascination and wholly characteristic of Longus' Hellenistic poetics.

The narrator's act of narration implicitly takes place soon after the discovery of the painting that it expounds. The impulse to narrate was immediate, but composition was laborious and lengthy.<sup>6</sup> For the narrator the events of the story already belong in an indeterminately distant past.

Although the author's narratee is led to see that the narrator does not really fully 'know' his story, he presents himself as a conventionally omniscient narrator, with access to the entire action, including the unspoken thoughts, emotions and dreams of his characters. In fact he knows more about the characters' feelings than they do themselves; a pose of ironic superiority to which we shall return. The narrator limits this omniscience, however, in two interesting ways. He avoids claiming knowledge of action on the divine plane, except when the gods intrude physically or through dreams into the world of mortals and so become open to human perception. For example, after Chloe has been abducted by the Methymnaeans, the Nymphs appear in a dream to Daphnis and tell him that they took pity on Chloe when she was exposed as a baby, have been taking care of her ever since, and have now asked Pan to intervene to save her (2.23.2–5). None of these divine actions has been previously narrated: they are revealed achronically at the point where the divinities tell the characters what they have done. Furthermore the narrator's knowledge of the Nymphs' state of mind is limited to what a human observer could infer from their appearance: 'it was *as if* they were sorry for Daphnis' (2.23.1). Similarly, Pan's intervention is narrated only as it would have appeared to those involved; his agency is revealed only when he informs the Methymnaean commander Bryaxis of it in a dream (2.27.1–3). The supernatural events of the intervention itself are carefully relegated to the realm of appearances:

... all the land suddenly *seemed* ablaze with fire, and there came a *noise* of the splashing of oars, *as if* a great fleet were sailing in to the attack. Someone gave the call to arms, another shouted for the commander.

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<sup>6</sup> This is implied by the verb *exeponēsamēn* (*pr.* 3), with its resonance of Alexandrian painstaking craftsmanship. We recall for instance that Catullus' friend Cinna took nine years to compose his epyllion *Žmyrna* (Cat. 92).



One man *appeared* to have been wounded, one lay on the ground in a semblance of death. *One might have thought* one was watching a night-time battle, but there was no foe there. (2.25.3)

Eros controls events,<sup>7</sup> but again the narrator disclaims direct knowledge, retreating into formulations such as ‘as if Love had taken pity on him, the following happened’ (3.6.5).<sup>8</sup> This reticence about the actions of the gods contrasts with the practice of the embedded mythical narratives, whose narrators are both narratologically more primitive and theologically more privileged: when Daphnis tells Chloe the story of Echo, for example, he is able to tell her not just of Pan’s actions but of his emotional states too, and even the motives of Earth in hiding the scattered limbs of Echo (3.23.3–4).

At the opposite end of creation, the narrator distances himself from the pathetic fallacy, and avoids ascribing human thoughts and emotions to the animals. For example Daphnis’ goats ‘seemed to be listening’ to the music of his pipes (1.13.4), and after Dorcon’s death his cows’ mournful mooing and aimless running was their way of lamenting their dead herdsman ‘in the estimation of shepherds and goatherds’ (1.31.4).

In communicating with his narratee, the narrator uses the first person of himself only once, in a context like those just discussed, to qualify the attribution of human emotions to animals which were ‘pining, I think (*oimai*), for Daphnis and Chloe’ (1.32.3). The narratee is addressed directly just once, when the narrator is describing Mytilene, which ‘will give you the impression of an island rather than a city’ (1.1.2).<sup>9</sup> Elsewhere, however, the narrator invokes the reactions of a hypothetical *tis* to the events he is describing, to similar effect. So, for example, when Chloe watches Daphnis bathing, the narrator says of his suntan ‘one might have supposed its colour came from the shadow of his hair’

<sup>7</sup> At 2.27.2 Pan refers to Chloe as ‘a maiden from whom Love intends to make a story’, the story being the very one narrated.

<sup>8</sup> The one exception to this is at 1.11.1, where the narrator says ‘Love plotted something serious’. I read this as an intended metaphor on the narrator’s part, which the author’s narratee can see is the literal truth. On the other hand, when the narrator says (1.15.4) ‘now Daphnis too had to know the deeds of love’, his omniscience is simply that of one who knows the whole story, not of one who knows the minds of the gods; similarly 2.2.6.

<sup>9</sup> *nomiseis ou polin horan alla nēson*. If we accept this reading from the better of the two primary manuscripts (V), the future tense may be understood as the narrator anticipating the narratee’s reaction to his vivid description. However, the other MS (F) has the more expected optative *nomisais* implying a condition such as ‘if you were to visit it’.

(1.13.2); an instance of the ‘anonymous focalizer’ device. The indefinite pronoun is distinct from Chloe, whose reactions are described omnisciently in the next sentence, and also, formally, from the narrator, who is describing events directly. It provides a locus for the narratee within the frame of the fiction, but one that allows the narrator simultaneously to impose on him a self-consciously romantic or literary response and to distance it from himself.<sup>10</sup>

Another simple form of communication between the narrator and his narratee is the explanatory aside, which often, as with Chariton, does not even disrupt the syntax of the sentence in which it is included. A good example is at 2.21.2: ‘So they sailed away, toiling at the oars (for there was no wind), but Daphnis ...’ A particular use of this device is in naming characters, the narrator’s prerogative in this text: ‘Greatly alarmed, Bryaxis (this was the commander’s name) leapt up’ (2.28.1).<sup>11</sup>

This narrator is not a particularly sententious one, but his *sententiae* do further establish the basis of shared interests and assumptions on which the narrator’s narratee is constructed. For instance, on three occasions a *sententia* is used as a psychological explanation, embodying a general truth of human nature, unquestioningly acceptable to both narrator and narratee. After Daphnis has been recognized by his natural parents

he hugged them to his breast as if he had known them all his life, and refused to leave their embrace. So quickly does nature win credence.

(4.23.2)

A few chapters later he devotes his pastoral gear to the deities of the countryside:

But there is more pleasure in what is familiar than in unaccustomed prosperity, so much so that he wept over each of these objects as he parted with it.

(4.26.3)

The romantic proclivities of the narrator and his narratee are most clearly shown by the explicative function of the *sententia* at 3.5.4:

But for love all ways are passable, through fire, water, and the snows of Scythia. So (*oun*) he ran all the way to the yard.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The same effect occurs at 1.23.2, 2.25.4, 2.35.2, 4.2.1, 4.4.4, 4.15.4, 4.32.2.

<sup>11</sup> At 4.5.2 one MS (V) includes in the parenthesis an etymology of the runner Eudromus’ name. If this reading is retained, it will be an example of the kind of characterization of the narrator discussed below.

<sup>12</sup> This seems to be a proverb or cliché; a very similar formulation occurs in Lucian’s

Occasionally the narrator comments on the action in a way that again presupposes some community of thought or experience with his narratee: ‘Such sights would have turned even old men’s thoughts to sex’ (3.13.3). But these comments are not always easy to interpret. For example, after Daphnis is rescued from a wolf-trap, the goat he was chasing is also hauled out, with both its horns broken. The narrator comments: ‘So did Justice punish him for his defeat of the other goat’ (1.12.5). The evocation of providential Justice in such an incongruous context is clearly ironic, but it is impossible to decide whether the irony is that of the narrator sneering at his rustic subject matter (as he often does; see below), or of the author mocking a sentimental view of the world voiced in all seriousness by the narrator.

Often the narrator’s comments make his narratee complicit in a view of normality that naturalizes the action of the story in spite of its unfamiliar or fantastic quality:

Astonished, as was only natural, he drew closer and discovered a bonny baby boy, in swaddling clothes. (1.2.3)<sup>13</sup>

Or:

The dogs that accompanied her to protect the sheep and goats, with typical canine keenness to pick up a scent, got wind of Dorcon as he moved to attack the girl. (1.21.2)

Or:

As old men do when they have had a drop or two, they started telling each other lots of stories. (2.32.2)<sup>14</sup>

More ambiguously, the narrator trades on assumptions shared with his narratee to adopt an overtly evaluative or ironical stance towards his characters and their actions. His high profile in this regard is an element of the author’s characterization of him. The very partiality that binds the narrator to his narratee often distances him from the author’s narratee and exposes the limitations of the narrator’s understanding. A very simple manifestation of this evaluative stance is the specific statement of moral qualities in narratorial character-sketches: the narrator tells rather than shows what sort of people, for instance, Astylus and

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encomium of Demosthenes (14), and the thought is a familiar one from erotic poetry. This self-conscious use of proverbs etc. is an aspect of the narrator’s *persona*.

<sup>13</sup> Similar phrases denote ‘naturally’ at 2.2.1, 2.10.1, 4.27.1.

<sup>14</sup> Similar formulations at 3.21.2 (what sailors always do), 3.27.1 (what lovers with no money always do).

Gnathon are.<sup>15</sup> Likewise he expresses sympathy, approval and so on in quite straightforward ways, referring, for example, to ‘poor Dorcon’ after his death (1.31.4), and describing Dionysophanes’ formal garden as ‘absolutely superb’ (4.2.1).<sup>16</sup> More significant are comments the narrator passes on rusticity from an urban perspective, or on sexual innocence from a standpoint of knowledge and experience. For example, the developing beauty of Daphnis and Chloe is described as ‘too fine for the countryside’ (1.7.1).<sup>17</sup> Chloe believes Daphnis’ oaths of devotion sworn on the animals ‘for she was but a young girl and a shepherdess and thought the goats and sheep were the special gods of shepherds and goatherds’ (2.39.2). Daphnis ‘like the rustic and goatherd he was’ has no suspicions of Lycaenion’s intentions (3.18.1). This attitude of ironic superiority by the narrator towards the characters is an essential aspect of the dynamic of his narrative. It is, for instance, central to the account of the protagonists’ parallel innamorations that they do not know what their emotions are, whereas the narrator and his narratee instantly recognize the symptoms of love. A single word can encapsulate the stance of superiority: the narrator introduces Daphnis’ puzzled soliloquy on the effects of love with the verb *apelērei* (1.17.4) with its overt connotation of foolishness, and at the end, with patronising humour, calls him ‘Sir Daphnis’ (1.19.1).<sup>18</sup> This amused and distanced superiority runs throughout the narrative. When Daphnis and Chloe are first sent out to tend the flocks, the narrator comments that ‘they took on this job with great delight, as if it were a major office’ (1.8.3), indicating that from his sophisticated perspective it is nothing of the sort. When Lycaenion offers to teach Daphnis how to do what he wants to do to Chloe, the narrator comments that he responds ‘as if he was about to

<sup>15</sup> Respectively ‘a large-hearted young man and not unacquainted with the pain of love’ (4.17.1) and someone ‘whose accomplishments comprised eating, getting drunk, and drunken fornication, and who consisted of nothing more than jaws, a stomach, and the parts below the stomach’ (4.11.2).

<sup>16</sup> In each of these cases he is distanced from the author’s narratee: Dorcon is a complex and ambivalent figure, while the symbolic structure of the novel invites a comparison of Dionysophanes’ park with Philetas’ cottage-garden, not to its advantage, when the author’s narratee’s intertextual awareness of Hellenistic poetry comes into play; see Morgan 2004: 223–225.

<sup>17</sup> Closely similar is the description of Lycaenion as ‘by country standards rather glamorous’ (3.15.1). Such judgments are echoed by the urban characters in the novel, confirming the author’s alignment of the narrator with them.

<sup>18</sup> *Ho beltistos Daphnis*; compare ‘Sir Cricket’ at 1.26.3.

be taught something important, something truly heaven-sent' (3.18.2), implying this time that for men of the world such as he and his narratee sex holds no mysteries.

The narrator's frequent tone of sardonic humour also has the effect of belittling the story. As an example we can cite the episode where Daphnis tumbles into a pit dug to trap a predatory she-wolf. The narrator milks the slapstick, first by equating Daphnis to the rutting goat he is chasing and then in a po-faced description of the pair disappearing into a big hole one at a time, capped by Daphnis' perpendicular flight on goat-back, like an inept Bellerophon on a caprine Pegasus:

What with the one desperate to get away and the other pursuing furiously, they paid scant attention to the path beneath their feet, but both fell into a pit, first the goat and then Daphnis. What saved Daphnis' life was that he used the goat as a steed on his way to the bottom.

(1.21.1–2)

There seems to be more narrator's humour at 4.12.3, where Daphnis knocks over the pederastic parasite Gnathon and leaves him sprawled on the ground: 'It was not a boy he needed now to lend a helping hand but a man.' The narrator's weak but innocent aphorism is subverted by the author's game of luring his narratee into seeing a smuttier sense than the narrator's words will literally bear.<sup>19</sup> Often the narrator's humour resides in a single pointedly chosen word, as when he refers to Lycaenion's sexual 'tutorial' (*paidagōgia*, 3.19.1) of Daphnis, or uses a technical agricultural term of the beating up dealt to Lampis and his rustic chums by the effete Gnathon and his gang of city-boys (4.29.2 *sunēloēse* 'he completely threshed').

Before we examine how the author's narratee might construe these comments, we must note some other facets of this narrator's visible *persona*. He consistently glosses the action, with phrases like 'this was the first time they had ever heard Love's name' (2.8.1), displaying an omniscience extending beyond the substance and chronological limits of the narrative itself.<sup>20</sup> At the very end he includes an external prolepsis, which he marks as such with a degree of self-consciousness about the act of narration: 'But these names and acts came later' (4.40.1).

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<sup>19</sup> This effect depends on sensing the possibility of an erotic double entendre in the word *cheiragōgia*. Gnathon had been seeking erotic *cheiragōgia* from Daphnis but now literally needs a strong arm to lean on. The weakness of the narrator's clean joke may be a deliberate element in the author's characterization of him.

<sup>20</sup> Similar glosses are frequent; as at 1.22.3, 2.9.1 etc.

This self-awareness is at its most apparent on three occasions when he proudly draws attention to the paradoxical novelty of his material,<sup>21</sup> but also functions in a more complex way, as when he advertises the double unexpectedness of Daphnis' escape from piracy and shipwreck (1.31.1). The complexity here is that for anyone who knows the conventions of the Greek novel (as the author's narratee does but the narrator's narratee does not) these incidents are anything but unexpected: they are the canonical generic clichés. The narrator's pride in his plotting is undercut by the author's ironical critique of generic conventions. One striking way in which the narrator signals his control of the narrative is through the use of 'if-not situations' (→ Homer), especially at transitions into new episodes:

Perhaps they would have done the real thing, had not trouble of the following sort overtaken that entire area of the countryside. (2.11.3)<sup>22</sup>

The narrator signalled his concern for *sōphrosunē* in the prayer at the end of the prologue, and although the story of *Daphnis and Chloe* is the most overtly sexual of any of the Greek novels, the narrator certainly keeps within the bounds of propriety. Neither of the novel's two acts of sexual intercourse (Lycaenion's 'tutorial' and the protagonists' wedding night) is narrated, the narrator drawing a curtain of prim euphemism at the crucial moment. Other sexually charged incidents, such as the famous scene where Daphnis retrieves a cicada from Chloe's bosom are also narrated with a sort of artificial innocence. At such moments the story resists the narrator's telling of it.<sup>23</sup>

Last but not least, the narrator is prone to displays of pedantic erudition. This is exhibited in his bookishly humorous use of proverbs:

Dorcon, after coming so close to danger and escaping from the jaws not of a wolf, as in the proverb, but of a dog, was nursing his wounds. (1.22.1)<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> 3.30.2 'asking them for their son's hand in marriage, a quite unprecedented thing'; 4.7.5 'mourning for flowers, a thing without precedent'; 4.22.3 'Daphnis might have been lost in being found, an event without precedent'; in this last example the unreal condition, and the elaborate wordplay draw further attention to the narrator.

<sup>22</sup> Compare 3.24.3 'Chloe might easily have become a woman, had not the thought of blood scared Daphnis'; 4.22.3 'Daphnis might have been lost in being found—an event without precedent—had not Astylus realised what was happening and called out again.'

<sup>23</sup> Morgan 2003: 185ff.

<sup>24</sup> The proverb is found in most Greek paroemiographers, who refer it to those who get something unexpectedly. The humour lies in using the literal sense of the proverb in

But most striking are passages where the narrator intrudes himself directly into the text. When pirates abduct Daphnis, he is rescued when Chloe plays the pipes given her by Dorcon, whose cows, which the pirates have stolen, respond by jumping overboard and capsizing the pirates' ship. This already ludicrous sequence is expanded by a minute account of the physics of the sinking of the ship and rounded off with a little paradoxographical excursus:

In fact, a cow swims even better than a human being, and comes second only to water-fowl and, of course, fish. A cow would never drown while swimming, were it not for the fact that the ends of its hoofs drop off if saturated with water. Evidence to this effect is provided by the existence to this day of a large number of places by the sea named 'Oxford'.

(1.30.6)

The absurdity of this has dismayed scholars, and even led to a proposal to delete the whole passage as a copyist's addition.<sup>25</sup> However, there is no good reason to do so, and from our narratological viewpoint we can see that the joke is on the narrator himself, whose ridiculous pedantry distances him from the author and the best reader of the novel. Other discursive intrusions by the narrator<sup>26</sup> lack the obvious irony of this one, but nevertheless position him as an eager purveyor of erudite detail from an urban perspective. They too have aroused the unjust suspicions of textual critics.

It is time to turn to the effects of a narrator being so clearly distinguished from his author. It would be an overstatement to term him unreliable, but he should not be taken as possessing ultimate authority: the deep-level meanings articulated by the symmetry and structure of the plot and its recurrent symbolism do not coincide with those voiced by the narrator.<sup>27</sup> In a general way, the novel's evident awareness of its own artificiality and its deconstructive play with generic conventions belong to the author and are at the expense of the narrator, who buys into the stereotypes at face value (as we have seen in the case of his boast about the unexpectedness of events at 1.31.1).

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a context where its accepted meaning is inappropriate. A similar oddity occurs at 2.2.6, where Daphnis and Chloe 'like proverbial dogs off the leash, frolicked, piped, sang, played rough and tumble with the goats and sheep', though Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.1406b28) applies the proverb to sudden and petty viciousness.

<sup>25</sup> Castiglioni 1906; *Utinam recte* (says Reeve 1982) *sed Longum sapit*.

<sup>26</sup> Such as those on Lesbian wine at 2.1.4 and 4.10.3.

<sup>27</sup> Morgan 2004: 10–20.

More specifically, despite the narrator's parading of the tropes of omniscience, the author's text supplies material suggesting that there are aspects to the story (which, remember, fictionally existed before this telling of it) that have eluded the narrator. So, for example, the narrator does not make the connection, obvious to many readers, between the painted image whose discovery he relates in the prologue, and the images dedicated by Daphnis and Chloe at the end of the story.<sup>28</sup> At one level this failure heightens the reality effect: the narrator's failure to see everything implies that there 'really' is something there to see. But equally the connection gives the story a depth and resonance that bypass its narrator. Similarly, Philetas' account of his meeting with Eros and his encomium of the god's powers are marked both by their place in a clearly signed structure and by the rhetoric of their delivery as central to the text's meaning, but are treated by the narrator as a decorative interlude.<sup>29</sup> Even at the level of detail, one constantly encounters a significance that is not narrated. For example, Daphnis is rescued from the wolf-trap after Chloe removes her breast-band and enlists Dorcon's help to pull him out. The narrator does not mention the effect of Chloe's innocently bared breasts on Dorcon, but when Dorcon re-enters the plot a few paragraphs later as a suitor sexually obsessed with Chloe the cause of his infatuation is obvious enough to the author's narratee.<sup>30</sup> Here the story itself gives a good reader material from which he can reach a rounder, deeper and more explicit understanding than the narrator, with his worries about *sōphrosunē*, allows. Similarly, the narrator appears not to grasp the full significance of the character of Lycaenion, whose 'unwritten story' the author has carefully planted in the details of the story.<sup>31</sup>

The narrator makes *Daphnis and Chloe* a less profound and more conventional story than it really is. This is partly because, in accordance with the *persona* constructed in the prologue, he is made to impose on the story two opposite but inseparable urban preconceptions. The first idealizes the countryside, through the sentimental fantasies of simplic-

<sup>28</sup> Wouters 1989–1990; Hunter 1983: 42–43; Imbert 1980.

<sup>29</sup> This is particularly true if the rhetoric contains a level of specific intertextual engagement, now lost to us, with the poetry of Philetas of Cos. Such implicit intertextuality would obviously belong to the author rather than the narrator.

<sup>30</sup> The author even drops hints behind his narrator's back: the name Dorcon is cognate with *derkomai*: the experienced Dorcon 'sees' Chloe more clearly than the innocent Daphnis can.

<sup>31</sup> Dorcon and Lycaenion are discussed at greater length in Morgan 2003: 182–184.



ity and innocence that constitute ‘soft’ pastoral. The story itself resists this simplification, repeatedly exposing the falsity of the easy antithesis between ‘good’ country and ‘bad’ city.<sup>32</sup> Simultaneously, the urban perspective also entails disdain, manifested as an amused superiority or even disgusted hostility towards the lack of sophistication in the countryside and its inhabitants. Within the story the poles of this ambivalence are perfectly figured by the attitudes of the young Methymnaeans, who begin by taking an idyllic holiday and playing at rustic self-sufficiency, but end with contemptuous aggression when reality intrudes too far into their fantasies. One way in which the author communicates with his narratee is precisely by providing such foci within the fictional frame that mirror and make visible the narrator and his narratee. This complex literary technique, of course, distances the author’s narratee from the responses that the narrator seems to invite. It is a recurrent trope of the novel that the narrator’s irony is turned back on himself and that in assuming himself more sophisticated than his characters he reveals himself as less profound than his story. To return to two examples from our earlier discussion: the narrator smiles at Daphnis and Chloe’s naivety in supposing the care of the flock to be ‘a major office’, but the story itself teaches us that shepherding is the analogue of Love’s providential care for humankind, and so, yes, it is indeed a major office. And the narrator’s amusement at Daphnis’ enthusiastic response to Lycaenion’s offer of tuition is undermined by a Platonic allusion reminding the author’s narratee that Love truly is heaven-sent, and that the sexual act that Daphnis is about to learn is the outward and visible sign of the benevolent dispensation driving the whole of creation.

Finally we turn to the embedded tertiary<sup>33</sup> narratives in *Daphnis and Chloe*. These fall into three distinct groups. First, explanatory analepses conveying between the characters information already known to the narratees; second, explanatory analepses introducing new information, particularly to fill in the section of the story before the narrative begins; and third, a series of three mythological narratives told by characters.

The first group is technically straightforward, but Longus can use these simple internal repeating analepses for subtle literary effects. For example, the primary narrator’s account of Lamon’s discovery of the infant Daphnis is immediately followed by a reported narrative of Lamon to his wife Myrtale:

<sup>32</sup> This is argued out in Morgan 1994a.

<sup>33</sup> The main story itself of course being formally a secondary narrative.

He told her the whole story: how he discovered it lying abandoned, how he saw it being suckled, how he was ashamed to leave it there to die.

(1.3.2)

This reinforces the characterization of Lamon by singling out the qualities that distinguish him from Dryas: his altruism and the small importance he attaches to the valuables exposed with the child. Similarly when Daphnis returns to Chloe's arms after the wreck of the pirate's ship, the important thing is not what Chloe tells Daphnis, but what she conceals: '... the kiss was the only thing she did not mention, out of modesty' (1.31.2). After Chloe's restoration from the Methymnaeans, the summary reported narratives of Chloe and Daphnis emphasize the numinous aspects of the story: Chloe the miracles of Pan's intervention, Daphnis his vision of the Nymphs (2.30.3–4).

Two of these recapitulatory narratives merit further attention: those of Lamon and Dryas revealing to Dionysophanes the truth of their discoveries of the infant Daphnis and Chloe (4.19.3ff., 4.30.3–4). These are constructed with exact symmetry and each has a crucial plot-function, the first leading directly to the recognition of Daphnis, the second establishing Chloe's social standing as a suitable wife for him and paving the way to her own recognition; each is tailored to its narrator's character and needs. The slave Lamon gives an adept little speech, whose narrative is designed to win his master's good will and persuade him that he has not overstepped the limits of his discretion. The free Dryas is less deferential and more proudly rhetorical. The importance of these speeches is stressed by the astonishment and joy of their narratees.

These repeating internal analepses are symmetrically answered by two external analepses spoken by the biological fathers of the protagonists, Dionysophanes and Megacles, recounting the circumstances leading to the exposure of the children (4.24.1–4, 4.35.3–5). As with the narratives of the two foster-fathers there is contrast within the symmetry: the motives for exposure differ, and whereas Dionysophanes was led to regret his exposure of his son by a change of fortune for the worse, Megacles experienced an immediate change of fortune for the better.

A final internal analepsis that delivers new information to the primary narratee is Philetas' account to Daphnis and Chloe of his encounter with the god Eros in his garden (2.3.2–2.6.2). Although the primary narrator does not register its thematic importance, the significance of this episode is stressed for the author's narratee by its pivotal place in

the novel's didactic structure. It articulates large truths about Love and its place in the benevolent governance of the world; although the details elude us, it seems clear that the poet Philetas of Cos is a major intertextual presence. The author makes Philetas and the narrator use the same form of the same verb (*exepōnēsamēn*, 2.3.3, *pr.* 3) respectively of their horticultural work and effort in producing the narrative: the effect is to make garden and text analogous. So we need not be surprised to find the character acting as the author's mouthpiece: his narrative encapsulates the major authorial themes of the entire text: the meaning of Love, the relationship of art and nature, truth and fiction. This last surfaces in the responses of Philetas' narratees who 'were greatly delighted, as if the story they were being told was fiction, not fact' (2.7.1). The allusion to the Platonic distinction between *logos* and *muthos* indicates to the author's narratee that *muthos* here means much more than Daphnis and Chloe intend by it: Philetas' narrative is a myth in the Platonic sense, imparting truths truer than mere fact. By thus foregrounding the relationship of fiction to transcendent Truth, the author prepares his narratee for the startling revelation that the whole novel is a *muthos* whose author is Eros (2.27.2).

The episode is also remarkable for the interaction between the embedded narrator and his narratees. Philetas has come to teach Daphnis and Chloe something of great importance. His first attempt to do so is the narrative of his encounter with Eros, whether we read it as truth or fiction within the fiction. However, they receive it with simple unreflective pleasure, albeit in a way which points the author's narratee to a deeper understanding of the text's philosophy. Philetas responds by, as it were, decoding the allegory, and describing in elevated but explicit language the nature and power of Eros. However, Daphnis and Chloe seem no more capable of understanding explicit philosophical discourse than poetically nuanced allegory: so Philetas resorts to a description of his own emotions when in love with Amaryllis, now his wife. This at last enables the lovers to connect their own experiences with Love. Meanwhile the two failed attempts at communication within the fiction have allowed the author's most explicit communication with his own narratee, without the involvement of the narrator.

Finally, there are three mythological narratives embedded at roughly the same point in each of the first three books: Daphnis' narrative to Chloe about an unnamed girl who was transformed into a dove (1.27.2–4); Lamon's narrative of the story of Syrinx to a rustic gathering (2.34.1–3); and Daphnis' narration of the story of Echo to Chloe

(3.23.1–5). These narratives all have an explanatory function as aetiologies of phenomena in the main story: the dove's song, the music of the pipes, the echo; and the second is obviously distractive as well, filling the time taken for Tityrus to fetch Philetas' pipes. But it has long been recognized that their main importance lies in their complex thematic mirror-functions relative to the main narrative.<sup>34</sup>

The three myths are linked by common themes. Each is an aetiology of musical beauty produced by the metamorphosis of a central female character as the result of an act of aggression by a male. However, they also form an escalating series: the levels of sexuality and violence increase, counter-pointing the increasingly sexual relationship of Daphnis and Chloe. Metamorphosis is an extreme form of transition, the loss of one's previous self, but in these myths it is the doorway to a kind of immortality. As a series the myths teach that violence and loss are necessary preparation for the emergence of a new harmony, and in this respect foreshadow and lend significance to the metamorphosis of Chloe from virgin to bride and mother: she too must lose her old self, her childhood innocence, in order to effect the transition from charming sterility to fully socialized fertility. The myths construct paradigmatic gender roles, casting man as aggressor and woman as victim for her own good, and identify these paradigms with the Nymphs and Pan, who function within the story as the female and male principles of Eros, overseeing the lovers' experience and guiding it towards the correct outcome.<sup>35</sup> They are other tellings of the story of Daphnis and Chloe, as is made clear not just by detailed resemblances between the mythical characters and the lovers but also by the fact that after Lamon's narration Daphnis and Chloe cast themselves as Pan and Syrinx in a danced version of the story. At the same time, however, the myths also distance the mutual and consensual love of Daphnis and Chloe from less ideal forms of erotic action. In this respect they rehearse negative possibilities that the main story is able to avoid.

It is interesting to note how the myths are adapted to their narrators and narratees. The lack of overt eroticism in the first myth reflects the protagonists' ignorance even of the name of Love; the story of Syrinx

<sup>34</sup> There is a large literature on these myths, summarized and discussed by Morgan 1997: 2238–2241; for fuller discussion of their interpretation Morgan 2004: 171–172, 195–198, 213–216.

<sup>35</sup> The characters of the first myth are unnamed mortals, but within the narrative is a reference to the story of Pan and Pitys, a story of erotic violence analogous to the other two but appropriately displaced at this point in the protagonists' development.

comes at the point where they have learned the name of Love but not the mechanics of sex; the violence and emphasis on virginity in the story of Echo correspond to a stage in the story where Chloe is in real danger of losing her virginity, while the high blood quotient of the story echoes the warning Daphnis has just received from Lycæon about the bleeding that first intercourse will cause Chloe. There is also evidence of characterization through prose style. Lamon's narrative is marked by asyndeton, within and between sentences, and by paratactic brevity, but over his head, as it were, is woven a prose poetry full of assonance and symmetry, reinforcing the competitively intertextual relationship with the classics of Hellenistic pastoral poetry already signed in Lamon's statement that he learned the story from a Sicilian goatherd (alluding to Theocritus). Daphnis too narrates in an artificially naïve style.

All three of these narratives are designated explicitly as *muthoi*, just as the story of the novel is described as a *muthos* made out of Chloe by Love. They are all received with pleasure by their narratees, just as the novel will bring pleasure to its readers. These things are the mark of fiction. Nevertheless they serve a vital educative function, counterpointing the protagonists' affective development, just as the prologue of the novel promises its narratee preparatory education about Love. The series of aetiological metamorphoses of young heroines into objects of immortal beauty and pleasure is thus really completed by Chloe's transformation into *muthos* and novel. The series of myths stakes the author's claim for his own work, self-referentially mythic, uniquely combining pleasure and utility.

## CHAPTER FOURTY

### HELIODORUS

*J. Morgan*

#### *Introduction*

Chronologically the last of the novels, Heliodorus' *Ethiopian Story* is also structurally the most complex and the most polyphonic in its repertoire of narrators. Unlike Chariton, who names himself as narrator in his opening paragraph, Heliodorus remains anonymous until the conclusion of his narrative, where he presents himself not as narrator but as 'composer':<sup>1</sup>

So concludes the composition (*syntagma*) of the *Ethiopian story* about Theagenes and Chariclea, composed (*synetaxen*) by a Phoenician from Emesa, one of the race of the Sun, son of Theodosius, Heliodorus. (10.41.4)<sup>2</sup>

The difference is striking. Heliodorus positions himself as author outside the narrative structure of the novel. His usage distinguishes him from the primary narrator, who is an element of the text that he has 'composed'.

The primary narrative begins in the middle of the story. The primary narrator is anonymous and external. The date and setting of the act of narration remain unspecified, and the primary narratee is directly addressed only once in the second person (5.13.4). Although the primary narrator must know the whole of the story, he often conceals his knowledge, compelling the primary narratee to assemble it from a series of embedded narratives which characters address to one another. The sections of the story prior to the beginning of the narrative are communicated to the primary narratee through two prin-

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<sup>1</sup> The verb *suntassō* and its cognates are a standard term for literary composition, generally of an historical or factual kind, the central notion being that of compilation, not invention.

<sup>2</sup> Translations are from Morgan 1989a, occasionally adapted.

cial secondary narratives. In both cases the secondary narrators are internal, and their narratees are, strictly speaking, external; they do not feature as characters within the secondary narratives, but they are intimately affected by the events being narrated, sometimes in ways that they themselves do not at first realize.

The first secondary narrator is the Athenian Cnemon, who tells the protagonists of the novel, Theagenes and Chariclea, about his stepmother's infatuation for him and her conspiracy with her slave, Thisbe. His narrative is divided between two occasions: the first session (1.9.1–18.1) is solicited by his narratees as consolation for their own sufferings, and takes place during the night in a robber settlement in the Nile Delta, where they are all captive; it is received with tears, ostensibly of sympathy but in fact of self-pity (1.18.1). It includes a tertiary narrative by Cnemon's friend Charias, bringing him news of events in Athens following his exile, culminating in the stepmother's death (1.14.3–17.6). Charias is an external narrator, but his narrative is sourced in the narrative once told him by the internal narrator Thisbe, from which he quotes *verbatim* conversations between her and her mistress. The second section of Cnemon's narrative (2.8.3–9.5) is delivered over Thisbe's body, and explains what happened to her after her mistress's death and how she came to Egypt. In this section, Cnemon is an external but interested secondary narrator, paraphrasing a tertiary narrative by an external narrator, his friend Anticles, bringing further news from Athens. We can see in this sequence both how information is conveyed to the primary narratee through embedded narratives plausibly but variously motivated within the primary frame, and how these embedded narratives authenticate the story from within, forging chains of information extending back to first-hand witnesses.

The second secondary narrator bulks even larger in the economy of the novel as a whole. He is the enigmatic Egyptian priest Calasiris, mentor and guide of the protagonists. Again the narration is divided between two separate occasions. The external narratee of the first and longer session (2.24.5–5.1.3) is Cnemon. It is occasioned by a chance encounter between Cnemon and Calasiris and the discovery that they share the acquaintance of the protagonists. Calasiris' narrative informs Cnemon about them, and occupies a whole night in the house of the merchant Nausicles, where Calasiris is lodging. As internal narrator, Calasiris recounts his discovery of the heroine's identity at Delphi. This secondary narrative again contains embedded narratives. Chariclea's foster-father Charicles contributes as internal narrator a tertiary narra-

tive, with Calasiris as external narratee, of how he was given the infant girl by an Ethiopian ambassador in Egypt (2.29.2–33.4). This narrative is set immediately after Calasiris has given a public display of his Egyptian wisdom; its ‘argument’ function is to persuade him to break down Chariclea’s resistance to marriage. Within Charicles’ narrative is embedded a fourth-level narrative, with Charicles as external narratee, by the Ethiopian ambassador as internal narrator, covering his rearing of the infant Chariclea after her exposure by her parents (2.31.1–5), and designed to persuade Charicles to take on the care of the child. At this point the primary narratee is reading a narrative within a narrative within a narrative within a narrative. Later in the secondary narrative is another important tertiary narrative (4.8.1–8), a message in Ethiopian script left beside the exposed child,<sup>3</sup> passed by the ambassador to Charicles and unread until Calasiris gains access to it, ostensibly to help him fulfil his promise to Charicles, but in reality because he is seeking to confirm his suspicions about Chariclea’s true identity. The internal narrator of this message is Chariclea’s mother, Persinna, the queen of Ethiopia, and its internal narratee is the exposed child herself, intended to read the message at some unspecified future time; in fact Chariclea only becomes an actual narratee when Calasiris reads the message to her slightly later.<sup>4</sup> Within a page or two, four levels of narratee—Calasiris, Chariclea, Cnemon, and the primary narratee—share the revelation that the heroine is an Ethiopian princess. The message has a vital function within the secondary narrative, motivating Chariclea to head for the land of her birth; it also has an effect within the primary narrative, as Cnemon’s knowledge that his companions are bound for Ethiopia contributes to his decision to return to Athens.

Calasiris’ second session is set at a party in Nausicles’ house after he is reunited with Chariclea, and is elicited from him as entertainment. He tells his whole story for Nausicles’ benefit, but the primary narrator occludes the part already familiar to the primary narratee. Still as internal narrator, Calasiris relates events subsequent to the protagonists’ departure from Delphi culminating with the scene with which the primary narrative began (5.17.1–33.3). In this section there is only one

<sup>3</sup> The text, of course, presents it in Greek, as it does all non-Greek speech. At this juncture Calasiris says nothing about translating it, but later (4.11.4) he tells Cnemon that he translated it for the benefit of Chariclea.

<sup>4</sup> 4.11.4; by this point, of course, Calasiris already knows the text of the message, and so it is not repeated.



embedded tertiary narrative (5.20.2–9), when the fisherman Tyrrhenus warns Calasiris of a pirate plot by means of an internal narrative of his conversation with the pirate captain Trachinus.

From this point in the novel to the conclusion, the dominant voice is that of the primary narrator. A few small-scale embedded narratives pass information around the *dramatis personae*, but the second half of the novel is essentially a straightforward communication between primary narrator and primary narratee. The *Ethiopian story* is a long as well as a complex text, and it will not be possible to present a detailed analysis of all its narrators and narratives. What follows is perforce selective and suggestive. I begin with the primary narrator and his narratee, then move to the secondary narrators and their narratees, and finally offer a brief overall interpretation.

### *The primary narrator*

Heliodorus' primary narrator is an elusive figure. For much of the time he shows rather than tells: one point of the rigmarole of multiple narrators is precisely to avoid the imposition of an obtrusive primary narrator who mediates all relevant information to the primary narratee. Once the decision was taken, for whatever reason, to present the story in a non-linear form, essential elements of the *fabula* had to be communicated somehow. Rather than having the primary narrator repeatedly pause the story to fill in the gaps at appropriate junctures, Heliodorus' strategy allows information to be 'overheard' by the primary narratee as it passes between characters within the frame of the narrative, by means of plausibly motivated narratives, so preserving the dramatic illusion.<sup>5</sup> Other aspects of the primary narrator cohere with this strategy.

Most importantly, although he is, like the narrators of the other novels, omniscient,<sup>6</sup> he most frequently conceals his knowledge, describing events as they would have appeared to someone present at them. This protocol is established in the famous opening tableau: the narrator describes the scene of destruction on the beach through some bandits'

<sup>5</sup> The first, and still the fullest, analysis of the novel's 'dramatic' presentation is Hefti 1950.

<sup>6</sup> As is shown by the analepses discussed below, and a smaller number of explicit prolepses, as at 7.12.1–2; 8.17.5.

perceptions of it; he offers no explanations but reports their hypotheses.<sup>7</sup> Here the primary narrator abandons his omniscience by presenting events through the eyes of secondary focalizers within the text. More often, however, he achieves much the same effect by restricting his own focalization and becoming, as it were, merely an eye-witness of the events he narrates. In the very first sentence he introduces these observers not as ‘bandits’ but as ‘men in bandit gear’. The sense is given that he offers not omniscience but easy inference from visible data. This inferential stance is so prevalent as to defy complete listing:

She blushed, apparently at having allowed sleep to get the better of her.  
(5.34.2)

Most could be identified as Persians by their apparel and equipment.  
(6.12.2)

The majority of the men of Bessa ... seemed unhappy with the proposal.  
(7.5.2)

At other times the narrator’s self-imposed restriction to the perceptible leads him to withhold from his narratee information necessary for a full understanding of the action. This information emerges later, through the action and the words of the characters. The procedure is antithetical to that of the narrators of Chariton and Xenophon of Ephesus, and analogous to that of an internal narrator such as Achilles’ Clitophon, who limits his knowledge at any given point to that he had as a character at the time of the action. By these means Heliodorus’ external narrator is able to achieve some of the special effects of internal narration, including surprise and suspense. Three examples will give the idea of the narrative mode of most of the novel:

- (1) Thyamis hides his beloved Chariclea in a cave when his stronghold comes under attack. Despairing of survival he returns and kills a Greek-speaking woman in the darkness. When Theagenes and Cnemon go to recover Chariclea they stumble on the body. A voice is heard through the darkness. When Cnemon fetches a light and looks at the body, he finds that it is his Athenian nemesis, Thisbe, and as they go further into the cave, they find Chariclea, who had been calling to them. At every turn in this sequence the narrator suppresses his knowledge in order to make his narratee share the experiences of the characters (1.29–2.6).

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<sup>7</sup> For more detailed discussion see Bühler 1976; Morgan 1991: 86–90.

- (2) While in Egypt, Chariclea is sentenced to be burned alive, but she turns out to be fireproof, and stands unharmed in the middle of the flames, ‘like a bride in a chamber of flame’. The narrator withholds the information that one of the recognition tokens that she thought she was taking with her to her death is a jewel with special properties, and continues to do so until the protagonists realize the truth.<sup>8</sup>
- (3) In the battle at Syene, some contingents of the Ethiopian army act in a way which is, at first sight, mad. Faced with a charge by the Persian armoured cavalry, they rush towards the advancing foe. Their strategy only becomes clear when it takes visible effect: they throw themselves beneath the Persian horses and stab them upwards in the belly, the one vulnerable spot in their armour plating (9.17.2–18.2).

It is coherent with this strategy of not imparting full information to his narratee that some of the primary narrator’s most explicit interventions are to place limitations on his own knowledge:

They were given the warmest of welcomes by their host’s daughter, a young lady of marriageable age, and by all the serving-women of the house, for such, I imagine (*oimai*) had been their master’s instructions.

(2.22.1)<sup>9</sup>

Such expressions of uncertainty are a mannerism of this narrator, and are difficult to parallel in the other novels. Sometimes they take the simple form of the example just given, but sometimes the narrator’s incomplete knowledge is enacted through processes of speculation akin to those of an historian, resulting in multiple explanations:

About midnight a section of the dyke where the previous evening the Ethiopians had begun to dig an outlet ruptured without warning: it may be that the earth in that section had been piled up loosely and not properly tamped down, so that the base gave way as the water soaked into it; or those excavating the tunnel may have created an empty space into which the base of the dyke could collapse; or possibly the workmen had left the place where they had started their digging somewhat lower than the rest of the dyke, so that as the water level rose during the night, causing a fresh influx, the water was able to find a way through the place where the earth had been shovelled away, and, once that

<sup>8</sup> 8.9.9–11.9. On this example and the strategy in general see Morgan 1994b.

<sup>9</sup> Other examples: with *oimai* (‘I think’) at 1.8.1; 6.5.1; 8.8.2; 10.6.5; with *tacha* or *isōs* (‘perhaps’) at 2.20.2; 9.11.6, 19.5; with *hōs eōike* (‘so it seems’) or similar at 6.14.6; 7.5.2; 8.10.1; 10.6.5, 28.3.

happened, the channel grew deeper without anyone being aware of the fact; alternatively one might ascribe the event to divine intervention.

(9.8.2)<sup>10</sup>

In a work of fiction such uncertainty is itself fictitious. Heliodorus' narrator is constructed to have—or to feign to have—a relationship with the material of the story quite different from that of a creating or controlling author.<sup>11</sup> The limitations placed on him make an important contribution to the effect of the novel as a whole.

However, although the narrator's subtraction of himself and his omniscience from the narrative is an important innovation, it is a stance that can be abandoned when convenient. For example, between the two sections of Calasiris' narrative a complicated intrigue works itself out: Cnemon is deluded into believing that a woman captured by Nausicles is Thisbe, whom he knows to be dead, when in fact it is Chariclea. The situation is set up in a typical scene of direct speech in which the primary narrator's only contribution is a recurrent 'he said'. However, at the climax the narrator intervenes heavily to explain:

In fact, however, a supernatural power, whose habit it is in general to make mock of all human life and use it as its plaything, was evidently playing with Cnemon and refusing to allow him great happiness without also making him feel some pain. In a short while Cnemon was going to experience joy, which heaven therefore was now combining with sorrow, perhaps simply giving another demonstration of its habitual malice—though possibly human nature cannot admit of pure joy without a taint of sadness. Thus it was that that day Cnemon was turning away in fear from that which he wanted above all else, and that that which was sweetest to him of all things caused him such terror. For the woman he had heard lamenting was not Thisbe, but Chariclea! (5.4.1–2)

There follows an extended and omniscient analepsis filling in events between Cnemon's separation from the protagonists and Chariclea's appearance in Nausicles' house (5.4.3–9.2). This is completely at variance with the narrator's normal protocols: the imposition of limits to his knowledge is replaced by an omniscience extending to the divine plane of action, and allowing a precise and explicit prolepsis. The intervention of the primary narrator could easily have been avoided: Chariclea could have narrated her experiences to Cnemon the next morning,

<sup>10</sup> Other examples of multiple explanations at 1.31.4; 2.13.2; 7.6.4; 8.9.2; 10.28.4, 38.3.

<sup>11</sup> The forms and functions of the narrator's uncertainties are discussed in detail in Morgan 1982.

so that the primary narratee would, as usual, acquire information by eavesdropping on a secondary narrative; Nausicles is at hand to fill in any missing details. We can only speculate as to why this course was not followed: the crucial point is the flexibility of Heliodorus' primary narrator as a communicative tool. One special effect in the present case is that he can describe an intimate scene in a way unthinkable from Chariclea's own lips, both explicit and humorously ironic in its displaced use of sexual vocabulary:

They clasped one another in a prolonged embrace so tight that they seemed to be of one flesh. But the love they consummated was sinless and undefiled; their union was one of moist, warm tears; their only intercourse was one of chaste lips. For if ever Chariclea found Theagenes becoming too ardent in the arousal of his manhood, a reminder of his oath was enough to restrain him. (5.4.5)

We move now to some other aspects of the primary narrator. Firstly, he is very sententious; as in the other novels, normative generalizations delineate areas of community between narrator and narratee. In this case some of these *sententiae* focus on a polis-based Hellenocentricity, emphasizing the otherness of barbarians or outlaws:

Once embarked on a course of action, the heart of a savage brooks no turning back. And when a barbarian loses all hope of his own preservation, he will usually kill everything he loves before he dies, either in the deluded belief that he will be reunited with it beyond the grave or else to save it from the shameless clutches of his enemies. (1.30.6)

So much more precious, evidently, do brigands consider money than life itself: friendship and kinship are defined solely in terms of financial gain. This was certainly the case here. (1.32.4)<sup>12</sup>

Such community of cultural perspective is also inscribed in the openly evaluative descriptions of certain characters marked as 'other':

He [Thermouthis] had the hot blood of all brigands and the quick temper of all savages, which, aggravated by his frustrated passion, impelled him to close with the supposed culprits there and then. (2.12.5)

Arsace was a tall, handsome woman, highly intelligent and arrogant and proud by reason of her noble birth, naturally enough for one who had been born the sister of the Great King. But the life she led was disreputable: in particular she was a slave to perverted and dissipated pleasure. (7.2.1)

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<sup>12</sup> Other cultural *sententiae* belonging to the primary narrator at 1.4.3; 5.7.3; 7.26.10; 8.9.4.

This Hellenocentricity is all the more striking because in order to make such comments the narrator must abandon his usual stance of writing with the restricted knowledge of an eye-witness and take his narratee omnisciently into the heart of the other.<sup>13</sup> Particularly in the episodes centred on the carnally sensual Persian court in Egypt, he opposes the barbarian to the central romantic values. These values and the psychology of love form the basis of another series of normative *sententiae*:

So it is that genuine affection and wholehearted love disregard all external pains and pleasures and compel the mind to concentrate thought and vision on one object: the beloved. (1.2.9)<sup>14</sup>

Another aspect of the narrator's Hellenic identity is supplied by a series of similes and metaphors from the classical Greek theatre.<sup>15</sup> These are the narrator's metaliterary-referential commentary on the nature of his plotting and also serve to construct his narratee as a spectator as opposed to merely a listener, but the area from which they are drawn polemically locates both him and his narratee in the Greek literary tradition. Here is a spectacular example:

At that very moment either some divine power or some fortune that arbitrates over human destiny made the drama take a new and tragic twist, almost as if bringing a second drama on stage to compete with the one already in progress: by a miracle of stagecraft it brought Calasiris on to the scene on that very day, at that very hour ... and before the people of Memphis could recover from their amazement ... the drama was interrupted by another unexpected entry: Chariclea! ... all the people thronging the section of the wall where Arsacae, already swelling with jealousy at the spectacle of Chariclea, had her throne were enraptured

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<sup>13</sup> It is also striking, of course, in that the *author*, identifies himself as non-Greek, and the novel as a whole seems to propose a renegotiation of Hellenic identity, even re-centring the world on Ethiopia—which seems to serve as a cipher for the other sun-kingdom of Syrian Emesa, Heliodorus' home city.

<sup>14</sup> Other erotic and psychological *sententiae* at 1.4.3; 2.6.4, 15.2; 5.7.3; 6.7.8, 12.2; 7.7.5; 8.6.1, 7.6; 10.16.1.

<sup>15</sup> These were first studied by Walden 1894; for more recent discussion see Marino 1990 and Montes Cala 1992. Apart from their metaliterary nature, they establish a set of intertextual parameters within which the text can signify; they form the basis of a fine study by Paulsen (1992). These theatrical metaphors are not confined to the primary narrator; they sit naturally enough in the mouths of Greek characters (Charicles at 2.29.4; Chariclea at 2.8.3; 5.6.3–4; 6.8.5; Cnemon 1.8.7; 2.11.2, 23.5, 24.4; 3.1.1; Nausicles 5.12.2; Theagenes 2.7.3; 5.6.4); but rather oddly with Egyptians and Ethiopians (Calasiris 4.5.3; Hydaspes 10.12.2; Sisimithres 10.39.2).

by this miracle of theatrical art ... all were agreed that the high point of the drama was its romantic side. (7.6.4–5; 7.7.4; 7.7.7; 7.8.2)<sup>16</sup>

Another prominent aspect of the primary narrator is his ability to make factual digressions from the narrative, on matters such as the geography of Meroe, Persian armour-plated cavalry, or Egyptian religion.<sup>17</sup> These encyclopedic displays characterize the primary narrator as a repository of knowledge and the primary narratee as someone interested in such things. No other primary narrator of a novel is so excursive.<sup>18</sup> It is in these digressions that communication between primary narrator and primary narratee is most explicit. For example, the only second-person verb addressed to the primary narratee occurs in the digression on Ethiopian amethysts (5.13.4); and the account of the theology behind the festival of the Nile flood concludes with a piety including both narrator and narratee in a first-person plural pronoun:

Well, may the gods pardon us for saying this much. The greatest mysteries may not be spoken of: let us respect their sanctity as we continue our story of the events around Syene. (9.10.1)<sup>19</sup>

Finally, we must add a few words about the primary narrator's prose style, whose exuberant floridity both characterizes him as narrator and directs his narratee's responses. Frequent wordplays inscribe the narrator's reactions to his material. To take just a few examples: after describing how bandits living on rafts protect their babies by tethering them by the ankle, the narrator ends with a *bon mot* for his narratee to savour:

A strange way to keep children in hand, to tie them by the feet! (1.5.4)

The wordplay highlights the paradox and the irony, but also the textual pleasure of both narrator and narratee, drawing attention precisely

<sup>16</sup> Other notable examples from the primary narrator include 5.11.2 (a 'theatrical recognition-scene'); 8.17.5 (a prolepsis couched in abstruse theatrical terms); 10.16.3 ('Destiny's stage-management of human life'), 38.3 (divine staging of events).

<sup>17</sup> These examples are at, respectively, 10.5; 9.15; 9.9. These take us outside the narrative into reality, and should be distinguished from extended description of objects within the narrative.

<sup>18</sup> Achilles Tatius contains more and longer digressions, but, of course, they belong to the secondary internal narrator and are part of his characterization.

<sup>19</sup> Note that this digression rests on authority outside the novel (Egyptian 'natural philosophers and theologians') and includes one of the narrator's conscious omissions (more logical as this is not invented material).

to the narrator and his role in mediating events to the narratee.<sup>20</sup> A similar effect is achieved by a conceit as when Theagenes serves wine to Arsace:

As she quaffed the cup, she kept her eyes fixed steadily on Theagenes;  
and she drank deeper of the cup of love than of the wine. (7.27.3)

The narrator does not simply narrate: he draws attention to the act of narration, inviting a response not just to the story but to his telling of it.

A different effect is achieved in the first paragraph of the whole novel where the description of the scene on the beach is disrupted by a grammatical anacolouthon, as if the shock of seeing the bodies disturbs the narrator's syntax. But as the device is the narrator's, it is designed to convey the shock of the thieves through whose eyes the scene is described. Even at a point where cognitively he has subtracted himself, the narrator remains as self-advertising manipulative presence.

### *Secondary narrators*

We turn now to the major secondary narrators, beginning with Calasiris. The narrative structure of the *Ethiopian story* recalls that of the *Odyssey*; within this structure Odysseus' role in filling in the earlier parts of the story by means of a retrospective narrative by an internal narrator is taken over by Calasiris. Before even beginning his narrative, Calasiris alludes to the opening words of Odysseus' narrative (2.21.5). He is thus doubly cast as an Odyssean figure before his story begins. His role as an actor involves trickery and duplicity, albeit in the service of the higher good; his act of narration is similarly less—or more—than straightforward. This is made explicit right at the beginning of his narrative, when Calasiris appears to be telling a quite different story from the account of the protagonists that Cnemon wants. Cnemon interrupts before he has finished a paragraph, and associates Calasiris with another Odyssean trickster:

You very nearly succeeded in bringing me straight to the ending of the story with your talk, before I realized what you were up to, wheeling on this subplot which, so the saying goes, has nothing to do with Dionysus. So take your narrative back to what you promised. So far I have found

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<sup>20</sup> Similar wordplay at, for example, 1.1.6; 5.4.5; 7.12.1; 8.1.5, 9.8, 14.2; 9.11.5, 19.3, 22.2.



you just like Proteus of Pharos, not that you take on false and shifting forms as he did, but you are forever trying to lead me in the wrong direction. (2.24.4)

And when Calasiris makes a new start, he apologizes for his apparent deviousness:

First I shall tell you briefly about myself. This is not, as you think, a sophist's trick to avoid telling the story, but the logical way to present my narrative and an indispensable preliminary. (2.24.5)

At the heart of his narrative lies an apparent contradiction that calls his reliability as narrator into serious question.<sup>21</sup> At the beginning of his narrative, Calasiris says he will pass over his travels after departure from Egypt, since they are irrelevant to Cnemon's enquiry about Theagenes and Chariclea. He picks up his story with his arrival at Delphi, which he chose as an appropriate destination for a priest. There his help is enlisted by Charicles, the priest of Apollo, to break down his foster-daughter's resistance to marriage; Charicles tells him that she was entrusted to him by an Ethiopian who had raised her after she was exposed as an infant. Having committed himself to assist, Calasiris receives an oracle prophesying a journey to the 'Black Land of the Sun', and, after observing the protagonists fall in love, experiences a vision of Apollo and Artemis telling him to take the lovers to Egypt. Perplexed as to what the gods want and how to carry out their instructions, he decides he must see the message from Chariclea's mother. But, having read the message and told Chariclea of its contents, he also tells her that he visited Ethiopia before coming to Delphi, was commissioned by Persinna to find her daughter, and came to Delphi in the knowledge that she was there.

At the very least this exposes Calasiris to the charge of withholding important information from his narratee, much as the primary narrator does. More importantly, unless a way can be found to reconcile the two accounts, either the contradiction derives from authorial incompetence, or the primary narratee is intended to understand one of them as deliberately deceptive. If Calasiris knew all along that Persinna's daughter was at Delphi, his *aporia* about Chariclea's identity and failure to understand some pretty transparent divine messages is difficult

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<sup>21</sup> This has drawn the attention of many scholars. The first full analysis was that of Hefti 1950; more recently Winkler 1982 has been hugely influential in arguing that the contradiction can be resolved; see also Futre Pinheiro 1991, Fuchs 1993: 174–188; Baumbach 1997 argues that Calasiris is lying when he says he went to Ethiopia.

to accept: is the account of his thought-processes he gives Cnemon therefore less than truthful? Or is the postponed revelation that he went to Ethiopia a falsehood invented to secure Chariclea's cooperation in the fulfilment of the divine plan? None of these solutions is problem-free, but a narratological approach perhaps favours the last. The novel would be unreadable if the primary narratee were not able to accept the facts of Calasiris' narrative to Cnemon, however manipulative its presentation. However, the story of the visit to Ethiopia occurs in a tertiary narrative by Calasiris embedded within his secondary narrative; the narrative structure requires the primary narratee to accept that Calasiris tells Cnemon the truth about what he said to Chariclea, but not necessarily that what he told her was true. In formal terms his tertiary narrative is equivalent to other deceptions he employs to achieve his god-sanctioned goals, such as the charlatanry about the Evil Eye, the blatantly wrong dream-interpretation offered Charicles, or the various instances of hocus-pocus he employs to represent himself as a practitioner of Egyptian wisdom.<sup>22</sup> Like Odysseus, with whom he is so programmatically identified, Calasiris is deceitful as an actor but not as a narrator.<sup>23</sup>

The other aspect of Calasiris' secondary narrative which requires comment is the close interplay between narrator and narratee.<sup>24</sup> The narrative is elicited by Cnemon's curiosity, even before he realizes that Calasiris has any connection with his absent friends. Once he knows of that connection, Cnemon demands the narrative as payment for news about Calasiris' 'children', but he is motivated as much by the anticipation of pleasure as by concern for his friends.<sup>25</sup> In the course of his narrative, Calasiris repeatedly addresses Cnemon by name, and the primary narrator repeatedly records the secondary narratee's responses and reactions. The curiosity that led Cnemon to request the story in the first place drives him on through the narrative: he is impatient to know the outcome and frustrated by delays:

<sup>22</sup> Respectively 3.7.2–8.2; 4.15.1–3; 3.17.1–3; 4.5.3; 4.7.12–13.

<sup>23</sup> This reading is confirmed by the fact when the action reaches Meroe, Persinna shows no sign of expecting Chariclea's return and does nothing to exculpate Calasiris from Charicles' accusation that he is a false prophet who collaborated in a criminal act.

<sup>24</sup> This is analysed in detail by Morgan 1991: 95–100; in addition to Winkler, there are important discussions in Hardie 1998 and Hunter 1998a.

<sup>25</sup> At 2.23.5 he associates his desire for stories with the god Dionysus, who 'has taken up residence in him' (in other words he has a drink or two), and envisages the narration as a dramatic event.

‘It is not surprising,’ interrupted Cnemon, ‘that those who were there watching should have felt the suspense; even now my heart goes out to Theagenes. So, I beg you, make haste and tell me whether he was proclaimed the victor.’ (4.3.4)<sup>26</sup>

He derives such pleasure from the narrative that he becomes immune to weariness,<sup>27</sup> and he only agrees to the adjournment of the narrative when external interruptions cannot be ignored (5.1.4). His pleasure is inextricably linked with the romantic nature of the story:

I cannot agree with Homer, father, when he says that there is satiety of all things, including love. In my estimation, one can never have a surfeit of love, whether one is engaged in its pleasures or listening to tales of it. And if the story being told is the love of Theagenes and Chariclea, who could be so insensitive, so steely-hearted, that he would not be spellbound by the tale, even if it lasted a whole year? (4.4.3)

But while he is sometimes impatient, he also sometimes retards the narrative to elicit a larger dose of *enargeia*. He wants the illusion of being present, and compels Calasiris to paint a word-picture of the Delphic procession and even give a *verbatim* rendition of the processional hymn:

You have not yet described them so that I can see them for myself. Your story has me in its power, body and soul, and I cannot wait to have the pageant pass before my very eyes. Yet you hurry past without a second thought. I feel like the proverbial guest who has turned up too late for the feast! You have rung the curtain up and brought it down again all in one phrase ... you are trying to cheat me of the best part of the story by not giving me all the details of the hymn. It is as if you had only provided me with a view of the procession, without my being able to hear anything. (3.1.1; 3.2.3)

Some of his interventions voice his delight in vivid and accurate description, as with Calasiris’ description of Delphi (2.26.1–2) or of the protagonists:

Your description portrayed them so vividly (*enargōs*), so exactly as I know them from my own experience, that they seemed to be before my eyes. (3.4.7)

<sup>26</sup> At 2.32.3 he barges through two narrative levels to interrupt Charicles’ tertiary narration, at the point where the Ethiopian ambassador departs before telling Charicles the truth about Chariclea’s origins. He expresses his disappointment and seeks Calasiris’ reassurance that the truth will be told in due course.

<sup>27</sup> At 3.4.4 dialogue between Calasiris and Cnemon marks the passing of time; at 4.4.2 Calasiris remarks that he is ‘proof against sleep’.

On other occasions, Cnemon demands encyclopedic digressions, pressing Calasiris on the Homeric method of recognizing gods (3.12.1) or the geography of the Gulf of Corinth (5.17.2). But while eager for detail, he has a clear sense of priorities, suppressing questions and keeping Calasiris to the matter in hand, even when the latter mentions names—Thisbe, Thyamis—which are of great interest to his narratee.

This sense of what is important and what is secondary also ostensibly characterizes Calasiris as a narrator:

The last thing I want to do, Cnemon, is to bore you with such irrelevancies (*tois exōthen*), so I was confining myself to the central theme (*ta kairiōtera*) of my tale and the answers to your original questions.

(3.1.2)<sup>28</sup>

However, the irrelevancies that Calasiris here proposes to omit include the Delphic rite at which Theagenes and Chariclea fell in love at first sight. This is hardly irrelevant to any conception of the central theme, and it could not have been Calasiris' intention to omit it. Unless the author is not fully in control of his text, we must assume that Calasiris is provoking Cnemon to ask for a more expansive treatment, as he certainly does elsewhere, dropping tantalizing references to 'Egyptian Homer' into his narrative, a bait that Cnemon resists a few times before he eventually swallows it.<sup>29</sup>

Calasiris the narrator of course knows more than Calasiris the character knew, and generally he observes the protocol of not exploiting knowledge gained subsequently. Attention is even drawn to the convention, when Calasiris is at a loss to understand the instructions given him by Apollo and Artemis; Cnemon interrupts: 'I am sure you learned the answer afterwards, father, and will tell me in due course' (3.12.1). He also observes the documentary convention to the extent of recording an action in its proper chronological place but noting that he only came to know of it later (4.15.4). More frequently he narrates in an inferential way, avoiding omniscience about, for example, other people's thoughts and emotions:

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<sup>28</sup> Cf. 3.10.3 'there is no point in boring you with all the details ...', a bait to which Cnemon does not rise.

<sup>29</sup> Although Calasiris is in a hurry to get to the end of the story so that he can hear Cnemon's news of Theagenes and Chariclea, he also has a psychological compulsion to tell his tale to someone, that existed even before he knew that Cnemon was acquainted with his 'children' (2.21.6).

My words were followed by a short silence, but the look in her eyes was enough to tell me that her mind was a turmoil of shifting emotions.

(4.6.1)<sup>30</sup>

Nevertheless, he sometimes conceals from his narratee thoughts and knowledge that he had at the time of the action, and which are thus perfectly narratable. At 3.18.3 he says that he dissembled to Charicles, acknowledging that he is now concealing his true thoughts also from his narratee. A little later (4.5.1) he tells Cnemon that he had already begun to form suspicions about Chariclea's parentage, but does not reveal what they were or how they formed him. This reticence heightens the dramatic effect of the revelation about Chariclea's birth when Calasiris reads the message from her mother.

Calasiris shares some features of the primary narrator. He too uses normative *sententiae* both to explain the action and create an affective community with his narratee. Because he is Egyptian, but mostly because of the subject matter of his narrative, his generalizations tend to concern erotic psychology rather than Hellenic identity:

The mind of a person in love is rather like that of a drunkard: volatile and completely unstable, since in both cases the soul is riding on a tide of emotional fluidity, which is why lovers are prone to heavy drinking and drunkards to falling in love.

(3.10.5)<sup>31</sup>

Like the primary narrator he is aphoristic and stylistically self-conscious:

The following day was the last of the Pythian tournament, but for the young couple another tournament was still at its height, one presided over and refereed, it seems to me, by Love, who was determined to use these two contestants, in the only match he had arranged, to prove that his particular tournament is the greatest of all.

(4.1.1)

As a very Hellenized Egyptian, he can quote Homer directly (3.4.1), compare Theagenes explicitly to the Homeric Achilles (4.3.1) and allude to other Greek literary texts.<sup>32</sup>

However, Calasiris narrates as Egyptian wise man. This *persona* is established right at the start of his narrative:

<sup>30</sup> Thus the central scene of inamoration is restricted to Calasiris' observations and inferences (3.5.4–7).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. 3.10; 4.1.2, 3.2, 4.4.; non-erotic *sententiae* at 2.24.7; 3.4.8; 5.25.2, 3.

<sup>32</sup> Calasiris' narrative includes consciously intended allusions to both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, to Moschus and Euripides.

After [my wife's] release from this life, I lived untroubled for some time, complacently proud of the two sons she had borne me; but before many years had passed the pre-ordained celestial cycle of the stars turned the wheel of our fortunes; the eye of Cronus lit upon my house and brought a change for the worse. My science had given me warning of this, but not the ability to escape it, for while it is possible to foresee the immutable dispensations of fate, it is not permitted to evade them. (2.24.6)

Encyclopedic digressions on matters such as the Nile floods (2.28), Homer's Egyptian background, and the nature of the gods' appearance (3.13) confirm and renew it. It is his wisdom that enables him to form suspicions about Chariclea's true identity before, as it were, the correct time to narrate them to someone less wise than he. However, his holiness produces a potential mismatch with his narratee. Briefly put, the story Cnemon wishes to hear is not necessarily the one that Calasiris wishes to tell. Cnemon's 'interest in incidental spectacle' leads Calasiris to call him a 'true Athenian' (3.1.2) and in the exchange about divine epiphanies in Homer,<sup>33</sup> Cnemon cheerfully classes himself among 'the ignorant majority' who fail to read beyond the surface of the text (3.12.3). The climax of Calasiris' narrative is the moment when he reads Persinna's message to her daughter; for him it is a moment of religious epiphany, and there is latent in the whole of Calasiris' narrative the sense that for him this is more of a religious story than a romantic one, both in the way he understands and in the way he tells it:

On reading this, Cnemon, I perceived the hand of the gods and marvelled at the subtlety of their governance. I was filled with a mixture of pleasure and sadness, and had the peculiar experience of being moved simultaneously to joy and tears. My heart was thankful that the mystery had been explained, that the riddle of the oracle had been solved, but it was sorely troubled about the course the future might take and filled with pity for the life of man, whose instability and insecurity, whose constant changes of direction were made all too manifest in the story of Chariclea. (4.9.1)<sup>34</sup>

<sup>33</sup> The secondary narratee takes this stuff seriously, but the primary narratee surely does not, the exegesis of *Iliad* 13.71–72 at 3.12–13 being comically forced. The question of whether Calasiris himself takes it seriously is left open, but the primary narratee is, I think, intended to see that Calasiris is having fun at Cnemon's expense, just as, within his narrative, he acts and speaks duplicitously to a number of other characters. But as this is a digression from his narrative, it does not invalidate the principle that the facts of his narration are to be taken as true.

<sup>34</sup> This is argued in more detail in Winkler 1982; one does not need to accept the whole of Winkler's thesis to agree with this point.

Cnemon's responses and interventions, on the other hand, concern spectacle and emotion. What he says of his knowledge of Homer can well describe his understanding of Calasiris' deeper meanings:

I know that I was taught the superficial purport of the lines when the text was first expounded to me, but I am totally unaware of the religious teaching embedded in them. (3.12.3)

If Calasiris' secondary narrative formally serves an explanatory function, Cnemon's is distractive, in two senses. For the secondary narratees, Theagenes and Chariclea, 'a story of woes like their own would be a great consolation' (1.9.1.), and divert them from a night of tears; in fact at the end of Cnemon's narrative they still weep for their own distress. For the primary narratee Cnemon's narrative is a postponement; at this stage he is being tantalized with hints and scraps of information about the protagonists; it is clear that the primary narrator is not going to explain who they are, and also, from two failed attempts to communicate with Egyptians, that the presence of a Greek-speaking audience is needed before the protagonists can make any revelations about themselves. When the Egyptian robber-captain assigns Theagenes and Chariclea to the care of a young Greek captive, 'so that they might have someone to talk to' (1.7.3), the expectation is that this will allow them to make their revelations. However, they end up as embedded narratees rather than embedded narrators, and the primary narratee must wait for Calasiris' narrative.<sup>35</sup>

Cnemon introduces his narrative in tragic terms:

Why do you batter and prise open these doors, to borrow a phrase from the tragedians? This is no time to introduce a new theme into your own tragedy in the form of my misfortunes. (1.8.7)<sup>36</sup>

A careful reading of his story, however, suggests that his portrayal of himself in tragic terms is at variance with the comic intrigue that forms his narrative.<sup>37</sup> Like Clitophon in Achilles Tatius, he is an internal narrator, whom the primary narratee must learn to interpret. It is not just that he is understandably partial, leaving no doubt as to where his perceptions of good and evil lie; his whole take on his story is

<sup>35</sup> This and other approaches to Cnemon's narrative are discussed in Morgan 1989b.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. 2.11.1, where he fears that Thisbe has come to make him 'the victim of another Attic tragedy, but in an Egyptian setting'.

<sup>37</sup> Paulsen 1992: 85–102 is excellent on this point. Even Cnemon's name marks him out as a figure from the comic stage.

different from the one which the primary narratee is invited to take by the novel's system of dramatic imagery and allusion.

Although they interrupt him less than he will interrupt Calasiris, Cnemon engages constantly with his narratees, addressing them in the second person plural, omitting boring details (1.9.4), worrying about their need for sleep (1.14.2). Exclamations display his emotional investment in re-enacting past experience:

With these words I stepped forward to dispatch the pair of them. But—o gods!—it was my father who slid from the bed and fell at my feet.

(1.12.3)

An interestingly piquant narrative situation arises much later in the novel (6.2–3), when Cnemon tells the same story to Nausicles to provide a diversion during a journey.<sup>38</sup> The primary narrator presents a summary in indirect speech, recapitulating the story with a minimal surplus of new information. The spice here is that the narratee of this occluded secondary narrative is an internal one, but the equally internal narrator does not realize it; it is only later that he learns that Thisbe's anonymous lover was Nausicles. The complex reactions of this unrecognised internal narratee are written out in full in the text:

Cnemon's story left Nausicles in a state of utter indecision, by turns disposed to admit the truth about himself and Thisbe and then inclined to put off doing so to another time. In the end he kept his own counsel, though only with difficulty, partly by his own decision, partly because something else occurred to prevent his telling all.

(6.3.1)

The main importance of Cnemon's story, however, is as analogue and antithesis to the primary narrative.<sup>39</sup> Thematically, Cnemon's story—one of illicit and degrading sexual attractions, egocentric intrigues, meaningless casual erotic and merely physical extra-marital liaisons, relationships based on inequalities of power and status—counterpoints, detail by detail, the ideal love story of the protagonists, whose love is mutual, exclusive, chaste, selfless, spiritual, permanent, and profoundly meaningful. The figure of Thisbe in particular is constructed as Chariclea's antitype, and the plot repeatedly contrives situations where the one is somehow exchanged for the other. This moral antithesis between the base love of Cnemon's Athens and the ideal love of Theagenes

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<sup>38</sup> Note that Cnemon can tell the same story for radically different purposes; in neither is he successful.

<sup>39</sup> The theme of this paragraph is treated at greater length by Morgan 1989b.



and Chariclea, between the world of the secondary narrative and the direction of the primary narrative, represents the novel's most profound statement of values.

Among other embedded narratives, we must note Chariclea's lying account of her origins in response to Thyamis' proposal of marriage (1.21–22). This has an 'argument' function, to buy time by getting him to agree to a postponement, and to safeguard the protagonists' position by convincing him that she and Theagenes are brother and sister. Chariclea is (supposedly) an internal narrator, and Thyamis is (truly) an internal narratee, since his discovery of the couple on the beach forms the last detail of the narrative. It is this appeal to the narratee's own knowledge that lends the whole narrative its credibility for him. Chariclea's performance of the narrative is scripted with unusual precision:

For a while she stood with her eyes fixed on the ground, repeatedly shaking her head, apparently gathering her thoughts to say something. Eventually she looked Thyamis full in the face. Her beauty dazzled him even more now, for her reflections had brought a special blush to her cheeks and there was fire in her eyes. With Cnemon interpreting she said ... (1.21)

Her body language, including the tears with which she concludes, is integral to her persuasion. The effect of this narrative on the primary narratee is interesting. At this early stage, he probably realizes that Theagenes and Chariclea are the protagonists, and suspects that, by the rules of the genre, they are lovers; but as yet no firm information has been forthcoming. The primary narratee thus cannot judge the truth or otherwise of Chariclea's narrative; its apparently solid detail must prompt at least a reconsideration as to whether the generic assumptions really will apply in this novel. It is only a few chapters later that the mendacity of the narrative is definitively established, as so often without the intervention of the primary narrator.

### *Conclusion*

The *Ethiopian story* is a novel in which much narrating is done. This is clearly the product of its plot-structure, but, equally clearly, Heliodorus is interested in the narrative act for itself. The secondary narrative of Calasiris in particular explores the interaction of narrator and narratee, and it is difficult not to conclude that a paradigm of some sort is being offered to the primary narratee for his relation to the novel,

though whether he sees Cnemon as a qualified portrait of an ideal narratee or as an ironically distanced deterrent example is a question still open to argument. The point perhaps is that each view is both correct and wrong; the *mise en scène* is contrived to make the primary narratee aware that there is an issue concerning the correct way to respond to narrative, to distinguish between central and incidental, between superficial and profound understandings. Cnemon's sympathy and engagement are hardly things that the primary narratee will want to abjure, but they may not be the complete or exclusive qualifications for a good reader of a romantic novel. Similarly, the plot's emphasis on cognition and interpretation is enacted at all its narrative levels. Both Cnemon's and Calasiris' narratives are introduced in such a way as to highlight the hermeneutic problems they pose. Calasiris' account of his own re-assembly of Chariclea's true story from multiple fragments mirrors the primary narratee's activity in synthesizing the whole plot of the *Ethiopian Story* out of its multiple, sometimes partial and limited, sometimes deliberately elusive component narratives. Above all, Heliodorus presents a veritable menagerie of narrating specimens, and compels his reader to consider and compare their forms, functions and effects; the primary narrator and narratee are not exempted from this scrutiny: as the author distinguishes himself from the primary narrator, the reader must think what it is to be a primary narratee. If we are looking for a narratological study from the ancient world, we are more likely to find it in Heliodorus' novel than anywhere else.



## EPILOGUE

### NARRATORS, NARRATEES, AND NARRATIVES IN ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE

*I.J.F. de Jong and R. Nünlist*

#### *Narratology and genre*

One important conclusion that emerges from the preceding overview of narrators in ancient Greek literature is that there is no direct correlation between genre and type of narrator. For example, epic narrators, who by virtue of their subject matter are external, may be either covert (Homer, Homeric hymns) or overt (*Theogony*, Apollonius of Rhodes). Narrators of historiographical and biographical texts can be either external (the majority) or—partially—internal (Thucydides, Polybius, Cassius Dio). Similarly, in the novels we find both external (Chariton) and internal (Achilles Tatius) narrators, as well as overt (Chariton) and covert (Xenophon of Ephesus) ones.

Nor does single authorship necessarily mean a preference for one type of narrator. The Hesiodic narrator is external in the *Theogony* (excluding the introductory ‘Hymn to the Muses’) and internal in *Works & Days*. The Platonic dialogues feature both primary and secondary narrators (depending on whether the dialogue has a narrative frame, or is purely dialogic), and both overt and covert narrators (depending on whether it is Socrates or one of his disciples who is reporting). Theocritus and Callimachus produced poems with a narrative frame and purely ‘mimetic’ ones. And a disparate corpus such as that of Lucian contains virtually every conceivable type of narrator. Within a text, the narrator’s status may be constant, but one may also see a shift from external to internal (Thucydides, Polybius, Cassius Dio),<sup>1</sup> or an alterna-

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<sup>1</sup> Admittedly, in the case of historians this is not really a matter of choice. As soon as they embark on contemporary history, they immediately become potentially internal.

tion between overt and covert (e.g. Appian and Herodian). Similarly, in the course of his narrative the secondary narrator Clitophon (Achilles Tatius) displays a transition from restricted knowledge to omniscience.

That the choice of narrator is relatively independent of the genre can also be deduced from the fact that several *a priori* non-narrative genres such as drama, oratory, and choral lyric nevertheless tend to incorporate narrative, sometimes extensively.

Consequently, one of the more striking insights gained by the exercise undertaken in this volume is that, from a narratological point of view, lines can be drawn between various authors and texts which differ considerably from those normally drawn on the basis of a generic approach. To give only a few examples: the narrator and narrative style in Herodotus are not only strongly indebted to Homer, but also display features of the contemporaneous scientific, epideictic genre. The narrator in Apollonius of Rhodes, who has thus far been brought into connection with Homer and drama, reveals upon closer narratological examination a surprisingly Herodotean outlook. More in general, the influence exercised by the Herodotean narrative style is much greater than is generally acknowledged: not only Xenophon (in his historiographical and biographical works) and Plutarch are indebted to him, but also Aristides, Dio Chrysostom, and Lucian.

This said, it is nevertheless possible to point to a few tendencies. Historiography, biography, and choral lyric tend to have external narrators (they recount stories from the past) who are overt (they want to teach a lesson); forensic oratory and drama have narrators who are internal (they are to a greater or lesser extent—and in the case of oratory even critically—involved in the events) and overt (they want, indeed need, to persuade their addressees).

### *Narrators*

Leaving aside generic considerations and looking at the types of narrators as they are found in the texts, the following observations can be made. Among the primary narrators, by far the most frequent type is the external and overt narrator. The overtness usually takes the form of narratorial interventions, not dramatization; no primary external narrator ever develops a full-fledged personality.

Next in frequency among the primary narrators is the internal narrator, whose prominence can vary considerably: he may be a protago-

nist (e.g. the Socratic narrator or the narrator in oratory),<sup>2</sup> a more or less active participant in, and witness to, contemporary history (overt: Polybius, Cassius Dio, Herodian, covert: Thucydides), or a silent interlocutor and witness to a philosophical dialogue (the disciple narrator in Plato and Xenophon). Special cases are the internal narrator of Achilles Tatius, who disappears from the stage after a couple of paragraphs never to return again, his place being taken by another—secondary—narrator, and Longus, where again a frame narrative quickly yields to a secondary narrative, one in which the primary narrator remains centre stage, only switching from being internal to external.

The least frequent among the primary narrators is external and covert (Homer, the Homeric Hymns, Moschus, Xenophon of Ephesus). This observation leads to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that at this point the most influential storyteller of Greco-Roman antiquity, Homer, has not set the tone.

Interestingly enough, the signs by which all these types of narrators—explicitly or implicitly—reveal their presence as narrating agents are universal and not restricted to a single genre, though they may be exploited for different effects in the various genres: first-person references, references to the narrator's own time, apostrophes, gnomic utterances, comments (both metanarrative or evaluative), 'if not' situations, interactional particles, cross-references, prolepsis and analepsis, descriptions, similes, suggestive juxtaposition, motifs, proofs, visualization, and appeals to what is natural.

Finally, it is worth remembering (→ Introduction) that there is one group of texts which are best narratologically analysed if one assumes a suppressed primary narrator: the mimetic dialogues of Plato and Lucian, the mimetic hymns of Callimachus, and the mimetic idylls of Theocritus. Their closest parallels in this respect are such texts as Achilles Tatius and Longus, where the embedded narrative predominates, and the primary narrative provides only an introductory frame, which may or may not be resumed at the end. Conversely, a primary narrator may display a general reluctance to make use of secondary narrative (Hesiod, Homeric Hymns, Apollonius of Rhodes, Arrian,

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<sup>2</sup> From a modern perspective it is perhaps surprising that the corpus under consideration does not contain a single example of a text with primary internal narration from beginning to end, in the style of *Moby Dick* or *A la recherche du temps perdu*. The closest ancient parallel seems to be Augustus' *Res Gestae*. This type of narrative can be found in pre-Greek literature (e.g. Hittite).

Appian, the orators). An intermediate position is occupied by texts such as Homer's, where the primary narrator predominates, but which nevertheless incorporates numerous extended secondary narratives.

When we turn to secondary narrators, it is more difficult to draw clear quantitative conclusions. Here we should keep in mind that every narrative text has one primary narrator but often several secondary narrators. We find external and internal narrators in about equal numbers, whereby Homer and Herodotus display a predominance of external narrators, who recall events from the mythic past by means of parallels to the present, while drama features mainly internal narrators. But there are no strict rules, since we find the occasional internal narrator in Homer (Achilles, Odysseus) and Herodotus (Cambyses recounting why he—mistakenly, as he now realizes—killed his brother Smerdis), or an external narrator in drama (the chorus). All of these secondary narrators, whether external or internal, are by definition dramatized: they have a personality, in that each is a character in the primary narrative or the dramatic universe. However, being an internal narrator does not automatically mean that one is an overt narrator. This may be the case (Clitophon in Achilles Tatius, the oratorial narrators), but the messengers of the Attic stage are highly invisible as characters in their own stories (something which allows them to see things hidden to others), but highly overt as narrators, commenting on what they are reporting and expressing their emotions.

In addition to secondary narrators, certain texts favour reported narrators: collective or anonymous spokesmen whose stories are quoted by the narrator in indirect speech ('the Spartans say', 'they say'). Not surprisingly, we encounter these reported narrators with particular frequency in historiographical, biographical, and rhetorical narratives, where the primary narrator feels the need to authenticate his own story, or disqualify other people's stories, by introducing sources, authorities, alternative versions, witnesses and the like.

A final device which enables authors of narrative texts to introduce some sort of voice is the narratorial *alter ego*: characters, who, because of their profession, function, opinions, name, etc. invite a comparison with the primary narrator. Such *alter egos* are found in Homer (the singers Phemius and Demodocus), Apollonius of Rhodes (the singer Orpheus and the seer Phineus), Herodotus (the wise advisers Solon, Artabanus, Demaratus, the incredulous enquirer Polycrates, and the historian Hecataeus), Polybius (the character 'Polybius'), and Lucian (Lycinus, Momus, Parrhesiades, etc.).

All types of narrators, whether primary or secondary, internal or external, may at times turn to second-person narration. As noted in the Introduction (→), this is in general a rare phenomenon, but it does occur with some frequency in ancient Greek narrative, mainly in the honorific context of the apostrophe of heroes in Homer and—less often—Apollonius of Rhodes, and of gods in the Homeric and Callimachean hymns, and in the accusatory context of narrators reminding their internal narratees of what they have done (notably Menelaus and Helen in *Odyssey* 4, ‘Hesiod’ and Perses in the *Works and Days*, and Hylus and Deanira in Sophocles *Trachiniae*). We find a special and rather eerie use of second-person narration in Cassandra’s extended apostrophes of Troy and of certain of its inhabitants (Paris, Hector), doomed to be destroyed or die, in Lycophron.

Considering the power of the spoken word in antiquity, it is hardly surprising that almost all primary narrators present themselves as speakers rather than writers. In the cases where the texts are likely to have been intended for a reading audience (Apollonius of Rhodes, Callimachus), we are perhaps dealing with the device of feigned orality.<sup>3</sup> Embedded narratives also tend to be oral, but documents such as written sources or letters do occasionally occur (Thucydides, Polybius, Philostratus, novels).

### *Narratees*

The primary narratees of ancient Greek narrative are generally covert and considerably less visible than the narrators. They are often anonymous, unspecified as to gender, age, or even home city, and only rarely explicitly addressed. Hardly ever do narratees have an actual name (Perses in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, the victors of the epinician odes, the dedicatees of Theocritus or Philostratus), or a more or less specific identity (the Athenian jurors). This unemphatic and largely unspecified status of the narratee, which may be seen as the counterpart of the avoidance to dramatize the external narrator, may perhaps be due to the largely public nature of ancient Greek literature: the audience was—at any rate in pre-hellenistic times—physically present, which invited an

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<sup>3</sup> As a minor caveat one should perhaps take into account that even modern authors, who clearly write for readers, frequently present their narrators as *telling* a story.



immediate identification of audience and narratee. At the same time, too specific a characterization of the narratee might have led to an undesirable discrepancy with the actual audience. On a slightly different level, the unspecified status of the narratee may also have to do with the universalistic claim of the narrators (first witnessed in Homer): they often envisage the whole world as their intended or at least potential recipient. This claim is particularly palpable in the Greek authors writing under the Roman empire, who hope to serve both Greek and Roman audiences. In any case, the texts examined in this volume seem to indicate that ancient Greek authors were reluctant to make extensive use of the possibilities inherent in a more specific narratee (contrast, for example, *Tristram Shandy* or *Tom Jones*).

Though largely invisible, these narratees are nevertheless implicitly present as the beneficiaries of the narrator's story, indeed of the many devices which he employs to tell his story in the precise manner and with the precise effect he wants. In addition to the signs of the narrator already discussed, which in their effect are of course all aimed at the narratees, there are numerous less prominent indications which testify to the communication between narrator and narratee: rhetorical questions, the 'presentation through negation' device, explanations (often in the form of *gar*-clauses), the 'indefinite second person' device ('there you/someone could have seen'), the 'anonymous witness' device ('this is what each citizen said as he saw the Argonauts rushing forward with their weapons') and the 'anonymous interlocutor' device ('if someone would desire more exact measurements ...'). Certain narrators even engage their narratees in a more active participation in the (re)construction of the story, which thereby becomes part of their 'education'.

As has been argued in the introduction to this volume, narratees, both primary and secondary, are important instruments by which a narrator steers the intellectual, moral, and emotional reception of his story. Sometimes this works in a straightforward manner, the narratees being obviously set up as models for the readers (e.g. the secondary narratees of Homer, and the narratees of Chariton, who obviously share the beliefs and knowledge of the narrator). But sometimes the process is more complicated, in that the text constructs a narratee who is incredulous, misinformed, philosophically uneducated, or even downright critical or dissonant, and hence still must be persuaded or educated by the narrator. Examples include: Perses in *Works and Days*, the narratees in Plutarch and in Xenophon's works, both historical and philosophical.

Needless to say, the construction of such dissonant narratees forms part of the text's rhetoric, in that they provide a negative foil for an ideal primary narratee. As such they steer the reception in an equally efficient way.

Another complication—and source of narrative exploitation—is the fact that primary and secondary narratees need not agree in their reaction to, and evaluation of, the story: the primary narratees may know or understand more about what is happening than the characters, and this discrepant awareness often results in pathos or dramatic irony. A related phenomenon, found mainly in drama, is the case of multiple narratees, when the same story has a different effect on different recipients. Here again, the primary narratees are led to compare the various reactions and in the end distil their own.

### *The functions of storytelling*

From the intended recipients of narrative it is a small step to the question of why stories are told in the first place. Here it is easiest to start with embedded narratives, because the reason for telling them is often explicitly indicated.

Only rarely are embedded stories narrated solely with a view to entertainment or in order to 'kill time' (Theocritus, some of the Homeric instances, although these always have a key function for the primary narratees). Much more often they serve to inform characters (Xenophon *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*, Chariton, and most dramatically Cassandra in Lycophron) or primary narratees (Homeric Hymns, Apollonius of Rhodes, Callimachus, where the embedded narratives convey aetiological, mythological, or descriptive material; Homer, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Euripidean prologues and epilogues, sketching the events which preceded or followed the main story); in other words, here the embedded narratives function as analepses or prolepses which supplement the main story. A special category is formed by the false stories of Homer, Sophocles, and Aristophanes, which serve to mislead characters (while the primary narratees are expected to note the discrepancy). A very common function is that of the paradigm or instruction: events from the past are held up like a mirror, in order to persuade or dissuade. Though the interaction here primarily concerns the characters within the story, it is clear that the primary narratees are also meant to benefit from this form of instruction. As primary narratees, they

are privileged in that they have a multiple perspective: they both hear the paradigmatic story and witness the reaction of the characters, who may or may not get the message. By and large, the points made about embedded narratives also apply to narrative texts in general. The genre which comes closest to being written primarily with a view to entertainment is perhaps the novel; the other narrative genres and texts show a stronger tendency to inform or even instruct the audience in one way or another.

*A history of ancient Greek narrative*

Taking a final, bird's eye view of the history of narrators, narratees, and narratives in ancient Greek literature, it is clear that we are not dealing with a development in the sense of a steadily increasing refinement and expansion of what was initially a modest set of simple instruments. The history of Greek literature begins with a 'big bang', in that the first texts we have, the Homeric epics, display much of the narratorial repertoire and handle it in a virtuoso manner, while at its end the relatively simple Chariton and the extremely sophisticated Heliodorus exist side by side.

Nevertheless—and though being aware of the teleological fallacy—it is possible to see certain trends in the course of the centuries. On the formal level, there seems to be a tendency towards experimentation with the number of narrative levels (e.g. Plato's *Symposium* and Lycophron's *Cassandra* with four narrative levels each). A similar development may be seen when the distinction between the different narrative voices is deliberately blurred, for example, when the primary narrator usurps a character's story (Apollonius of Rhodes and Jason) or interferes in the stories of secondary or reported narrators (Herodotus, Thucydides). This whole question must also be seen in connection with the boundaries of narrative. Clear demarcation (e.g. Homer, tragic messengers, and the orators) contrasts with blurred demarcation (e.g. Pindar and Aristophanes), while *Cassandra* again forms an experimental extreme. Aristophanes' case also shows the development of heavily punctuated narrative taking the place of uninterrupted narrative.

On the conceptual level, there seems to be an increased problematization of the narrator's omniscience and thus his narrative authority. While almost taken for granted by early Greek poets as part of the Muses' inspiration, omniscience becomes qualified and modified by historiography and other types of scientific writing, in which narrators

authenticate their accounts and attest to the limitations of their knowledge. One result is the mildly paradoxical situation of a poet, Apollonius of Rhodes, who invokes the Muses, but nevertheless qualifies his omniscience. Another is the downright dismissal of autopsy and other forms of authentication (Lucian). A third is the ironic undermining of an omniscient narrator (Longus).

All in all, it is best not to try to 'emplot' the story of ancient Greek narrative in terms of progress or decline, but rather, borrowing Quintilian's metaphor of Homer, to see it as an ocean, a large reservoir from which streams draw their water or to which they return it again. It thereby increases or decreases but flows neither forward nor backward. It is to be expected that the later volumes of the series will further supplement and refine this slowly evolving picture of the 'ocean' of ancient Greek narrative techniques.



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## THEMATIC INDEX

The index comprises the principal narratological questions discussed in the present volume. Its main purpose is to enable readers to follow these questions through the various chapters. Occasionally, the index also refers to discussions of the topic which do not expressly use the actual catchword. References are to pages, footnotes are not specifically singled out.

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